Impact
serialize-javascript escapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a
<script> element. In 7.1.1 that guarantee does not hold for function
values: a crafted function body can carry a literal, unescaped </script>
into the output, terminating the script element early so the remainder is
parsed as HTML.
SCRIPT_CLOSE_REGEXP used <\/script[^>]*> as its first alternative. The
character class excludes only >, so a single match could run from one
</script all the way to the next > anywhere in the source — swallowing a
second, complete </script> along the way. Only one replacement is emitted
per match, and the plain-code branch neutralizes just the leading <
('< ' + match.slice(1)), so the swallowed tag was re-emitted verbatim.
Reaching that shape requires </script in code position, which is legal
JavaScript: x</script=+/ parses as x < /script=+/, a comparison against a
regex literal.
const serialize = require('serialize-javascript');
const src = "function f(x){ return x</script=+/ + '</script><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }";
const out = serialize({ h: new Function('return ' + src)() });
// {"h":function f(x){ return x< /script=+/ + '</script><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }}
Embedded as the README documents (<script>window.S = <%= serialize(state) %></script>)
and parsed by Chromium, the script element ends at the injected tag and the
<img> becomes a live DOM node with its onerror handler executing in the
page origin.
Only the function path is affected. The same payload passed as data is
escaped correctly, and options.isJSON / non-function values are unaffected.
Patches
Fixed in 7.1.2. The wildcard now excludes < as well as >
([^<>]*), so a match can never reach past a second <. Every </script
in the source therefore either begins its own match or is followed by a
character the HTML tokenizer does not accept as ending a tag name — it ends
the tag name only on TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE, / or >, and emits anything
else as text.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 7.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, 7.1.0 and earlier are
unaffected, or avoid serializing functions whose source text is
attacker-influenced.
Regression note
This is a regression specific to 7.1.1, not a long-standing issue. 7.1.0 and
earlier applied the same wildcard but escaped the entire match, so no tag
survived. Downstream scanners defaulting to a >= 7.1.0 range would be
overly broad.
Impact
serialize-javascriptescapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a<script>element. In 7.1.1 that guarantee does not hold for functionvalues: a crafted function body can carry a literal, unescaped
</script>into the output, terminating the script element early so the remainder is
parsed as HTML.
SCRIPT_CLOSE_REGEXPused<\/script[^>]*>as its first alternative. Thecharacter class excludes only
>, so a single match could run from one</scriptall the way to the next>anywhere in the source — swallowing asecond, complete
</script>along the way. Only one replacement is emittedper match, and the plain-code branch neutralizes just the leading
<(
'< ' + match.slice(1)), so the swallowed tag was re-emitted verbatim.Reaching that shape requires
</scriptin code position, which is legalJavaScript:
x</script=+/parses asx < /script=+/, a comparison against aregex literal.
Embedded as the README documents (
<script>window.S = <%= serialize(state) %></script>)and parsed by Chromium, the script element ends at the injected tag and the
<img>becomes a live DOM node with itsonerrorhandler executing in thepage origin.
Only the function path is affected. The same payload passed as data is
escaped correctly, and
options.isJSON/ non-function values are unaffected.Patches
Fixed in 7.1.2. The wildcard now excludes
<as well as>(
[^<>]*), so a match can never reach past a second<. Every</scriptin the source therefore either begins its own match or is followed by a
character the HTML tokenizer does not accept as ending a tag name — it ends
the tag name only on TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE,
/or>, and emits anythingelse as text.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 7.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, 7.1.0 and earlier are
unaffected, or avoid serializing functions whose source text is
attacker-influenced.
Regression note
This is a regression specific to 7.1.1, not a long-standing issue. 7.1.0 and
earlier applied the same wildcard but escaped the entire match, so no tag
survived. Downstream scanners defaulting to a
>= 7.1.0range would beoverly broad.