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fix(install): manage auth-profile env refs via OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS#96059

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Darren2030:fix/auth-profile-managed-env-keys
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fix(install): manage auth-profile env refs via OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS#96059
Darren2030 wants to merge 1 commit into
openclaw:mainfrom
Darren2030:fix/auth-profile-managed-env-keys

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@Darren2030

@Darren2030 Darren2030 commented Jun 23, 2026

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Summary

Fixes #95895. When a provider API key such as GEMINI_API_KEY is configured via an auth profile, openclaw gateway install was writing the key as a plaintext literal in the generated systemd/LaunchAgent service file. All other provider secrets were already handled via OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS and resolved at runtime; auth-profile env refs were the missing source.

Changes

  • src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts: include auth-profile env refs when computing OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS, so they are removed from inline service env values and referenced via the managed-keys list instead.
  • src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.test.ts: update existing auth-profile assertions and add a GEMINI_API_KEY regression test.
  • scripts/repro/issue-95895-auth-profile-managed-env-keys.mts: standalone reproduction script that runs buildGatewayInstallPlan against a real temp home and verifies the key is managed, not inline.

Real behavior proof

  • Behavior addressed: auth-profile GEMINI_API_KEY no longer appears as a plaintext literal in the generated gateway service environment; it is listed in OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS.
  • Real environment tested: Linux, Node 24.13, source tree at current main.
  • Exact steps or command run after this patch:
    • pnpm build
    • node --import tsx scripts/repro/issue-95895-auth-profile-managed-env-keys.mts
  • Evidence after fix: 
    OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS=GEMINI_API_KEY
GEMINI_API_KEY inline=(not inline - good)
PASS: Auth-profile GEMINI_API_KEY is managed, not written as plaintext.
  • Observed result after fix: plan.environment.GEMINI_API_KEY is undefined; plan.environment.OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS contains GEMINI_API_KEY.
  • What was not tested: Actual systemd service file rendering on a host with systemctl; the fix is at the install-plan environment level.

Verification

  • pnpm test src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.test.ts --run — 45 passed
  • node scripts/run-oxlint.mjs --tsconfig config/tsconfig/oxlint.core.json src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.test.ts — passed
  • node --import tsx scripts/repro/issue-95895-auth-profile-managed-env-keys.mts — PASS

AI-assisted: yes.

@openclaw-barnacle openclaw-barnacle Bot added scripts Repository scripts commands Command implementations size: S labels Jun 23, 2026
@Darren2030 Darren2030 mentioned this pull request Jun 23, 2026
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@mushuiyu886 mushuiyu886 mentioned this pull request Jun 23, 2026
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@clawsweeper

clawsweeper Bot commented Jun 23, 2026 •
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Thanks for the context here. I swept through the related work, and this is now duplicate or superseded.

Close: this branch is superseded by #96149, and this patch is not safe to merge because it removes auth-profile env values from the install plan without marking them file-backed for service delivery.

Canonical path: Close this branch and review or land the file-backed environmentValueSources fix in #96149 for the canonical credential-exposure issue.

So I’m closing this here and keeping the remaining discussion on #96149.

Review details

Best possible solution:

Close this branch and review or land the file-backed environmentValueSources fix in #96149 for the canonical credential-exposure issue.

Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue?

Yes. Source inspection shows auth-profile env refs enter the install plan as inline values on current main, and this PR then removes those values through the managed-key policy before service renderers can deliver them.

Is this the best way to solve the issue?

No. OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS is safe for durable dotenv-managed values, but auth-profile env refs need their current values preserved and marked file-backed for the service renderer.

Security review:

Security review cleared: The diff touches credential rendering but I found no new plaintext exposure or supply-chain change; the blocking issue is provider credential delivery.

AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant.

What I checked:

  • PR patch deletes auth-profile env values through managed-key policy: The PR changes managedServiceEnvKeys to include authProfileEnvironment; writeManagedServiceEnvKeysToEnvironment deletes listed keys from the planned environment before service rendering. (src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts:577, 77297447b173)
  • Current plan entries default to inline unless explicitly marked file-backed: addServiceEnvPlanEntries defaults missing valueSource to inline, so a service env value needs an explicit file-backed source if the renderer must carry it through an EnvironmentFile. (src/daemon/service-env-plan.ts:70, 654544b6b7c4)
  • Systemd EnvironmentFile only receives dotenv or file-backed environment values: Systemd staging merges dotenvVars and fileBackedEnvironment; a key removed from plan.environment and only named in OPENCLAW_SERVICE_MANAGED_ENV_KEYS has no current value to write. (src/daemon/systemd.ts:932, 654544b6b7c4)
  • Superseding PR preserves value delivery with the existing file-backed contract: The open replacement marks Google/Gemini config SecretRef and auth-profile env refs as environmentValueSources: "file", and its body includes staged systemd proof showing no inline plaintext plus a generated 0600 EnvironmentFile containing the values. (src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts:580, 80033c65c53e)
  • History points to daemon install and systemd env provenance owners: Blame and symbol history tie the relevant install-plan and systemd env-source code to recent daemon install commits, including the auth-profile daemon env introduction and later EnvironmentFile provenance work. (src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts:529, ba9fb4d994d6)

Likely related people:

  • vincentkoc: Current blame for the daemon install environment planner and systemd value-source helpers points to Vincent Koc's recent commits in this checkout. (role: recent area contributor; confidence: medium; commits: fa263affd584, c645ec4555c0; files: src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts, src/daemon/systemd.ts)
  • steipete: The auth-profile daemon env-ref persistence behavior appears in Peter Steinberger's fix: persist auth profile env refs for daemon install commit, directly adjacent to this PR's touched path. (role: introduced adjacent behavior; confidence: medium; commits: ba9fb4d994d6, a2cb80b9c4be; files: src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts, src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.test.ts, src/daemon/systemd.ts)
  • tmimmanuel: History for avoiding inline dotenv secrets in systemd units changed the EnvironmentFile rendering path that this PR should use instead of dropping the planned value. (role: adjacent systemd EnvironmentFile contributor; confidence: medium; commits: a2ab9e6a8e4c; files: src/daemon/systemd.ts, src/daemon/systemd.test.ts, src/config/state-dir-dotenv.ts)

Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning high; reviewed against 654544b6b7c4.

@clawsweeper clawsweeper Bot added rating: 🧂 unranked krab Not merge-ready due to missing proof or serious correctness/safety concerns. status: 📣 needs proof The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask. P1 High-priority user-facing bug, regression, or broken workflow. merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility 🚨 May break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrade paths. merge-risk: 🚨 auth-provider 🚨 May break OAuth, tokens, provider routing, model choice, or credentials. labels Jun 23, 2026
@clawsweeper

clawsweeper Bot commented Jun 24, 2026

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ClawSweeper applied the proposed close for this PR.

@clawsweeper clawsweeper Bot closed this Jun 24, 2026
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commands Command implementations merge-risk: 🚨 auth-provider 🚨 May break OAuth, tokens, provider routing, model choice, or credentials. merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility 🚨 May break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrade paths. P1 High-priority user-facing bug, regression, or broken workflow. rating: 🧂 unranked krab Not merge-ready due to missing proof or serious correctness/safety concerns. scripts Repository scripts size: S status: 📣 needs proof The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask.

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[Security]: GEMINI_API_KEY written as a plaintext literal in the generated systemd service unit

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