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driver: add an access policy that bypasses governance retention - #16
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Keys issued by this driver can never bypass GOVERNANCE retention: neither readonly nor readwrite grants BypassGovernanceRetention, so on a bucket with Object Lock a GOVERNANCE retention behaves exactly like COMPLIANCE. Backup tools rely on a designated key being able to remove or rewrite such objects before they expire, which is the point of GOVERNANCE. Add a readwrite-governance-bypass accessPolicy that grants everything readwrite grants plus BypassGovernanceRetention, scoped to the bucket like the other actions. readwrite stays as it is, so no existing key gains the bypass. SeaweedFS matches this bucket-scoped grant from 4.48 on. Up to 4.47 the server builds the action it checks with the object key already attached and CanDo appends the bucket again, so only Admin passes. The README documents the policies and that minimum. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <[email protected]>
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Review comments at @pkg/driver/provisioner.go:
- Around line 746-747: Update DriverGrantBucketAccess to prevent a repeat grant
from adding bypass-governance actions to an identity that already has
credentials from a different policy; use a separate identity for bypass-enabled
access or reject the policy change. Add a repeat-grant test that verifies the
existing readwrite credential cannot gain the bypass action.
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…#5284) ## What this PR does This PR bumps seaweedfs COSI driver to v0.4.0, because v0.3.1 can lose a grant for good: BucketAccess reports `accessGranted` and its Secret is written, but S3 gateways keep rejecting the key with `InvalidAccessKeyId`. Fixes #4912. Driver v0.3.1 grants access by rewriting legacy `/etc/iam/identity.json`, and every S3 gateway migrates this file to per-identity files and renames it away on each change, so grant written during migration is dropped. v0.4.0 also writes `/etc/iam/identities/<user>.json` on grant (seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#15). First version of this PR built the driver from that upstream commit, now upstream released v0.4.0 so it's just a tag bump. Rest of v0.4.0 doesn't reach the platform: - `readwrite-governance-bypass` access policy (seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#16) is opt-in, none of our BucketAccessClasses use it. - Bucket deletion is refused while objects hold an active lock (seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#18), only for object-lock buckets. All `-lock` BucketClasses are `Retain`, and sidecar calls DriverDeleteBucket only for `Delete`. - Filer errors (seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#20) are now matched by exact not-found message, I checked it against seaweedfs 4.45 filer and formats match. One behavior change: bucket deletion doesn't ignore errors of the recursive delete anymore, so sidecar retries instead of reporting success. How I tested (seaweedfs 4.45, two S3 gateways): Bucket with one user, then three more users added in one change, after a minute ListObjects with each user key, rejected key retried once more after 30s. Five runs for each driver, the fixed one is a build of `5efd120`, the commit v0.4.0 takes the grant fix from: | driver | keys rejected for good | | --- | --- | | v0.3.1 | 5 of 20 (4 runs out of 5 lost at least one) | | `5efd120` | 0 of 20 | Same failure broke v1.7.1-rc.1 e2e, RabbitMQ backup round-trip got `403 InvalidAccessKeyId` for freshly granted key: https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/actions/runs/42980741995 Keys already lost on running clusters stay broken after upgrade. Workaround from #4912 still works: remove user from Bucket, wait until its BucketAccess is gone, add it back. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(seaweedfs): bucket users granted together could get S3 keys that never work (403 InvalidAccessKeyId). COSI driver is bumped to v0.4.0, which writes each grant to per-identity IAM file. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Updates** * Updated the SeaweedFS COSI driver to version `v0.4.0`. * The updated driver writes IAM files per identity, helping preserve grants when identity files are updated. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
Describe your changes
Keys issued by this driver can never bypass GOVERNANCE retention. Neither
readonlynorreadwritegrantsBypassGovernanceRetention, so on a bucket with Object Lock a GOVERNANCE retention behaves exactly like COMPLIANCE. Backup tools rely on a designated key being able to remove or rewrite such objects before they expire, which is the point of GOVERNANCE.This adds a
readwrite-governance-bypassaccessPolicy: everythingreadwritegrants plusBypassGovernanceRetention, scoped to the bucket like the other actions.readwriteis unchanged, so no existing key gains the bypass.SeaweedFS matches this bucket-scoped grant from 4.48 on. Up to 4.47,
checkGovernanceBypassPermissionbuilds the action it checks with the object key already attached (BypassGovernanceRetention:<bucket>/<key>), andCanDoappends the bucket again, so aBypassGovernanceRetention:<bucket>grant never matches and onlyAdminpasses. In 4.48 the check goes throughauthorizeObjectKeyActionwith the bare action and the grant matches. On an older server the new policy therefore behaves asreadwrite, which is what the README now says next to a short description of the three policies (accessPolicywas not documented before).Tests: a case for the new policy in the existing
TestDriverGrantBucketAccessPolicytable, checked to fail with the bypass action removed.go test ./...andgo vet ./...pass;markdownlint-cli2passes on the README.Issue ticket number and link
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Summary by CodeRabbit
readwrite-governance-bypassbucket access policy, allowing object deletion or overwrite under GOVERNANCE retention when the request includes the required bypass header.