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Rampart

A firewall for AI coding agents.

Go License CI Release Docs


Claude Code's --dangerously-skip-permissions mode, and similar autonomous modes in Cline and Codex, give agents unrestricted shell access. Your agent can read your SSH keys, exfiltrate your .env, or rm -rf / with no guardrails.

Rampart evaluates the actions an agent exposes through a supported hook, plugin, proxy, or process boundary. Matching shell commands, file operations, fetches, and other tool calls can be blocked before the host executes them. Rampart does not see arbitrary syscalls or network traffic inside a process you already allowed; read the threat model for the boundary.


Install

# Homebrew (macOS and Linux, recommended)
brew install peg/tap/rampart

# One-line install (no sudo required)
curl -fsSL https://rampart.sh/install | bash

# Go install (requires Go 1.25.12+)
go install github.com/peg/rampart/cmd/rampart@latest

Windows (PowerShell):

irm https://rampart.sh/install.ps1 | iex

Upgrading from Rampart 1.2.x on Windows? Rerun the PowerShell installer above. It repairs the affected legacy ~\.rampart ACL before replacing the binary. If that directory is locked, rampart upgrade may be unable to start and cannot perform the repair itself.

For an unattended OpenClaw agent, the zero-configuration path is:

rampart protect openclaw

Quick start

Protect OpenClaw with managed defaults—no policy file to read or write:

rampart protect openclaw

This installs the native plugin and local service, activates fail-closed Guard defaults, restarts the gateway, and runs safe behavioral canaries through the live before_tool_call path. It does not ask the model to run anything.

Recheck the boundary at any time:

rampart verify openclaw

Other integrations currently use the setup workflow:

# Claude Code
rampart setup claude-code

# Hermes Agent (experimental)
rampart setup hermes

# Cline
rampart setup cline

# Codex CLI, IDE extension, and desktop app
rampart setup codex
rampart verify codex

# Any other agent (wraps $SHELL)
rampart wrap -- your-agent

Check the broader installation state:

rampart doctor

Current integration coverage, live-host evidence, and known gaps are published in the support matrix and security-assurance guide.

Then watch your agent in real time:

rampart watch

Optional persistent local config

If you do not want to keep exporting environment variables, Rampart also supports ~/.rampart/config.yaml for local defaults:

url: http://127.0.0.1:9090
# serve_url: http://127.0.0.1:9090   # compatibility alias for url
# api: http://127.0.0.1:9091         # optional advanced override for daemon/split-topology API setups
Setting Use it for Notes
url Primary Rampart base URL Canonical setting for hook/watch/plugin/service-backed flows
serve_url Backwards-compatible alias for url Kept for compatibility; prefer url in new configs
api Optional API base URL override for approval/control commands Advanced only; usually unnecessary unless you split the API away from the main serve endpoint

Notes:

  • url is the main knob; use this unless you have a specific reason not to.
  • api is not the normal setting for rampart serve; it is for advanced daemon/split-topology setups.
  • Client-side --api flags expect an API base URL (http://127.0.0.1:9091), while daemon/server --api flags refer to an API listen address (127.0.0.1:9091).

Resolution order is: flag → environment → config file → auto-discovered state → default.

Once an integration is configured, each tool call that integration exposes to Rampart goes through the policy engine:

ALLOW 14:23:01  exec  "npm test"                      [allow-dev]
ALLOW 14:23:03  read  ~/project/src/main.go            [default]
DENY  14:23:05  exec  "rm -rf /tmp/*"                  [block-destructive]
LOG   14:23:08  exec  "curl https://api.example.com"   [log-network]
ASK   14:23:10  exec  "kubectl apply -f prod.yaml"     [ask]
DENY  14:23:12  resp  read .env                        [block-credential-leak]
                  -> blocked: response contained AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY

How it works

Rampart architecture

Local pattern matching is benchmarked in microseconds. The optional rampart-verify sidecar adds LLM-based classification for selected ambiguous commands. Decisions observed at the configured Rampart boundary are written to a hash-chained audit trail.

Agent Setup command Integration
Claude Code rampart setup claude-code Native pre/post tool hooks via ~/.claude/settings.json
OpenClaw rampart protect openclaw Zero-config native guard + active verification
Hermes Agent rampart setup hermes Experimental pre_tool_call user plugin
Cline rampart setup cline Native hooks via settings
Codex rampart setup codex Native user-level lifecycle hooks for CLI, IDE, and desktop
Any agent rampart wrap -- <agent> Shell wrapping via $SHELL
MCP servers rampart mcp -- <server> MCP protocol proxy
System-wide rampart preload -- <cmd> LD_PRELOAD syscall interception
rampart watch live audit dashboard
Table of Contents

Getting Started: Install · Quick start · Claude Code · OpenClaw · Hermes Agent · Wrap any agent

Core Features: Policies · Approval flow · Audit trail · Live dashboard · Webhook notifications

Advanced: LD_PRELOAD · MCP proxy · SIEM integration · Webhook actions · Preflight API

Reference: Performance · Security · OWASP coverage · CLI reference · Compatibility · Building from source


Claude Code

Native integration through Claude Code's hook system. Rampart classifies the current hook-visible shell, file, network, MCP, delegation, transfer, and scheduling tools before execution. In enforce mode, a future unknown PreToolUse tool fails closed until Rampart is updated. Successful tool responses are scanned and policy-blocked string content is replaced before the next model turn:

# Optional: dashboard and service-backed/headless approval features
rampart serve install

# Wire up hooks
rampart setup claude-code

Then use Claude Code normally. Rampart runs invisibly in the background.

To remove:

rampart setup claude-code --remove

OpenClaw

OpenClaw is Rampart's first zero-configuration protection target:

rampart protect openclaw

The command installs and enables the native plugin, restores Rampart's managed OpenClaw and Guard policies, starts the background service, enables fail-closed degraded behavior, restarts the gateway, and actively verifies the result. Existing unrelated OpenClaw settings and custom Rampart policies are preserved.

The managed Guard defaults focus on consequences:

  • routine local work continues without prompts
  • destructive commands and credential access are denied
  • publishing, deployment, privileged service changes, and cross-conversation messages require approval
  • read-only message actions and replies to the originating conversation remain available
  • with the managed failOpen: false setting, the plugin returns a deny for tool requests when the policy service is unavailable

rampart verify openclaw uses fixed safe canaries. It traverses the running plugin's normalization, message classification, policy request, degraded-mode, and decision-mapping code without executing a command, reading a file, sending a message, contacting an external host, or adding verification noise to the audit log. Verification requires Rampart's local admin token and rejects incomplete or stale plugin self-reports.

rampart serve is part of this path. The plugin calls the local Rampart service for policy evaluation, approvals, and audit flow.

How exec approvals work

Rampart leaves global tools.exec.ask set to "off", so routine shell commands do not spam you with approval prompts. When a Rampart policy returns ask, the plugin returns OpenClaw's native requireApproval result for that specific tool call.

In practice, that means:

  • safe commands run normally, with no prompt
  • denied commands are blocked immediately
  • only commands that match a Rampart ask rule show an OpenClaw approval card

What the plugin protects

1. Native plugin: evaluates tool calls in before_tool_call, blocks deny decisions immediately, and routes selective approvals through OpenClaw's native approval UI.

2. Selective native approvals: Rampart decides when an action should require approval, and OpenClaw shows the approval card only for those matched calls.

3. Managed Guard defaults: layers consequence-oriented safeguards over the OpenClaw profile without requiring YAML configuration.

For advanced/manual integration work, rampart setup openclaw remains available.

Legacy compatibility path

rampart setup openclaw --patch-tools still exists as a compatibility option for older setups, but it is no longer the recommended path. It modifies OpenClaw dist files and must be re-applied after upgrades.

Run rampart verify openclaw to test behavior; use rampart doctor for a wider configuration health report.


Hermes Agent (experimental)

Hermes Agent integration uses a user plugin installed into ~/.hermes/plugins/rampart:

rampart setup hermes
hermes plugins enable rampart

The plugin registers a Hermes pre_tool_call hook and sends sanitized tool metadata to Rampart before execution. It defaults to /v1/preflight/{tool} so early tests do not create hidden approvals that Hermes cannot resume. ask decisions block with an approval-required message until Hermes has a first-class plugin approval/resume flow.


Wrap any agent

For agents without a hook system, wrap sets $SHELL to a policy-checking shim. Works with any agent that reads $SHELL (Aider, OpenCode, Continue, and more):

rampart wrap -- aider
rampart wrap -- opencode
rampart wrap -- python my_agent.py

Add preload coverage to a process

For agents with no hook system and no $SHELL support, preload intercepts exec-family syscalls at the OS level:

rampart preload -- your-agent
rampart preload -- python my_agent.py
rampart preload -- node agent.js

# Monitor mode: log only, no blocking
rampart preload --mode monitor -- risky-tool

Intercepts execve, execvp, system(), popen(), and posix_spawn(). Denied calls return EPERM.

Platform notes: Preload mode covers supported exec-family calls made through the dynamic loader on Linux and in non-SIP-protected macOS processes. Static or setuid binaries, direct syscalls, and macOS SIP-protected processes can bypass this boundary; see the threat model before relying on preload mode.


Protect MCP servers

Drop-in proxy between your agent and any MCP server:

rampart mcp -- npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /path

In your MCP config (Claude Desktop, etc.):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "filesystem": {
      "command": "rampart",
      "args": ["mcp", "--", "npx", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "."]
    }
  }
}

Auto-generate policies from an MCP server's tool list:

rampart mcp scan -- npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem .

Writing policies

Policies are YAML. Glob matching, hot-reload on file change.

rampart setup creates ~/.rampart/policies/custom.yaml as a starter template. It's never overwritten by upgrades.

version: "1"
default_action: allow

policies:
  - name: block-destructive
    match:
      tool: ["exec"]
    rules:
      - action: deny
        when:
          command_matches: ["rm -rf *", "mkfs.*", "dd if=*", ":(){ :|:& };:"]
        message: "Destructive command blocked"

  - name: block-credential-reads
    priority: 1
    match:
      tool: ["read"]
    rules:
      - action: deny
        when:
          path_matches: ["**/.ssh/id_*", "**/.aws/credentials", "**/.env"]
        message: "Credential access blocked"

  - name: block-exfil
    match:
      tool: ["fetch"]
    rules:
      - action: deny
        when:
          domain_matches: ["*.ngrok-free.app", "*.requestbin.com", "webhook.site"]
        message: "Exfiltration domain blocked"

Use command_contains for substring matching (case-insensitive):

  - name: block-dangerous-substrings
    match:
      tool: ["exec"]
    rules:
      - action: deny
        when:
          command_contains: ["DROP TABLE", "rm -rf"]
        message: "Dangerous substring detected"

Use action: ask to trigger an approval prompt:

  - name: ask-before-sudo
    match:
      agent: ["claude-code"]
      tool: ["exec"]
    rules:
      - action: ask
        when:
          command_contains: ["sudo "]
        message: "This command needs your approval"

No YAML editing required for common cases. When a command is blocked, Rampart suggests what to run:

# When "npm install lodash" gets denied:
#   💡 To allow this: rampart allow "npm install *"
rampart allow "npm install *"
#  Rule added; policy reloaded (12 rules active)

Evaluation: Deny always wins. Lower priority number = evaluated first. Four actions: deny, ask, watch, allow.

Project-local policies

Drop .rampart/policy.yaml in any git repo for project-specific rules. Commit it so every team member gets the same rules automatically:

rampart init --project

Security note: Set RAMPART_NO_PROJECT_POLICY=1 to skip project policy loading when working in untrusted repos.

Built-in profiles

rampart init --profile standard    # allow-by-default, blocks dangerous commands
rampart init --profile paranoid    # deny-by-default, explicit allowlist
rampart init --profile ci          # strict; all approvals become hard denies
rampart init --profile yolo        # log-only, no blocking

Approval flow

For commands that need a human to decide:

policies:
  - name: production-deploys
    match:
      tool: ["exec"]
    rules:
      - action: ask
        when:
          command_matches: ["kubectl apply *", "terraform apply *"]
        message: "Production deployment requires approval"

How approval reaches you depends on your environment:

Environment How you approve
Claude Code Native approval prompt in the terminal
OpenClaw Native approval card in your connected chat surface
Any rampart approve <id> via CLI, dashboard, or signed URL
rampart pending          # What's waiting
rampart approve abc123   # Let it through
rampart deny abc123      # Block it

Pending approvals expire after 2 minutes by default (--approval-timeout to change).


Audit trail

Each tool decision Rampart receives is logged to hash-chained JSONL. Editing, inserting, or deleting an individual record breaks chain verification:

rampart audit tail --follow    # Stream events
rampart audit verify           # Check chain integrity
rampart audit stats            # Decision breakdown
rampart audit search           # Query by tool, agent, decision, time range

Live dashboard

rampart watch           # TUI: live colored event stream

Web dashboard at http://localhost:9090/dashboard/ when rampart serve is running. Three tabs: live stream, history, and a policy REPL to test commands before they run.


Webhook notifications

notify:
  url: "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/your/webhook"
  on: ["deny"]

policies:
  # ...

Works with Discord webhooks, Slack incoming webhooks, or any HTTP endpoint.


SIEM integration

# RFC 5424 syslog (Wazuh, QRadar, ArcSight, Sentinel)
rampart serve --syslog localhost:514

# Common Event Format (Splunk, QRadar)
rampart serve --syslog localhost:514 --cef

Webhook actions

Delegate allow/deny decisions to an external service:

rules:
  - action: webhook
    when:
      command_matches: ['*production*']
    webhook:
      url: 'http://localhost:8090/verify'
      timeout: 5s
      fail_open: true

See rampart-verify, an optional LLM sidecar for ambiguous commands (~$0.0001/call).


Preflight API

Check if a call would be allowed without executing it:

curl -s localhost:9090/v1/preflight/exec \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"agent":"a","session":"s","params":{"command":"rm -rf /"}}'
# → {"allowed":false,"decision":"deny","matched_policies":["block-destructive"]}

Performance

Policy evaluation is benchmarked in microseconds on maintainer and CI hardware. Exact latency depends on the policy set, machine, and audit path:

Command Decision Time
rm -rf / deny 8µs
sudo reboot watch 6µs
.ssh/id_rsa read deny 3µs
git status allow 4µs
curl ngrok.io deny 3µs

Security recommendations

Self-modification protection. The standard profile blocks recognized agent-issued Rampart mutation commands and writes to known Rampart paths. This is defense in depth, not an OS isolation boundary: keep policy files and admin credentials outside the agent account for stronger protection.

Don't run your AI agent as root. Root access defeats user separation. Run agent frameworks as an unprivileged user.

Run rampart serve as a separate user in production to prevent agents from reading audit logs or modifying policies.

For a full discussion of the threat model, see docs/THREAT-MODEL.md.


OWASP coverage

Rampart maps to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications:

Risk Coverage
ASI02: Tool Misuse Partial: supported host-exposed tool calls are policy evaluated
ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution Partial: command patterns and optional semantic verification; allowed interpreters remain a boundary
ASI08: Data Exfiltration Partial: known domains, file paths, and credential patterns
ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Partial: ask where the integration has an approval path
ASI10: Rogue Agents Partial: observed actions are audited; Rampart is not process isolation
ASI01: Goal Hijack Partial: policy limits blast radius even if goals are altered
ASI06: Context Poisoning Partial: response scanning blocks credentials from context window
ASI07: Inter-Agent Communication ❌ Not addressed

Full OWASP mapping →


CLI reference

# Setup
rampart protect openclaw                    # Zero-config guard + live behavioral verification
rampart verify openclaw                     # Re-run safe canaries through the live plugin
rampart quickstart                           # Auto-detect, install, configure, health check
rampart setup claude-code                    # Claude Code native hooks
rampart setup cline                          # Cline native hooks
rampart setup openclaw                       # OpenClaw native plugin integration
rampart setup codex                          # Codex native lifecycle hooks
rampart verify codex                         # Verify hook install + native deny response
rampart setup <agent> --remove               # Clean uninstall

# Run
rampart wrap -- <command>                    # Wrap any agent via $SHELL
rampart preload -- <command>                 # LD_PRELOAD syscall interception
rampart mcp -- <mcp-server-command>          # Proxy MCP with policy enforcement
rampart mcp scan -- <server>                 # Auto-generate policies from MCP tools

# Serve
rampart serve [--port 9090]                  # Start approval + dashboard server
rampart serve install                        # Install as a boot service (systemd/launchd)
rampart serve --background                   # Start in background
rampart serve stop                           # Stop background server

# Diagnose
rampart doctor                               # Health check (colored output)
rampart doctor --fix                         # Auto-apply missing patches
rampart doctor --json                        # Machine-readable (exit 1 on issues)
rampart status                               # Quick dashboard: what's protected
rampart watch                                # Live TUI event stream

# Policy
rampart init [--profile standard|paranoid|ci|yolo]   # Initialize global policy
rampart init --project                                # Create .rampart/policy.yaml
rampart policy lint [file]                            # Lint policy file
rampart policy explain "git status"                   # Trace evaluation
rampart policy list                                   # Browse community registry
rampart policy fetch <name>                           # Install community policy

# Rules (no YAML editing required)
rampart allow "npm install *"               # Allow a command pattern
rampart block "curl * | bash"               # Block a pattern
rampart rules                               # List custom rules
rampart rules remove 3                      # Remove by number
rampart allow "docker *" --for 1h          # Temporary allow

# Test
rampart test "rm -rf /"                     # Dry-run against policies
rampart test --json                         # Structured output for CI

# Approvals
rampart pending                             # What's waiting
rampart approve <id>                        # Allow
rampart deny <id>                           # Deny

# Audit
rampart audit tail [--follow]
rampart audit verify
rampart audit stats
rampart log --deny                          # Recent denies

# Upgrade
rampart upgrade                             # New binary + refresh policies
rampart upgrade --no-binary                 # Refresh policies only

Compatibility

Agent Method Platforms
Claude Code rampart setup claude-code Linux, macOS, Windows
OpenClaw rampart protect openclaw Linux, macOS
Cline rampart setup cline Linux, macOS
Codex CLI, IDE, desktop rampart setup codex Linux, macOS, Windows
Claude Desktop MCP servers rampart mcp Linux, macOS, Windows
Aider, OpenCode, Continue rampart wrap Linux, macOS
Python agents rampart preload or HTTP API Linux, macOS
Node.js agents rampart preload or HTTP API Linux, macOS
Command-launched MCP servers rampart mcp Linux, macOS, Windows
Supported dynamically linked processes rampart preload Linux, macOS
Custom agents HTTP API at localhost:9090 Linux, macOS, Windows

Building from source

git clone https://github.com/peg/rampart.git
cd rampart
go build -o rampart ./cmd/rampart
go test ./...

Requires Go 1.25.12+.


Upgrading from v0.9.8?

v0.9.9 contains three breaking changes:

action: require_approval is now a hard error. Update your policies from:

- action: require_approval

to:

- action: ask
  ask:
    audit: true

Run rampart policy lint to find all occurrences.

--serve-token flag removed. Use the RAMPART_TOKEN environment variable instead:

# Before (v0.9.8 and earlier)
rampart serve --serve-token mysecrettoken

# After (v0.9.9+)
RAMPART_TOKEN=mysecrettoken rampart serve

GET /v1/policy endpoint removed. Use GET /v1/status for server health or GET /v1/policies to list active policies.


Companion Tool: Snare

Rampart blocks. Snare catches.

Snare plants canary tokens in your AI agent's environment - API keys, cloud credentials, file paths. If your agent, or something that compromised it, uses those tokens, you get an instant alert.

Rampart + Snare = preventive + detective controls. Use both.


Contributing

Contributions welcome. Open an issue first for anything beyond small fixes. All work goes through the staging branch. PRs to main require one approving review.


License

Apache 2.0

About

Open-source firewall for AI agents. Policy engine that audits and controls what OpenClaw, Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and any AI tool can do on your machine.

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