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feat: allow coding agents to authenticate with claimable temporary accounts (#23225)
## Summary <!-- What changed and why. Link to issue if applicable. --> <!-- Remember: we squash-merge, so this description becomes the commit message. --> Allow coding agents to authenticate with claimable temporary accounts The CLI now detects common coding-agent environments and keeps normal human CLI authentication behavior unchanged. When running as an agent, it prefers existing usable credentials, but if home credentials are inaccessible it creates an ephemeral Pulumi account through the agent signup endpoint. Automatically created agent credentials and claim metadata are stored in a shared temporary Pulumi directory (`/tmp/.pulumi` on non-Windows, `<OS temp dir>/.pulumi` on Windows) so sandboxed agent sessions on the same host and OS user can reuse them. The CLI prints claim instructions while claim metadata is present, asks agents to surface the claim URL, warns that claiming locks the org during the claim process, and tells agents to finish work before the user claims the account. If agent authentication fails after the account has been claimed or otherwise becomes unavailable, the CLI asks the user to run `pulumi login`. It also explains that the stacks the agent was working with may have moved to the user’s Pulumi account and that the agent’s access to those stacks may have changed. The CLI validates stored claim tokens before surfacing stale claim URLs and records unavailable claims to avoid repeatedly checking them. Expired claim state is cleaned up when the claim URL and access token have expired. ## Test plan <!-- How did you test this change? --> - [x] Added appropriate unit tests - For all changes - [ ] Added a test in `pkg/engine/lifecycletest` - For all engine/protocol changes - [ ] Added a conformance test in `pkg/testing/pulumi-test-language` - For language protocol changes - [ ] Added a golden test in `pkg/backend/display` - For changes to the output renderers ## Validation <!-- Commands you ran. Do not include output, but make sure that you've run these and checked the results. --> - [x] `make lint` — clean - [ ] `make test_fast` — all pass - [x] `make tidy_fix` — clean - [x] `make format` — clean - [x] Relevant SDK tests pass (if SDK changes) - [x] `make check_proto` — clean (if proto changes) ## Changelog <!-- Does this PR need a changelog entry? If so, did you run `make changelog`? --> - [x] Changelog entry added. If you do not believe this PR requires a changelog, ask a maintainer to apply the `impact/no-changelog-required` label. ## Risk <!-- What could go wrong? What's the blast radius? Does this affect public API? --> The main risk is unintended account selection in agent mode. If the CLI misclassifies a human shell as an agent, it could enter the agent-auth fallback path. The current detection is env-var based, so this mainly happens if someone has agent-like env vars set outside an actual agent session. Credential-source mistakes are the second risk. We explicitly avoided copying `PULUMI_ACCESS_TOKEN` or readable home credentials into `/tmp`, but bugs in this routing could leak user credentials into a shared temp dir. The current implementation only writes auto-created agent account credentials to the shared temporary Pulumi directory. Another risk is orphaned infrastructure state. If signup succeeds and claim metadata is missing, expired, or never shown, an agent can create stacks in an account the user may not claim. The CLI now validates stored claim tokens before surfacing claim URLs after authentication failures, but claim instructions still depend on local claim metadata being written and preserved. There is also a service compatibility risk: the CLI now depends on unauthenticated Pulumi Cloud agent signup and claim-validation endpoints. If those endpoint shapes change, agent auto-auth or stale-claim detection can break. ### Blast Radius Mostly CLI authentication behavior for detected coding-agent environments. Non-agent human CLI behavior should be unchanged. Existing `PULUMI_ACCESS_TOKEN`, `PULUMI_HOME`, and `PULUMI_CREDENTIALS_PATH` behavior remains authoritative and should fail rather than silently falling back when those explicit paths are inaccessible. For agents, the blast radius includes login/current-backend selection, stack listing, stack creation, service secrets access, private Pulumi Cloud template retrieval, and any command that needs a cloud backend. It can also affect shared host behavior because the shared temporary Pulumi directory is intentionally reused across sandboxed agents on the same machine, scoped by OS user permissions. ### Public API Yes, indirectly. The CLI calls unauthenticated Pulumi Cloud agent endpoints: - `GET /api/agents/signup` - `POST /api/agents/signup` - `GET /api/agents/signup/validate/{claimToken}` Signup is challenge-based. The first request receives `challengeID` and `challengeData`; the second request sends `challengeID`, `challengeResult`, and agent metadata. The CLI relies on the final signup response contract: { "accessToken": "...", "accessTokenValidUntil": "...", "claimToken": "...", "claimTokenValidUntil": "..." } The CLI derives the claim URL from `claimToken`. If expiration timestamps are missing or malformed, the CLI cannot reliably decide when to stop showing claim warnings or when to clean up shared agent state. <!-- NOTE: maintainer time is a limited resource. Pull requests that do not follow this template can create avoidable work and may be closed without review. Repeatedly ignoring these guidelines may result in temporary or permanent restrictions to your ability to contribute to this project. -->
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- type: feat
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scope: cli
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description: Allow coding agents to create claimable temporary accounts when not authenticated

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