Shawn Powers
Shawn Powers serves as the U.S. Agency for Global Media's Chief Strategy Officer, leading its interagency engagement, strategic planning, strategic initiatives, and partnerships with key international stakeholders. He oversees the Agency’s Office of Policy and Research (OPR), Office of Policy (VOA), and its Internet Freedom and circumvention programs.
Powers served as USAGM’s Senior Advisor for Global Strategy and Innovation from July 2018 through November 2019, where he focused on strategic planning, innovation, research and evaluation, and policy coordination for USAGM, as well as positioning the agency within the broader U.S. government and with key stakeholders. He has a Ph.D. from the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California (USC) and more than a decade of experience working at the nexus of public diplomacy, technology, and national security.
Previously Powers served as Executive Director of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, a body authorized by Congress to oversee and promote U.S. Government activities that intend to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics. From 2016-2018 he led the Commission’s efforts to understand and utilize artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities in the strategic communication space and helped forge a research and learning agenda and culture among public diplomacy practitioners.
Powers’ career began in 2003 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he was a research assistant in the International Security Program. In 2004, he started his graduate work at USC and led a number of research projects on international broadcasting and global media at the Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD). Since 2010, Powers has taught at Georgia State University, where he launched and directed its Center for Global Information Studies and remains an Associate Professor on leave.
As an academic, Powers researched the geopolitics of information and technology and published (with Michael Jablonski) the award-winning The Real Cyber War: A Political Economy of Internet Freedom (The University of Illinois Press, 2015). He has over 40 publications in academic and mainstream outlets, including The Washington Post, Guardian, and Huffington Post.
His research has been supported by grants from the British Council, Department of Defense, Department of State, European Commission, Knight Foundation, Open Society Foundation, and U.S. Institute of Peace, and he’s received fellowships from the London School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Oxford, and Central European University.
Powers received B.A.’s in International Affairs and Communication from the University of Georgia before earning his M.A. and Ph.D. from USC. He has been invited to speak at the Al Jazeera Forum, Austrian Diplomatic Academy, British Broadcasting Corporation, Council on Foreign Relations, SXSW, United Nations, World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates, and over 30 universities.
Address: Atlanta, GA
Powers served as USAGM’s Senior Advisor for Global Strategy and Innovation from July 2018 through November 2019, where he focused on strategic planning, innovation, research and evaluation, and policy coordination for USAGM, as well as positioning the agency within the broader U.S. government and with key stakeholders. He has a Ph.D. from the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California (USC) and more than a decade of experience working at the nexus of public diplomacy, technology, and national security.
Previously Powers served as Executive Director of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, a body authorized by Congress to oversee and promote U.S. Government activities that intend to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics. From 2016-2018 he led the Commission’s efforts to understand and utilize artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities in the strategic communication space and helped forge a research and learning agenda and culture among public diplomacy practitioners.
Powers’ career began in 2003 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he was a research assistant in the International Security Program. In 2004, he started his graduate work at USC and led a number of research projects on international broadcasting and global media at the Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD). Since 2010, Powers has taught at Georgia State University, where he launched and directed its Center for Global Information Studies and remains an Associate Professor on leave.
As an academic, Powers researched the geopolitics of information and technology and published (with Michael Jablonski) the award-winning The Real Cyber War: A Political Economy of Internet Freedom (The University of Illinois Press, 2015). He has over 40 publications in academic and mainstream outlets, including The Washington Post, Guardian, and Huffington Post.
His research has been supported by grants from the British Council, Department of Defense, Department of State, European Commission, Knight Foundation, Open Society Foundation, and U.S. Institute of Peace, and he’s received fellowships from the London School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Oxford, and Central European University.
Powers received B.A.’s in International Affairs and Communication from the University of Georgia before earning his M.A. and Ph.D. from USC. He has been invited to speak at the Al Jazeera Forum, Austrian Diplomatic Academy, British Broadcasting Corporation, Council on Foreign Relations, SXSW, United Nations, World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates, and over 30 universities.
Address: Atlanta, GA
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Books by Shawn Powers
Coinciding with the Summit, ACPD commissioned M&C Saatchi World Services to conduct an audit of global best practices in assessing public diplomacy programs, the results of which are included in this report. Put simply, this field-defining effort is a comprehensive accounting of best practices from around the world. Drawing upon 28 detailed case studies,
it provides in-depth analysis of the research and assessment practices from 17 countries, including input from Brazilian, Chinese, Turkish, and Russian practitioners.
The 2017 report was researched, verified, and written by ACPD members and staff with continuous input and collaboration from State Department public diplomacy and BBG officials. The information focuses on fiscal year 2016 funds spent and provides a complete accounting of public diplomacy and broadcasting activity at the time of publication (September 2017). Wherever possible, the report also examines fiscal year 2017 planned spending, strategy, and activities, in addition to fiscal year 2018 budget requests. The report reinforces ACPD’s work in the last four years on research and evaluation for public diplomacy and broadcasting, the organizational structure of public diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State and the career trajectories, and professional development of PD professionals.
Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? features essays by workshop participants that focus on emergent and potentially transformative technology and communication pa erns. The essays also highlight the potential challenges and opportunities these changes create for public diplomacy practitioners in particular and the U.S. government more broadly. We explore how public diplomacy practitioners can continue to productively engage with audiences around the world in the face of likely shifts in communication patterns, continue to effectively and effeciently help the United States to achieve its foreign policy priorities, and synchronize American interests with the interests of citizens and governments around the world.
Behind the rhetoric of cyberwar is an on-going state-centered battle for information resources. This real cyberwar between states is not new; it is as old as the systematic transfer of information across borders. From the invention of the postal service, to the laying of international telegraph and telephone wires, to the rise of international broadcasting, to the modern day roll out of internet and mobile infrastructure, states have been preoccupied with how to leverage information systems for political, economic, and social power. We propose a broader perspective of cyberwar, conceptualized as the utilization of digital networks for geopolitical purposes, including covert attacks against another state’s electronic systems, but also, and more importantly, the variety of ways the internet is used to further a state’s economic and military agendas. In addition to covert attacks, the internet, and the rules that govern it, shape political opinions, consumer habits, cultural mores and values. Unlike revolutionary communication technologies before it, the internet has the potential to be truly global, interoperable and interactive, thus magnifying its significance. The book looks beyond debates on the democratic value of new and emerging information technologies, focusing instead on the political, economic, and geopolitical factors driving internet freedom and control policies.
Ebook available at: https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=pWaZBgAAQBAJ&rdid=book-pWaZBgAAQBAJ&rdot=1&source=gbs_vpt_read&pcampaignid=books_booksearch_viewport
Papers by Shawn Powers
In the West, these contests are typically framed in the context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security. Foreign policies enacted in non-Western states to better monitor or control the flow of information are often characterized as efforts at state censorship, antidemocratic, and contrary to fundamental human rights codified in international law. Heavy-handed efforts by China, Iran, and Russia, for example, to create state-level information infrastructures are contrasted to “a freedom to connect,” a phrase Secretary of State Clinton used to describe a proposed fundamental, universal human right. This framing is, of course, strategic. Portraying efforts to control the flow of information via crude policy mechanisms as censorship normalizes the status quo, portraying the existing communications infrastructures and policies as preserving the global citizen’s freedom to connect.
In reality, all states enact policies to preserve sovereignty, and the emergence of the information age and knowledge-based societies requires greater control of information to preserve government legitimation and power projection. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States, the birthplace of the internet, benefited from a first-mover advantage, establishing the Global Information Infrastructure, driving the Telecommunications Annex to the GATTs Agreement and, for a time, dominating the ascendance of a global, information and data-driven economy. As a result, the United States, often through its private sector, drove the information technology policy agenda at the global level. The debates surrounding the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) and 2014 NetMundial meeting, both discussed throughout the class, reflect the growing significance and tensions around a foundational question in international communication: to what extent can and should states act to manage the flow of information within their sovereign territories?
of legitimating their authority, a process that increasingly
requires providing a citizenry with some level of
freedom of expression. At the same time, technologies
are evolving quickly and changing the ways that
communities are formed and authority legitimized. For
many states, allowing too much freedom of expression
risks a loss of legitimacy by another sword: the rise of
political challengers more able to engage the masses
and offer alternative visions for the future. It is within
this continuum—with absolute freedom of expression
on one end and total information control on the
other—that I explore four case studies in which states
discourage access to a singular, shared internet by
developing malleable domestic networks more capable
of facilitating a balance between freedom and control.
Coinciding with the Summit, ACPD commissioned M&C Saatchi World Services to conduct an audit of global best practices in assessing public diplomacy programs, the results of which are included in this report. Put simply, this field-defining effort is a comprehensive accounting of best practices from around the world. Drawing upon 28 detailed case studies,
it provides in-depth analysis of the research and assessment practices from 17 countries, including input from Brazilian, Chinese, Turkish, and Russian practitioners.
The 2017 report was researched, verified, and written by ACPD members and staff with continuous input and collaboration from State Department public diplomacy and BBG officials. The information focuses on fiscal year 2016 funds spent and provides a complete accounting of public diplomacy and broadcasting activity at the time of publication (September 2017). Wherever possible, the report also examines fiscal year 2017 planned spending, strategy, and activities, in addition to fiscal year 2018 budget requests. The report reinforces ACPD’s work in the last four years on research and evaluation for public diplomacy and broadcasting, the organizational structure of public diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State and the career trajectories, and professional development of PD professionals.
Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? features essays by workshop participants that focus on emergent and potentially transformative technology and communication pa erns. The essays also highlight the potential challenges and opportunities these changes create for public diplomacy practitioners in particular and the U.S. government more broadly. We explore how public diplomacy practitioners can continue to productively engage with audiences around the world in the face of likely shifts in communication patterns, continue to effectively and effeciently help the United States to achieve its foreign policy priorities, and synchronize American interests with the interests of citizens and governments around the world.
Behind the rhetoric of cyberwar is an on-going state-centered battle for information resources. This real cyberwar between states is not new; it is as old as the systematic transfer of information across borders. From the invention of the postal service, to the laying of international telegraph and telephone wires, to the rise of international broadcasting, to the modern day roll out of internet and mobile infrastructure, states have been preoccupied with how to leverage information systems for political, economic, and social power. We propose a broader perspective of cyberwar, conceptualized as the utilization of digital networks for geopolitical purposes, including covert attacks against another state’s electronic systems, but also, and more importantly, the variety of ways the internet is used to further a state’s economic and military agendas. In addition to covert attacks, the internet, and the rules that govern it, shape political opinions, consumer habits, cultural mores and values. Unlike revolutionary communication technologies before it, the internet has the potential to be truly global, interoperable and interactive, thus magnifying its significance. The book looks beyond debates on the democratic value of new and emerging information technologies, focusing instead on the political, economic, and geopolitical factors driving internet freedom and control policies.
Ebook available at: https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=pWaZBgAAQBAJ&rdid=book-pWaZBgAAQBAJ&rdot=1&source=gbs_vpt_read&pcampaignid=books_booksearch_viewport
In the West, these contests are typically framed in the context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security. Foreign policies enacted in non-Western states to better monitor or control the flow of information are often characterized as efforts at state censorship, antidemocratic, and contrary to fundamental human rights codified in international law. Heavy-handed efforts by China, Iran, and Russia, for example, to create state-level information infrastructures are contrasted to “a freedom to connect,” a phrase Secretary of State Clinton used to describe a proposed fundamental, universal human right. This framing is, of course, strategic. Portraying efforts to control the flow of information via crude policy mechanisms as censorship normalizes the status quo, portraying the existing communications infrastructures and policies as preserving the global citizen’s freedom to connect.
In reality, all states enact policies to preserve sovereignty, and the emergence of the information age and knowledge-based societies requires greater control of information to preserve government legitimation and power projection. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States, the birthplace of the internet, benefited from a first-mover advantage, establishing the Global Information Infrastructure, driving the Telecommunications Annex to the GATTs Agreement and, for a time, dominating the ascendance of a global, information and data-driven economy. As a result, the United States, often through its private sector, drove the information technology policy agenda at the global level. The debates surrounding the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) and 2014 NetMundial meeting, both discussed throughout the class, reflect the growing significance and tensions around a foundational question in international communication: to what extent can and should states act to manage the flow of information within their sovereign territories?
of legitimating their authority, a process that increasingly
requires providing a citizenry with some level of
freedom of expression. At the same time, technologies
are evolving quickly and changing the ways that
communities are formed and authority legitimized. For
many states, allowing too much freedom of expression
risks a loss of legitimacy by another sword: the rise of
political challengers more able to engage the masses
and offer alternative visions for the future. It is within
this continuum—with absolute freedom of expression
on one end and total information control on the
other—that I explore four case studies in which states
discourage access to a singular, shared internet by
developing malleable domestic networks more capable
of facilitating a balance between freedom and control.
The overarching premise of Muslim CVE community engagement initiatives has been to empower the silent majority of mainstream Muslim societies. The most common practice in this regard has been a series of high profile conferences (Amman Message), appeals (Letter to al-Baghdadi) and even anti-extremist fatwas. Unfortunately, such efforts have become something of a tiresome, but necessary, ritual. Widespread denunciation of terrorist attacks has not worked at decreasing extremists’ proclivity to violence. Even more, it has not persuaded non-Muslims that extremists are truly on the fringe of Islam. Clearly, it is time for CVE campaigns to innovate.
The event will begin with a conversation between Lee Bollinger, President of Columbia University and Susan Glasser, Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy Magazine. Please join us as we explore these issues with an eye to the future of public service media both domestically and with respect to the international broadcasting arena.