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tls: reject chains containing blocked public keys, update root certificates to NSS 3.131.1 - #46300
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…icates to NSS 3.131.1
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Updated 2:05 AM PT - Oct 21st, 2026
@dylan-conway, your commit c2d2ddd is building: |
… node:quic's refusing modes
WalkthroughCertificate trust data and root filtering rules change. TLS and QUIC verification now check certificate SPKI hashes against built-in and test-configured blocklists. New test controls and coverage exercise the verification behavior. ChangesCertificate verification
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to
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| Check name | Status | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Title check |  |
The title clearly summarizes the primary change: rejecting certificate chains with blocked public keys. It also accurately mentions the root certificate update. |
| Description check | |
The description includes both required sections. It explains the blocked-public-key behavior, root certificate updates, verification results, test coverage, and the limitation that the branch was not … |
| Linked Issues check | |
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. |
| Out of Scope Changes check | |
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. |
Full details: Description check
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Explanation
The description includes both required sections. It explains the blocked-public-key behavior, root certificate updates, verification results, test coverage, and the limitation that the branch was not tested with a local build.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
- 🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @test/js/node/tls/node-tls-cert.test.ts:
- Around line 476-494: Update the test case around connect to assert the
rejected promise directly with await
expect(connect(...)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "CERT_REVOKED" }); remove the
try/catch and expect.unreachable flow while preserving the existing client and
server TLS options.
Review comments at @test/js/node/tls/node-tls-internals.test.ts:
- Line 190: Update the server teardown and connection tracking around the listen
helper and afterEach hook: track accepted server-side TLSSocket instances,
destroy client and server sockets during teardown, await all server.close
callbacks before clearing the blocklist, and make client-chain connectTo
operations awaited where needed so no handshake remains active between tests.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters: 1
test/js/node/tls/fixtures/blocked-public-key-cert.pemis excluded by!**/*.pem
📒 Files selected for processing: 16
packages/bun-usockets/certdata.txtpackages/bun-usockets/generate-root-certs.plpackages/bun-usockets/root_certs.derpackages/bun-usockets/root_certs.txtpackages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/blocked_spkis.cpppackages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.cpackages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/root_certs_header.hsrc/js/internal-for-testing.tssrc/jsc/bindings/NodeTLS.cppsrc/jsc/bindings/NodeTLS.hsrc/runtime/node/quic/tls.rstest/js/node/quic/quic-sni.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-cert.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-internals.test.tstest/js/web/fetch/fetch-http3-client.test.tstest/regression/issue/31611.test.ts
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Beyond the inline finding, I also traced every peer-verification route for coverage of the new check: node:tls, fetch, Bun.serve client certs and HTTP/2 all go through us_cert_verify_cb (installed on every usockets SSL_CTX at openssl.c:1550), the lsquic HTTP/3 client calls us_x509_verify_cert from quic.c:1311, and node:quic gets us_ssl_ctx_reject_blocked_keys; the one remaining raw X509_verify_cert at openssl.c:1065 only builds the server's own chain, so it is not a gap. The i2d_X509_PUBKEY buffer is freed on both the hit and miss paths, and the deleted emSign label-distrust tests are replaced by the SPKI blocklist suites in node-tls-internals, node-tls-cert, fetch-http3-client and quic-sni.
Extended reasoning...
The change replaces label-based distrust of emSign roots with a compiled-in SPKI blocklist checked after chain verification in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto (new blocked_spkis.cpp, openssl.c wrapper, node:quic hook in tls.rs), regenerates the bundled root store to NSS 3.131.1, and adds test-only hooks via bun:internal-for-testing. It is a TLS trust-decision path shared by every client and server in Bun, so it is security-sensitive and not a candidate for automated approval. One confirmed finding is posted inline; the route-coverage audit and buffer-release check above were done from the diff and callers.
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline nit, I checked the two other verification entry points for the new predicate and found them failing closed: quic.c's HTTP/3 client builds its X509_STORE_CTX without SSL ex_data, so a blocked key makes us_x509_verify_chain return 0 and the custom verify reports invalid; node:quic installs the same function as the SSL_CTX cert-verify callback with no verify callback, so BoringSSL records CERT_REVOKED as the verify result (what the manual test asserts) and aborts under strict/auto. c2d2ddd dropping the static mutex addresses the exit-time abort I raised on the previous push; the now-unlocked test list is only ever written from the JS thread by the bun:internal-for-testing hooks, ordered against handshakes by the fetch request/response hand-off, and never written on a production path.
Extended reasoning...
The change replaces the label-based exclusion of four emSign roots with an SPKI blocklist checked after every chain verification in openssl.c (shared by the TLS client/server, HTTP/3 client in quic.c and node:quic via a new exported installer), regenerates the bundled roots from NSS 3.131.1, and adds test-only hooks plus tests for node:tls, fetch, HTTP/3 and node:quic. It is TLS/crypto trust-store code, so a human should still look despite only a nit surviving verification.
| expect(expected).toBeGreaterThan(0); | ||
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| // Count the excluded labels among those server-auth roots (a trust object's CKA_LABEL precedes its trust lines). | ||
| let label = ""; | ||
| let excluded = 0; | ||
| for (const line of certdata.split("\n")) { | ||
| const m = /^CKA_LABEL UTF8 "(.*)"$/.exec(line); | ||
| if (m) label = m[1]; | ||
| else if (line === "CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR" && isExcluded(label)) excluded++; | ||
| } | ||
| // Mirror the generator's hard-coded TrustCor exclusion (currently 0 entries). |
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🟡 nit (optional): maintainers get a spurious failure of this regression test on a future certdata.txt that lists a TrustCor root without server-auth trust. test/regression/issue/31611.test.ts:21-23 now counts every distinct CKA_LABEL matching /TrustCor/, while generate-root-certs.pl:270 only excludes TrustCor among roots should_output_cert already kept, so excluded can exceed what the generator left out. Fix: count the exclusion the way the base did, only on labels whose trust object carries CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR, so expected - excluded tracks the generator exactly.
Why this was flagged
The trigger is a certdata.txt that keeps a TrustCor certificate with a trust object not marked CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR for server auth (how NSS carries distrusted roots for a while); the entry point is this test run after a root update. test/regression/issue/31611.test.ts:21-23 computes excluded from all CKA_LABEL lines matching /TrustCor/, deduplicated by label, regardless of trust. generate-root-certs.pl:268-270 only reaches the TrustCor exclusion for roots that passed should_output_cert, so such a root is never counted as excluded by the generator. tls.rootCertificates.length then equals expected, but the test asserts expected - excluded at line 25 and fails although the bundle is correct. On the base branch the removed loop counted excluded labels only on CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR lines, which mirrored the generator. Today certdata.txt has 0 TrustCor entries, so the mismatch is latent.
Verification: Triggers only when certdata.txt carries a CKA_LABEL matching /TrustCor/ whose trust object is not TRUSTED_DELEGATOR. test/regression/issue/31611.test.ts:24-25 computes excluded from every CKA_LABEL matching /TrustCor/, while generate-root-certs.pl:268-271 only excludes TrustCor after should_output_cert(...) returned true, so expected - excluded is one less and the test fails spuriously.
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Considering this is a security fix, I suggest this be released in a new semver patch as soon as possible |
Bun 1.4.3 and earlier bundle a root store that still trusts the compromised eMudhra/emSign intermediates, even with --use-openssl-ca. The fix (oven-sh/bun#46300) is only in canary; switch back to latest once 1.4.4 is out. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Node 18 and 20 are EOL and will never drop emSign ECC Root CA - G3, so node.sh now installs only lts/jod. Bun has no fixed release yet (oven-sh/bun#46300), so .zshrc points it at the OS trust store with BUN_OPTIONS=--use-system-ca. pipx.sh upgrades the shared pip so its vendored certifi picks up 2026.10.19.
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From a quick look there appears to be no mitigation for this yet either: |
Bun 1.4.4 rejects certificate chains containing the blocked eMudhra keys (oven-sh/bun#46300). The Hermes pin-drift PR moves the Dockerfile and packageManager; this raises the engines floor and pins the two install-toolchain defaults and the embed-batch installer. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
What does this PR do?
A certificate chain that holds a public key on a compiled-in list now fails verification with
CERT_REVOKED. This is a port of Node's check and uses Node's list.Updates
certdata.txtto NSS 3.131.1 and regenerates the bundled root certificates (root_certs.der/root_certs.txt).generate-root-certs.plno longer takes a list of labels to leave out.The regenerated
root_certs.derholds 118 certificates, matchingroot_certs.txt.How did you verify your code works?
certdata.txtare identical to Node's, and the 118 certificates are the same set as Node's, compared by SHA-256.certdata.txtfails on Bun 1.4.3, which embeds the previous bundle.node:tlsclients and servers,fetch, the HTTP/3 client andnode:quic.