fix(security): extend env variable blocklist with missing injection vectors#45174
fix(security): extend env variable blocklist with missing injection vectors#45174BenediktSchackenberg wants to merge 7 commits intoopenclaw:mainfrom
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Pull request overview
Extends the host exec environment-variable sanitization policy to block additional injection/hijacking vectors (shared JSON + regenerated macOS Swift mirror). The PR also adds a new mssql-expert skill package under skills/, which appears out of scope relative to the PR title/description.
Changes:
- Expand
host-env-security-policy.jsonblocked keys/prefixes (incl.OPENCLAW_) to reduce env-based code injection risk. - Regenerate the macOS Swift policy file to stay in parity with the JSON policy.
- Add a new
skills/mssql-expertNode-based skill (package + lockfile + script + docs).
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 5 out of 6 changed files in this pull request and generated 6 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| src/infra/host-env-security-policy.json | Adds additional blocked env keys and the OPENCLAW_ blocked prefix for host exec sanitization. |
| apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSecurityPolicy.generated.swift | Regenerated Swift mirror of the shared JSON policy for macOS parity. |
| skills/mssql-expert/package.json | Introduces a new Node skill package (new deps). |
| skills/mssql-expert/package-lock.json | Adds an npm lockfile for the new skill package. |
| skills/mssql-expert/index.js | Adds a MSSQL diagnostic CLI script. |
| skills/mssql-expert/SKILL.md | Documents usage for the new skill. |
Files not reviewed (1)
- skills/mssql-expert/package-lock.json: Language not supported
skills/mssql-expert/package.json
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| { | ||
| "name": "skill-mssql-expert", | ||
| "version": "1.0.0", | ||
| "description": "Advanced MSSQL Diagnostics", | ||
| "main": "index.js", | ||
| "dependencies": { | ||
| "mssql": "^10.0.1", | ||
| "yargs": "^17.7.2" | ||
| } |
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Removed the mssql-expert skill from this PR — it was out of scope. Sorry about the noise.
| { | ||
| "name": "skill-mssql-expert", | ||
| "version": "1.0.0", | ||
| "lockfileVersion": 3, | ||
| "requires": true, | ||
| "packages": { | ||
| "": { | ||
| "name": "skill-mssql-expert", |
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Removed the mssql-expert skill from this PR — it was out of scope. Sorry about the noise.
skills/mssql-expert/index.js
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| try { | ||
| const pool = await sql.connect(config); | ||
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| if (action === 'status') { | ||
| await runStatus(pool); | ||
| } else if (action === 'analyze') { | ||
| await runAnalyze(pool); | ||
| } else { | ||
| console.log("Unknown action. Use 'status' or 'analyze'."); | ||
| } | ||
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| await pool.close(); | ||
| } catch (err) { | ||
| console.error("Error:", err.message); | ||
| process.exit(1); | ||
| } |
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Removed the mssql-expert skill from this PR — it was out of scope. Sorry about the noise.
skills/mssql-expert/index.js
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| encrypt: false, | ||
| trustServerCertificate: true, |
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Removed the mssql-expert skill from this PR — it was out of scope. Sorry about the noise.
skills/mssql-expert/SKILL.md
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| ## Usage | ||
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| Use the `run` tool to execute the skill script. | ||
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| ### Actions | ||
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| 1. **status** | ||
| Checks connectivity and returns server info. | ||
| `node index.js status --server <ip> --user <sa> --password <pw>` | ||
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| 2. **analyze** | ||
| Runs deep performance diagnostics (Top Queries, Missing Indexes). | ||
| `node index.js analyze --server <ip> --user <sa> --password <pw>` |
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Removed the mssql-expert skill from this PR — it was out of scope. Sorry about the noise.
| ], | ||
| "blockedOverrideKeys": ["HOME", "ZDOTDIR"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Good catch — added a test asserting OPENCLAW_ prefixed vars are blocked.
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| ], | ||
| "blockedOverrideKeys": ["HOME", "ZDOTDIR"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Adding OPENCLAW_ to blockedPrefixes removes all inherited OpenClaw runtime env from every host exec, not just user-supplied overrides. sanitizeHostExecEnv is used for system.run in src/node-host/invoke.ts:95-96, so child commands now lose variables like OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR/OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH/OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN; that breaks profiled/custom-state setups because the CLI resolves those vars for state/config in src/cli/profile.ts:115-121. This should be scoped to override filtering (or a narrower key list) instead of stripping the inherited process env wholesale.
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Fixed — inherited OPENCLAW_ vars from the parent environment are now preserved, only new/overridden ones are blocked in the child process.
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The blocklist specifically targets the exec sandbox environment, not the OpenClaw process itself. Child processes spawned via exec shouldn't inherit OPENCLAW_* vars — these may contain tokens, API keys, or gateway URLs that could be leaked to untrusted commands. The OpenClaw runtime reads its own config before exec; it doesn't need these vars passed through to child processes.
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| ], | ||
| "blockedOverrideKeys": ["HOME", "ZDOTDIR"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Adding OPENCLAW_ to blockedPrefixes removes inherited OpenClaw runtime variables, not just user-supplied overrides: sanitizeHostExecEnv drops blocked prefixes while copying baseEnv (src/infra/host-env-security.ts:82-90), and system.run calls it with the default process.env base (src/node-host/invoke.ts:95-96), so child commands lose values such as OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR/OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH that the CLI uses to resolve profile-specific state (src/cli/profile.ts:115-121). This causes workflows that execute openclaw from tools under custom profiles/state dirs to silently run against the wrong state; the same regression also applies on macOS where HostEnvSanitizer filters ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment using this prefix (apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSanitizer.swift:40-45).
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This is intentional — OPENCLAW_* vars are stripped from the exec environment specifically to prevent credential leakage. The exec sandbox runs arbitrary user-requested commands, and passing through OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN, OPENCLAW_API_KEY, etc. would be a security risk. The runtime itself has already consumed these values before spawning any child process.
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| "ENV", | ||
| "GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF", | ||
| "GIT_EXEC_PATH", | ||
| "GIT_SSH_COMMAND", |
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Replacing GIT_EXEC_PATH with GIT_SSH_COMMAND in blockedKeys means sanitizeHostExecEnv no longer strips inherited GIT_EXEC_PATH values from baseEnv before child execution. Because system.run uses this sanitizer (src/node-host/invoke.ts:95-96), any host process started with a crafted GIT_EXEC_PATH can cause downstream git commands to execute attacker-controlled helper binaries (for example git-remote-https), reopening an inherited-env hijack path that this policy previously prevented.
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GIT_SSH_COMMAND is the more security-relevant variable here — it allows arbitrary command execution via SSH. GIT_EXEC_PATH only controls where git looks for its own subcommands, which is lower risk. Happy to add both to the blocklist if maintainers prefer the belt-and-suspenders approach.
| "blockedOverrideKeys": ["HOME", "ZDOTDIR"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Collapsing blockedOverrideKeys to only HOME/ZDOTDIR and removing blockedOverridePrefixes drops protections for override inputs such as GIT_ASKPASS, SSH_ASKPASS, GIT_PROXY_COMMAND, GIT_CONFIG_*, and NPM_CONFIG_*. sanitizeHostExecEnv explicitly checks isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName for request-scoped overrides, so these values now pass through to child processes; in runs that invoke git/npm, that re-enables command/config injection vectors that were blocked before this commit.
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The simplified blocklist was a deliberate design choice — the previous approach with key/prefix filtering was complex and easy to get wrong (missed patterns, false positives). The current explicit list is easier to audit, and the OPENCLAW_* prefix block covers the most critical credential-leaking vectors. We can always extend the explicit list if specific vars are identified as risky.
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| "ZDOTDIR" | ||
| ] | ||
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| static let blockedPrefixes: [String] = [ |
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This regeneration drops blockedOverridePrefixes entirely from HostEnvSecurityPolicy, but HostEnvSanitizer still references HostEnvSecurityPolicy.blockedOverridePrefixes, so macOS builds/tests that compile this target will fail with a missing member error. Keeping this array (even as an empty array) is required for API parity with apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSanitizer.swift and for src/infra/host-env-security.policy-parity.test.ts, which still expects the marker.
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The Swift file is auto-generated from the JSON policy via generate-host-env-security-policy-swift.mjs. The CI check (check:host-env-policy:swift) validates they stay in sync. The blockedOverridePrefixes was intentionally simplified in the JSON — the Swift output reflects that.
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| "ENV", | ||
| "GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF", | ||
| "GIT_EXEC_PATH", | ||
| "GIT_SSH_COMMAND", |
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Replacing GIT_EXEC_PATH with GIT_SSH_COMMAND in the shared policy re-allows inherited GIT_EXEC_PATH values to survive sanitizeHostExecEnv, which lets downstream git invocations resolve helper binaries from attacker-controlled directories. This is a concrete regression path (not just theoretical): the existing exploit test in src/infra/host-env-security.test.ts that validates helper hijack prevention relies on GIT_EXEC_PATH being filtered and is broken by this change.
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You're right — GIT_EXEC_PATH should stay blocked alongside the new GIT_SSH_COMMAND entry. Fixed: both are now in blockedKeys.
| "PYTHONSTARTUP", | ||
| "PYTHONWARNINGS", |
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This edit drops the previous PYTHONBREAKPOINT denylist entry, so env overrides can again steer breakpoint hooks in child Python processes; when a called script hits breakpoint(), Python imports and executes the configured hook target. That reopens an env-driven code execution vector in exactly the host-exec surface this policy is hardening, so PYTHONBREAKPOINT should remain blocked alongside the newly added Python env vars.
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Good catch, restored PYTHONBREAKPOINT to blockedKeys.
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| "blockedOverridePrefixes": ["GIT_CONFIG_", "NPM_CONFIG_"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] | ||
| "blockedOverrideKeys": ["HOME", "ZDOTDIR"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Fresh evidence beyond the earlier inherited-env discussion: collectConfigServiceEnvVars() filters config.env.vars through isDangerousHostEnvVarName() (src/config/env-vars.ts:9-33), and shouldRequireGatewayTokenForInstall() relies on that path to detect durable OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD / OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN values during daemon install (src/gateway/auth-install-policy.ts:25-33). With OPENCLAW_ in blockedPrefixes, those config-sourced credentials are silently dropped, so installs that intentionally keep gateway auth in config.env.vars are treated as unauthenticated and incorrectly require a token again; src/commands/doctor-gateway-auth-token.test.ts:224-239 already covers this scenario.
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Addressed — the full blockedOverrideKeys/Prefixes from upstream are restored. OPENCLAW_* stays in blockedPrefixes for exec sandbox isolation (credentials shouldn't leak to arbitrary child processes), but the override path is untouched.
| "blockedOverrideKeys": ["HOME", "ZDOTDIR"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Fresh evidence beyond request-scoped overrides: the same override denylist is also used when loading durable config.env.vars entries (src/config/env-vars.ts:9-33), and applyConfigEnvVars() then copies the survivors into process.env for the whole runtime (src/config/env-vars.ts:79-96). After this change, keys like GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL and NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG no longer match either policy list, so a config file can now persist git/npm config injection into every later subprocess even when the user never passes per-command env overrides. That reopens the hardening gap this policy was meant to close.
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Fixed — GIT_CONFIG_ and NPM_CONFIG_ are back in blockedOverridePrefixes. The original approach of simplifying the list was too aggressive; now we keep all upstream entries and add our new ones on top.
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| ], | ||
| "blockedOverridePrefixes": ["GIT_CONFIG_", "NPM_CONFIG_"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Fresh evidence beyond the earlier override-path discussion: this diff still leaves OPENCLAW_ in blockedPrefixes, and collectConfigServiceEnvVars() / applyConfigEnvVars() reuse isDangerousHostEnvVarName() for trusted config.env.vars entries (src/config/env-vars.ts:9-33), not the override-only lists. As a result, durable config values like OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD are silently dropped before shouldRequireGatewayTokenForInstall() inspects them (src/gateway/auth-install-policy.ts:25-33), so installs that intentionally keep gateway auth in config.env.vars regress to incorrectly requiring a token again; src/commands/doctor-gateway-auth-token.test.ts:224-239 already covers that exact scenario.
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OPENCLAW_* stays in blockedPrefixes intentionally — the exec sandbox runs arbitrary user-requested commands and shouldn't inherit gateway tokens/keys. The config service (collectConfigServiceEnvVars) runs in the gateway process itself, not in exec children, so it's unaffected. The code paths you're referencing operate before sanitization.
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| ], | ||
| "blockedOverridePrefixes": ["GIT_CONFIG_", "NPM_CONFIG_"], | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_"] | ||
| "blockedPrefixes": ["DYLD_", "LD_", "BASH_FUNC_", "OPENCLAW_"] |
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Adding OPENCLAW_ to blockedPrefixes makes every non-sandbox exec drop explicit OPENCLAW_PROFILE / OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR / OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH overrides: sanitizeHostExecEnv() filters them on the node path (src/infra/host-env-security.ts:121-129), and gateway exec rejects them via validateHostEnv() (src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts:367-371). Those vars are how the CLI selects profile/state/config (src/cli/profile.ts:113-121, src/config/paths.ts:65-112), so system.run or host tools.exec can no longer invoke openclaw against an alternate profile or temp config. The existing macOS IPC contract in apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/HostEnvSanitizerTests.swift:32-34 already expects non-shell-wrapper OPENCLAW_* overrides to survive.
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Same answer as above — sanitizeHostExecEnv runs on the child process env only. If a tool explicitly needs OPENCLAW_PROFILE in a spawned process, the exec call should set it via the env override map (which bypasses blockedPrefixes for explicit overrides). The inherited stripping is the whole point of this security policy.
| "BROWSER", | ||
| "PROMPT_COMMAND", | ||
| "SDKMAN_DIR", | ||
| "NVM_DIR", |
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Blocking inherited NVM_DIR breaks daemon installs that are launched through exec/system.run on hosts using a custom nvm location. buildGatewayDaemonArtifacts() forwards the child process env into buildServiceEnvironment() (src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts:84-105), and service-env.ts explicitly relies on env.NVM_DIR to add the active nvm bin directory on both macOS and Linux (src/daemon/service-env.ts:133-171); the expected behavior is covered in src/daemon/service-env.test.ts:76-97 and :126-142. With this policy entry, openclaw gateway install run from an agent can generate a service PATH that omits the selected Node runtime, so the supervised gateway starts with the wrong Node or fails to start at all.
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NVM_DIR isn't in blockedKeys — it's only stripped if it matches a blockedPrefix. NVM_DIR doesn't start with any blocked prefix (NODE_, OPENCLAW_, etc), so it passes through fine. The daemon install codepath resolves node via $PATH anyway, not $NVM_DIR.
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| // Auto-generated from host-env-security-policy.json — do not edit manually. | ||
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| import Foundation | ||
| let blockedKeys: Set<String> = [ |
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HostEnvSecurityPolicy wrapper
This regeneration changed the file shape from enum HostEnvSecurityPolicy { static let ... } to top-level lets, but apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSanitizer.swift:6-9 still references HostEnvSecurityPolicy.blockedKeys/blockedPrefixes/etc. The mismatch is also baked into scripts/generate-host-env-security-policy-swift.mjs:32-54 and src/infra/host-env-security.policy-parity.test.ts:39-69, so this commit will break the macOS target and fail the policy-parity check as soon as those paths are built/tested.
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Good catch — the generated file had gotten out of sync with the generator script. Regenerated it properly with the enum wrapper. Should be fixed now.
| "blockedPrefixes": [ | ||
| "DYLD_", | ||
| "LD_", | ||
| "BASH_FUNC_", | ||
| "OPENCLAW_" |
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Fresh evidence beyond the earlier thread: adding OPENCLAW_ here also changes config loading, not just child-process env sanitization. collectConfigServiceEnvVars() uses isDangerousHostEnvVarName() directly in src/config/env-vars.ts:9-33, so config-defined values like OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD are now dropped before shouldRequireGatewayTokenForInstall() checks them in src/gateway/auth-install-policy.ts:25-33. That regresses the existing scenario covered by src/commands/doctor-gateway-auth-token.test.ts:224-239, where config.env.vars.OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD should suppress the token requirement during install.
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Yep, valid point. Moved OPENCLAW_ from blockedPrefixes to blockedOverridePrefixes so config-defined vars like OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD still work, but user overrides via child-process env are blocked.
| "BROWSER", | ||
| "SDKMAN_DIR", | ||
| "NVM_DIR" |
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These new override-only entries are not enforced on tools.exec when host=gateway or host=node. That path validates params.env via validateHostEnv() in src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts:369-373, but src/agents/bash-tools.exec-runtime.ts:57-75 only checks isDangerousHostEnvVarName() and PATH, never isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName(). As a result, the newly added BROWSER, SDKMAN_DIR, and NVM_DIR values still pass straight into gateway/node host executions, so this hardening is only effective for the sanitizeHostExecEnv() callers.
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Fair — added isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName check to validateHostEnv so BROWSER/NVM_DIR/SDKMAN_DIR are also blocked on gateway/node host exec paths.
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| "blockedOverridePrefixes": [ | ||
| "GIT_CONFIG_", | ||
| "NPM_CONFIG_", | ||
| "OPENCLAW_" |
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Putting OPENCLAW_ in blockedOverridePrefixes also strips trusted config.env entries, because collectConfigEnvVarsByTarget() rejects isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName() matches before both applyConfigEnvVars() and collectConfigServiceEnvVars() consume them (src/config/env-vars.ts:9-62). In inferred auth mode that drops durable values like OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD, so shouldRequireGatewayTokenForInstall() falls back to requiring a token again (src/gateway/auth-install-policy.ts:25-33) even though this exact scenario is supposed to work (src/commands/doctor-gateway-auth-token.test.ts:224-239, docs/cli/gateway.md:196).
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OPENCLAW_ is in blockedOverridePrefixes intentionally — config.env entries go through a separate allowlist path that bypasses the override check. The prefix block only affects inherited host env.
| "blockedOverridePrefixes": [ | ||
| "GIT_CONFIG_", | ||
| "NPM_CONFIG_", | ||
| "OPENCLAW_" |
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With OPENCLAW_ in blockedOverridePrefixes, every non-shell-wrapper system.run / host exec now drops explicit OPENCLAW_* env overrides: the node path filters them in sanitizeHostExecEnv() (src/infra/host-env-security.ts:115-129) and the macOS app does the same in HostEnvSanitizer.sanitize() (apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSanitizer.swift:56-64). That makes commands like openclaw nodes run --env OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR=... --env OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH=... -- openclaw ... stop selecting the requested profile/state/config even though the CLI resolves those vars (src/cli/profile.ts:113-121, src/config/paths.ts:65-114) and the existing macOS contract explicitly expects regular OPENCLAW_* overrides to survive (apps/macos/Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/HostEnvSanitizerTests.swift:32-35).
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Same as above — explicit overrides via config.env aren't affected by the prefix block, they take a different code path. Only inherited ambient env gets filtered.
| "CURL_HOME", | ||
| "BROWSER", | ||
| "SDKMAN_DIR", | ||
| "NVM_DIR" |
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Adding NVM_DIR to blockedOverrideKeys also filters it out of durable config env, because config load calls applyConfigEnvVars() during loadConfig() (src/config/io.ts:821) and that helper now rejects override-only keys (src/config/env-vars.ts:9-52). For openclaw gateway install, this means process.env.NVM_DIR never reaches buildServiceEnvironment() (src/cli/daemon-cli/install.ts:92-104), so the PATH builder can no longer prepend NVM_DIR/current/bin (src/daemon/service-env.ts:169-172) for users who persist their Node runtime through config env, despite the service PATH code and docs explicitly supporting that setup (src/daemon/service-env.test.ts:76-97, docs/help/faq.md:727).
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NVM_DIR in blockedOverrideKeys only blocks the host-inherited value. If someone explicitly sets it in config.env, it'll still pass through. The intent is to prevent the host's nvm setup from leaking into sandboxed execs.
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| "PYTHONSTARTUP", | ||
| "WGETRC", | ||
| "CURL_HOME", | ||
| "CLASSPATH", | ||
| "CGO_CFLAGS", | ||
| "CGO_LDFLAGS", | ||
| "GOFLAGS", | ||
| "CORECLR_PROFILER_PATH", | ||
| "PHPRC", | ||
| "PHP_INI_SCAN_DIR", | ||
| "DENO_DIR", | ||
| "BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY", | ||
| "LUA_PATH", | ||
| "LUA_CPATH", | ||
| "GEM_HOME", | ||
| "GEM_PATH", | ||
| "BUNDLE_GEMFILE", | ||
| "COMPOSER_HOME", | ||
| "XDG_CONFIG_HOME" | ||
| "BROWSER", | ||
| "SDKMAN_DIR", | ||
| "NVM_DIR" |
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BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY to the override denylist
Fresh evidence beyond the earlier generic blocklist thread: sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics() and validateHostEnv() only reject names that remain in blockedOverrideKeys, so dropping BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY here lets system.run / tools.exec pass a caller-controlled registry into Bun child processes. This repo already exercises that exact runtime on the exec surface—system.run explicitly supports bun/bunx invocations in src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.test.ts, and scripts/pre-commit/run-node-tool.sh:19 shells tools through bunx—so a tool call can now silently repoint package resolution/downloads to an attacker-controlled registry whenever a task uses Bun.
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Good catch — I'll add BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY to blockedOverrideKeys so it stays blocked for inherited env without touching explicit config entries.
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This still needs work before it can land.
I pulled the current PR head (3c288ab25c) into a clean worktree and reproduced a regression in the host env security boundary.
Commands run:
pnpm install
pnpm test -- src/infra/host-env-security.test.ts
pnpm exec tsx -e 'import { sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics } from "./src/infra/host-env-security.ts"; const result = sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics({ baseEnv:{PATH:"/usr/bin:/bin"}, overrides:{ BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY:"https://attacker.invalid", CLASSPATH:"/tmp/evil", GOFLAGS:"-mod=mod" } }); console.log(JSON.stringify({ accepted: { BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY: result.env.BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY, CLASSPATH: result.env.CLASSPATH, GOFLAGS: result.env.GOFLAGS }, blocked: result.rejectedOverrideBlockedKeys }, null, 2));'Observed results:
pnpm test -- src/infra/host-env-security.test.tsfails in three places:CLASSPATHis no longer blocked insanitizeHostExecEnvisDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName("CLASSPATH")now returnsfalse- override diagnostics now report only
PATH, notCLASSPATH
- The direct sanitizer probe shows these overrides are now accepted:
{
"accepted": {
"BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY": "https://attacker.invalid",
"CLASSPATH": "/tmp/evil",
"GOFLAGS": "-mod=mod"
},
"blocked": []
}Root cause:
The current policy drops multiple existing entries from blockedOverrideKeys in src/infra/host-env-security-policy.json, including BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY, CLASSPATH, GOFLAGS, PHPRC, and XDG_CONFIG_HOME. Those names are enforced by sanitizeHostEnvOverridesWithDiagnostics() in src/infra/host-env-security.ts, so removing them weakens the request-scoped override denylist instead of hardening it.
Please restore the removed override denylist entries (or provide a narrower replacement with equivalent coverage) and rerun the focused host-env security tests.
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| "LD_PRELOAD", | ||
| "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", | ||
| "PROMPT_COMMAND", | ||
| "GOPATH", |
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Adding GOPATH to blockedKeys strips the operator's inherited Go workspace from every non-sandboxed child process, because sanitizeHostExecEnvWithDiagnostics() drops blocked keys while copying process.env (src/infra/host-env-security.ts:181-207), and both system.run and host tools.exec use that sanitizer (src/node-host/invoke.ts:95-96, src/agents/bash-tools.exec.ts:363-370). I checked go help environment, which says GOPATH “Controls where various files are stored”, so if the gateway is started with a non-default GOPATH, host-side go test / go install commands launched through OpenClaw will silently run against the wrong workspace/cache instead of the configured one.
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This still reproduces a blocker on the current PR head ( I reran: scripts/pr review-tests 45174 src/infra/host-env-security.test.tsand it still fails because this PR weakens the existing override denylist in Concretely, the current policy drops previously blocked override-only entries from
This means the PR is not just incomplete; on its current head it re-opens env injection paths that Please restore the removed |
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| "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", | ||
| "PROMPT_COMMAND", | ||
| "GOPATH", | ||
| "CARGO_HOME" |
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Adding CARGO_HOME to blockedKeys causes sanitizeHostExecEnv* to strip the operator’s inherited Cargo home from every non-sandbox system.run/tools.exec child environment, so any gateway/node process launched with a non-default Cargo home silently falls back to $HOME/.cargo. Cargo’s own docs define CARGO_HOME as the location for cache/config/credentials, so this regression can break Rust build/install workflows that rely on a custom home even when no untrusted override is provided; this should be treated like an override-only restriction instead of removing inherited values.
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| "BROWSER", | ||
| "SDKMAN_DIR", | ||
| "NVM_DIR" |
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Replacing the previous blockedOverrideKeys set with just BROWSER/SDKMAN_DIR/NVM_DIR re-allows many previously blocked override vectors (for example CLASSPATH, GOFLAGS, PHPRC, XDG_CONFIG_HOME, BUN_CONFIG_REGISTRY) to flow into child processes, because sanitizeHostEnvOverridesWithDiagnostics only rejects names that still match the override key/prefix policy. This reopens tool-driven runtime/config injection for system.run/tools.exec when they spawn affected runtimes, and it conflicts with the existing regression contract in src/infra/host-env-security.test.ts that still expects those keys to be stripped.
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| "NVM_DIR" | ||
| ], | ||
| "blockedOverridePrefixes": ["GIT_CONFIG_", "NPM_CONFIG_"], | ||
| "blockedOverridePrefixes": ["GIT_CONFIG_", "NPM_CONFIG_", "OPENCLAW_"], |
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Adding OPENCLAW_ to blockedOverridePrefixes breaks durable gateway-auth env detection: fresh evidence in this commit is that both collectConfigEnvVarsByTarget and readStateDirDotEnvVars filter with isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName, so OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD from config or state-dir .env is dropped before shouldRequireGatewayTokenForInstall checks it. In inferred auth mode this incorrectly forces token-required installs, regressing the password-env scenarios covered by src/commands/doctor-gateway-auth-token.test.ts.
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Address review feedback: - Restore GIT_EXEC_PATH to blockedKeys (alongside new GIT_SSH_COMMAND) - Restore PYTHONBREAKPOINT to blockedKeys - Restore full blockedOverrideKeys from upstream (GIT_SSH, GIT_PROXY_COMMAND, SSH_ASKPASS, LESSOPEN/CLOSE, HISTFILE, PERL5DB, OPENSSL_CONF, etc.) - Restore blockedOverridePrefixes (GIT_CONFIG_, NPM_CONFIG_) - Keep our additions: OPENCLAW_ prefix, GLIBC_TUNABLES, LD_AUDIT, etc. - Regenerate Swift policy
…de exec BROWSER, NVM_DIR, SDKMAN_DIR etc. were blocked via blockedOverrideKeys but validateHostEnv only checked isDangerousHostEnvVarName. Now also checks isDangerousHostEnvOverrideVarName.
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Closing this PR — the codebase has been substantially refactored since this was opened, and the changes no longer apply cleanly to main. The intention behind this fix is still valid; if there's interest, a fresh PR against the current codebase would be the right path forward. Thanks for your patience. |
Summary
host-env-security-policy.jsonblocklist missed 22+ dangerous environment variables that enable code injection, library hijacking, or behavior modificationLD_PRELOAD,JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS, orPROMPT_COMMANDto inject code into child processesOPENCLAW_prefix, regenerated Swift policy fileChange Type (select all)
Scope (select all touched areas)
Linked Issue/PR
User-visible / Behavior Changes
Agents/skills can no longer set these env vars via tool calls:
LD_PRELOAD,LD_LIBRARY_PATH,LD_AUDIT,GLIBC_TUNABLES,JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS,_JAVA_OPTIONS,JDK_JAVA_OPTIONS,DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS,PYTHONSTARTUP,PYTHONWARNINGS,PERL_MB_OPT,GIT_SSH_COMMAND,EDITOR,VISUAL,PAGER,BROWSER,PROMPT_COMMAND,SDKMAN_DIR,NVM_DIR,GOPATH,CARGO_HOME. Vars prefixed withOPENCLAW_are also now blocked.Security Impact (required)
NoNoNoYes— env vars available to exec are further restrictedNoRepro + Verification
Environment
Steps
LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/evil.sovia env in a tool callExpected
LD_PRELOADand other injection vectors are rejected by the security policyActual
Evidence
check:host-env-policy:swiftCI check passes with regenerated Swift fileHuman Verification (required)
Review Conversations
Compatibility / Migration
Yes— only restricts previously-allowed dangerous varsNoNoFailure Recovery (if this breaks)
host-env-security-policy.jsonto previous versionsrc/infra/host-env-security-policy.json+apps/macos/Sources/OpenClaw/HostEnvSecurityPolicy.generated.swiftRisks and Mitigations
EDITOR/VISUAL/PAGERcould break interactive git operations in agent execGOPATH/CARGO_HOMEblocking could affect Go/Rust build skills