You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
[BUG] Pretty sure this repo got hacked and if you use this it will send your secrets to a hacker #2464
Thanks for reporting this issue, don't forget to star this project if you haven't already to help us reach a wider audience.
Reacted by mary, Mason Brott, Nikita Ilinykh, कारतोफ्फेलस्क्रिप्ट™, Vìncent Le Goff and Koki Nakashima
Reacted by Nicholas de Paola , nicolasgere, Andrei Filippov, William Yardley, Patrick Dung, Vasyl Teliman, Kristian Dupont, Saatvik Arya, Andreas Røssland, Hiroshi Muraoka and 11 more
fwiw, it doesn't appear to send/push the secrets anywhere, but rather print the secrets to the logs in a double base64 encoded string, and then the hacker/anyone can scan the publicly available GHA runner logs of the job runs. So public repos are most at risk it seems.
Reacted by Leroy231, Cameron, William Yardley, camilodiazsal and Alexis Lucattini
fwiw, it doesn't appear to send/push the secrets anywhere, but rather print the secrets to the logs in a double base64 encoded string, and then the hacker/anyone can scan the publicly available GHA runner logs of the job runs. So public repos are most at risk it seems.
Private repos should still not use this action until there is an all clear. This is either:
Maintainer compromise
Rogue maintainer
In both cases, the actor responsible can trivially update the backdoor to exfiltrate credentials too.
Reacted by Elijah Lynn, Matthew Lorimor, Tristan Hill and Megamind
Done, thanks for the link, didn't know about that yet!
For everyone else, please submit one too to stop this from spreading further, you can copy/paste this:
URGENT: hundreds/thousands of `github_token` secrets leaked, and many more.
See https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/issues/2463
Reacted by Claiborne Flinn, Will Da Silva, devyn, Cameron, Devin Buhl, Michael Feil and William Yardley
Reacted by Claiborne Flinn, Cameron, Devin Buhl and Michael Feil
Does this only affect public repos, or is there an exploitable surface area in private repos, too?
@bachya As of this moment it only prints secrets to the actions log in double base64 encoded format. So technically not exploitable in private repo's, but doesn't mean this couldn't be changed.
This could be an issue in private repos (especially for organizations) if there are members who can view the private repo but do not have the same access level as the workflow token, or who do not have access to the same secrets as the workflow.
This assumes you're pinned to the compromised commit, and not to a tag. If you've pinned a tag, assume that whoever did this may update it further to do other things.
Yes I think we are all very intrigued to know the RCA of this, for an action with over 22k public installs it would very good to be transparent here.
Reacted by Daniel Manners, Steven Kreitzer, Devin Buhl, Diana, Bryan Jones, Jonathon Lacher, Aaron Bach, Abdirahman Mohamed, Peter Pathirana, François Proulx and 2 more
@intrigus-lgtm@onedr0p This attack appears to have been conducted from a PAT token linked to @tj-actions-bot account to which "GitHub is not able to determine how this PAT was compromised."
Account Security Enhancements
The password for the tj-actions-bot account has been updated.
Authentication has been upgraded to use a passkey for enhanced security.
The tj-actions-bot account role has been updated to ensure it has only the minimum necessary permissions.
GitHub proactively revoked the compromised Personal Access Token (PAT) and flagged the organization to prevent further exploitation.
Reacted by Devin Buhl, intrigus-lgtm, Matthew Lorimor, Daniel Manners, Mark Esler, Derek Gurchik, François Proulx, John de Freitas, Avish Jha, linchun and 1 more
Can you explicitly state or link to the tag with the fix instead of saying to use the latest version please? Also, this is worth calling out in main README that everyone should update to an explicitly stated version or later.
Reacted by Matthew McEachen and Akshay Iyyadurai Balasundaram
@jackton1 fwiw, we built Octo STS to eliminate our own usage of GitHub PATs for automation exactly like this in favor of federated trust relationships. Personally I'd love it if GitHub would just launch their own, so we don't have to run this, but if you'd have any interest in discussing it after the dust settles, feel free to reach out to me.
My meta concern is that without knowing how the PAT leaked, there's no telling whether it will simply leak again by the same means.
Reacted by Megamind, Andrew Watson, David Costa and David Vo
Reacted by Jason Hall, Darius Jahandarie and Ryan Cox
Can you explicitly state or link to the tag with the fix instead of saying to use the latest version please? Also, this is worth calling out in main README that everyone should update to an explicitly stated version or later.
Hi @ppat, all tags have been restored and fixed, except for v45.0.5 through v45.0.9. These versions all point to the latest commit on main.
@jackton1 fwiw, we built Octo STS to eliminate our own usage of GitHub PATs for automation exactly like this in favor of federated trust relationships. Personally I'd love it if GitHub would just launch their own, so we don't have to run this, but if you'd have any interest in discussing it after the dust settles, feel free to reach out to me.
My meta concern is that without knowing how the PAT leaked, there's no telling whether it will simply leak again by the same means.
HI @mattmoor, Thank you for sharing this, and I appreciate the suggestion regarding Octo STS. It’s an interesting approach to improving security for automation workflows, and I agree that having GitHub provide a similar solution natively would be ideal. Once things settle down, I’d be happy to discuss this further and learn more about your implementation.
I completely understand the importance of identifying the root cause of the PAT leak to prevent recurrence. I’m actively working to investigate how the leak occurred and will take steps to ensure that the same vulnerability cannot be exploited again.
@intrigus-lgtm@onedr0p This attack appears to have been conducted from a PAT token linked to @tj-actions-bot account to which "GitHub is not able to determine how this PAT was compromised."
Account Security Enhancements
* The password for the `tj-actions-bot` account has been updated.
* Authentication has been upgraded to use a passkey for enhanced security.
* The tj-actions-bot account role has been updated to ensure it has only the minimum necessary permissions.
* GitHub proactively revoked the compromised Personal Access Token (PAT) and flagged the organization to prevent further exploitation.
You may also want to consider requiring only signed commits to this repo.
@mceachen Thank you for the suggestion! Requiring signed commits has been enabled which wasn’t initially required to ensure the integrity of all contributions. We’ll continue to monitor and enhance security measures as needed to prevent any future incidents. If you have any additional recommendations, feel free to share them.
@jackton1 Do you have proof that the access came from the PAT? If so, where was that PAT stored and how was it used? Presumably, since it's your bot, you're the only one with access to the PAT, correct?
Regardless of the PAT though, it seems clear in the PR logs that the commits were pushed from your own account, not from the @tj-actions-bot account:
@jackton1 Do you have proof that the access came from the PAT? If so, where was that PAT stored and how was it used? Presumably, since it's your bot, you're the only one with access to the PAT, correct?
Regardless of the PAT though, it seems clear in the PR logs that the commits were pushed from your own account, not from the @tj-actions-bot account:
The author of the commit is clearly misleading see the details of commit here: #2463 (comment)
How the PAT was obtained unfortunately "GitHub is not able to determine how this PAT was compromised."
This is not reassuring that you don’t know how the PAT was compromised… makes me think it’ll just happen again.
The Personal access token affected was stored as a GitHub action secret which has since been revoked. Going forward no PAT would be used for all projects in the tj-actions organization to prevent any risk of reoccurrence. We’ll continue to monitor and enhance security measures as needed to prevent any future incidents. If you have any additional recommendations, feel free to share them.
Activity
tj-actions-bot commentedon Mar 14, 2025
Thanks for reporting this issue, don't forget to star this project if you haven't already to help us reach a wider audience.
varunsh-coder commentedon Mar 14, 2025
I had created an issue for this incident here: #2463
gaby commentedon Mar 14, 2025
Ping @jackton1
Please add 2FA to your account!
ElijahLynn commentedon Mar 14, 2025
fwiw, it doesn't appear to send/push the secrets anywhere, but rather print the secrets to the logs in a double base64 encoded string, and then the hacker/anyone can scan the publicly available GHA runner logs of the job runs. So public repos are most at risk it seems.
AdnaneKhan commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Private repos should still not use this action until there is an all clear. This is either:
In both cases, the actor responsible can trivially update the backdoor to exfiltrate credentials too.
gaby commentedon Mar 15, 2025
@nikitastupin Can you delete that
memdump.pyfile?ElijahLynn commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Every tag got pointed to this malicious commit:
https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/tags
gaby commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Report the repo as active malware so GitHub can disable it in the meantime.
https://support.github.com/contact/report-abuse?category=report-content&report=tj-actions&report_content_url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Ftj-actions%2Fchanged-files&report_id=67116787&report_type=content
ElijahLynn commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Done, thanks for the link, didn't know about that yet!
For everyone else, please submit one too to stop this from spreading further, you can copy/paste this:
bachya commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Does this only affect public repos, or is there an exploitable surface area in private repos, too?
smbonn2005 commentedon Mar 15, 2025
@bachya As of this moment it only prints secrets to the actions log in double base64 encoded format. So technically not exploitable in private repo's, but doesn't mean this couldn't be changed.
tdorianh commentedon Mar 15, 2025
This could be an issue in private repos (especially for organizations) if there are members who can view the private repo but do not have the same access level as the workflow token, or who do not have access to the same secrets as the workflow.
This assumes you're pinned to the compromised commit, and not to a tag. If you've pinned a tag, assume that whoever did this may update it further to do other things.
NetOpWibby commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Seems like this isn't meant to be a malicious takeover. The author of the gist also made this: https://github.com/nikitastupin/pwnhub ("How GitHub Actions workflows can be hacked")
ryanaslett commentedon Mar 15, 2025
The author of the gist likely has nothing to do with this, and somebody has taken their POC's and implemented them IRL.
7 remaining items
onedr0p commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Yes I think we are all very intrigued to know the RCA of this, for an action with over 22k public installs it would very good to be transparent here.
LorenzoRogai commentedon Mar 15, 2025
why does this still exist though? can we really be sure to start using it again?
0e58ed8
jackton1 commentedon Mar 15, 2025
@intrigus-lgtm @onedr0p This attack appears to have been conducted from a PAT token linked to @tj-actions-bot account to which "GitHub is not able to determine how this PAT was compromised."
Account Security Enhancements
tj-actions-botaccount has been updated.ppat commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Can you explicitly state or link to the tag with the fix instead of saying to use the latest version please? Also, this is worth calling out in main README that everyone should update to an explicitly stated version or later.
mattmoor commentedon Mar 15, 2025
@jackton1 fwiw, we built Octo STS to eliminate our own usage of GitHub PATs for automation exactly like this in favor of federated trust relationships. Personally I'd love it if GitHub would just launch their own, so we don't have to run this, but if you'd have any interest in discussing it after the dust settles, feel free to reach out to me.
My meta concern is that without knowing how the PAT leaked, there's no telling whether it will simply leak again by the same means.
jackton1 commentedon Mar 15, 2025
Hi @ppat, all tags have been restored and fixed, except for v45.0.5 through v45.0.9. These versions all point to the latest commit on main.
jackton1 commentedon Mar 15, 2025
HI @mattmoor, Thank you for sharing this, and I appreciate the suggestion regarding Octo STS. It’s an interesting approach to improving security for automation workflows, and I agree that having GitHub provide a similar solution natively would be ideal. Once things settle down, I’d be happy to discuss this further and learn more about your implementation.
I completely understand the importance of identifying the root cause of the PAT leak to prevent recurrence. I’m actively working to investigate how the leak occurred and will take steps to ensure that the same vulnerability cannot be exploited again.
mceachen commentedon Mar 15, 2025
You may also want to consider requiring only signed commits to this repo.
jackton1 commentedon Mar 15, 2025
@mceachen Thank you for the suggestion! Requiring signed commits has been enabled which wasn’t initially required to ensure the integrity of all contributions. We’ll continue to monitor and enhance security measures as needed to prevent any future incidents. If you have any additional recommendations, feel free to share them.
Mohamed-E commentedon Mar 15, 2025
@jackton1 Do you know the scope of the secrets that could have been exposed? Workflow level? Repo level? Org level? Or just all secrets in the chain?
nightpool commentedon Mar 16, 2025
@jackton1 Do you have proof that the access came from the PAT? If so, where was that PAT stored and how was it used? Presumably, since it's your bot, you're the only one with access to the PAT, correct?
Regardless of the PAT though, it seems clear in the PR logs that the commits were pushed from your own account, not from the @tj-actions-bot account:
osdiab commentedon Mar 16, 2025
This is not reassuring that you don’t know how the PAT was compromised… makes me think it’ll just happen again.
jackton1 commentedon Mar 16, 2025
The author of the commit is clearly misleading see the details of commit here: #2463 (comment)
How the PAT was obtained unfortunately "GitHub is not able to determine how this PAT was compromised."
jackton1 commentedon Mar 16, 2025
The Personal access token affected was stored as a GitHub action secret which has since been revoked. Going forward no PAT would be used for all projects in the tj-actions organization to prevent any risk of reoccurrence. We’ll continue to monitor and enhance security measures as needed to prevent any future incidents. If you have any additional recommendations, feel free to share them.