Papers by Davis Kuykendall
To address what I call the “Uniformity”, “Capriciousness”, and “Reducibility” objections, recent ... more To address what I call the “Uniformity”, “Capriciousness”, and “Reducibility” objections, recent agent-causation theories hold that agent-causation is a type of substance causation. Substance causation consists in substances producing effects by exercising or manifesting their powers. Importantly, these versions of agent-causation assume a realist metaphysics of powers, where powers are properties of substances that can exist unmanifested. However, the realist theories of powers that agent-causal theories have relied upon explicitly hold that powers—rather than their substances—are causes. Substances are merely derivative causes, as the bearers of powers. Critics therefore argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers. In this paper, I argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers only if powers are self-exemplifying properties. I also offer reasons for why powers—especially agent-causal powers—are non-self-exemplifying prope...
Studia Neoaristotelica, 2019
Leibniz argued that (i) substantial forms only begin to exist via Divine creation; (ii) created s... more Leibniz argued that (i) substantial forms only begin to exist via Divine creation; (ii) created substances cannot transeuntly cause accidents in distinct substances; and yet (iii) created substances immanently produce their accidents. Some of Leibniz’s support for (i) came from his endorsement of a widely-made argument against the eduction of substantial forms. However, in defense of eduction, Suárez argued that if creatures cannot produce substantial forms, they also cannot produce accidents, threatening the consistency of (i) and (iii). In this paper, I argue that Leibniz successfully defends the consistency of (i) and (iii) against Suárez’s argument, but at the expense of the consistency of (ii) and (iii).
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2021
Philosophers, tracing back to Aristotle, traditionally distinguished between agents and patients ... more Philosophers, tracing back to Aristotle, traditionally distinguished between agents and patients in causal interactions. Agents interact with patients and patients suffer change as a result. Recently, many philosophers have challenged the agent/patient distinction, arguing instead that causal interactions are symmetrical, consisting in mutually interacting entities. Hence, they also argue that there is no principled basis for the agent/patient distinction. In this paper, I defend the distinction. I do so by arguing that there is a widespread type of causal interaction between distinct entities where an asymmetry results due to the interaction, providing principled grounds for the agent/patient distinction. The type of interaction is when one of the two (or more) interacting entities undergoes a change in its kind membership, structure, causal powers, or intrinsic properties as a result of the interaction, while the other does not. There are many examples of this type of interaction in molecular biology and chemistry. I focus specifically on (i) the actions of enzymes on substrates and (ii) H2O molecules breaking polarized molecules' bonds. After giving a brief overview of previous and historically important accounts of the agent/patient distinction, I present the critics' arguments. I then turn to the positive case, arguing that there are many interactions resulting in an asymmetry that provides a principled basis for distinguishing agents from patients. Finally, I lay out and to a limited extent defend several commitments of my account and respond to objections. Part 1 Agent and Patient Distinction Overview I'll start with an initial characterization of previous accounts of the agent/patient distinction before turning to criticisms of it in Part 2. I'll then defend a nuanced version of the distinction in
Kuykendall, Davis W. Ph.D. Purdue University, August 2016. Leibniz on Intrasubstantial Causation ... more Kuykendall, Davis W. Ph.D. Purdue University, August 2016. Leibniz on Intrasubstantial Causation and Change. Major Professor: Jan Cover. Leibniz argued that in natural world, only intra-substantial or immanent causation is possible— the causation that takes place within an individual, when an individual brings about a change in itself. In this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s arguments against the rival view that posits a world of causally interacting substances and issues pertaining to Leibniz’s own positive metaphysics of immanent causation and change. Chapter 1 is devoted to stage setting for the remainder of the dissertation. I first offer a historically informed overview of efficient causation and change before introducing Leibniz’s novel views, including his criticisms of competing accounts and his own positive account. After presenting a detailed roadmap of my project, I articulate the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz assumed in this dissertation, whe...
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2021
In this paper, I defend the agent/patient distinction against critics who argue that causal inter... more In this paper, I defend the agent/patient distinction against critics who argue that causal interactions are symmetrical. Specifically, I argue that there is a widespread type of causal interaction between distinct entities, resulting in a type of ontological asymmetry that provides principled grounds for distinguishing agents from patients. The type of interaction where the asymmetry is found is when one of the entities undergoes a change in kind, structure, powers, or intrinsic properties as a result of the interaction while the other does not. Interactions of this type are widespread in molecular biology and chemistry. I focus specifically on (i) the actions of enzymes on substrates and (ii) water molecules breaking the bonds of polarized molecules. Finally, I respond to objections by laying out and to a limited extent defending three commitments of my account: emergent entities and powers, realism about chemical kinds or structures, and the assumption of the agent/patient distinction in functional attributions in biology.
Philosophia, 2021
To address what I call the “Uniformity”, “Capriciousness”, and “Reducibility” objections, recent ... more To address what I call the “Uniformity”, “Capriciousness”, and “Reducibility” objections, recent agent-causation theories hold that agent-causation is a type of substance causation. Substance causation consists in substances producing effects by exercising or manifesting their powers. Importantly, these versions of agent-causation assume a realist metaphysics of powers, where powers are properties of substances that can exist unmanifested. However, the realist theories of powers that agent-causal theories have relied upon explicitly hold that powers—rather than their substances—are causes. Substances are merely derivative causes, as the bearers of powers. Critics therefore argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers. In this paper, I argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers only if powers are self-exemplifying properties. I also offer reasons for why powers—especially agent-causal powers—are non-self-exemplifying properties, in support of the irreducibility of agent-causation.
Studia Neoaristotelica, 2019
Leibniz argued that (I) substantial forms only begin to exist via Divine creation; (II) created s... more Leibniz argued that (I) substantial forms only begin to exist via Divine creation; (II) created substances cannot transeuntly cause accidents in distinct substances; and yet (III) created substances immanently produce their accidents. Some of Leibniz’s support for (I) came from his endorsement of a widely-made argument against the eduction of substantial forms. However, in defense of eduction, Suárez argued that if creatures cannot produce substantial forms, they also cannot produce accidents, threatening the consistency of (I) and (III). In this paper, I argue that Leibniz successfully defends the consistency of (I) and (III) against Suárez’s argument, but at the expense of the consistency of (II) and (III).
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019
I argue that the debate between proponents of substance causation (SC) and proponents of causatio... more I argue that the debate between proponents of substance causation (SC) and proponents of causation by powers (PC), as to whether substances or their powers are causes, hinges on whether or not powers (as properties) are self-exemplifying or non-self-exemplifying properties. SC is committed to powers being non-self-exemplifying properties while PC is committed to powers being self-exemplifying properties. I then argue that powers are non-self-exemplifying properties, in support of SC.
Book Reviews by Davis Kuykendall
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2022
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Papers by Davis Kuykendall
Book Reviews by Davis Kuykendall