Rethink.CEE Program

As a result of various crises, the European Union (EU) witnessed the rise of Eurosceptic and/or populist parties in its member states. However, the link between Euroscepticism and populism remains under-theorized, and the East-Central European (ECE) region is still surprisingly under-studied. This paper aims to fill these gaps by studying the development of Eurosceptic populist narratives in Hungary and Poland. Connecting the literature on Euroscepticism and the ideational approach to populism, it is shown through Orbán's and Kaczyński's discourses how (1) the EU is equated with 'the corrupt elite' that stands in conflict with 'the pure people', the Hungarians and Poles, and (2) how the EU is claimed to act against the notion of popular sovereignty. While the article highlights differences between the Eurosceptic populist narratives of the two party leaders, a politically driven 'anti-imperialist' theme prevails in both cases, which differentiates them from their Western-European counterparts as well.

A clientelistic network of media ownership plays a significant role in the unprecedented media capture in Hungary. The government wields power informally, using powerful individuals and companies aligned with Fidesz to silence critical outlets. The EU can and should act.

This paper is a reflection on Zsolt Boda's essay on "Polarization and the disintegration of the polity. Reflections on populism and the future of liberal democracies". He is discussing two specific consequences of populist politics, namely the polarization of the polity and the erosion of democratic norms.

Populism in CEE teaches us amidst the ongoing pandemic crisis, the democratic public is seeking policy changes that give them hope for a brighter future. Left unmet due to the economic downturn,  their demands could evolve into pressure from populists waging cultural war against minorities, blaming foreigners and the EU to further exploiting identity-based anxieties This paper is a reflection on Zsolt Boda’s essay on “Polarization and the disintegration of the polity. Reflections on populism and the future of liberal democracies”.

This paper provides a nuanced picture of demo­cratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland by analyzing the uncodified, informally enforced interactions of the Fidesz and PiS governments that create an uneven playing field to their benefit. This can take various forms of clientelist exchange that create a twofold system of dependence—between the electorate and the government, and within circles closely allied with the regime. It is crucial for the EU to pay greater attention to these problems of informal power in member states like Hungary and Poland because its existing proce­dures for dealing with democratic and rule-of-law backsliding mainly monitor the institutional and legal systems and are ill-suited to address informal mechanisms used by governments.

The aim of this policy paper is threefold. Besides explaining the linkage between Euroscepticism and populism in Hungary and Poland, my goal is to put these cases into comparison with Western (Italian, French) examples. By zooming into the foreign policies of Fidesz and the PiS, I also highlight its various practical advantages
on the domestic level.

Hungary and Poland have seen the most widespread erosion of democracy in the European Union since Fidesz and Law and Justice started their authoritarian remaking in 2010 and 2015, respectively. Despite the EU's introduction of various doctrinal innovations, it could not force these regimes to comply with the core values of the EU. While the literature has focused on the formal violation of the rule of law, the links between informal power and the limited constraining role of the EU have remained undertheorized. This article aims to fill the gap by studying the informal exercise power of the Fidesz and PiS governments that helped them to create an uneven political playing field. Connecting the literature on hybrid authoritarian regimes and informality, it will be shown through three main domains how the Hungarian and Polish governments (1) distributed informal political-economic decisionmaking power informally throughout clientelist corruption, (2) captured the media through loyal oligarchs/allies, and (3) employed electoral clientelism to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor. While the study proposes a theoretical framework related to the Hungarian and Polish examples, it is also a warning for the EU to take the informal exercise of power seriously.

Hungary and Poland have seen the most widespread erosion of democracy in the European Union since Fidesz and Law and Justice started their authoritarian remaking in 2010 and 2015, respectively. Despite the EU's introduction of various doctrinal innovations, it could not force these regimes to comply with the core values of the EU. While the literature has focused on the formal violation of the rule of law, the links between informal power and the limited constraining role of the EU have remained undertheorized. This article aims to fill the gap by studying the informal exercise power of the Fidesz and PiS governments that helped them to create an uneven political playing field. Connecting the literature on hybrid authoritarian regimes and informality, it will be shown through three main domains how the Hungarian and Polish governments (1) distributed informal political-economic decisionmaking power informally throughout clientelist corruption, (2) captured the media through loyal oligarchs/allies, and (3) employed electoral clientelism to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor. While the study proposes a theoretical framework related to the Hungarian and Polish examples, it is also a warning for the EU to take the informal exercise of power seriously.

In a new MapInfluenCE paper, Edit Zgut-Przybylska analyzes the link between the clientelistic hybrid regime built by Viktor Orbán‘s Hungary and Budapest’s burgeoning ties with China. The paper argues that while the Eastern Opening strategy of the Hungarian government largely has not delivered the expected results and the scale of Chinese investments remains small, bilateral projects in cooperation with China help to enrich the networks of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who utilizes procurement-related clientelist corruption to consolidate power. The author analyzes the misuse of settlement bonds, the Budapest-Belgrade railway upgrade project, the Fudan University project as well as COVID-19-related purchases by the government-linked oligarch networks. The paper provides recommendations for the EU on how to address the informal exercise of power in Hungary and the negative aspects of economic engagement with China.

The subject of the thesis is to track the provision of Europeanness justification by capitals of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, whereas the justification is concentrated in less spatial, but slightly more temporal duties based on the inter-war experience of nation-states. Mission of the paper is to define a comparative framework of capital city qualities and its behaviour broadcast (i.e. capitalness) within the three Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Presented Master thesis reveals transformation of Lithuania's foreign policy under framework of Eastern Partnership programme in 2009-2014, thus assessing, whether Lithuania's foreign policy has experienced a shift from small state policy to smart state strategy.
Supervisor: dr. Laurynas Jonavičius
Defended at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science on January 20, 2015. Mark - 9.

The article addresses Lithuania’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009–2014 from the perspective of small states’ abilities to influence decision- making processes within the European Union. The author aims at revealing the puzzle of Lithuania’s marginal capacities of absolute power being disproportional to the output of its foreign policy towards implementation of the Eastern Partnership programme and hence utilising “smart state strategy” conceptualised by Anders Wivel. The novelty of the study rests on expansion of applying the smart state strategy towards the post-negotiation stage of the policy implementation. The article contributes to the debate over the applicability of the “smart state strategy” approach towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, by arguing that Lithuania’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009–2014 does indeed serve as an example of such behaviour, however recognising Lithuania’s initial shift from utilising “small state policy” to “smart state strategy”.

The article addresses Lithuania’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009-2014 from the perspective of small states’ abilities to influence decision making processes within the European Union. The author aims at revealing the puzzle of Lithuania’s marginal capacities of absolute power being disproportional to the output of its foreign policy towards implementation of the Eastern Partnership programme and hence utilising “smart state strategy” conceptualised by Anders Wivel. The novelty of the study rests on expansion of applying the smart state strategy towards the post-negotiation stage of the policy implementation. The article contributes to the debate over the applicability of the “smart state strategy” approach towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, by arguing that Lithuania’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership programme in 2009-2014 does indeed serve as an example of such behaviour, however recognising Lith...