@@ -108,24 +108,43 @@ implementation/tests, prior accepted fixes, and platform semantics.
108108- #3242 's construct trap and #3244 's completion-teardown — behavior changes
109109 without a defect.
110110
111- ** Rulings required before any implementation:**
112-
113- 1 . #3239 flash cookie: ` __Host- ` rename (wire break), SameSite choice
114- (the PR's Lax claim is factually wrong), lifetime, and whether raw form
115- input belongs in the cookie at all.
116- 2 . #3249 flash ` url ` identity on overflow: refuse, digest, or explicit
117- truncation flag — never a silent prefix.
118- 3 . #3250 refused no-JS navigation: which statuses (if any) become 303s; the
119- PR's version redirects CSRF refusals and sets cookies pre-origin-check.
120- 4 . #3252 ` targetUrl ` contract: does a same-origin ` Location ` alone name the
121- destination without a ` Referer ` ?
122- 5 . #3240 /#3238 ` wrapInvocation ` semantics: entry-only vs hop-by-hop per-handler
123- hooks, and whether invalid hook values fall back, disable, or throw.
124- 6 . #3237 ` withMeta({ method }) ` post-GET: throw, revoke, or document.
125- 7 . #3241 nested deferred scope: which carriers (objects/arrays vs Set/Map/
126- frozen) are supported, and whether returned containers may be mutated.
127- 8 . #3248 whether a ` undefined ` outcome writes a flash cookie.
128- 9 . #3242 whether ` new serverFn() ` deserves runtime rejection.
111+ ** Rulings — resolved 2026-09-03:**
112+
113+ 1 . #3239 flash cookie: the payload (including form ` input ` , which the router's
114+ ` filter(s.input) ` attribution requires on the flash-seeded render) is
115+ AES-GCM encrypted, always. Key resolution: explicit ` secret ` option →
116+ bundler-injected ` globalThis.__SOLID_FLASH_KEY__ ` → no key means no flash
117+ cookie plus a dev diagnostic. Envelope gains ` SameSite=Lax ` and
118+ ` Max-Age=60 ` ; the recorded ` url ` is the unbound base so ` .with() ` -bound
119+ forms match ` fn.base ` . No ` __Host- ` rename, no redaction heuristics.
120+ 2 . #3249 flash overflow: refuse to flash (plain redirect, no cookie) — never a
121+ silent prefix. Landed in ` 3393fb62 ` .
122+ 3 . #3250 refused no-JS navigation: ratified as-is — security refusals keep raw
123+ statuses and never flash; a refused request is of unproven origin and its
124+ ` Referer ` is attacker-controlled. Closed, no code change.
125+ 4 . #3252 ` targetUrl ` : a same-origin ` Location ` is server-authored and alone
126+ names the fold destination; no ` Referer ` corroboration. Closed as ratified.
127+ 5 . #3240 /#3238 ` wrapInvocation ` : entry-only semantics kept and pinned
128+ (` c08e9742 ` ); invalid hook values throw at hook resolution on both roads
129+ (` ed6b6053 ` ). No hop-by-hop propagation.
130+ 6 . #3237 ` withMeta({ method }) ` against an existing grant: throws in dev,
131+ fails closed (grant revoked) in prod (` 12263816 ` ).
132+ 7 . #3241 supported carriers: plain objects and arrays, copy-on-write — user
133+ containers are never mutated; Set/Map/frozen slots documented out of scope
134+ (` 84a94bc1 ` ).
135+ 8 . #3248 ` undefined ` outcome: writes no flash cookie, pinned by test
136+ (` f21e060b ` ).
137+ 9 . #3242 construction: native Proxy semantics stay; no construct trap.
138+
139+ ** Landed fixes (all merged to ` next ` 2026-09-03):** #3232 ` ff2ecf11 ` ,
140+ #3234 ` c0bc9baa ` , #3235 ` 5cee0f77 ` , #3236 ` 7009adfd ` , #3237 ` 12263816 ` ,
141+ #3238 ` ed6b6053 ` , #3241 ` 84a94bc1 ` , #3244 ` b7b17abf ` , #3245 ` 6c9f8f45 ` ,
142+ #3246 ` 292bdc52 ` , #3247 ` a1ff2860 ` , #3248 ` f21e060b ` , #3249 ` 3393fb62 ` ,
143+ #3251 ` a14c1385 ` , #3253 ` 6bb51c9b ` . Every issue in the sweep is closed;
144+ the #3239 encrypted-flash runtime and its vite-plugin key-injection
145+ companion are the remaining implementation work. The ** audit** /** ruling**
146+ markers in the tables above record the pre-triage state and read as
147+ resolved per this section.
129148
130149## Extraction and merge discipline
131150
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