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fix(browser): block node routes when sandbox host control is disabled#97958

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eleqtrizit merged 1 commit into
openclaw:mainfrom
eleqtrizit:794
Jun 30, 2026
Merged

fix(browser): block node routes when sandbox host control is disabled#97958
eleqtrizit merged 1 commit into
openclaw:mainfrom
eleqtrizit:794

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Summary

Enforce the existing sandbox browser host-control policy for paired browser-node routes.

What Problem This Solves

Fixes an issue where sandboxed agents with allowHostControl: false could still reach a signed-in host browser by selecting or automatically resolving a paired browser node.

Changes

  • Carry the existing allowHostControl policy into browser-node target resolution.
  • Reject explicit node targets and node pins when host browser control is disabled.
  • Skip automatic browser-node routing under the same policy.
  • Add focused coverage for explicit, pinned, and automatic node routes.
  • Preserve the existing operator.admin scope requirement for browser proxy invocation.

Why This Change Was Made

Browser target resolution owns the choice between sandbox, host, and node routes. Enforcing the policy there closes every node-routing variant before discovery or dispatch without changing trusted host-control behavior.

User Impact

Sandboxed agents can no longer bypass disabled host browser control through a paired node. Explicitly authorized host and node browser workflows continue to work.

Validation

  • node scripts/run-vitest.mjs extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.test.ts — 74/74 tests passed.
  • Focused oxfmt check — passed.
  • Focused oxlint check — passed.
  • git diff --check — passed.
  • Structured autoreview — no accepted or actionable findings.

Evidence

The regression test covers target=node, an explicit node pin, and automatic node routing with allowHostControl: false; all three fail before gateway or local browser dispatch. Existing coverage confirms authorized node access remains available with allowHostControl: true.

Notes

@openclaw-barnacle openclaw-barnacle Bot added size: XS maintainer Maintainer-authored PR labels Jun 29, 2026
@clawsweeper

clawsweeper Bot commented Jun 29, 2026

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Codex review: needs real behavior proof before merge. Reviewed June 29, 2026, 7:59 PM ET / 23:59 UTC.

Summary
The PR passes allowHostControl into browser-node target resolution, blocks explicit and automatic node routing when host browser control is disabled, and adds focused browser-tool regression tests.

PR surface: Source +9, Tests +15. Total +24 across 2 files.

Reproducibility: yes. Source inspection of current main shows browser-node resolution does not receive allowHostControl and can select a node before the host-control check runs; I did not execute tests because this review is read-only.

Review metrics: 1 noteworthy metric.

  • Browser routing policy: 1 existing node-routing path newly gated. The diff changes a user-visible sandbox policy boundary, so maintainers should explicitly accept the fail-closed behavior before merge.

Merge readiness
Overall: 🐚 platinum hermit
Proof: 🌊 off-meta tidepool
Patch quality: 🐚 platinum hermit
Result: ready for maintainer review.

Overall follows the weaker of proof and patch quality, so missing proof can cap an otherwise strong patch.

Rank-up moves:

  • Confirm in maintainer review that node browser routing is intentionally governed by allowHostControl.

Risk before merge

  • [P1] This intentionally makes sandboxed sessions with allowHostControl=false fail closed or stay on the sandbox instead of using a browser-capable node, so existing workflows that relied on that implicit node route will stop reaching the signed-in browser.

Maintainer options:

  1. Accept fail-closed sandbox hardening (recommended)
    Treat node-hosted browser control as covered by allowHostControl and accept that disabled host control now blocks implicit and explicit node routes.
  2. Clarify the release-note context
    Before merge, make sure the PR body or squash message states that sandboxed browser node routing is now blocked when host control is disabled.
  3. Pause for a separate node policy
    If maintainers want node browser routing to be configurable separately from host browser control, pause this PR and make that policy decision explicitly.

Next step before merge

  • [P1] Protected maintainer label plus intentional fail-closed browser routing means the next action is maintainer review and merge judgment, not an automated repair.

Security
Cleared: The diff tightens an existing sandbox/browser security boundary and does not add dependencies, CI changes, secret handling, downloads, or new supply-chain surface.

Review details

Best possible solution:

Merge this boundary fix after a maintainer accepts the fail-closed compatibility impact and normal CI is green, keeping the policy check in browser target resolution before node discovery or dispatch.

Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue?

Yes. Source inspection of current main shows browser-node resolution does not receive allowHostControl and can select a node before the host-control check runs; I did not execute tests because this review is read-only.

Is this the best way to solve the issue?

Yes. The PR fixes the narrow owner boundary by carrying the existing sandbox policy into browser-node target resolution, and the added tests cover explicit target, explicit node pin, and automatic node routing.

AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant.

Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning high; reviewed against 18b2ff683fd3.

Label changes

Label changes:

  • add P0: The PR addresses a sandbox host-control bypass tied to a related advisory, which is a security-boundary issue.
  • add merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility: Merging this PR can stop existing sandboxed sessions with allowHostControl=false from using implicit or explicit browser-node routes.
  • add rating: 🐚 platinum hermit: Overall readiness is 🐚 platinum hermit; proof is 🌊 off-meta tidepool and patch quality is 🐚 platinum hermit.
  • add status: 👀 ready for maintainer look: ClawSweeper has no concrete contributor-facing blocker left for this PR. Not applicable: The PR is protected by the maintainer label, so the external-contributor real-behavior proof gate is not applied; the body provides focused test validation but not live sandbox/browser proof.

Label justifications:

  • P0: The PR addresses a sandbox host-control bypass tied to a related advisory, which is a security-boundary issue.
  • merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility: Merging this PR can stop existing sandboxed sessions with allowHostControl=false from using implicit or explicit browser-node routes.
  • rating: 🐚 platinum hermit: Overall readiness is 🐚 platinum hermit; proof is 🌊 off-meta tidepool and patch quality is 🐚 platinum hermit.
  • status: 👀 ready for maintainer look: ClawSweeper has no concrete contributor-facing blocker left for this PR. Not applicable: The PR is protected by the maintainer label, so the external-contributor real-behavior proof gate is not applied; the body provides focused test validation but not live sandbox/browser proof.
Evidence reviewed

PR surface:

Source +9, Tests +15. Total +24 across 2 files.

View PR surface stats
Area Files Added Removed Net
Source 1 9 0 +9
Tests 1 16 1 +15
Docs 0 0 0 0
Config 0 0 0 0
Generated 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0
Total 2 25 1 +24

What I checked:

  • Root policy read: Read root AGENTS.md fully and applied its OpenClaw PR review, protected-label, security-boundary, and scoped-extension guidance. (AGENTS.md:1, 18b2ff683fd3)
  • Scoped extension policy read: Read extensions/AGENTS.md fully; browser plugin work stays within the bundled plugin boundary and uses local plugin code rather than crossing into core internals. (extensions/AGENTS.md:1, 18b2ff683fd3)
  • Current main behavior gap: On current main, createBrowserTool passes requestedNode, target, and sandboxBridgeUrl into resolveBrowserNodeTarget, but not allowHostControl, so node selection can happen before the host-control policy check in resolveBrowserBaseUrl. (extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.ts:537, 18b2ff683fd3)
  • Current node auto-routing path: resolveBrowserNodeTarget currently auto-selects a single connected browser-capable node, honors explicit target=node and node pins, and only skips node routing for sandboxBridgeUrl when there is no explicit node route. (extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.ts:261, 18b2ff683fd3)
  • Host-control policy contract: The sandbox docs state allowHostControl=false is the default and blocks sandboxed sessions from targeting the host browser; browser docs document target values including sandbox, host, and node. Public docs: docs/gateway/config-agents.md. (docs/gateway/config-agents.md:986, 18b2ff683fd3)
  • PR patch evidence: The PR head adds an allowHostControl=false guard to resolveBrowserNodeTarget and tests target=node, an explicit node pin, and automatic node routing without dispatching to Gateway or the local browser client. (extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.ts:262, 0a9f53f0f3f2)

Likely related people:

  • mbelinky: Authored and merged the prior browser-node existing-session routing PR that made profile=user route through browser nodes. (role: feature owner; confidence: high; commits: 4566843cc302, 13889aa64dee, 23fa1d16435f; files: extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.ts, extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.test.ts, docs/tools/browser.md)
  • eleqtrizit: Has prior merged browser security hardening work on browser.proxy guards and recent adjacent browser-proxy admin-scope work before this PR. (role: recent area contributor; confidence: high; commits: e5aae5e0564a, 98af90b5271b, 8f24cedc8a11; files: extensions/browser/src/node-host/invoke-browser.ts, src/gateway/server-methods/nodes.ts, extensions/browser/src/browser-tool.test.ts)
  • LaPhilosophie: Authored the recently merged browser.proxy admin-scope change that protects the same node-hosted browser proxy surface from direct node.invoke access. (role: adjacent security-route author; confidence: medium; commits: 3fe6638d3a96, 456c48f368cb; files: src/gateway/server-methods/nodes.ts, src/gateway/server.node-invoke-approval-bypass.test.ts)
What the crustacean ranks mean
  • 🦀 challenger crab: rare, exceptional readiness with strong proof, clean implementation, and convincing validation.
  • 🦞 diamond lobster: very strong readiness with only minor maintainer review expected.
  • 🐚 platinum hermit: good normal PR, likely mergeable with ordinary maintainer review.
  • 🦐 gold shrimp: useful signal, but proof or patch confidence is still limited.
  • 🦪 silver shellfish: thin signal; proof, validation, or implementation needs work.
  • 🧂 unranked krab: not merge-ready because proof is missing/unusable or there are serious correctness or safety concerns.
  • 🌊 off-meta tidepool: rating does not apply to this item.

Shiny media proof means a screenshot, video, or linked artifact directly shows the changed behavior. Runtime, network, CSP, and security claims still need visible diagnostics.

How this review workflow works
  • ClawSweeper keeps one durable marker-backed review comment per issue or PR.
  • Re-runs edit this comment so the latest verdict, findings, and automation markers stay together instead of adding duplicate bot comments.
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@clawsweeper clawsweeper Bot added rating: 🐚 platinum hermit Good normal PR readiness with ordinary maintainer review expected. status: 👀 ready for maintainer look ClawSweeper has no concrete contributor-facing blocker left for this PR. P0 Emergency: data loss, security bypass, crash loop, or unusable core runtime. merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility 🚨 May break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrade paths. labels Jun 29, 2026
@eleqtrizit
eleqtrizit merged commit 2cf765f into openclaw:main Jun 30, 2026
132 of 139 checks passed
@eleqtrizit
eleqtrizit deleted the 794 branch June 30, 2026 19:27
chenyangjun-xy pushed a commit to chenyangjun-xy/openclaw that referenced this pull request Jul 1, 2026
Rorqualx pushed a commit to Rorqualx/cortex that referenced this pull request Jul 6, 2026
Rorqualx pushed a commit to Rorqualx/cortex that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2026
RomneyDa added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 22, 2026
* fix: gate diagnostics command to owners

(cherry picked from commit 170bf72)

* fix(agent): replace self-wait with deferred release in retained-lock abort cleanup (#96100)

* fix(agent): wait for retained session write before releasing held lock on abort

* fix(agent): replace self-wait with deferred release in retained-lock abort cleanup

* fix(test): reject fallback acquire with SessionWriteLockTimeoutError in active-scope cleanup test

* fix(agent): trim retained-lock comments

Signed-off-by: sallyom <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 0a042f6)

* fix(gateway): resume channel after pending task recovery

(cherry picked from commit 6039da3)

* fix(gateway): resume channel after pending task recovery

(cherry picked from commit ecd29fe)

* fix(outbound): ignore empty delivery receipts (#79811)

(cherry picked from commit 9a735be)

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles (#97041)

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles

---------

Co-authored-by: Pick-cat <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4985671)

* fix(opencode-go): re-arm idle timer on block-boundary events to prevent false stalled-stream abort (#97128)

* fix(opencode-go): re-arm idle timer on block-boundary events to prevent false stalled-stream abort

When the opencode-go model finalizes a tool call and deliberates before
the next one, the provider emits real block-boundary SSE events
(text_end, thinking_end, toolcall_start, toolcall_end) that prove the
socket is alive, but the watchdog's isProviderProgressEvent only
returned true for token deltas (text_delta, thinking_delta,
toolcall_delta). This caused the idle timer to fire and falsely abort a
live stream, replacing a completed answer with a stalled error and
dropping the provider's real done event.

Fix: include block-boundary events in isProviderProgressEvent so the
idle timer is re-armed on any forward-progress provider event.
text_start and thinking_start are intentionally excluded because they
are synthetic preamble events that should not shorten the first-event
window.

Closes #96518

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* test(opencode-go): satisfy lint in stream regression

* test(opencode-go): satisfy lint in stream regression

* test(opencode-go): satisfy lint in stream regression

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 552ec2b)

* fix(model-fallback): don't rethrow provider-side AbortErrors as user cancellations (#90908)

* fix(model-fallback): don't rethrow provider-side AbortErrors as user cancellations

When the LLM API closes the connection mid-stream, the fetch layer
surfaces AbortError("This operation was aborted") with no external
abort signal triggered. The old guard `shouldRethrowAbort()` returned
false for these errors (because isTimeoutError matched the message),
so they fell through to the fallback loop but were never retried —
the error propagated up and produced SILENT_REPLY_TOKEN in group
sessions, permanently silencing the topic.

Replace the guard with a direct check: only rethrow AbortError when
the external abort signal is actually set (user/gateway cancellation).
Provider-side AbortErrors without an external signal now fall through
to the next fallback candidate, giving the system a chance to recover.

* fix(cron): forward abort signal into runWithModelFallback

Thread the cron executor's abort signal into the shared
runWithModelFallback call so that cron timeouts and cancellations
stop the fallback chain instead of retrying with the next candidate.

Previously, the run callback checked params.abortSignal?.aborted and
threw, but runWithModelFallback itself had no signal — so the new
guard in model-fallback.ts could not distinguish a caller abort from
a provider-side AbortError and would retry silently.

Also adds a focused regression test verifying the signal is forwarded.

---------

Co-authored-by: Shengting Xie <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: yayu <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 98ed83f)

* fix(browser): block node routes when sandbox host control is disabled (#97958)

(cherry picked from commit 2cf765f)

* fix(exec): bind Windows allowlist execution path (#98260)

* fix(exec): bind windows allowlist execution path

* fix(exec): add windows shadow execution proof

* fix(exec): preserve wildcard allowlist behavior

* fix(exec): correct blocked plan test fixture

(cherry picked from commit 3811001)

* fix(mcp): suppress unhandled error on stderr pipe in stdio transport (#99803)

* fix(mcp): suppress unhandled error on stderr pipe in stdio transport

When child.stderr is piped to stderrStream without an error
handler, a stream-level error (EPIPE, I/O failure) crashes the
process. Add a noop error handler before the pipe, consistent
with the error handlers already present on stdin and stdout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* test(mcp): add regression test for stderr pipe error suppression

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): report stderr stream errors

* fix(mcp): report stderr stream errors

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1b84316)

* Harden macOS SQLite WAL checkpoints (#99067)

(cherry picked from commit f7f1be2)

* fix(secrets): suppress unhandled stdout/stderr stream errors in exec resolver (#100521)

* fix(secrets): suppress unhandled stdout/stderr stream errors in exec resolver

* proof(secrets): add real behavior proof script for exec resolver stream error catch

* proof(secrets): replace wrapper with real exec resolver stream error proof

* style: apply oxfmt to changed files

(cherry picked from commit c9a0783)

* fix(agents): retry transient filesystem races when reading workspace bootstrap files (#100910)

* fix(agents): retry transient filesystem races when reading workspace bootstrap files

* fix(agents): retry transient boundary resolution

---------

Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f36d170)

* fix(gateway): finish plugin HTTP responses after post-header failures (#102125)

* fix(gateway): finish plugin HTTP responses after post-header failures

* test(gateway): satisfy plugin HTTP regression lint

* fix(gateway): skip ending destroyed plugin responses

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 240d350)

* fix(gateway): validate exact custom browser origins (#38290)

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit fa0349a)

* fix: block unspecified trusted DNS targets (#103075)

(cherry picked from commit c70f3d0)

* fix(channels): make nack callbacks idempotent (#104919)

* fix(channels): make nack callbacks idempotent

* fix(channels): coalesce overlapping nack callbacks

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 02d307e)

* fix(channels): prevent base URL credentials in status output (#107754)

* fix(channels): redact credentials in account URLs

* fix(channels): sanitize final status summaries

(cherry picked from commit 210340f)

* fix(channels): prevent lifecycle listener buildup (#109108)

(cherry picked from commit 0e1fad7)

* fix(sandbox): use Buffer.byteLength for env var value size limit (#105017)

* fix(sandbox): use Buffer.byteLength for env var value size limit

validateEnvVarValue checked value.length (UTF-16 code units) against
the 32768-byte limit, so multi-byte CJK values like "值".repeat(11000)
passed the check despite exceeding 33 KB in UTF-8. Switch to
Buffer.byteLength(value, "utf8") so the limit matches the actual byte
count the OS and child processes see.

* test(sandbox): simplify env byte-limit coverage

Co-authored-by: 唐梓夷0668001293 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 84fb48c)

* fix(gateway): guard process.kill ESRCH race in signalVerifiedGatewayPidSync (#109590)

* fix(gateway): guard process.kill ESRCH race in signalVerifiedGatewayPidSync

A verified gateway process can exit between the argv validation check and
the process.kill call, causing an unhandled ESRCH error. Wrap the kill in
try-catch and silently swallow ESRCH (process already gone = signal
already delivered).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>

* docs(gateway): explain ESRCH signal race

Co-authored-by: 丁宇婷0668001435 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 853b1a8)

* fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS SSRF bypass (#110693)

* fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS bypass

The isAutoAllowedLitellmHostname helper auto-enables private-network access
for loopback-style hosts. Before this fix, lowered.startsWith("127.")
matched DNS hostnames like 127.evil.com, letting remote endpoints bypass
the explicit allowPrivateNetwork opt-in — a SSRF risk.

Add isIP(host)===4 guard so only literal IPv4 loopback addresses qualify.
Same canonical pattern as extensions/slack/src/monitor/relay-source.ts:271
and the codex loopback fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* test(litellm): cover loopback endpoint policy

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3d03b60)

* fix(discord): sustained gateway bursts stop growing memory (#110954)

* fix(discord): sustained gateway bursts stop growing memory

* fix(discord): contain gateway queue overflow

* fix(discord): drop oldest saturated gateway sends

Co-authored-by: 张贵萍0668001030 <[email protected]>

* fix(discord): surface gateway overflow warnings

Co-authored-by: 张贵萍0668001030 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 69aeba9)

* fix(gateway): bound busy channel health by real run age (#103793)

* fix(gateway): bound busy channel health by real run age

The channel health policy treats a channel as healthy-busy even while
disconnected, bounded only by a 25 minute stale ceiling measured from
lastRunActivityAt. The run-state heartbeat refreshes lastRunActivityAt
every 60 seconds for as long as any run is active, so a run that hangs
forever (for example a send blocking on a dead socket after the
transport already reported connected:false) keeps that timestamp fresh
and the stuck ceiling is never reached. The account is then reported
healthy forever by the health monitor, readiness probe, and health CLI,
and no restart ever fires.

createRunStateMachine now tracks each in-flight run's start time keyed by
an opaque run handle and publishes the oldest still-active run's start as
activeRunStartedAt. The health policy busy override keys its ceiling off
the real run age, so a run stuck longer than the threshold reports stuck
and the monitor can restart it. Because the reported start is the oldest
active run and advances to the next-oldest as runs complete, a channel
churning through many short overlapping runs (activeRuns above 1 across
concurrent queue keys) stays healthy; only a genuinely hung run breaches
the ceiling. Short and active runs stay healthy and the existing
lastRunActivityAt fallback is preserved for snapshots without a start
time.

* fix(channels): retain run-state callback compatibility

Keep the released zero-argument onRunEnd callback source-compatible while allowing internal queue callers to pass a run handle for exact concurrent-run accounting. The compatibility path closes the oldest active run, preserving existing lifecycle behavior for consumers that do not use handles.

* fix(channels): keep anonymous runs out of age tracking

The zero-argument lifecycle callbacks cannot identify which concurrent run completed, so they must not update the identity-sensitive run start used by channel health. Keep their busy count separately and reserve exact start tracking for the shared queue's handle-aware lifecycle path.

* fix(channels): keep tracked runs internal

Keep the public run-state lifecycle callbacks unchanged. The channel queue now owns opaque run identity and augments its status updates with the oldest active queue run, so implementation details do not expand the SDK surface.

* fix(channels): type queue run start status

Keep activeRunStartedAt in the internal status patch type so the queue can publish its private tracked-run age through the existing status sink.

* fix(channels): wrap isActive to satisfy unbound-method lint

* fix(gateway): gate busy run-age ceiling on disconnected transport

(cherry picked from commit 18b79d9)

* fix(deps): update fast-uri past advisory

(cherry picked from commit 1be9db0)

* fix(release): adapt maintenance-line hardening

Backport/adapt 18ec9ce, dea1fe1, 7f32b6c, 1da345e, 931ac3e, 89780d5, and c0d99ed for the 2026.6 extended-stable maintenance line.

* fix(deps): bump protobufjs to 7.6.5

Backport-adapted from a230f74.

* test(gateway): cover bounded macOS process probe

* chore(release): prepare 2026.6.34

* test(dotenv): share path override environment assertions

* fix(release): resolve 2026.6.34 CI blockers

---------

Signed-off-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: joshavant <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Lee <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: openclaw-clownfish[bot] <280122609+openclaw-clownfish[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Liu Wenyu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: pick-cat <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pick-cat <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: weiqinl <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: shengting <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Shengting Xie <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: yayu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Agustin Rivera <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cxbAsDev <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: ooiuuii <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Masato Hoshino <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: mushuiyu886 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Bruno Wowk (Volky) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pavan Kumar Gondhi <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Glucksberg <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: xingzhou <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: tzy-17 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: krissding <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: lsr911 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Yuval Dinodia <[email protected]>
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