[HOTFIX] fix(tldraw): allow data:image/svg+xml on <image> with recursive sanitization#8088
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MitjaBezensek merged 1 commit intohotfixesfrom Feb 25, 2026
Merged
[HOTFIX] fix(tldraw): allow data:image/svg+xml on <image> with recursive sanitization#8088MitjaBezensek merged 1 commit intohotfixesfrom
MitjaBezensek merged 1 commit intohotfixesfrom
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…ization (#8087) When you export shapes as SVG, paste back (creates image shape), then export again with other shapes — the second export wraps the first SVG as `<image href="data:image/svg+xml;base64,...">`. On paste, `sanitizeSvg()` strips this href because `sanitizeUri` only allows raster data URIs on `<image>` elements. Result: blank image. This PR decodes the embedded SVG, runs `sanitizeSvg()` recursively (strips scripts/XSS), then re-encodes. Fully malicious embedded SVGs (no safe content left) are still blocked. Also adds a `MAX_NODE_DEPTH=100` cap on `sanitizeNode` recursion to prevent DoS from deeply nested elements. ### Change type - [x] `bugfix` ### Test plan 1. Export a geo shape as SVG 2. Paste it back (creates image shape) 3. Select that image shape + another shape, export as SVG 4. Paste the resulting SVG — the image should render correctly, not be blank - [x] Unit tests ### Release notes - Fixed SVG sanitizer stripping embedded SVG data URIs on `<image>` elements. Nested SVGs (from re-exporting pasted SVG images) are now recursively sanitized instead of blocked. <!-- CURSOR_SUMMARY --> --- > [!NOTE] > **Medium Risk** > Touches XSS-sensitive SVG sanitization logic and introduces recursive decoding/encoding of data URIs, so subtle parsing/encoding or missed edge cases could create security or rendering regressions. > > **Overview** > Fixes a regression where exported SVGs containing nested `<image href="data:image/svg+xml;base64,...">` were being blanked by the sanitizer. > > `sanitizeSvg` now allows `data:image/svg+xml` on `<image>`/`<feImage>` by decoding the embedded SVG, re-running sanitization recursively, and re-encoding the sanitized result (dropping the `href` entirely if the embedded SVG has no safe content). Adds an embed recursion depth limit and new unit tests covering safe embedded SVG preservation and script-stripping behavior. > > <sup>Written by [Cursor Bugbot](https://cursor.com/dashboard?tab=bugbot) for commit 8297037. This will update automatically on new commits. Configure [here](https://cursor.com/dashboard?tab=bugbot).</sup> <!-- /CURSOR_SUMMARY -->
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This is an automated hotfix PR for dotcom deployment.
Original PR: #8087![]()
with recursive sanitization
Original Title: fix(tldraw): allow data:image/svg+xml on
Original Author: @MitjaBezensek
This PR cherry-picks the changes from the original PR to the hotfixes branch for immediate dotcom deployment.
/cc @MitjaBezensek
Note
Medium Risk
Touches XSS-hardening logic and changes which
data:URIs are permitted on<image>, so mistakes could reintroduce injection vectors or break image rendering; recursion depth limiting reduces worst-case risk.Overview
sanitizeSvgnow allowsdata:image/svg+xmlURLs on<image>/<feImage>by decoding and recursively sanitizing the embedded SVG, then re-encoding it as a data URI; unsafe/invalid embedded SVG (or overly deep nesting) causes thehrefto be removed.This introduces helpers for data-URI decode/encode, threads a recursion
depththrough node/attribute sanitization, and expands tests to cover preserving safe embedded SVG, stripping scripts from mixed-content embeds, and continuing to block fully malicious embeds.Written by Cursor Bugbot for commit aa36002. This will update automatically on new commits. Configure here.