School of Public Policy

AbstractÐThis paper presents a dynamic model that characterizes the changing states of trac volumes, design capacities, and pavement conditions in a transportation network's major commuting arteries. It also portrays the evolution of two system-wide eectsÐtotal vehicle miles travelled (VMT) and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissionsÐand accounts for lagged adjustments in travel behavior in its disequilibrium formulation. The model can be employed in optimal control exercises to determine what steps ought to be taken, when and where, and by how much in order to achieve planning objectives. Speci®cally, the model can be used to determine optimal combinations of trac demand management measures, lane widening, and highway maintenance for achieving desired peak-period congestion levels, reducing VMT and VOC emissions to levels mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), and keeping pavement conditions at acceptable serviceability ratings. Information on intertemporal tradeos between planning objectives, now required by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Eciency Act (ISTEA), is generated in solutions to such exercises. We discuss how the model can be operationalized and illustrate its practicability with a small empirical example. #

Let us start with a paradox. Political science is generally a larger, bettersupported, and more prestigious field than sociology. No doubt, part of this attaches to the subject matter—people seek power, particularly through effective control of states and political office, and therefore turn to the science of power in search of answers.

Abstract The" Rise of the West" has been treated by economic historians as stemming from the onset of rapid economic growth, driven by technological advances. In contrast, all premodern and non-Western economies have been treated as showing only slow or no growth, interrupted by periodic crises. This is an error.

The wave of revolutions sweeping the Middle East bears a striking resemblance to previous political earthquakes. As in Europe in 1848, rising food prices and high unemployment have fueled popular protests from Morocco to Oman. As in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989, frustration with closed, corrupt, and unresponsive political systems has led to defections among elites and the fall of once powerful regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and perhaps Libya. Yet 1848 and 1989 are not the right analogies for this past winter's events.

The debate over the “Rise of the West” has generally been over which factor or factors— cultural, geoographic, or material—in European history led Europe to diverge from the World's pre-industrial civilizations. This article aims to shift the terms of the debate by arguing that there were no causal factors that made Europe's industrialization inevitable or even likely. Rather, most of Europe would not and could not move toward industrialization any more than China or India or Japan.

Michael Mann's work ranges over such a vast array of periods and places–the prestate peoples of prehistory in the Old and New World; the ancient empires of Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Athens, Hellas, Rome; the varied states of Europe from the Middle Ages to the present; and excursions into India, China and the lands of Islam–that one's first reaction to my title might be: how could anyone claim that Mann's method is not comparative? Let me consult an expert who should know: Michael Mann. On p.

Was there an" early modern" world? From a glance at book titles, one would think there is a well-defined period in global history that cuts across nations and is recognized as" early modern." According to literally hundreds of volumes covering Europe, North Africa, the Ottoman Empire, China, India, Japan, and the New World,') these societies either had their own" early modern" periods, or were part of an" early modern" world.

Przeworski et al.(2000) challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski et al.(2000) we find that the modernization hypothesis stands up well.

Barbara Misztal sets out to argue that certain changes in contemporary societies make the construction of trust more urgent and that the nature of trust necessary to sustain social order and the quality of social relationships is changing (pp. 8–10).

[NGOs]), and the long-term interests of both donor and recipient in the political stability and economic development of the recipient nation. To incorporate additional concerns—such as preserving the world's environment, reducing population pressures, and conserving natural resources—would seem a luxury. Yet in fact that “luxury” may be a necessity.

1 To make this more precise, let us say a peasant family requires 15 days of labor per mu of land to produce a single crop of 2 shi of rice, while intensifying production by double cropping increases production by 50%, but requires 75% more labor. That is, it would require an additional 12 days of labor to obtain an additional 1 shi worth of a secondary crop. The family seems to be worse off, as crop output per drops from 1.33 shi per day of labor to 1.11 shi per day of labor, a decline in labor productivity of 20%.

75 ty remains high—the population grows extremely rapidly, sometimes doubling in a single generation. Population growth is concentrated among youth, since the largest component of falling death rates is reduced infant and child mortality. This creates a substantial “youth bulge”—a disproportionate share of men and women in their teens and early twenties compared to mature adults. This baby boom often outpaces society's ability to establish and staff schools, leading to inadequate education.

Abstract One of the most solidly established results in the social sciences is the positive correlation between higher levels of income and a higher incidence of democracy across countries. However, explanations for this relationship have proved varied and uncertain. This is because existing methodologies have treated the relationship as a linear and continuous one and searched for average incremental impacts of democracy on development, or of economic growth on transitions to democracy.

Proposes that poor pre-industrial countries, including those just recovering from or even struggling with violent conflicts, should be encouraged and aided in quickly setting up democratic institutions. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, building democracy in war-torn and corrupt states has offered hope for addressing key problems such as corruption and ineffectiveness.

One of the most discussed topics in comparative politics is the relationship between democracy and economic development. One of the best established results in this field is the positive relationship between income per capita and democracy. As first established by Seymour Martin Lipset, higher levels of income per capita are strongly associated with a higher likelihood that a country will be a democracy; lower income levels with a higher likelihood that a country will be a dictatorship (Lipset 1960).

In this beautifully crafted book, Timur Kuran provides a remarkably rich analysis of how Islamic law impeded economic progress in the Middle East and North Africa. Kuran's views are fresh and powerful, and they are subtle. He does not claim that Islamic law was generally bad for economic activity. He does not claim that prohibitions on interest denied credit to merchants or entrepreneurs. Nor does he claim that predation by absolutist states blocked capitalist accumulation or inhibited commerce.

_________________________ s we cross into the new century, the world seems finally to have turned the corner on population growth. A combination of increased education for women, national and international support for policies of population planning and the spread of economic development and accompanying movement along the demographic transition frontier have led to falling population growth rates around the world.