Papers by Sufian Zhemukhov
The North Caucasus has long been one of the most turbulent regions in Eurasia. Events such as the... more The North Caucasus has long been one of the most turbulent regions in Eurasia. Events such as the seces-sionist conflicts in Chechnya in the 1990s, the growing radicalization and the spread of insurgency groups across the region, and most recently discussions over the prospects for, and the security of, the hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics alongside rising local Circassian nationalism on the ground in Sochi have grabbed the headlines both in Russia and internationally. These events are set against a background of a general rise in nationalism and ongoing anti-Caucasian sentiment in Russia. This paper investigates the roots causes of these complex developments, and the impact that this region is likely to have on Russian and regional politics in the next decade.
PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, 2012
PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, 2012
PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, 2013
As Russia’s world-class athletes, culture, and economic development will be showcased at the 2014... more As Russia’s world-class athletes, culture, and economic development will be showcased at the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, its political direction and an array of unresolved issues will be exposed. No doubt, some foreign countries and NGOs are already trying to capitalize on the globalized nature of the Olympic Games to urge the Kremlin to come to terms with troublesome topics, from the Russian occupation of Georgian territories to LGBT rights and the scandal surrounding asylum-seeker Edward Snowden. What patterns have emerged in the Kremlin’s responses to major issues and challenges? How will the Kremlin handle increasing domestic pressure and global scrutiny as the Games come closer?
With its subtropical climate and beaches, Sochi is known as the summer capital of Russia. For its... more With its subtropical climate and beaches, Sochi is known as the summer capital of Russia. For its conversion into a global winter sports resort, the Russian government has set in motion a gigantic programme of investment. With dire consequences: the gigantomaniac project has resulted in a massive waste of money, enormous environmental damage and infrastructure grossly out of proportion to the everyday needs of the local population.
PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, 2014
Russian-Georgian relations have gone through many changes, but before August 2008 one constant in... more Russian-Georgian relations have gone through many changes, but before August 2008 one constant in this relationship was the attitude toward Georgia’s territorial integrity. In 1990-91, when Georgia made its first official steps toward independence, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev tried to stop the republic by approving of the various ―separatist‖ declarations issued by the parliaments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both formally autonomous units within Soviet Georgia. In contrast to Gorbachev’s policy, however, the first presidents of Russia and Georgia, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, tried to develop good relations between their states. When the GeorgianAbkhaz war began in August 1992, Russia expressed its support of Georgia’s territorial integrity and even deployed military troops to the Russian republic of KabardinoBalkaria (with its titular Circassian/Kabardian population) to prevent thousands of Circassian volunteers from joining Abkhaz in their fight against Georgia...
Anthropological Journal of European Cultures, 2018
A nuanced reading of the current situation in the North Caucasus reveals two main trends that art... more A nuanced reading of the current situation in the North Caucasus reveals two main trends that articulate in confrontation with Russian nationalism. First, in the eastern part of the region, particularly in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, a shift from nationalism to Islam has taken place, and the ties between religion and political machine are strong and visible. Second, and by contrast, in the western part of the region, including Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia, nationalism has increased, and the political elites seldom practice religion publicly.
![Research paper thumbnail of The Story of Circassian Tobacco: Prehistory of Globalization [Çerkes Tütününün Tarihi]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/87676489/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Journal of Caucasian Studies, 2018
This article explores the story of Circassian tobacco by connecting local developments in Circass... more This article explores the story of Circassian tobacco by connecting local developments in Circassia with global markets in the 18 th and 19 th centuries. Since the 17 th century, European travelers described production, usage, and trade of Circassian tobacco. The 1807 Constitution of Kabarda (Eastern Circassia) prohibited tobacco for religious reasons; while the Russian conquest, in 1864 ended tobacco growing traditions and culture in Western Circassia. But the Russian settlers inherited the indigenous tobacco culture after they occupied the villages and houses left by the deported Circassians and brought it to a new level. Circassians produced a special brand of tobacco for export, known as Ozereg. Circassian tobacco successfully competed with Virginian tobacco from the year 1700 onwards, after the czar relaxed the ban on Russian trade with the Caucasus. In 1723, Russia started producing a new kind of Circassian tobacco known as cherkassky tabak in Ukraine. The Circassian tobacco competed with the Chinese tobacco in Western Siberia and with Californian tobacco in Alaska. Circassian tobacco became an exchange currency among the Native Siberians and Native Americans. This kind of Circassian tobacco became known as extremely bad for health thanks to the saltpeter added to it in order to preserve it. In the United States, tobacco manufacturer Pierre Lorillard introduced a new tobacco brand which he claimed was real Circassian tobacco, exploiting the exotic image of Circassian females.
Journal of Caucasian Studies, 2017
В электронных ресурсах библиотеки Конгресса США в г. Вашингтоне собран архив большого количества ... more В электронных ресурсах библиотеки Конгресса США в г. Вашингтоне собран архив большого количества американских газет. В течение нескольких месяцев мы просмотрели архивы американских газет с целью найти в упоминания о черкесах. Из них в около 200 газетах нами было обнаружено упоминание слова «черкес» в более 26000 номерах.
Nationalities Papers, 2017
Journal of Caucasian Studies, 2015
In the context of an institutionalized multi-nationalist ideology, the language policy in Russia ... more In the context of an institutionalized multi-nationalist ideology, the language policy in Russia is based on the distinction of the native language of the Russian people and the languages of all other non-Russians. Such a distinction is reflected in 'the Constitution of the Russian Federation,' federal and regional laws and policy practices that have given advantage to Russian over the other titular languages of the indigenous people in the Russian Federation. This article charts the grand 'shift' in Russian state policy toward ethnic diversity. The Soviet-era multinational Leninist/Stalinist approach summarized in the slogan "druzhba narodov" (friendship of peoples) shifted toward a more assimilationist nation-building model. Such ideology reduces the ethnic diversity into just a cultural, folkloric feature of an otherwise monolingual, monocultural nation-state. What is the purpose of this discriminatory ethnic and language policy? Our case study of Circassians, one of the ethnic groups in the North Caucasus, demonstrates that, after many decades, such a policy has only caused political and cultural damages to all sides and alienation between them. On the one hand, the assimilationist language policy continues to cause problems with the non-Russian ethnic groups adding to the major challenges that the Russian state faces today. On the other hand, non-Russian ethnic groups, though not yet assimilated into the Russian culture, have undergone significant decrease in terms of their rights to develop their languages.
Demokratizatsiya, Sep 22, 2013
Terrorist violence has become the hallmark of post-Soviet politics in the North Caucasus.1 In Apr... more Terrorist violence has become the hallmark of post-Soviet politics in the North Caucasus.1 In April 2013, its effects allegedly reached as far as the finish line of the Boston Marathon, forcing the American public and policy makers to realize that Russia's internal security threats could become transnational.What causes such destructive energy and ferocity? The prevalent explanations for the political violence raging in the North Caucasus can be grouped under three broad categories: historical legacies and ethnic identities, socioeconomic problems including the "backwardness" of the region, and the political ideology of Islamic jihad, which has spread from the Middle East to supplant the region's discredited programs of secular nationalism.2 Each of these three broad drivers highlight certain facts, yet they represent rather distant and indiscriminate causal explanations. Our intent here is to explore a more proximate layer of causality informed by state-centered theories of political mobilization and ideological framing.3Our central argument is that the state is paralyzed from the top down in the Muslim-majority republics of the North Caucasus, such as Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherkessia. Chechnya is a special case of the Russian state center delegating its powers and finances to an ostensibly tame warlord. The semblance of functioning sub-national states in the region is maintained by the flow of federal subsidies and the sheer inertia of Soviet-era institutions that remain deeply ingrained in the structures of everyday life, especially in urban centers. The Russian state, however, lost both the moral authority and infrastructural power to act on anything beyond daily repression and the brazenly inequitable redistribu- tion of rents and subsidies.4What makes the situation in the North Caucasus different from the rest of the Russian Federation is neither particular venality, nor the heavy dependence of local governments on budget transfers. It is rather the presence of an anti-systemic force that gives local politics a peculiarly triangular shape. Social power is contested by three distinct kinds of politi- cal elite: the late Soviet era officialdom; rent-seeking political capitalists (a local variety of "oligarchs") originating in the 1990s; and the Islamist underground, which emerged in the 2000s, putatively as an alternative state and society. None of the forces so far can prevail over the others. The trian- gular gridlock of three contestants, each with a distinct group culture and action repertoire, thus becomes at the same time both the consequence of state weakening and the cause furthering its collapse. This condition, as we demonstrate through in-depth case study analysis of Kabardino-Balkaria below, represents further stages in the erosion of the Soviet state following its disintegration in 1991.Using historical evidence from the twentieth century, we will show that in the internal ethnic fringes of the USSR, state elites were organizing around neo-patrimonial chief-like figures rather than formal rational- bureaucratic institutions. The contentious and criminalized unbundling of the former Soviet state and its industries was conducted by the quarrelsome tandem of two elites, the inescapably politicized rent-seeking officials and the equally rent-seeking political capitalists of different hues and calibers.5 In pursuing their goals, both elites employed violent means through either state agencies or private Mafioso retinues.6 This sort of violence, however, remained non-ideological and largely targeted fellow elite competitors. It is a separate counter-factual question to ask why no revolutionary oppo- sition of any ideological kind could be consolidated in Russia proper, although scholars like Henry Hale and Stephen Hanson suggest important clues.7 Only in the North Caucasus after approximately 1999 (the time of the second war in Chechnya) did a third elite emerge from within local societies: the young Islamist militants. …
This article examines the impact of mega-events on civil society. Based on a case study of the 20... more This article examines the impact of mega-events on civil society. Based on a case study of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, it concludes that mega-events provide a way for state-business alliances to impose their development preferences on society with little oversight or accountability. Environmental groups, in particular, find few opportunities to influence decisions. Nevertheless, activism is not completely futile because, in some cases, groups can use events like the Olympics as a platform to score small victories and to develop experience that can be applied in subsequent confrontations. Additionally, mega-events expand the repertoire of Russian organizations by giving them a central focus around which they can organize, though to date, they have not taken advantage of these opportunities.
Slavic Review, 2013
In the north Caucasus, collective dance has long been an expression of communal identity and a fo... more In the north Caucasus, collective dance has long been an expression of communal identity and a forum for political dissent. In this article Sufian Zhemukhov and Charles King examine the emergence and transformation of a communal dance form known as adyge jegu (roughly, “Circassian festival“) in the Russian republics of Adygeia, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. They chart the history of the adyge jegu after 2005, elucidate debates over the meaning of authenticity in contemporary Circassian nationalism, and provide a detailed archaeology of the specific decisions that enabled this cultural artifact to get constructed in one way but not another. While attention typically focuses on elite-driven narratives of border security and terrorism, the adyge jegu highlights grassroots debates over the meaning of right behavior, the boundaries of communal identity, and alternatives to Russianness in either its russkii or rossiiskii varieties.
Nationalities Papers, 2012
This article focuses on problems of the national movement of the Circassians – a small nation in ... more This article focuses on problems of the national movement of the Circassians – a small nation in the Caucasus, most of whose population is dispersed all over the world. The paper researches the development of the Circassian movement from 1989–2000 and its contemporary structure since 2005. The modern Circassian movement as a whole has never been approached from a political science viewpoint. This research aims to answer several core questions: What are the different strands of the movement? What principles are they based on? Who are the participants? What political forces support them? How do these political forces interact with each other?
Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia, 2011
Historian Sufian Zhemukhov describes the periodization of Islam in Kabarda (and among Circassians... more Historian Sufian Zhemukhov describes the periodization of Islam in Kabarda (and among Circassians of the North Caucasus) in thirteen stages, beginning with initial proseletyzing by Arabs in the eleventh-thirteenth centuries among the Cherkess. Focus is on degrees of practice of the "pillars of Islam" at the various stages, with key religious figures in each period named.
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Papers by Sufian Zhemukhov