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fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS SSRF bypass#110693

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steipete merged 2 commits into
openclaw:mainfrom
lsr911:fix/litellm-loopback-ip-guard
Jul 18, 2026
Merged

fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS SSRF bypass#110693
steipete merged 2 commits into
openclaw:mainfrom
lsr911:fix/litellm-loopback-ip-guard

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@lsr911

@lsr911 lsr911 commented Jul 18, 2026

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What Problem This Solves

LiteLLM image generation automatically permits private-network access for loopback-style endpoints. The previous 127. prefix check also matched DNS hostnames such as 127.evil.com, allowing an attacker-controlled public hostname to receive the loopback exemption without the operator's explicit allowPrivateNetwork opt-in.

Why This Change Was Made

The provider now applies the 127/8 exemption only when Node's net.isIP confirms that the parsed hostname is an IPv4 literal. This keeps endpoint ownership local to the LiteLLM provider and leaves the shared SSRF policy unchanged. Provider-level regression coverage exercises the canonical image-generation request path, including the explicit opt-in fallback.

The surrounding audit found no second unfixed instance in the same LiteLLM path: Slack and policy helpers already validate literal IPv4 input, the Nostr socket check receives a resolved peer address rather than a URL hostname, and the analogous Codex WebSocket authentication issue is tracked separately in #110692.

User Impact

Literal 127/8, localhost, IPv6 loopback, and host.docker.internal LiteLLM endpoints remain automatic. A DNS hostname beginning with 127. now needs the existing models.providers.litellm.request.allowPrivateNetwork opt-in, as other non-loopback private endpoints already do.

Evidence

  • node scripts/run-vitest.mjs extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.test.ts — 1 file passed, 12 tests passed.
  • node scripts/check-changed.mjs -- extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.ts extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.test.ts — all extension typecheck, test-typecheck, lint, formatting, dependency, boundary, database-first, and import-cycle gates passed on Blacksmith Testbox: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/actions/runs/29665469639
  • .agents/skills/autoreview/scripts/autoreview --mode branch --base origin/main --stream-engine-output — clean; no accepted/actionable findings.
  • Node 26.5.0 net.isIP probe classified 127.0.0.1 and 127.255.255.255 as IPv4 literals, while classifying 127.evil.com as not an IP literal.

Fix and tests improved by the OpenClaw maintainer team; original security report and patch by @lsr911.

@openclaw-barnacle openclaw-barnacle Bot added extensions: litellm size: XS triage: needs-pr-context Candidate: external PR body lacks required problem context or evidence. labels Jul 18, 2026
@clawsweeper clawsweeper Bot added proof: sufficient ClawSweeper judged the real behavior proof convincing. rating: 🐚 platinum hermit Good normal PR readiness with ordinary maintainer review expected. status: 👀 ready for maintainer look ClawSweeper has no concrete contributor-facing blocker left for this PR. P0 Emergency: data loss, security bypass, crash loop, or unusable core runtime. merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility 🚨 May break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrade paths. labels Jul 18, 2026
@clawsweeper

clawsweeper Bot commented Jul 18, 2026

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Codex review: needs maintainer review before merge. Reviewed July 18, 2026, 7:46 PM ET / 23:46 UTC.

Summary
The branch restricts LiteLLM image-generation loopback auto-allowance to literal IPv4 127/8 addresses and adds regression coverage for literal loopback, IPv6 loopback, DNS lookalikes, and the existing private-network opt-in.

PR surface: Source +2, Tests +6. Total +8 across 2 files.

Reproducibility: yes. source-reproducible: the base condition accepts any parsed hostname beginning with 127., and the added cases exercise 127.evil.com through the canonical LiteLLM image-generation request path. The supplied terminal probe independently confirms Node does not classify that hostname as an IPv4 literal.

Review metrics: none identified.

Merge readiness
Overall: 🐚 platinum hermit
Proof: 🐚 platinum hermit
Patch quality: 🦞 diamond lobster
Result: ready for maintainer review.

Overall follows the weaker of proof and patch quality, so missing proof can cap an otherwise strong patch.

Rank-up moves:

  • none.

Risk before merge

  • [P1] An operator using a LiteLLM endpoint whose DNS hostname begins with 127. will now need the existing models.providers.litellm.request.allowPrivateNetwork opt-in; that is an intentional compatibility restriction, not a new configuration surface.

Maintainer options:

  1. Accept the intentional endpoint-policy tightening (recommended)
    Merge the literal-IP guard because exceptional 127.* DNS endpoints retain a documented existing opt-in rather than silently receiving a loopback exemption.
  2. Pause for a compatibility decision
    Keep the PR open only if maintainers intend 127.* DNS hostnames to remain implicitly trusted despite the SSRF-policy bypass.

Next step before merge

  • No narrow automated repair remains; the next action is normal maintainer review of the intentional compatibility tightening.

Security
Cleared: The diff narrows a provider-local trust exemption using Node’s built-in node:net API and adds no dependency, secret, workflow, or supply-chain surface.

Review details

Best possible solution:

Land the narrow provider-local guard with its regression coverage, retaining the existing explicit private-network opt-in for exceptional non-literal endpoint hosts.

Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue?

Yes, source-reproducible: the base condition accepts any parsed hostname beginning with 127., and the added cases exercise 127.evil.com through the canonical LiteLLM image-generation request path. The supplied terminal probe independently confirms Node does not classify that hostname as an IPv4 literal.

Is this the best way to solve the issue?

Yes. Keeping the exception in the LiteLLM owner and requiring Node’s literal-IP classification is the narrowest maintainable fix; the shared SSRF policy and existing opt-in remain unchanged.

AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant.

Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning high; reviewed against 56eef7998902.

Label changes

Label justifications:

  • P0: The prior rule can exempt an attacker-controlled DNS hostname from the provider’s private-network request restriction, creating a security-bypass path.
  • merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility: Existing deployments using a 127.* DNS hostname must switch to the already-supported private-network opt-in after this intentional policy correction.
  • rating: 🐚 platinum hermit: Overall readiness is 🐚 platinum hermit; proof is 🐚 platinum hermit and patch quality is 🦞 diamond lobster.
  • status: 👀 ready for maintainer look: ClawSweeper has no concrete contributor-facing blocker left for this PR. Sufficient (terminal): The PR supplies after-fix terminal evidence for Node’s literal-IP classification plus provider-path regression coverage and successful changed-path validation; redact any endpoint or deployment details if further proof is posted.
  • proof: sufficient: Contributor real behavior proof is sufficient. The PR supplies after-fix terminal evidence for Node’s literal-IP classification plus provider-path regression coverage and successful changed-path validation; redact any endpoint or deployment details if further proof is posted.
Evidence reviewed

PR surface:

Source +2, Tests +6. Total +8 across 2 files.

View PR surface stats
Area Files Added Removed Net
Source 1 3 1 +2
Tests 1 28 22 +6
Docs 0 0 0 0
Config 0 0 0 0
Generated 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0
Total 2 31 23 +8

What I checked:

  • Changed security decision: The proposed provider helper changes the loopback exemption from lowered.startsWith("127.") to isIP(lowered) === 4 && lowered.startsWith("127."), preventing DNS labels from satisfying the IPv4 loopback rule while retaining literal 127/8 behavior. (extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.ts:66, ccf927f6b241)
  • Request-path coverage: The expanded provider tests classify 127.255.255.254 and IPv6 loopback as automatic, classify 127.evil.com as requiring the normal private-network policy, and verify the explicit allowPrivateNetwork fallback for both a LAN IP and the DNS lookalike. (extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.test.ts:254, ccf927f6b241)
  • Maintainer follow-up: The current head includes a follow-up test commit authored by steipete after assignment, strengthening the changed policy boundary rather than widening the shared SSRF implementation. (extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.test.ts:306, ccf927f6b241)
  • Supplied after-fix proof: The PR supplies a Node net.isIP terminal probe, focused provider-path test result, changed-path gate result, and a successful real-behavior-proof check; this directly supports the literal-versus-DNS distinction used by the patch. (ccf927f6b241)

Likely related people:

  • steipete: The PR timeline shows assignment to steipete, and the current head includes steipete’s follow-up commit expanding the LiteLLM endpoint-policy coverage. (role: recent LiteLLM-path contributor and assigned reviewer; confidence: high; commits: ccf927f6b241; files: extensions/litellm/image-generation-provider.test.ts)
What the crustacean ranks mean
  • 🦀 challenger crab: rare, exceptional readiness with strong proof, clean implementation, and convincing validation.
  • 🦞 diamond lobster: very strong readiness with only minor maintainer review expected.
  • 🐚 platinum hermit: good normal PR, likely mergeable with ordinary maintainer review.
  • 🦐 gold shrimp: useful signal, but proof or patch confidence is still limited.
  • 🦪 silver shellfish: thin signal; proof, validation, or implementation needs work.
  • 🧂 unranked krab: not merge-ready because proof is missing/unusable or there are serious correctness or safety concerns.
  • 🌊 off-meta tidepool: rating does not apply to this item.

Shiny media proof means a screenshot, video, or linked artifact directly shows the changed behavior. Runtime, network, CSP, and security claims still need visible diagnostics.

How this review workflow works
  • ClawSweeper keeps one durable marker-backed review comment per issue or PR.
  • Re-runs edit this comment so the latest verdict, findings, and automation markers stay together instead of adding duplicate bot comments.
  • A fresh review can be triggered by eligible @clawsweeper re-review comments, exact-item GitHub events, scheduled/background review runs, or manual workflow dispatch.
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Review history (1 earlier review cycle)
  • reviewed 2026-07-18T12:35:09.399Z sha d8d2e5d :: needs maintainer review before merge. :: none

@steipete steipete self-assigned this Jul 18, 2026
lsr911 and others added 2 commits July 19, 2026 00:31
… DNS bypass

The isAutoAllowedLitellmHostname helper auto-enables private-network access
for loopback-style hosts. Before this fix, lowered.startsWith("127.")
matched DNS hostnames like 127.evil.com, letting remote endpoints bypass
the explicit allowPrivateNetwork opt-in — a SSRF risk.

Add isIP(host)===4 guard so only literal IPv4 loopback addresses qualify.
Same canonical pattern as extensions/slack/src/monitor/relay-source.ts:271
and the codex loopback fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>
@steipete
steipete force-pushed the fix/litellm-loopback-ip-guard branch from d8d2e5d to ccf927f Compare July 18, 2026 23:42
@openclaw-barnacle openclaw-barnacle Bot added size: S and removed size: XS triage: needs-pr-context Candidate: external PR body lacks required problem context or evidence. labels Jul 18, 2026
@steipete

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Maintainer pass complete on exact head ccf927f6b241b85ef6b0015d8ed8c1059285a734.

What changed:

  • Added provider-level regression coverage for 127.evil.com, the wider literal 127/8 range, localhost, both IPv6 loopback spellings, host.docker.internal, and explicit private-network opt-in.
  • Simplified the production predicate so the 127/8 exemption requires a real IPv4 literal without a redundant 127.0.0.1 branch.
  • Audited sibling 127. matchers: the shared-policy and Slack paths already validate literals; the analogous Codex auth-boundary issue remains separate in fix(codex): guard loopback WS classification with isIP to prevent DNS hostname bypass #110692.

Proof:

Known proof gaps: none material. The permission decision is made before network dispatch and is directly exercised at the provider HTTP boundary, so a live LiteLLM service would not add signal to this hostname-classification regression.

@steipete
steipete merged commit 3d03b60 into openclaw:main Jul 18, 2026
97 of 101 checks passed
@steipete

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Merged via squash.

github-actions Bot pushed a commit to Desicool/openclaw that referenced this pull request Jul 19, 2026
… DNS SSRF bypass (openclaw#110693)

* fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS bypass

The isAutoAllowedLitellmHostname helper auto-enables private-network access
for loopback-style hosts. Before this fix, lowered.startsWith("127.")
matched DNS hostnames like 127.evil.com, letting remote endpoints bypass
the explicit allowPrivateNetwork opt-in — a SSRF risk.

Add isIP(host)===4 guard so only literal IPv4 loopback addresses qualify.
Same canonical pattern as extensions/slack/src/monitor/relay-source.ts:271
and the codex loopback fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* test(litellm): cover loopback endpoint policy

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
RomneyDa added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 22, 2026
* fix: gate diagnostics command to owners

(cherry picked from commit 170bf72)

* fix(agent): replace self-wait with deferred release in retained-lock abort cleanup (#96100)

* fix(agent): wait for retained session write before releasing held lock on abort

* fix(agent): replace self-wait with deferred release in retained-lock abort cleanup

* fix(test): reject fallback acquire with SessionWriteLockTimeoutError in active-scope cleanup test

* fix(agent): trim retained-lock comments

Signed-off-by: sallyom <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 0a042f6)

* fix(gateway): resume channel after pending task recovery

(cherry picked from commit 6039da3)

* fix(gateway): resume channel after pending task recovery

(cherry picked from commit ecd29fe)

* fix(outbound): ignore empty delivery receipts (#79811)

(cherry picked from commit 9a735be)

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles (#97041)

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles

* fix(agents): guard delivery-evidence attachment recursion against cycles

---------

Co-authored-by: Pick-cat <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4985671)

* fix(opencode-go): re-arm idle timer on block-boundary events to prevent false stalled-stream abort (#97128)

* fix(opencode-go): re-arm idle timer on block-boundary events to prevent false stalled-stream abort

When the opencode-go model finalizes a tool call and deliberates before
the next one, the provider emits real block-boundary SSE events
(text_end, thinking_end, toolcall_start, toolcall_end) that prove the
socket is alive, but the watchdog's isProviderProgressEvent only
returned true for token deltas (text_delta, thinking_delta,
toolcall_delta). This caused the idle timer to fire and falsely abort a
live stream, replacing a completed answer with a stalled error and
dropping the provider's real done event.

Fix: include block-boundary events in isProviderProgressEvent so the
idle timer is re-armed on any forward-progress provider event.
text_start and thinking_start are intentionally excluded because they
are synthetic preamble events that should not shorten the first-event
window.

Closes #96518

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* test(opencode-go): satisfy lint in stream regression

* test(opencode-go): satisfy lint in stream regression

* test(opencode-go): satisfy lint in stream regression

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 552ec2b)

* fix(model-fallback): don't rethrow provider-side AbortErrors as user cancellations (#90908)

* fix(model-fallback): don't rethrow provider-side AbortErrors as user cancellations

When the LLM API closes the connection mid-stream, the fetch layer
surfaces AbortError("This operation was aborted") with no external
abort signal triggered. The old guard `shouldRethrowAbort()` returned
false for these errors (because isTimeoutError matched the message),
so they fell through to the fallback loop but were never retried —
the error propagated up and produced SILENT_REPLY_TOKEN in group
sessions, permanently silencing the topic.

Replace the guard with a direct check: only rethrow AbortError when
the external abort signal is actually set (user/gateway cancellation).
Provider-side AbortErrors without an external signal now fall through
to the next fallback candidate, giving the system a chance to recover.

* fix(cron): forward abort signal into runWithModelFallback

Thread the cron executor's abort signal into the shared
runWithModelFallback call so that cron timeouts and cancellations
stop the fallback chain instead of retrying with the next candidate.

Previously, the run callback checked params.abortSignal?.aborted and
threw, but runWithModelFallback itself had no signal — so the new
guard in model-fallback.ts could not distinguish a caller abort from
a provider-side AbortError and would retry silently.

Also adds a focused regression test verifying the signal is forwarded.

---------

Co-authored-by: Shengting Xie <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: yayu <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 98ed83f)

* fix(browser): block node routes when sandbox host control is disabled (#97958)

(cherry picked from commit 2cf765f)

* fix(exec): bind Windows allowlist execution path (#98260)

* fix(exec): bind windows allowlist execution path

* fix(exec): add windows shadow execution proof

* fix(exec): preserve wildcard allowlist behavior

* fix(exec): correct blocked plan test fixture

(cherry picked from commit 3811001)

* fix(mcp): suppress unhandled error on stderr pipe in stdio transport (#99803)

* fix(mcp): suppress unhandled error on stderr pipe in stdio transport

When child.stderr is piped to stderrStream without an error
handler, a stream-level error (EPIPE, I/O failure) crashes the
process. Add a noop error handler before the pipe, consistent
with the error handlers already present on stdin and stdout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* test(mcp): add regression test for stderr pipe error suppression

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): report stderr stream errors

* fix(mcp): report stderr stream errors

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1b84316)

* Harden macOS SQLite WAL checkpoints (#99067)

(cherry picked from commit f7f1be2)

* fix(secrets): suppress unhandled stdout/stderr stream errors in exec resolver (#100521)

* fix(secrets): suppress unhandled stdout/stderr stream errors in exec resolver

* proof(secrets): add real behavior proof script for exec resolver stream error catch

* proof(secrets): replace wrapper with real exec resolver stream error proof

* style: apply oxfmt to changed files

(cherry picked from commit c9a0783)

* fix(agents): retry transient filesystem races when reading workspace bootstrap files (#100910)

* fix(agents): retry transient filesystem races when reading workspace bootstrap files

* fix(agents): retry transient boundary resolution

---------

Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f36d170)

* fix(gateway): finish plugin HTTP responses after post-header failures (#102125)

* fix(gateway): finish plugin HTTP responses after post-header failures

* test(gateway): satisfy plugin HTTP regression lint

* fix(gateway): skip ending destroyed plugin responses

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 240d350)

* fix(gateway): validate exact custom browser origins (#38290)

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit fa0349a)

* fix: block unspecified trusted DNS targets (#103075)

(cherry picked from commit c70f3d0)

* fix(channels): make nack callbacks idempotent (#104919)

* fix(channels): make nack callbacks idempotent

* fix(channels): coalesce overlapping nack callbacks

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 02d307e)

* fix(channels): prevent base URL credentials in status output (#107754)

* fix(channels): redact credentials in account URLs

* fix(channels): sanitize final status summaries

(cherry picked from commit 210340f)

* fix(channels): prevent lifecycle listener buildup (#109108)

(cherry picked from commit 0e1fad7)

* fix(sandbox): use Buffer.byteLength for env var value size limit (#105017)

* fix(sandbox): use Buffer.byteLength for env var value size limit

validateEnvVarValue checked value.length (UTF-16 code units) against
the 32768-byte limit, so multi-byte CJK values like "值".repeat(11000)
passed the check despite exceeding 33 KB in UTF-8. Switch to
Buffer.byteLength(value, "utf8") so the limit matches the actual byte
count the OS and child processes see.

* test(sandbox): simplify env byte-limit coverage

Co-authored-by: 唐梓夷0668001293 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 84fb48c)

* fix(gateway): guard process.kill ESRCH race in signalVerifiedGatewayPidSync (#109590)

* fix(gateway): guard process.kill ESRCH race in signalVerifiedGatewayPidSync

A verified gateway process can exit between the argv validation check and
the process.kill call, causing an unhandled ESRCH error. Wrap the kill in
try-catch and silently swallow ESRCH (process already gone = signal
already delivered).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>

* docs(gateway): explain ESRCH signal race

Co-authored-by: 丁宇婷0668001435 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 853b1a8)

* fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS SSRF bypass (#110693)

* fix(litellm): guard loopback hostname auto-allow with isIP to prevent DNS bypass

The isAutoAllowedLitellmHostname helper auto-enables private-network access
for loopback-style hosts. Before this fix, lowered.startsWith("127.")
matched DNS hostnames like 127.evil.com, letting remote endpoints bypass
the explicit allowPrivateNetwork opt-in — a SSRF risk.

Add isIP(host)===4 guard so only literal IPv4 loopback addresses qualify.
Same canonical pattern as extensions/slack/src/monitor/relay-source.ts:271
and the codex loopback fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* test(litellm): cover loopback endpoint policy

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3d03b60)

* fix(discord): sustained gateway bursts stop growing memory (#110954)

* fix(discord): sustained gateway bursts stop growing memory

* fix(discord): contain gateway queue overflow

* fix(discord): drop oldest saturated gateway sends

Co-authored-by: 张贵萍0668001030 <[email protected]>

* fix(discord): surface gateway overflow warnings

Co-authored-by: 张贵萍0668001030 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 69aeba9)

* fix(gateway): bound busy channel health by real run age (#103793)

* fix(gateway): bound busy channel health by real run age

The channel health policy treats a channel as healthy-busy even while
disconnected, bounded only by a 25 minute stale ceiling measured from
lastRunActivityAt. The run-state heartbeat refreshes lastRunActivityAt
every 60 seconds for as long as any run is active, so a run that hangs
forever (for example a send blocking on a dead socket after the
transport already reported connected:false) keeps that timestamp fresh
and the stuck ceiling is never reached. The account is then reported
healthy forever by the health monitor, readiness probe, and health CLI,
and no restart ever fires.

createRunStateMachine now tracks each in-flight run's start time keyed by
an opaque run handle and publishes the oldest still-active run's start as
activeRunStartedAt. The health policy busy override keys its ceiling off
the real run age, so a run stuck longer than the threshold reports stuck
and the monitor can restart it. Because the reported start is the oldest
active run and advances to the next-oldest as runs complete, a channel
churning through many short overlapping runs (activeRuns above 1 across
concurrent queue keys) stays healthy; only a genuinely hung run breaches
the ceiling. Short and active runs stay healthy and the existing
lastRunActivityAt fallback is preserved for snapshots without a start
time.

* fix(channels): retain run-state callback compatibility

Keep the released zero-argument onRunEnd callback source-compatible while allowing internal queue callers to pass a run handle for exact concurrent-run accounting. The compatibility path closes the oldest active run, preserving existing lifecycle behavior for consumers that do not use handles.

* fix(channels): keep anonymous runs out of age tracking

The zero-argument lifecycle callbacks cannot identify which concurrent run completed, so they must not update the identity-sensitive run start used by channel health. Keep their busy count separately and reserve exact start tracking for the shared queue's handle-aware lifecycle path.

* fix(channels): keep tracked runs internal

Keep the public run-state lifecycle callbacks unchanged. The channel queue now owns opaque run identity and augments its status updates with the oldest active queue run, so implementation details do not expand the SDK surface.

* fix(channels): type queue run start status

Keep activeRunStartedAt in the internal status patch type so the queue can publish its private tracked-run age through the existing status sink.

* fix(channels): wrap isActive to satisfy unbound-method lint

* fix(gateway): gate busy run-age ceiling on disconnected transport

(cherry picked from commit 18b79d9)

* fix(deps): update fast-uri past advisory

(cherry picked from commit 1be9db0)

* fix(release): adapt maintenance-line hardening

Backport/adapt 18ec9ce, dea1fe1, 7f32b6c, 1da345e, 931ac3e, 89780d5, and c0d99ed for the 2026.6 extended-stable maintenance line.

* fix(deps): bump protobufjs to 7.6.5

Backport-adapted from a230f74.

* test(gateway): cover bounded macOS process probe

* chore(release): prepare 2026.6.34

* test(dotenv): share path override environment assertions

* fix(release): resolve 2026.6.34 CI blockers

---------

Signed-off-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: joshavant <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Lee <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: sallyom <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: openclaw-clownfish[bot] <280122609+openclaw-clownfish[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Liu Wenyu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: pick-cat <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pick-cat <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: weiqinl <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: shengting <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Shengting Xie <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: yayu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Agustin Rivera <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cxbAsDev <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: ooiuuii <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Masato Hoshino <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: mushuiyu886 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Bruno Wowk (Volky) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pavan Kumar Gondhi <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Glucksberg <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: xingzhou <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: tzy-17 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: krissding <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: lsr911 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Yuval Dinodia <[email protected]>
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extensions: litellm merge-risk: 🚨 compatibility 🚨 May break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrade paths. P0 Emergency: data loss, security bypass, crash loop, or unusable core runtime. proof: sufficient ClawSweeper judged the real behavior proof convincing. rating: 🐚 platinum hermit Good normal PR readiness with ordinary maintainer review expected. size: S status: 👀 ready for maintainer look ClawSweeper has no concrete contributor-facing blocker left for this PR.

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