fix(security): restrict inbound media staging to media directory#4893
Closed
evanotero wants to merge 4 commits intoopenclaw:mainfrom
Closed
fix(security): restrict inbound media staging to media directory#4893evanotero wants to merge 4 commits intoopenclaw:mainfrom
evanotero wants to merge 4 commits intoopenclaw:mainfrom
Conversation
Member
|
Closing this in favor of #4930 which is a superset of this PR (includes the same assertSandboxPath fix plus agent hint updates and doc improvements). Credit to @evanotero for the original fix — already co-authored in #4930. Thanks! |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
This PR fixes a critical sandbox bypass vulnerability where host files could be exfiltrated into a restricted agent workspace.
Description
The 'stageSandboxMedia' function previously copied any absolute path provided in the 'MediaPaths' context into the agent's sandbox workspace without validation. This allowed a malicious plugin or hook to pull sensitive host files (e.g., '/etc/shadow') into the sandbox where they could be read by a restricted agent.
This fix:
Testing