@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ use std::process::Stdio;
2727use std:: sync:: OnceLock ;
2828use tokio:: process:: { Child , Command } ;
2929use tracing:: debug;
30+ #[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
31+ use tracing:: warn;
3032
3133const SUPERVISOR_ONLY_ENV_VARS : & [ & str ] = & [
3234 openshell_core:: sandbox_env:: SANDBOX_TOKEN ,
@@ -189,12 +191,68 @@ fn validate_capability_bounding_set_clear(
189191 "Failed to clear unknown child capability bounding set entries: {unknown_err}"
190192 ) ) ,
191193 } ,
194+ Err ( err) if err. code ( ) == libc:: EPERM => {
195+ warn ! (
196+ ?remaining,
197+ "CAP_SETPCAP is unavailable and the child capability bounding set is non-empty; \
198+ the child process relies on seccomp for confinement"
199+ ) ;
200+ Ok ( ( ) )
201+ }
192202 Err ( err) => Err ( miette:: miette!(
193203 "Failed to clear child capability bounding set: {err}"
194204 ) ) ,
195205 }
196206}
197207
208+ /// Probe capability bounding-set availability and emit an OCSF
209+ /// `DetectionFinding` from the parent process when `CAP_SETPCAP` is
210+ /// unavailable and the bounding set is non-empty. Called once before
211+ /// `pre_exec`/`fork()` so the event reaches the tracing subscriber.
212+ #[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
213+ fn log_capability_bounding_set_readiness ( ) {
214+ use std:: sync:: Once ;
215+ static PROBED : Once = Once :: new ( ) ;
216+ let mut already_probed = true ;
217+ PROBED . call_once ( || already_probed = false ) ;
218+ if already_probed {
219+ return ;
220+ }
221+
222+ let has_setpcap = capctl:: caps:: CapState :: get_current ( )
223+ . is_ok_and ( |state| state. effective . has ( capctl:: caps:: Cap :: SETPCAP ) ) ;
224+ let bounding = capctl:: caps:: bounding:: probe ( ) ;
225+
226+ if has_setpcap || bounding. is_empty ( ) {
227+ return ;
228+ }
229+
230+ openshell_ocsf:: ocsf_emit!(
231+ openshell_ocsf:: DetectionFindingBuilder :: new( openshell_ocsf:: ctx:: ctx( ) )
232+ . activity( openshell_ocsf:: ActivityId :: Open )
233+ . severity( openshell_ocsf:: SeverityId :: High )
234+ . confidence( openshell_ocsf:: ConfidenceId :: High )
235+ . is_alert( true )
236+ . finding_info(
237+ openshell_ocsf:: FindingInfo :: new(
238+ "setpcap-unavailable" ,
239+ "CAP_SETPCAP Unavailable With Non-Empty Bounding Set" ,
240+ )
241+ . with_desc(
242+ "The supervisor cannot clear the child capability bounding set \
243+ because CAP_SETPCAP is not in the effective set. \
244+ The child process will rely on seccomp for confinement. \
245+ This is expected in rootless container runtimes with \
246+ AppArmor user-namespace restrictions.",
247+ ) ,
248+ )
249+ . message( format!(
250+ "CAP_SETPCAP unavailable, capability bounding set non-empty: {bounding:?}"
251+ ) )
252+ . build( )
253+ ) ;
254+ }
255+
198256// Pins the pre-seccomp child mount namespace where supervisor identity sockets
199257// are shadowed. Children enter it with setns before dropping privileges.
200258#[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
@@ -548,11 +606,14 @@ impl ProcessHandle {
548606 }
549607 }
550608
551- // Probe Landlock availability and emit OCSF logs from the parent
552- // process where the tracing subscriber is functional. The child's
553- // pre_exec context cannot reliably emit structured logs.
609+ // Probe Landlock and capability bounding-set availability and emit
610+ // OCSF logs from the parent process where the tracing subscriber is
611+ // functional. The child's pre_exec context cannot reliably emit
612+ // structured logs.
554613 #[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
555614 sandbox:: linux:: log_sandbox_readiness ( policy, workdir) ;
615+ #[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
616+ log_capability_bounding_set_readiness ( ) ;
556617
557618 // Phase 1 (as root): Prepare Landlock ruleset by opening PathFds.
558619 // This MUST happen before drop_privileges() so that root-only paths
@@ -1150,22 +1211,17 @@ mod tests {
11501211
11511212 #[ test]
11521213 #[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
1153- fn capability_bounding_set_clear_rejects_nonempty_eperm ( ) {
1214+ fn capability_bounding_set_clear_tolerates_nonempty_eperm ( ) {
11541215 let mut remaining = capctl:: caps:: CapSet :: empty ( ) ;
11551216 remaining. add ( capctl:: caps:: Cap :: CHOWN ) ;
11561217
1157- let result = validate_capability_bounding_set_clear (
1158- Err ( capctl:: Error :: from_code ( libc:: EPERM ) ) ,
1159- remaining,
1160- || panic ! ( "unknown capabilities should not be checked when known caps remain" ) ,
1161- ) ;
1162-
1163- assert ! ( result. is_err( ) ) ;
11641218 assert ! (
1165- result
1166- . unwrap_err( )
1167- . to_string( )
1168- . contains( "Failed to clear child capability bounding set" )
1219+ validate_capability_bounding_set_clear(
1220+ Err ( capctl:: Error :: from_code( libc:: EPERM ) ) ,
1221+ remaining,
1222+ || panic!( "unknown capabilities should not be checked when known caps remain" ) ,
1223+ )
1224+ . is_ok( )
11691225 ) ;
11701226 }
11711227
@@ -1270,21 +1326,7 @@ mod tests {
12701326
12711327 let result = drop_privileges ( & policy) ;
12721328
1273- #[ cfg( target_os = "linux" ) ]
1274- {
1275- if capability_bounding_set_clear_available ( ) {
1276- assert ! ( result. is_ok( ) , "drop_privileges failed: {result:?}" ) ;
1277- } else {
1278- let msg = format ! ( "{}" , result. unwrap_err( ) ) ;
1279- assert ! (
1280- msg. contains( "Failed to clear child capability bounding set" ) ,
1281- "unexpected failure: {msg}"
1282- ) ;
1283- }
1284- }
1285-
1286- #[ cfg( not( target_os = "linux" ) ) ]
1287- assert ! ( result. is_ok( ) ) ;
1329+ assert ! ( result. is_ok( ) , "drop_privileges failed: {result:?}" ) ;
12881330 }
12891331
12901332 #[ test]
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