Papers by Alycia W . LaGuardia-LoBianco
The Journal of Value Inquiry
There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is int... more There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is intrinsically good. A Humean-style error theory of the value of pain and pleasure is developed against these commonsense claims. We defend the thesis that the value of pain and pleasure is always contingent and only instrumental. We survey prominent theories of both intrinsic value and pain/pleasure, all of which assume that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable. We base our error theory on counterexamples to this assumption, upon which these theories falter, and a theory of pain and pleasure which derives their value solely from their evolutionary function.
Teaching Ethics, 2022
A perennial topic in introductory ethics classes, abortion has offered students a real-life issue... more A perennial topic in introductory ethics classes, abortion has offered students a real-life issue to critically analyze. In this paper, I argue a popular approach to teaching abortion in such classes fails to attend to relevant political contexts of the issue and that this contributes to harms against pregnant people. I will argue for these conclusions by identifying three related problems with such an approach: these lessons frame a political issue as apolitical, value impartiality over lived experiences in moral assessment, and objectify the already-objectified group of pregnant people in the course of debating about them. I will then point to considerations that may help counter the harms caused by this approach and informed by these problems. These involve framing abortion lessons in terms of the relevant political and historical context of abortion and incorporating firstperson accounts that engage with the embodied, lived experiences of abortion.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2023
There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is int... more There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is intrinsically good. A Humean-style error theory of the value of pain and pleasure is developed against these commonsense claims. We defend the thesis that the value of pain and pleasure is always contingent and only instrumental. We survey prominent theories of both intrinsic value and pain/pleasure, all of which assume that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable. We base our error theory on counterexamples to this assumption, upon which these theories falter, and a theory of pain and pleasure which derives their value solely from their evolutionary function.
Social Philosophy Today, 2022
I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to repair and prevent moral damage that some... more I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to repair and prevent moral damage that some survivors of domestic violence may experience. This responsibility is grounded in those communities’ complicity in domestic violence and the moral damage that may result. Drawing on Claudia Card’s work on domestic violence, I first explain two forms of moral damage that some survivors may experience. These are: 1) normative isolation, or abusive environments that are marked by distorted moral standards about the abuse itself, and 2) coerced self-betrayal, the coercive entrapment of the survivor’s agency, emotions, and beliefs to express the will of the abuser. Though the abuser is always the primary cause of abuse, I argue that survivors’ communities can contribute to a climate that facilitates domestic violence by, for instance, sustaining harmful norms about gender roles, shaming survivors, protecting abusers, and not wanting to interrupt “private matters.” When this complicity exists, I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to create structures that repair and prevent moral damage from domestic violence. Finally, I sketch out some practical considerations for building these structures. These involve creating violence-resistant communities that protect survivors, hold abusers accountable, and help survivors reclaim their agencies.
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2021
A common question in moral philosophy concerns how we should regard traumatic histories that have... more A common question in moral philosophy concerns how we should regard traumatic histories that have influenced wrongdoing. In this paper, I argue that one standard line of response—survivors are exempt from blame for a given wrongdoing because of a traumatic history that influenced this wrongdoing—is problematic. Instead of trying to determine how trauma categorically exempts survivors from blame, I argue that we should start from the fact that survivors are members of the moral community who can be as blameworthy as anyone, and then ask how considerations of trauma might impact a moral response to their wrongdoing. I consider and reject three attempts to exempt survivors on the grounds of traumatic histories, arguing that each risks divesting survivors of moral agency. I then develop an account of compassionate blame, a unique attitude in which we can blame the survivor for their wrong while also taking compassion towards the survivor in light of their traumatic history, and argue that this is the appropriate moral attitude to cultivate in these cases.
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion, 2021
In these comments, I argue that Michael Brady’s analysis of emotions tacitly assumes ideal, non-a... more In these comments, I argue that Michael Brady’s analysis of emotions tacitly assumes ideal, non-adverse conditions, and that this makes his theory apt only for certain kinds of lives. I aim to augment his view by considering how certain emotions work differently under one non-ideal circumstance: trauma (specifically, intimate partner violence). The standard function and value of emotions that Brady articulates alters for agents surviving this trauma, and therefore cannot be captured by a theory that assumes ideal conditions. Instead, it requires a different theoretical approach. My overall aim is to make the case that when doing philosophy of emotion, it is imperative to consider the non-ideal, adverse, and messy circumstances of our lives—exemplified by trauma—in order to provide a truly human theory of emotion.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 2019
In this paper, I assess one dimension of self-injury through a framework of psychological oppress... more In this paper, I assess one dimension of self-injury through a framework of psychological oppression. Certain effects of psychological oppression, I argue, share a surprising degree of overlap with subjective features of self-injury, and may thereby partly explain socially marginalized agents’ high risk of self-injury. I first discuss certain subjective features of self-injury that are particularly salient in agents’ self-reports. I then canvass some of the literature on the risk of self-injury among members of socially marginalized groups. Focusing on one socio-cultural analysis of self-injury as a start, I discuss Sarah Naomi Shaw’s (2002) feminist analysis of self-injury. I argue that while Shaw’s analysis pays important attention to certain features of self-injury, its reliance on white feminine socialization, and body and beauty norms in particular, is overly restrictive. Finally, using Sandra Bartky’s (1990) conception of psychological oppression, I focus on three features of psychological oppression and their connections to self-injury: 1) self-loathing and intra-self fragmentation; 2) bodily objectification; and 3) shame over acting out one’s agency.
Social Theory and Practice, 2019
Common-sense morality tells us we should help our loved ones who suffer. Self-saboteurs complicat... more Common-sense morality tells us we should help our loved ones who suffer. Self-saboteurs complicate this intuition: ought we help someone who wants to suffer? In this paper, I discuss mechanisms of and motivations for self-sabotaging behavior. I then turn to the ethical complications of these cases: the risk of becoming complicit in another’s self-sabotage; the acceptable limits of caring for a self-saboteur; and the permissibility of paternalistic interference. I argue that while there is some permissible leeway involved in meeting another’s needs—including submitting to their low-stakes manipulation—doing so risks damaging the relationship. While paternalistic interference may seem justified, I argue that this approach is a morally problematic denial of the self-saboteur’s agency. Instead, I offer an alternative route between complicity and interference: carers ought to try to maintain a relationship built on the honest recognition of each other’s reasons, which may include the sel...
Philosophy, 2018
Moral questions surrounding suffering tend to focus on obligations to relieve others’ suffering. ... more Moral questions surrounding suffering tend to focus on obligations to relieve others’ suffering. In this paper, I focus on the overlooked question of what sufferers morally owe to themselves, arguing that they have the duty to self-care. I discuss agents who have been shaped by moral luck to contribute to their own suffering and canvass the ways in which this damages their moral agency. I contend that these agents have a duty to care for themselves by protecting and expanding their agency, which involves precluding further destruction of agency and ensuring the continued ability to self-care.
Blog Posts by Alycia W . LaGuardia-LoBianco
Blog of the APA: Women in Philosophy, 2022
Dissertation by Alycia W . LaGuardia-LoBianco
I'm at it too long; you keep me curious, for you are always learning, always fascinated by the wo... more I'm at it too long; you keep me curious, for you are always learning, always fascinated by the world; you've taught me what authenticity, honesty, and loyalty really are. You are my favorite person ever, and I am so grateful to have the chance to hang out with you for the rest of our lives. We got through it. I love you babe, always and forever. viii Chapter 1: Human Suffering as Distressed Disorientation If, however, a person should regard even the affects of hatred, envy, covetousness, and the lust to rule as conditions of life…he will suffer from such a view of things as from seasickness.-Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil The act of living is different all through.-C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed I.
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Papers by Alycia W . LaGuardia-LoBianco
Blog Posts by Alycia W . LaGuardia-LoBianco
Dissertation by Alycia W . LaGuardia-LoBianco