PurposeGlobal and local processing is part of human perceptual organisation, where global process... more PurposeGlobal and local processing is part of human perceptual organisation, where global processing helps extract the “gist” of the visual information and local processing helps perceive the details. Individual differences in these two types of visual processing have been found in autism and ADHD (Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). Virtual reality (VR) has become a more available method of research in the last few decades. No previous research has investigated perceptual differences using this technology.Design/methodology/approachThe objective of the research is to threefold: (1) identify if there is association between ADHD and autistic traits and the performance on the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (ROCF) task, (2) investigate practical effects of using VR drawing tools for research on perceptual experiences and (3) explore any perceptual differences brought out by the three-dimensional nature of the VR. The standard ROCF test was used as a baseline task to investigate t...
This is a short essay on the philosophy of virtual reality forthcoming in The Philosopher's Maga... more This is a short essay on the philosophy of virtual reality forthcoming in The Philosopher's Magazine.
This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactua... more This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation (call this combination CCT), can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT can help us resurrect the much-maligned fragility response to the problems of late pre-emption by understanding fragility in counterpart-theoretic terms. Some reasons to prefer this CCT approach to rivals are discussed.
Is the relation of causation transitive? If c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e does it foll... more Is the relation of causation transitive? If c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e does it follow of necessity that c is a cause of e? To many the transitivity of causation seems like a fundamental part of our causal concept and yet in recent years there have been several counterexamples which purport to show failures of transitivity in fairly ordinary cases. In this paper I will offer a novel treatment of these cases. First I will show that treating events as individuals within a counterpart theory provides the expressive resources to disambiguate and dissolve some of these counterexamples. Next, I will show that a tougher sort of example is immune to this strategy. I will then show that by applying a proportionality constraint to causal claims (akin to Yablo (1992)) we can deal with even the tougher sorts of case. This leaves us with a dilemma: is causation always proportional and therefore transitive, or is it sometimes not proportional and therefore not a transitive relation? I will argue that causation is not transitive but that conceding this is not as costly as one might think.
Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘devi... more Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or coincidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation. I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains.
What is it for an event not to occur? This is an urgent, yet under explored, question
for counte... more What is it for an event not to occur? This is an urgent, yet under explored, question for counterfactual analyses of causation quite generally. In this paper I take a lead from Lewis in identifying two different possible standards of non-occurrence that we might adopt and I argue that we need to apply them asymmetrically: one standard for the cause, another for the effect. This is a surprising result. I then offer a contextualist refinement of the Lewis approach in light of initial problems, and discuss how the asymmetry remained hidden until now. I then relate the non- occurrence problem to issues of transitivity and proportionality in causation, before showing that a parallel problem exists for contrastivist and interventionist approaches to causation too.
Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the ca... more Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to "independently plausible" and "well grounded" theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional (in Yablo's sense) to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, and one that generalises: any attempt to rescue the autonomy of the special sciences, or the efficacy of the mental, from exclusion worries had better not look to proportionality for help.
PurposeGlobal and local processing is part of human perceptual organisation, where global process... more PurposeGlobal and local processing is part of human perceptual organisation, where global processing helps extract the “gist” of the visual information and local processing helps perceive the details. Individual differences in these two types of visual processing have been found in autism and ADHD (Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). Virtual reality (VR) has become a more available method of research in the last few decades. No previous research has investigated perceptual differences using this technology.Design/methodology/approachThe objective of the research is to threefold: (1) identify if there is association between ADHD and autistic traits and the performance on the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (ROCF) task, (2) investigate practical effects of using VR drawing tools for research on perceptual experiences and (3) explore any perceptual differences brought out by the three-dimensional nature of the VR. The standard ROCF test was used as a baseline task to investigate t...
This is a short essay on the philosophy of virtual reality forthcoming in The Philosopher's Maga... more This is a short essay on the philosophy of virtual reality forthcoming in The Philosopher's Magazine.
This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactua... more This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation (call this combination CCT), can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT can help us resurrect the much-maligned fragility response to the problems of late pre-emption by understanding fragility in counterpart-theoretic terms. Some reasons to prefer this CCT approach to rivals are discussed.
Is the relation of causation transitive? If c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e does it foll... more Is the relation of causation transitive? If c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e does it follow of necessity that c is a cause of e? To many the transitivity of causation seems like a fundamental part of our causal concept and yet in recent years there have been several counterexamples which purport to show failures of transitivity in fairly ordinary cases. In this paper I will offer a novel treatment of these cases. First I will show that treating events as individuals within a counterpart theory provides the expressive resources to disambiguate and dissolve some of these counterexamples. Next, I will show that a tougher sort of example is immune to this strategy. I will then show that by applying a proportionality constraint to causal claims (akin to Yablo (1992)) we can deal with even the tougher sorts of case. This leaves us with a dilemma: is causation always proportional and therefore transitive, or is it sometimes not proportional and therefore not a transitive relation? I will argue that causation is not transitive but that conceding this is not as costly as one might think.
Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘devi... more Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or coincidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation. I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains.
What is it for an event not to occur? This is an urgent, yet under explored, question
for counte... more What is it for an event not to occur? This is an urgent, yet under explored, question for counterfactual analyses of causation quite generally. In this paper I take a lead from Lewis in identifying two different possible standards of non-occurrence that we might adopt and I argue that we need to apply them asymmetrically: one standard for the cause, another for the effect. This is a surprising result. I then offer a contextualist refinement of the Lewis approach in light of initial problems, and discuss how the asymmetry remained hidden until now. I then relate the non- occurrence problem to issues of transitivity and proportionality in causation, before showing that a parallel problem exists for contrastivist and interventionist approaches to causation too.
Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the ca... more Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to "independently plausible" and "well grounded" theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional (in Yablo's sense) to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, and one that generalises: any attempt to rescue the autonomy of the special sciences, or the efficacy of the mental, from exclusion worries had better not look to proportionality for help.
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Papers by Neil McDonnell
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for counterfactual analyses of causation quite generally. In this paper I take a lead
from Lewis in identifying two different possible standards of non-occurrence that we
might adopt and I argue that we need to apply them asymmetrically: one standard
for the cause, another for the effect. This is a surprising result. I then offer a
contextualist refinement of the Lewis approach in light of initial problems, and
discuss how the asymmetry remained hidden until now. I then relate the non-
occurrence problem to issues of transitivity and proportionality in causation, before
showing that a parallel problem exists for contrastivist and interventionist
approaches to causation too.
for counterfactual analyses of causation quite generally. In this paper I take a lead
from Lewis in identifying two different possible standards of non-occurrence that we
might adopt and I argue that we need to apply them asymmetrically: one standard
for the cause, another for the effect. This is a surprising result. I then offer a
contextualist refinement of the Lewis approach in light of initial problems, and
discuss how the asymmetry remained hidden until now. I then relate the non-
occurrence problem to issues of transitivity and proportionality in causation, before
showing that a parallel problem exists for contrastivist and interventionist
approaches to causation too.