This case measures how a weak service credential can connect separate access-control mistakes into one domain-level path.
I built an isolated three-VM Active Directory lab to examine one deliberately vulnerable identity path from discovery through remediation. The environment used a Windows Server 2022 domain controller, a Windows Server 2022 member server, and a Kali assessment workstation on a host-only VMware network with no default gateway.
The exercise had a narrow goal: validate whether a low-privilege user could discover a service account, recover its lab-only credential within a fixed offline budget, follow one delegated directory edge, and reach a protected marker. I then removed each intentional weakness and repeated the relevant checks.
All accounts, credentials, addresses, and directory objects were created only for this local lab. No production systems or external targets were involved.
| System | Role | Lab address |
|---|---|---|
| DC01 | Domain controller and DNS server for adlab.test |
192.168.112.10 |
| APP01 | Domain member server | 192.168.112.20 |
| KALI01 | Assessment workstation | 192.168.112.30 |
Each guest used VMware VMnet1. DHCP and default gateways were disabled for the lab guests. Coordinated powered-off snapshots preserved clean, scenario-ready, and remediated Windows states.
The scenario began with the lab-only analyst account. A read-only directory query identified one service account, svc_web, with the expected HTTP service principal name for APP01.
I requested one Kerberos service ticket and used a fixed offline budget of 400 candidates. The lab credential was recovered in 31 seconds. The ticket, hash, recovered credential, and raw tool output stayed in temporary memory-backed storage and were removed after the run.
The recovered account could open APP01's administrative share in a read-only validation. I did not perform remote execution, remote writes, persistence, or broad host enumeration.
The directory path continued through one precise group-member delegation and two directory replication rights assigned to an otherwise unprivileged lab group. The rules of engagement limited the proof to the dedicated scenario_da account. A non-interactive check then reached a Domain Admin-only marker on DC01.
The directory rights had broader technical capability than the exercise used. That distinction was documented in the manifest and enforced as an operator restriction during the run.
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Service accounts targeted | 1 |
| Offline candidate budget | 400 |
| Offline recovery time | 31 seconds |
| APP01 administrative-share validation | Successful, read only |
| Remote execution or remote write | None |
| Directory proof target | scenario_da only |
| Persistence | None |
| Temporary sensitive artifacts after cleanup | 0 |
I remediated the path in stages so each control could be checked independently:
| Weakness | Remediation | Retest |
|---|---|---|
| Human-managed service credential and SPN | Rotated the svc_web credential, enabled password expiration, and removed the SPN |
A low-privilege query returned no SPN for svc_web |
| Service account was local administrator on APP01 | Removed ADLAB\svc_web from local Administrators |
APP01 denied the former administrative-share access |
| Delegated group-member control | Removed the member-attribute rule | No delegated member rule remained |
| Directory replication rights | Removed both replication rules | No scenario replication rule remained |
| Previously recovered privileged proof credential | Rotated scenario_da and enabled password expiration |
The former stored credential was rejected |
A final low-privilege directory query returned no SPN for svc_web. The APP01 secure channel and zero-default-route control remained valid after remediation.
The selected images below show the isolation gate and two bounded results. The first is a cropped terminal capture. The other two are sanitized operator summaries backed by private working evidence.
Before testing, KALI01 used the lab subnet, queried DC01 for DNS, and had no IPv4 or IPv6 default route. APP01's SMB service was reachable from KALI01 on the lab network.
Raw screenshots and sensitive exercise material remain outside Git in a private local evidence directory. Public images exclude passwords, tickets, hashes, authentication commands, host paths, VMware controls, and unrelated desktop content.
Sanitized summaries are presentation artifacts, not independent proof. Supporting screenshots remain private and are not intended for publication.
The verified Kali management path uses public-key SSH. Kali console password login has not been verified and is not claimed as part of the completed work.


