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crash: chromewebstore.google.com detail page → SIGSEGV in browser process (Electron 44 exposes chrome.webstorePrivate without a delegate) #346

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Description

@meinharrd

Report

Open https://chromewebstore.google.com/ and click any extension card. The whole app crashes. Reported by @meinharrd on 2026-09-11 against the shipped build (platform not yet recorded here, presumably the macOS 0.8.5 package).

What I could not reproduce (Linux x64, xvfb, real network, real nodes)

Every run below loaded the store, dismissed Google's EU consent page and the "Switch to Chrome?" popup, then clicked the first in-viewport card (Google Translate). The app stayed up and the detail page rendered (screenshot below).

build click style result
main d69affb, from source real mouse click via host window detail page, no crash
main, from source in-page a.click() (SPA route) detail page, no crash
main, from source middle-click opened in new tab, no crash
main, from source Ctrl+click opened in new tab, no crash
main, from source address-bar navigation to the detail URL detail page, no crash
0.8.5 39f1cd5, from source real mouse click detail page, no crash
main packaged (electron-builder --linux --x64, linux-unpacked/freedom) real mouse click detail page, no crash

Electron 44.3.0 / Chromium 152 in all runs. No render-process-gone, child-process-gone or uncaught exception in the main-process log during the click. The only main-process crash seen is at quit and is unrelated to this page: #345.

So on Linux the click path is fine. The crash is platform- or environment-specific, and the next step needs data from the machine that crashes.

Needed from the reporting machine

  • OS and architecture, Freedom version (About), and whether it is the DMG/DEB/AppImage/NSIS install or a source run.
  • The main-process log: macOS ~/Library/Logs/Freedom/main.log, Linux ~/.config/Freedom/logs/main.log, Windows %APPDATA%\Freedom\logs\main.log. The last ~50 lines before the crash.
  • The OS crash report. macOS: the newest Freedom-*.ips in ~/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/ (Console.app → Crash Reports). Its termination block and the crashed thread's stack tell us whether this is a main-process abort (like ipfs: main process aborts (SIGABRT) on quit — napi_throw fatal in freedom-ipfs-event-worker #345's napi_throw), a Chromium CHECK, or a GPU/renderer death that took the window with it.
  • Whether it also happens with the wallet locked / a fresh profile (Profiles → New), and with adblock off. That separates profile state from the page itself.
  • Whether navigating straight to a detail URL (e.g. https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/google-translate/aapbdbdomjkkjkaonfhkkikfgjllcleb) crashes too, or only the click from the store front.

Note that Freedom never calls crashReporter.start(), so there are no minidumps of our own under crash-reports/; the OS report is the only trace.

Also observed on this page (not the crash, worth their own issues if confirmed)

  • webview-preload fails to inject the Swarm and Radicle providers on Google's pages: Failed to set the 'textContent' property on 'HTMLScriptElement': This document requires 'TrustedScript' assignment. Any site with a Trusted Types CSP gets no window.swarm / window.radicle. Caught, not fatal.
  • [adblock-update] feed read failed: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'makeReader') a few seconds after the page loads. The filter engine itself reported ready.
  • Google's own bundle logs Uncaught (in promise) Error: wd after the SPA route; harmless.

Repro driver used

Playwright _electron launcher, FREEDOM_TEST_MODE unset (live network), FREEDOM_TEST_USER_DATA pointed at a scratch dir; stdout/stderr of the Electron process captured to a file; click delivered with win.mouse.click(webviewRect.x + cardRect.x, webviewRect.y + cardRect.y) after scrollIntoView inside the guest. The ELECTRON_ENABLE_LOGGING=1 stream is what shows a crash if one happens.

Activity

  1. meinharrd commented on Sep 11, 2026

    @meinharrd
    ContributorAuthor

    Reproduced on macOS, root-caused: Electron 44 exposes chrome.webstorePrivate to the store page

    Environment: macOS 26.6.2 (25G83), arm64, /Applications/Freedom.app 0.8.5 (DMG install), Electron 44.3.0 / Chromium 152.0.7977.78, fresh scratch profile (FREEDOM_TEST_USER_DATA), live network. Driver: Playwright _electron with executablePath on the installed app.

    run result
    store front → consent "Reject all" → click Google Translate card SIGSEGV 0.4 s after the click
    direct navigation to /detail/google-translate/aapbdbdomjkkjkaonfhkkikfgjllcleb SIGSEGV ~1 s after the page lands, no click needed
    same click, but delete chrome.webstorePrivate executed in the page first no crash, detail page renders, clean exit
    electron . from the source tree with the Electron 43.4.1 in node_modules no crash

    Fresh profile crashes too, so profile state, wallet lock state and adblock are ruled out. The three Freedom-*.ips reports from the original machine have the identical stack.

    Crash report

    EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV), KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS at 0x0, faulting thread CrBrowserMain (browser/main process), x0 = 0. Symbolicated with Electron's published breakpad symbols for v44.3.0 (Electron Framework UUID 4C4C44E3-5555-3144-A193-1D6578CCBF56 matches):

    0 extensions::WebstorePrivateGetReferrerChainFunction::Run()            webstore_private_api.cc:1440
    2 ExtensionFunction::RunWithValidation()
    3 extensions::ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::DispatchWithCallbackInternal(...)
    5 extensions::ExtensionFrameHost::Request(...)
    6 extensions::mojom::LocalFrameHostStubDispatch::AcceptWithResponder(...)
    8 mojo::InterfaceEndpointClient::HandleIncomingMessageThunk::Accept(...)
    

    Chromium 152 extensions/browser/api/webstore_private/webstore_private_api.cc:1440:

      if (!ExtensionsAPIClient::Get()
               ->GetWebstorePrivateAPIDelegate()          // nullptr in Electron
               ->IsSafeBrowsingEnabledAndReady(browser_context())) {

    Why

    Since the Chromium 152 roll the webstorePrivate API lives in //extensions instead of //chrome, so Electron 44 compiles and registers it and ships the core _api_features.json entry that exposes it to ordinary web pages on https://chromewebstore.google.com/*. Electron provides no WebstorePrivateAPIDelegate, so the first chrome.webstorePrivate.* call from the page is a null-pointer method call in the browser process. Probing the store page in 0.8.5 confirms it gets a real chrome.webstorePrivate with 19 functions (getReferrerChain, install, beginInstallWithManifest3, getExtensionStatus, ...), all configurable/writable; the store calls getReferrerChain as soon as a detail page is shown. Not Freedom code.

    Upstream fix: electron/electron#53752 "fix: don't expose chrome.webstorePrivate to web pages" (merged to main 2026-09-09, backported to 45-x-y). The 44-x-y backport electron/electron#53776 is still open, so no released Electron 44.x contains it yet. Electron 43.x predates the roll and is unaffected, matching the source control run above.

    About the Linux non-repro

    The repo's node_modules/electron is 43.4.1 while package-lock.json pins 44.3.0. A from source run or an electron-builder package built from stale node_modules uses 43.4.1, which does not expose the API. Worth re-checking the Linux runs with process.versions.electron from inside the app rather than the lockfile.

    Options

    • Bump electron once a 44.x release with #53776 ships (or move to 45 when stable).
    • Interim app-side workaround: in the webview preload, on chromewebstore.google.com / chrome.google.com/webstore, run webFrame.executeJavaScript('delete chrome.webstorePrivate') at document start. Deleting the property is exactly what kept the app alive in the control run, and executeJavaScript is not subject to Google's Trusted Types CSP that blocks the current <script> provider injection.
  2. added this to the v0.8.6 milestone on Sep 11, 2026
  3. changed the title [-]crash: chromewebstore.google.com → click any extension → hard crash (reported on 0.8.5; not reproducible on Linux)[/-] [+]crash: chromewebstore.google.com detail page → SIGSEGV in browser process (Electron 44 exposes chrome.webstorePrivate without a delegate)[/+] on Sep 11, 2026
  4. added a commit that references this issue on Sep 17, 2026
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