Peer-reviewed articles by Ketevan Bolkvadze
How do the survival incentives facing incumbents in hybrid regimes affect the engineering of bure... more How do the survival incentives facing incumbents in hybrid regimes affect the engineering of bureaucratic reforms? This article tackles this question by departing from the literature on competitive authoritarianism and with the help of detailed empirical evidence from Georgia’s public administration reforms (2004–2012). It first argues that in order to preserve their hold on power, dominant parties have to tilt the political playing field, while still upholding popular support. I posit that this dual incentive structure leads the incumbents to promote efficiency of public service, but to also curb these policies at a point that would jeopardize their ability to use administrative resources for partisan ends. Consequently, bureaucratic reforms reach a saturation point, beyond which no more reforms can be endured.
This article investigates the rationale behind compliance and non-compliance with EU conditionali... more This article investigates the rationale behind compliance and non-compliance with EU conditionality in
Georgia’s hybrid regime. Following the literature on competitive authoritarianism, it argues that the survival
strategies of hybrid regime incumbents compel them to dodge conditionality in those policy areas that are
crucial for maintaining the uneven political playing field. On the other hand, specific self-preservation tactics
dictate that they should embrace neighbourhood Europeanisation in policy domains capable of generating votes.
Taken together, these hypotheses alert us to the possibility that hybrid regime governments in the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries are cherry picking conditionality.
Reports by Ketevan Bolkvadze
Book chapters in edited volumes by Ketevan Bolkvadze
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Peer-reviewed articles by Ketevan Bolkvadze
Georgia’s hybrid regime. Following the literature on competitive authoritarianism, it argues that the survival
strategies of hybrid regime incumbents compel them to dodge conditionality in those policy areas that are
crucial for maintaining the uneven political playing field. On the other hand, specific self-preservation tactics
dictate that they should embrace neighbourhood Europeanisation in policy domains capable of generating votes.
Taken together, these hypotheses alert us to the possibility that hybrid regime governments in the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries are cherry picking conditionality.
Reports by Ketevan Bolkvadze
Book chapters in edited volumes by Ketevan Bolkvadze
Georgia’s hybrid regime. Following the literature on competitive authoritarianism, it argues that the survival
strategies of hybrid regime incumbents compel them to dodge conditionality in those policy areas that are
crucial for maintaining the uneven political playing field. On the other hand, specific self-preservation tactics
dictate that they should embrace neighbourhood Europeanisation in policy domains capable of generating votes.
Taken together, these hypotheses alert us to the possibility that hybrid regime governments in the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries are cherry picking conditionality.