Intoxicated with poets and playwrights, our modern sensibilities quickly recoil from any notion o... more Intoxicated with poets and playwrights, our modern sensibilities quickly recoil from any notion of love put forth in economic terms. Love is not a cold monetary exchange, we might say, but rather a passionate giving of our hearts. However, the metaphors we use for love in our everyday lives reveals that we have yet to fully divorce ourselves from such economic conceptions. We speak of " investing in a relationship, " of the " give and take of relationships, " and how we are " unable to repay the love " given by the other. As the shortcomings of the purely Shakespearian love have been well elucidated by philosophers and theologians alike, I wish instead to focus on this latter conception of love as presented in our economic metaphors, specifically with reference to debt – a metaphor few authors have been willing to employ in their expositions. Using the work of Hadewijch, a 13 th century Christian mystic, and Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher of the mid-19 th century, I want to propose that our economic metaphors for love may still be employed, and may in fact be helpful, but only within a Christian framework.
Attempting to rectify casuist and manualist theories of conscience, Catholic moral theology has s... more Attempting to rectify casuist and manualist theories of conscience, Catholic moral theology has since sought to quell the unnecessary conflict these theories have imposed between freedom and law. For such a dichotomy necessitated an errant understanding of conscience as that capacity by which one discerns and applies the dictates of natural law over and against human freedom. However, despite its attempt to offer a more holistic and “orthodox” conception of conscience, Catholic moral theology has often found itself bound by notions of “natural law” still indebted to the definitions and constructions of these very traditions. Following Herbert McCabe’s assessment, I wish to propose that Catholic moral theology’s reconciliation between law and freedom, though necessary, is misinformed in its present understanding of natural law as obligation. Examining the critique of conscience offered by the 1993 papal encyclical, Veritatis Splendor, might best elucidate this error. I will then argue that by reconceptualizing natural law anthropologically, McCabe is able to present a more robust theory of conscious that enables moral growth and opens the individual more fully to the community.
Proposing a way forward in any field of inquiry requires that one first get a clear view of the l... more Proposing a way forward in any field of inquiry requires that one first get a clear view of the landscape, taking note of the ground upon which one stands, and of the briars and trenches that may be at one's feet. Looking out at the current state of ethical theory, two interweaving paths can be seen to dominate most of the terrain. Both paths, however, are often difficult to see, not because they are so small and insignificant, but because they are so broad. The first welltread course treats ethics as a discipline concerned with isolated choices, or dilemmas. Such an approach dominated the methodology of classical casuistry, situation ethics, and all too often dominates public ethical discourse in the form of "what would you do if...?" hypotheticals. In these approaches, the 'ethical' is typically concerned with tough cases of conscience that must be determined by weighing out which choice will result in the most good, or protects the most rights, or is the most loving, and so on. The second path sets out with the notion that a fruitful study of ethics should result in a closed, fixed system or definition into which any situation, any ethical problem, could be inserted and assessed according to the applicable principles. These approaches can seem legalistic if the system is too narrowly constrained, or at other times, or to other members of that same society, can appear sufficiently liberating or just (depending on which terminology is currently in vogue in the public ethical discourse). It should be noted that the first path weaves in and through this larger and more foundational one, rarely venturing beyond its boundaries (situation ethics could be seen as such an attempt in its unwillingness to assert a priori any definitive rule for "love"). other's humanity, but is fundamentally a rejection of obedience to God. 71 Moreover, McCabe wants us to see that the two are inseparable: to be obedient to God is to live to the full extent and depth of what it means to be human, a possibility only when seeking after God's Word-God's language-and the meaning it constitutes. It may be said then that sin is no more, but no less than, dehumanizing. Because our humanity is constituted by our relationships and the communication which enables those relationships, we are only human to the extent that our communication is open to the formation of unaccommodated relationships. 72 Sin is what inhibits or refuses that communication, those relationships, and is thus, as McCabe puts it, "a rejection by mankind of its own meaning," and therefore "a deprivation of reality." 73 This is not a necessarily new idea, for one may find a similar view expressed by Athanasius in his work, On the Incarnation. The clearest example of this occurs when Athanasius describes why God could not simply let humanity perish as a result of their sins: "it was equally monstrous that beings which once had shared the nature of the Word should perish and turn back again into non-existence through corruption." 74 Whether or not Athanasius is getting to the same point as McCabe will require a bit of context. Further in the text he makes this comment concerning humanity's fall into sin: "What was God to do in face of this dehumanizing of mankind, this universal hiding of the knowledge of Himself by the wiles of evil spirits?" 75 With this passage we observe that the problem of sin that earlier resulted in "nonexistence" here results in the "dehumanizing of mankind," thus aligning the two as one and the 71 McCabe, GM, 93. 72 McCabe, LLL, 127. 73 Ibid., 111. 74 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, §6. 75 Ibid., §13.
Intoxicated with poets and playwrights, our modern sensibilities quickly recoil from any notion o... more Intoxicated with poets and playwrights, our modern sensibilities quickly recoil from any notion of love put forth in economic terms. Love is not a cold monetary exchange, we might say, but rather a passionate giving of our hearts. However, the metaphors we use for love in our everyday lives reveals that we have yet to fully divorce ourselves from such economic conceptions. We speak of " investing in a relationship, " of the " give and take of relationships, " and how we are " unable to repay the love " given by the other. As the shortcomings of the purely Shakespearian love have been well elucidated by philosophers and theologians alike, I wish instead to focus on this latter conception of love as presented in our economic metaphors, specifically with reference to debt – a metaphor few authors have been willing to employ in their expositions. Using the work of Hadewijch, a 13 th century Christian mystic, and Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher of the mid-19 th century, I want to propose that our economic metaphors for love may still be employed, and may in fact be helpful, but only within a Christian framework.
Attempting to rectify casuist and manualist theories of conscience, Catholic moral theology has s... more Attempting to rectify casuist and manualist theories of conscience, Catholic moral theology has since sought to quell the unnecessary conflict these theories have imposed between freedom and law. For such a dichotomy necessitated an errant understanding of conscience as that capacity by which one discerns and applies the dictates of natural law over and against human freedom. However, despite its attempt to offer a more holistic and “orthodox” conception of conscience, Catholic moral theology has often found itself bound by notions of “natural law” still indebted to the definitions and constructions of these very traditions. Following Herbert McCabe’s assessment, I wish to propose that Catholic moral theology’s reconciliation between law and freedom, though necessary, is misinformed in its present understanding of natural law as obligation. Examining the critique of conscience offered by the 1993 papal encyclical, Veritatis Splendor, might best elucidate this error. I will then argue that by reconceptualizing natural law anthropologically, McCabe is able to present a more robust theory of conscious that enables moral growth and opens the individual more fully to the community.
Proposing a way forward in any field of inquiry requires that one first get a clear view of the l... more Proposing a way forward in any field of inquiry requires that one first get a clear view of the landscape, taking note of the ground upon which one stands, and of the briars and trenches that may be at one's feet. Looking out at the current state of ethical theory, two interweaving paths can be seen to dominate most of the terrain. Both paths, however, are often difficult to see, not because they are so small and insignificant, but because they are so broad. The first welltread course treats ethics as a discipline concerned with isolated choices, or dilemmas. Such an approach dominated the methodology of classical casuistry, situation ethics, and all too often dominates public ethical discourse in the form of "what would you do if...?" hypotheticals. In these approaches, the 'ethical' is typically concerned with tough cases of conscience that must be determined by weighing out which choice will result in the most good, or protects the most rights, or is the most loving, and so on. The second path sets out with the notion that a fruitful study of ethics should result in a closed, fixed system or definition into which any situation, any ethical problem, could be inserted and assessed according to the applicable principles. These approaches can seem legalistic if the system is too narrowly constrained, or at other times, or to other members of that same society, can appear sufficiently liberating or just (depending on which terminology is currently in vogue in the public ethical discourse). It should be noted that the first path weaves in and through this larger and more foundational one, rarely venturing beyond its boundaries (situation ethics could be seen as such an attempt in its unwillingness to assert a priori any definitive rule for "love"). other's humanity, but is fundamentally a rejection of obedience to God. 71 Moreover, McCabe wants us to see that the two are inseparable: to be obedient to God is to live to the full extent and depth of what it means to be human, a possibility only when seeking after God's Word-God's language-and the meaning it constitutes. It may be said then that sin is no more, but no less than, dehumanizing. Because our humanity is constituted by our relationships and the communication which enables those relationships, we are only human to the extent that our communication is open to the formation of unaccommodated relationships. 72 Sin is what inhibits or refuses that communication, those relationships, and is thus, as McCabe puts it, "a rejection by mankind of its own meaning," and therefore "a deprivation of reality." 73 This is not a necessarily new idea, for one may find a similar view expressed by Athanasius in his work, On the Incarnation. The clearest example of this occurs when Athanasius describes why God could not simply let humanity perish as a result of their sins: "it was equally monstrous that beings which once had shared the nature of the Word should perish and turn back again into non-existence through corruption." 74 Whether or not Athanasius is getting to the same point as McCabe will require a bit of context. Further in the text he makes this comment concerning humanity's fall into sin: "What was God to do in face of this dehumanizing of mankind, this universal hiding of the knowledge of Himself by the wiles of evil spirits?" 75 With this passage we observe that the problem of sin that earlier resulted in "nonexistence" here results in the "dehumanizing of mankind," thus aligning the two as one and the 71 McCabe, GM, 93. 72 McCabe, LLL, 127. 73 Ibid., 111. 74 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, §6. 75 Ibid., §13.
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