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feat(gui): give both Meta providers their brand mark (#3338)
* docs(devlog): Muse release-train roadmap and audit round 1 Plans the v2.41.0 release train: a risk-classed regression review of the 36 commits on dev ahead of main, a Meta provider mark, and the preview/main publish path. The manual release path exists because the user forbade the local full suite for this unit, and scripts/release.ts runs it in preflight. Audit round 1 established that a hand-rolled path is strictly weaker than the helper unless it also proves the version unused before bumping, uses push-event CI on the exact 40-char SHA, and re-reads the live remote head before dispatch; all three are now in 030/040. 005 records the audit synthesis, including the one finding rebutted: the Terms-of-Service acknowledgement for high-risk OAuth providers is enforced in the browser rather than at /api/oauth/login. That is real, but it predates this work and applies identically to anthropic and google-antigravity, so it is recorded as a follow-up in 050 rather than folded into a release cycle. * feat(gui): give both Meta providers their brand mark meta-model and meta-muse landed today with no icon alias and no display name, so the dashboard drew them as an initial tile with a raw config id underneath. Every other first-class provider carries both. meta.svg is the aria-label="Meta symbol" inline SVG that dev.meta.ai renders in its own navigation header, read through a signed-in session. Meta publishes no square vector at the conventional paths -- favicon.svg, icon.svg and logo.svg all 404 on that host, and the declared icon is a 32x32 .ico -- so the rendered header mark is the first-party vector, taken from the developer console these two providers actually belong to. Path data and gradient stops are verbatim. React's generated gradient ids (_r_d_, _r_e_, _r_f_) are renamed to meta-mark-a/-b/-c because a generated id collides when several marks are inlined into one document, which is the same reason minimax.svg renamed its unnamed-gradient id; the presentational height/width/role/aria-label give way to the viewBox, and xmlns is added so the file stands alone. One brand, two credentials: meta-model is Meta's own pay-as-you-go Model API, meta-muse imports the Muse Code CLI credential. Sharing one asset is the same shape as the three Alibaba plan ids. The mark is not masked -- three linear gradients in Meta brand blue, and masking flattens a gradient to one ink. The generic wiring check only fires when an asset named after the provider id is already committed, and neither id is "meta", so a dropped alias row would restore the fallback tile silently. Both are pinned explicitly instead. * docs(devlog): screenshot of the Meta provider mark The provider rail before and after, on both tile surfaces. The fallback tile and the new mark are the same 19px box, which is the only way to see that a gradient mark actually reads at that size on #303030 and #f4f4f4 both. * docs(devlog): per-commit regression review of the 36-commit release delta Every commit dev carries ahead of main, risk-classed and evidenced. Four commits get R3 treatment: the Muse credential import, the reusable-workflow permission grant, the pull_request_target attribution gate, and the provider editor's field-admission policy. All four are clean on a line-level read. 1387 focused assertions across 38 test files, zero failures, plus typecheck and privacy:scan at the dev head. The full suite was not run, at the maintainer's instruction for this unit. One accepted residual, not a blocker: the ToS acknowledgement for high-risk OAuth providers is enforced in the browser rather than at /api/oauth/login. It predates this delta and applies identically to anthropic and google-antigravity, so publishing 2.41.0 changes nobody's exposure. * docs(devlog): fold the CodeRabbit review into the release plan Six findings, all correct. The ledger now carries one row per SHA. The grouped Cursor and combos rows hid exactly what a per-commit ledger exists to show: 2ab9d94 touches four request paths while its neighbours touch one file each, and that is not visible from a row reading "clean, covered by the batch". R1 and R0 become tables for the same reason. The credential format example moves out of its table cell. Two pipe characters inside a five-column row are delimiters to a Markdown parser, so the verdict column was not where it claimed to be. The version preflights become blocking commands rather than commands that retrieve data. The channel-forward check has no automated equivalent: release.yml compares only for exact-version duplication, so nothing in CI stops a dist-tag being moved backwards. The ancestry proof fetches main first. git ls-remote reads the remote without updating origin/main, so the merge-base could have evaluated stale history. The artifact check covers meta-model, meta-muse and meta.svg rather than one of the three, and the ToS verdict rule is now stated as a rule instead of leaving a later reader to infer why one bypass was accepted. --------- Co-authored-by: jun <[email protected]>
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# 260903 — Muse release train: regression review, provider mark, v2.41.0
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## Why this unit exists
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`origin/dev` is 36 commits ahead of `origin/main`, which still carries
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`v2.40.0` (published 2026-09-02). Three of those commits are the Meta/Muse
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line that landed today:
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- `878f75417` (#3317) — Muse Spark 1.3 registered on the 1.2 spec.
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- `ff1ac6b8c` (#3321) — the direct Meta Model API provider (`meta-model`).
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- `1aa839aa8` (#3337) — the `meta-muse` provider importing the Muse Code CLI
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credential behind a Terms-of-Service warning.
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The user asked for three things, in order: regression-review the 36-commit
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delta against `main`, give Muse a provider mark in the dashboard, and run the
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release through to a published Meta/Muse-carrying version.
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## Constraints that shape every phase
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- **No local full suite.** `bun run test` and a bare `bun test` are forbidden
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for this unit. Verification is focused `bun test <file>`, `bun run typecheck`,
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and exact-SHA GitHub CI (`ci.yml` + `service-lifecycle.yml`).
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- That constraint is load-bearing on the release path. `scripts/release.ts`
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runs the whole suite in its preflight, so the helper cannot be used here.
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The release therefore takes the manual path the helper would otherwise
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automate: bump on the release branch, wait for both exact-SHA workflows,
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then `gh workflow run release.yml` with `version`/`tag`/`expected-sha`.
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- `--no-verify` pushes are authorized; PRs target `dev` and merge with admin
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once CI is green.
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- `main` and `preview` carry rulesets requiring a pull request. Promotion is
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by PR, not by push.
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## Work phases
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| Phase | Doc | Deliverable |
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|-------|-----|-------------|
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| wp0 | this unit | roadmap + review method (docs only) |
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| wp1 | `010_wp1_regression_review.md` | per-commit regression record for all 36 commits |
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| wp2 | `020_wp2_muse_mark.md` | Meta/Muse SVG + `provider-icons.ts` wiring |
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| wp3 | `030_wp3_preview_release.md` | `preview` dist-tag publish, exact-SHA proof |
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| wp4 | `040_wp4_main_release.md` | `latest` dist-tag publish, ancestry proof |
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wp1 and wp2 are independent of each other and both gate wp3. wp4 consumes
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wp3's published preview.
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## Review method (wp1)
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A 36-commit delta is too large to re-derive from scratch, and re-reading every
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diff line would produce a document nobody checks. The review is risk-classed
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instead, and the class decides what evidence is required:
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- **R0 docs-only** — `devlog/` or `docs-site/` only. Evidence: the diff touches
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no runtime path. No test needed.
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- **R1 scoped runtime** — one subsystem, covered by a focused test file that
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already exists. Evidence: the focused test passes at the dev head.
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- **R2 cross-cutting** — touches routing, the model catalog, release
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automation, or a shared contract. Evidence: focused tests plus a read of the
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seam the change crosses.
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- **R3 credential/security** — auth, tokens, OAuth, keychain, workflow
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permissions. Evidence: line-level read of the credential path plus
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`privacy:scan`.
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The Muse commits are R2 (#3317, #3321) and R3 (#3337).
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Three more are R3, corrected after audit round 1 (`005`): `7ce0ba518` (#3262)
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grants `contents: write` and `pull-requests: write` to a reusable-workflow
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call, `7a529a2e8` (#3318) changes `pull_request_target` processing — a declared
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trust boundary in `.github/AGENTS.md` — and `3c7c021ec` (#3296) touches
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provider credential admission. A workflow-permission grant is a credential
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change even when the diff reads like plumbing, which is the hole the first
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draft of this table had.
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## What "done" means here
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`main` carries the reviewed dev SHA, npm `latest` resolves to the stable
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version built from it, and `ocx` users installing fresh get Muse Spark 1.3
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plus both Meta providers with a real mark in the dashboard.
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# Audit round 1 — synthesis
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Reviewer: delegated read-only auditor (gpt-5.6-sol, high). Verdict: **FAIL**,
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seven findings. Every one was re-derived against the tree before folding; the
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outcome is six folded and one rebutted-with-a-carve-out.
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## 1. "ToS enforcement is bypassable" — REBUTTED as a release blocker, RECORDED as a known limit
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The reviewer is right about the mechanism and wrong about what it means for
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this release.
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The mechanism, confirmed: `loginMetaMuse` emits its warning through the
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optional `ctrl.n` progress callback (`src/oauth/meta-muse.ts:128`). The CLI's
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own OAuth path wires that to `console.log` (`src/oauth/login-cli.ts:87`), so
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`ocx login meta-muse` prints it. The management API's flow, by contrast,
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installs `n: () => {}` (`src/oauth/index.ts:1720`) and drops it on the floor —
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which means `POST /api/oauth/login` and `ocx account login meta-muse`, which
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goes through that same endpoint, never surface the warning text. The GUI shows
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`OAuthTosWarningModal` client-side, so the acknowledgement is enforced by the
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browser, not by the server.
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Why it does not block:
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- **It is not a regression and not Muse-specific.** `n: () => {}` predates this
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work by a long way, and `anthropic` and `google-antigravity` — the other two
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`HIGH_RISK` ids in `gui/src/oauth-tos-risk.ts:10` — have carried exactly the
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same client-side-only gate since `fbac9f05e`. Shipping v2.41.0 changes the
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exposure for none of them.
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- **The credential path itself is clean.** The reviewer looked for a leak and
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found none: no Keychain stderr surfaced, no response bodies in errors, a fixed
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public error vocabulary, atomic 0600 persistence.
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- **The bypass requires the user's own admin token.** `/api/oauth/login` is
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behind management auth. The actor who can call it is the account holder, who
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is the only party the ToS warning protects, and who has already installed and
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signed into the Muse Code CLI on that machine.
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What it is: a real server-side consent gap across all three high-risk
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providers, worth its own unit. It is recorded here and in
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`050_followups.md` rather than folded into a release cycle, because a
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backend consent boundary is a behaviour change for `anthropic` and
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`google-antigravity` users too, and that does not belong in a release train
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the user asked to ship today.
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## 2-5. Release-path corrections — FOLDED
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All four are correct and all four are now in the phase docs:
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- **Version availability before the bump.** `scripts/release.ts:513` checks
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unused-version and channel-forward ordering BEFORE mutating anything; the
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workflow's own duplicate check at `release.yml:303` runs only after dispatch.
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Doing this by hand means proving the version unused first, not discovering it
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from a failed publish. Live state at audit time: `latest=2.40.0`,
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`preview=2.40.0-preview.20260902`, `2.41.0` unused.
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- **Exact-SHA is stricter than "CI passed".** `release-dispatch-guard.cjs:14`
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requires a lowercase 40-char SHA, an allowed ref, a `workflow_dispatch`
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event, and equality with `GITHUB_SHA`; `release.yml:222` requires a
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successful **push-event** CI run on the release branch — PR CI does not
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satisfy it.
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- **`dev` already carries `2.41.0`.** `package.json:3`. The main bump in the
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original 040 was a no-op step; promotion carries the version with it. The
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post-release workflow is `dev-version-bump.yml`, and its PR moves `dev` to
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`2.42.0`.
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- **Publishing is OIDC Trusted Publishing.** `release.yml:119` (`id-token:
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write`), `:153` (npm >= 11.5.1), `:285`. No `NPM_TOKEN`; verify provenance
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and `gitHead` after publish.
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## 6. Risk classification — FOLDED
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`7ce0ba518` (#3262) grants `contents: write` + `pull-requests: write`
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(`release.yml:67`) and `7a529a2e8` (#3318) changes `pull_request_target`
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processing, a declared trust boundary (`.github/AGENTS.md:16`). Both move R2 ->
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R3. `3c7c021ec` (#3296) touches provider credential admission and also gets R3.
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## 7. Icon wiring — FOLDED
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The set is `MASKED_PROVIDER_ICONS` (`gui/src/provider-icons.ts:188`), not
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`MASKED_MARKS`; `020` named the client-side set by mistake. `meta.svg` carries
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three gradients, so the masking question does not arise — the mark is colour and
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is drawn as an image. Provenance goes in the asset README, and the two ids get
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explicit assertions rather than relying on the generic wiring check.
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Reviewer's own non-blocking note, confirmed: no test enumerates every registry
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provider's display name, and `tests/provider-workspace-data.test.ts` does not
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need changing.
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# wp1 — Regression review of the 36 dev-ahead-of-main commits
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## Input
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`git log --oneline origin/main..origin/dev` at the head recorded in
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`000_plan.md`. Baseline is `v2.40.0`.
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## Method
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Each commit gets one row: SHA, PR, risk class (R0-R3 per `000_plan.md`), the
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evidence actually checked, and a verdict of `clean`, `accepted`, or `blocker`.
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A `blocker` must be fixed on `dev` before wp3 starts; an `accepted` row must
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say why the residual risk is tolerable in a release.
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Evidence is gathered without the full suite:
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- `git show --stat <sha>` for the touch set of every commit.
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- For R1/R2, the focused test file that owns the subsystem, run individually.
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- For R3, a line-level read of the credential handling plus
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`bun run privacy:scan`.
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- `bun run typecheck` once at the dev head covers the type-level seams that a
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per-commit read would otherwise have to reason about by hand.
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## Special attention: the Meta/Muse line
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Three questions decide whether this release is safe to publish:
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1. **Does `meta-muse` ever write the imported credential anywhere a log or a
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scan can see it?** #3337's follow-up (`81c1ebe8c` on the feature branch,
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squashed into `1aa839aa8`) redacts scanned secrets and bounds the Keychain
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read. Verify the redaction covers the error paths, not just the happy path.
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2. **Can the ToS warning be bypassed?** The provider is deliberately marked
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unsupported; the warning is the only thing standing between a user and an
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unauthorized use of their Muse Code subscription.
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The verdict rule, so a later reader reaches the same decision this unit
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did. A bypass is `UNSAFE` and blocks the release when it is EITHER of:
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- a **new** bypass introduced by a commit in this delta, or
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- any path that **discloses the credential** (a log line, an error body, a
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serialized config field).
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A bypass is **accepted** only when all three hold: it predates the delta,
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it applies identically to the other `HIGH_RISK` providers rather than
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singling out `meta-muse`, and it is recorded in `050_followups.md` with
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the file:line evidence. That is exactly one case here — the client-side-only
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acknowledgement on `POST /api/oauth/login` — and `005` §1 is why it
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qualifies. Anything that does not meet all three is `UNSAFE`.
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3. **Does Muse Spark 1.3 leak into a provider that cannot serve it?** #3317
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added 1.3 on the 1.2 spec across the resellers; the registry must not
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advertise 1.3 on a provider whose upstream roster lacks it.
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## Output
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`011_review_ledger.md` — the per-commit table. Written in wp1's B phase, not
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here.

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