┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ AGENT GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM │
│ │
│ Hive Patroclus Relay Miser │
│ ───── ───────── ───── ───── │
│ Agent Authz MCP Proxy Cost │
│ Runtime & Infrastructure & Tool Optimization │
│ Orchestration Gateway │
│ │
│ Sentiel Aegis │
│ ─────── ───── │
│ Observability Network │
│ DLP & Enforcement │
│ Compliance & Attestation │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
| Component | Port | Role | Repo |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hive | 8000 | Agent runtime & orchestration | rShetty/hive |
| Patroclus | 8484 | Authorization infrastructure | rShetty/patroclus |
| Relay | 8090 | MCP gateway & tool proxy | rShetty/relay |
| Miser | 8787 | LLM cost optimization | rShetty/miser |
| Sentiel | 8585 | Observability, DLP, compliance | rShetty/sentiel |
| Aegis | 8686 | Network egress & attestation | rShetty/Aegis |
# Start all 6 services
~/patroclus/scripts/start-ecosystem.sh start
# Check status
~/patroclus/scripts/start-ecosystem.sh status
# Run e2e test
python3 ~/patroclus/scripts/e2e_test.py
# Stop everything
~/patroclus/scripts/start-ecosystem.sh stop- Sentiel: http://localhost:8585 — Real-time agent governance dashboard
- Hive: http://localhost:8000 — Agent marketplace
- Patroclus: http://localhost:8484/health — Authorization health
- Aegis: http://localhost:8686/health — Network enforcement health
When an agent is registered in Hive, Hive auto-registers it with Patroclus (principal + agent + default policy with rate limits and approval requirements).
Relay calls Patroclus check_access() before every MCP tool dispatch.
Fail-closed: if Patroclus is unreachable, tool calls are denied.
Hive agents route LLM calls through Miser via OPENROUTER_BASE_URL env var.
Miser classifies complexity and routes to the cheapest capable model.
Each component sends events to Sentiel:
- Patroclus: authorization decisions (allow/deny/approval)
- Relay: tool call inputs/outputs (DLP-inspected)
- Miser: LLM cost events (model, tokens, cost)
- Hive: agent activity (delegation, heartbeat, completion)
Sentiel correlates by session_id, detects anomalies (spending spikes,
high denial rates, DLP violations), and generates compliance reports
(SOC2, GDPR, EU AI Act, HIPAA).
Aegis acts as an HTTP proxy for agent processes. It:
- Blocks egress to unauthorized destinations (default-deny)
- Verifies agent runtime integrity via SHA-256 binary attestation
- Enforces data residency (block requests to non-compliant regions)
- Logs all network requests for audit
Agents are configured with:
export HTTP_PROXY=http://localhost:8686
export HTTPS_PROXY=http://localhost:8686Patroclus's hash-chained audit log feeds into Sentiel's compliance reports. Sentiel maps audit entries to compliance controls:
- SOC2 CC6.1 (Access Controls) ← Patroclus authz decisions
- SOC2 CC7.1 (System Monitoring) ← All component events
- SOC2 CC8.1 (Change Management) ← Patroclus approval workflow
- GDPR Art.30 (Records of Processing) ← All agent actions logged
- EU AI Act Art.14 (Human Oversight) ← Patroclus require_approval decisions
- HIPAA 164.312(b) (Audit Controls) ← Hash-chained audit trail
1. User submits task to Hive
2. Hive dispatches to agent (registers with Patroclus if new)
3. Agent makes LLM call → Miser (classifies, routes, caches, reports cost to Sentiel)
4. Agent makes tool call → Relay
→ Relay checks with Patroclus (allow/deny/approval)
→ Relay inspects output with Sentiel DLP engine
→ If allowed, Relay forwards to upstream
→ Relay sends tool call event to Sentiel
5. Agent network traffic → Aegis (egress policy check, geo check)
6. All events → Sentiel (correlated by session_id)
7. Sentiel dashboard shows real-time activity
8. Sentiel generates compliance reports on demand
9. Patroclus audit trail (hash-chained) provides tamper-evidence
10. Kill switch (Patroclus) → blocks all future access
Aegis → blocks all network egress
Sentiel → alerts on the kill event
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| All 6 services healthy | ✓ |
| Hive agent → Patroclus auto-registration | ✓ |
| Patroclus policy auto-created | ✓ |
| Read access ALLOWED with JWT | ✓ |
| Production deploy → REQUIRE_APPROVAL | ✓ |
| Human approval workflow | ✓ |
| Rate limiting enforced | ✓ |
| Audit trail hash-chained | ✓ |
| Session tracking (trajectory, trust) | ✓ |
| Kill switch blocks access | ✓ |
| Relay connected to Patroclus | ✓ |
| Miser ready for LLM routing | ✓ |
| Sentiel DLP detects SSN in tool output | ✓ |
| Sentiel anomaly alert on DLP violation | ✓ |
| Sentiel SOC2 compliance report generated | ✓ |
| Aegis default-deny blocks unknown host | ✓ |
| Aegis allow policy permits authorized host | ✓ |
| Aegis attestation verifies binary hash | ✓ |
| Threat | Prevented By |
|---|---|
| Agent calls unauthorized tool | Patroclus (policy deny) + Relay (intercepts) |
| Agent accesses production data | Patroclus (require_approval) |
| Agent exfiltrates data to external API | Aegis (egress deny) |
| Agent makes too many calls | Patroclus (rate limiting) |
| Agent overspends on LLM | Patroclus (budget cap) + Miser (cheap routing) |
| Agent runs with stale credentials | Patroclus (token expiry + revocation) |
| Agent runtime tampered | Aegis (attestation hash mismatch) |
| Sensitive data in tool output | Sentiel (DLP detection + redaction) |
| Data sent to non-compliant region | Aegis (geo enforcement) |
| Agent stuck in denial loop | Sentiel (anomaly alert) |
| No audit trail for compliance | Patroclus (hash-chained) + Sentiel (reports) |
| Agent goes rogue | Patroclus (kill switch) + Aegis (egress block) |