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Jinzhong Niu

City University of New York/ Guttman Community College, Information Technology, Faculty Member

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Address: New York, New York, United States

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University of Wollongong

American University in Cairo

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Armando Marques-Guedes

UNL - New University of Lisbon

Luís Moniz Pereira

Universidade Nova de Lisboa

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Khurram Shehzad

National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST)

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Stockholm University

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Papers by Jinzhong Niu

Dynamic Data Migration Policies for Query-Intensive Distributed Data Environments

Modern large distributed applications, such as telecommunication and banking services, need to re... more Modern large distributed applications, such as telecommunication and banking services, need to respond instantly to a huge number of queries within a short period of time. The data-intensive, query-intensive nature makes it necessary to build these applications in a distributed data environment that involves a number of data servers sharing service load. How data is distributed among the servers has a crucial impact on the system response time. This paper introduces two policies that dynamically migrate data in such an environment as the pattern of queries on data changes, and achieve query load balance. One policy is based on a central controller that periodically collects the query load information on all data servers and regulates data migration across the whole system. The other policy lets individual server dynamically selects a partner to migrate data and balance query load in between. Experimental results show that both policies significantly improve system performance in terms of average query response time and fairness, and communication overhead incurred is marginal.

OOPN: AN OBJECT-ORIENTED PETRI NETS AND ITS INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT

CATP: A Communication Protocol for CAT Games

Overview of CAT: A Market Design Competition

JCAT: A Platform for the TAC Market Design Competition (Demo Paper

On the Behavior of Competing Markets Populated by Automated Traders

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Computing Research Repository, 2009

This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanis... more

Using Evolutionary Game-Theory to Analyse the Performance of Trading Strategies in a Continuous Double Auction Market

Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement

Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an a... more Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions, especially continuous double auctions, makes it difficult to apply the usual analytic game-theoretic methods to do this. This paper takes an experimental approach, searching a parameterized space of possible auction types, and presents a new pricing policy for continuous double auctions. The paper further demonstrates how this policy, together with a shout improvement rule, helps to reduce the fluctuation of transaction prices in auctions involving agents with minimum intelligence while keeping the overall efficiency high.

Network effects in double auction markets with automated traders

Many electronic markets are linked together into larger "network markets" where the links reflect... more Many electronic markets are linked together into larger "network markets" where the links reflect constraints on traders. These constraints mean that a choice to trade in one market limits the trader's choice of other markets to use. This kind of network market is important because so many basic products, including gas, water, and electricity, are traded in such markets, and yet it has been little studied until now. This paper studies networks of double auction markets populated with automated traders, concentrating on the effects of different network topologies. We find that different topologies confer significant economic benefits to individual markets, suggesting that these network effects can be an important consideration in market design.

On the Economic Effects of Competition between Double Auction Markets

Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. T... more Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. The same stocks and commodities may be listed on multiple exchanges, and traders who want to deal in those goods have a choice of markets in which to trade. While there has been extensive research into agentbased trading in individual markets, there is little work on this kind of multiple market scenario. Our work seeks to address this imbalance, examining how standard economic measures, like allocative efficiency, are affected by the presence of multiple markets for the same good. We find that while dividing traders between several small markets typically leads to lower efficiency than grouping them into one large market, the movement of traders between markets, and price incentives for changing markets, can reduce this loss of efficiency.

What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms

Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2010

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 tac Market Design Game. We present a classification ... more This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 tac Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

An Analysis of Entries in the First TAC Market Design Competition

This paper presents an analysis of entries in the first TAC Market Design Competition final that ... more This paper presents an analysis of entries in the first TAC Market Design Competition final that compares the entries across several scenarios. The analysis complements previous work analyzing the 2007 competition, demonstrating some vulnerabilities of entries that placed highly in the competition. The paper also suggests a simple strategy that would have performed well.

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Computing Research Repository, 2010

JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition

Auctions, Evolution, and Multi-agent Learning

For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mec... more For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mechanisms, using a range of techniques from evolutionary and multi-agent learning. This paper gives an overview of this work. The paper presents results from several experiments that we have carried out, and tries to place these in the context of the overall task that we are engaged in.

Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design in the domain of double auctions. W... more This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parameterized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.

Dynamic Data Migration Policies for Query-Intensive Distributed Data Environments

Modern large distributed applications, such as telecommunication and banking services, need to re... more Modern large distributed applications, such as telecommunication and banking services, need to respond instantly to a huge number of queries within a short period of time. The data-intensive, query-intensive nature makes it necessary to build these applications in a distributed data environment that involves a number of data servers sharing service load. How data is distributed among the servers has a crucial impact on the system response time. This paper introduces two policies that dynamically migrate data in such an environment as the pattern of queries on data changes, and achieve query load balance. One policy is based on a central controller that periodically collects the query load information on all data servers and regulates data migration across the whole system. The other policy lets individual server dynamically selects a partner to migrate data and balance query load in between. Experimental results show that both policies significantly improve system performance in terms of average query response time and fairness, and communication overhead incurred is marginal.

OOPN: AN OBJECT-ORIENTED PETRI NETS AND ITS INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT

CATP: A Communication Protocol for CAT Games

Overview of CAT: A Market Design Competition

JCAT: A Platform for the TAC Market Design Competition (Demo Paper

On the Behavior of Competing Markets Populated by Automated Traders

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Computing Research Repository, 2009

This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanis... more

Using Evolutionary Game-Theory to Analyse the Performance of Trading Strategies in a Continuous Double Auction Market

Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement

Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an a... more Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions, especially continuous double auctions, makes it difficult to apply the usual analytic game-theoretic methods to do this. This paper takes an experimental approach, searching a parameterized space of possible auction types, and presents a new pricing policy for continuous double auctions. The paper further demonstrates how this policy, together with a shout improvement rule, helps to reduce the fluctuation of transaction prices in auctions involving agents with minimum intelligence while keeping the overall efficiency high.

Network effects in double auction markets with automated traders

Many electronic markets are linked together into larger "network markets" where the links reflect... more Many electronic markets are linked together into larger "network markets" where the links reflect constraints on traders. These constraints mean that a choice to trade in one market limits the trader's choice of other markets to use. This kind of network market is important because so many basic products, including gas, water, and electricity, are traded in such markets, and yet it has been little studied until now. This paper studies networks of double auction markets populated with automated traders, concentrating on the effects of different network topologies. We find that different topologies confer significant economic benefits to individual markets, suggesting that these network effects can be an important consideration in market design.

On the Economic Effects of Competition between Double Auction Markets

Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. T... more Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. The same stocks and commodities may be listed on multiple exchanges, and traders who want to deal in those goods have a choice of markets in which to trade. While there has been extensive research into agentbased trading in individual markets, there is little work on this kind of multiple market scenario. Our work seeks to address this imbalance, examining how standard economic measures, like allocative efficiency, are affected by the presence of multiple markets for the same good. We find that while dividing traders between several small markets typically leads to lower efficiency than grouping them into one large market, the movement of traders between markets, and price incentives for changing markets, can reduce this loss of efficiency.

What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms

Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2010

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 tac Market Design Game. We present a classification ... more This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 tac Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

An Analysis of Entries in the First TAC Market Design Competition

This paper presents an analysis of entries in the first TAC Market Design Competition final that ... more This paper presents an analysis of entries in the first TAC Market Design Competition final that compares the entries across several scenarios. The analysis complements previous work analyzing the 2007 competition, demonstrating some vulnerabilities of entries that placed highly in the competition. The paper also suggests a simple strategy that would have performed well.

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Computing Research Repository, 2010

JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition

Auctions, Evolution, and Multi-agent Learning

For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mec... more For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mechanisms, using a range of techniques from evolutionary and multi-agent learning. This paper gives an overview of this work. The paper presents results from several experiments that we have carried out, and tries to place these in the context of the overall task that we are engaged in.

Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design in the domain of double auctions. W... more This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parameterized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.