fix(seed-portwatch): rate-limit recovery — concurrency 12→6 + batch backoff + temp gate#3694
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…ackoff + temporary gate Option E from the 2026-05-14 incident triage: combined response to the ongoing ArcGIS degradation where both direct AND proxy paths are throttled. Background (post-#3676 + #3681 deployed): Run #1 (19:55 UTC May 13): 24/30 proxy successes, gate fails 24<50 Run #2 (00:03 UTC May 14): 5/30 proxy successes, gate fails 5<50 Both #3676 (cold-fetch cap) and #3681 (proxy fallback on timeout) are working as designed. The remaining problem: Decodo proxy is now also being rate-limited — successive runs degrade as our usage spikes the proxy's bucket. ArcGIS itself appears degraded for this dataset. Three coordinated changes: (B) CONCURRENCY 12 → 6 Halve in-flight fetches so neither ArcGIS-direct nor Decodo-proxy sees a 12-concurrent burst. Math at cold-fetch cap 30: 5 batches × ~60s realistic + 4×5s backoff ≈ 320s 5 batches × ~90s worst case + 4×5s backoff ≈ 470s Both fit the 570s bundle budget. (C) BATCH_BACKOFF_MS = 5_000 (new) Sleep 5s between batches (skip on last, skip on signal-abort to preserve SIGTERM responsiveness). Spaces out per-batch bursts so neither service hits its rate-limit window from our run alone. 20s total added — negligible against the 570s budget. (Temporary) MIN_VALID_COUNTRIES 50 → 25 Coverage gate lowered so partial-success runs (5-25 successful fetches + stale-served from cache) can advance seed-meta. Pre-fix, seed-meta was frozen at 2026-05-12 00:03 UTC for 60+ hours because no run reached 50. The 25 floor is sized so a 5-success run still fails (real outage) but a 25+ partial-success run advances meta and clears the operator-facing WARNING. Marked TEMPORARY in the inline comment with a 2026-05-20 review target — must revert to 50 once ArcGIS recovers and runs reliably exceed 50 again. Test enforces the comment shape so a future reviewer can't silently normalise 25 as the new permanent floor. Tests: 87/87 pass (was 85, +2 for BATCH_BACKOFF + MIN_VALID_COUNTRIES invariants; +1 modification for CONCURRENCY value). This week's portwatch series: #3676 Structural cold-fetch cap (merged) #3681 Proxy retry on timeout (merged) This Rate-limit recovery (concurrency + backoff + gate)
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Greptile SummaryThis PR applies three coordinated operational mitigations to the
Confidence Score: 4/5Safe to merge as an emergency hotfix; the three operational knob changes are well-reasoned and budget math checks out. All three core changes are straightforward constant adjustments with clear justification and matching test coverage. The signal-abort guard skips the sleep correctly but does not break the loop, leaving process.exit(1) in onSigterm as the real SIGTERM backstop. A wrong PR number in a test comment is the only other finding. No files require special attention beyond the two minor findings noted above. Important Files Changed
Flowchart%%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%%
flowchart TD
A[fetchAll called] --> B[Partition countries]
B --> C{needsFetch > MAX_COLD_FETCH=30?}
C -- yes --> D[Cap at 30, serve rest stale]
C -- no --> E[Use all misses]
D --> F[batches = ceil / CONCURRENCY=6]
E --> F
F --> G[for batchIdx 1..batches]
G --> H[Promise.allSettled 6 fetches]
H --> I[Write results to countryData]
I --> J{batchIdx==1 AND >=80% errors?}
J -- yes --> K[CIRCUIT-BREAKER break]
J -- no --> L{batchIdx < batches AND !signal.aborted?}
L -- yes --> M[sleep BATCH_BACKOFF_MS=5s]
L -- no --> N{more batches?}
M --> N
N -- yes --> G
N -- no --> O[validateFn: size >= MIN_VALID=25]
K --> O
O -- fail --> P[extendTtl + return early]
O -- pass --> Q[Write Redis + advance seed-meta]
Reviews (1): Last reviewed commit: "fix(seed-portwatch): rate-limit recovery..." | Re-trigger Greptile |
| it('CONCURRENCY is 12 and PER_COUNTRY_TIMEOUT_MS is 90s', () => { | ||
| assert.match(src, /CONCURRENCY\s*=\s*12/); | ||
| it('CONCURRENCY is 6 and PER_COUNTRY_TIMEOUT_MS is 90s', () => { | ||
| // Halved from 12 → 6 on 2026-05-14 (PR #3683) to ease pressure on both |
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The comment inside this test cites
PR #3683, but that is a previously merged PR in this series (not the current one). The current PR is #3694. Since this comment is copy-pasted into the test suite as a permanent record of why CONCURRENCY was halved, a wrong PR number will send a future reader to the wrong diff.
| // Halved from 12 → 6 on 2026-05-14 (PR #3683) to ease pressure on both | |
| // Halved from 12 → 6 on 2026-05-14 (PR #3694) to ease pressure on both |
| if (batchIdx < batches && !signal?.aborted) { | ||
| await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, BATCH_BACKOFF_MS)); | ||
| } |
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Signal-abort check skips sleep but doesn't exit the loop
After the !signal?.aborted guard skips the 5 s sleep, the for loop immediately continues to the next iteration and starts a fresh batch of up to 6 concurrent fetches. Because withPerCountryTimeout creates its own independent AbortController (not linked to the parent signal), those fetches run completely oblivious to the abort. The PR description and inline comment claim "the loop exits immediately without paying the full 5 s," but that is only true for the sleep itself; the onSigterm → process.exit(1) path is the actual backstop. Adding if (signal?.aborted) break; immediately after the skipped-sleep block would match the stated intent.
Greptile PR #3694 review: P2 — Signal-abort skipped the sleep but kept the loop running. Pre-fix: `if (batchIdx < batches && !signal?.aborted) await sleep(...)` correctly skipped the 5s sleep on abort, but the for-loop continued to the next iteration and started a fresh batch of up to 6 concurrent fetches via withPerCountryTimeout (which creates its own AbortController not linked to the parent signal). Net effect: the actual SIGTERM backstop was onSigterm → process.exit(1), not the abort guard. Fix: `if (signal?.aborted) break;` before the sleep — exits the loop immediately so SIGTERM doesn't start additional in-flight work. P2 — Test comment cited wrong PR number (#3683 vs #3694). The "Halved from 12 → 6 on 2026-05-14 (PR #3683)" comment in the CONCURRENCY test referenced a non-existent PR in this series. Fixed to #3694 so a future reviewer following the comment lands on the right diff. Tests: 87/87 still pass. Updated the BATCH_BACKOFF_MS test to assert both the new `break` shape and the simplified sleep condition; the previous combined `batchIdx < batches && !signal?.aborted` pattern is now split across the two checks.
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Both P2s addressed in `2ec4b41c2`: P2 — Signal-abort skipped sleep but didn't break the loop Greptile's catch was correct. The pre-fix Fix: `if (signal?.aborted) break;` BEFORE the sleep check. Now the loop exits immediately on abort, no additional in-flight batch starts, and the comment matches behavior. P2 — Test comment cited wrong PR number The CONCURRENCY test had `"Halved from 12 → 6 on 2026-05-14 (PR #3683)"` — `#3683` was from a hypothetical PR-numbering reference in my drafting, not a real PR. Fixed to `#3694`. 87/87 tests still pass. Updated the BATCH_BACKOFF_MS test to assert both the new `break` shape and the simplified sleep condition. |
Greptile PR #3694 round 3 P1: with the temp coverage gate lowered to 25, a cap-mode partial-success run would CLEAR the coverage gate (countryData.size ≥ 25) but STILL fail the unchanged degradation guard (countryData.size < prevCount × 0.8 ≈ 139 in the incident state) — seed-meta never advances, WARNING persists, PR's main recovery claim broken. Math at the current incident state: prevCount 174 degradation threshold 0.8 × 174 = 139 cap-mode realistic 30 cold-fetch + ~24 stale-served = ~54 → 54 << 139 → DEGRADATION GUARD FAILS → extendTtl + return → seed-meta stays frozen, WARNING persists. Fix shape: signal cap-mode from fetchAll() back to main() via a new `capTriggered: bool` field plus `servedStaleCount` / `droppedTooOldCount` / `droppedNoCacheCount` counters. main() bypasses the 80% guard for cap-mode runs (intentional partial coverage by design — see #3676's rotation contract) and logs a `PARTIAL PUBLISH (cap-mode)` line with the fresh/stale split. The bypass is scoped: non-cap runs (where needsFetch ≤ 30 and we fetched all misses normally) STILL apply the 80% guard so silent data-loss scenarios (ArcGIS regression silently drops 100 → 50 countries) remain caught. Logic shape: if (!validateFn) → extendTtl + return [coverage gate] if (capTriggered) → log PARTIAL PUBLISH + fall through [bypass] else if (countryData.size < prevCount × 0.8) → extendTtl + return [silent-loss guard] → publish + advance seed-meta Tests (3 new): fetchAll-shape (returns the 4 new fields), bypass shape (else-if structure ensures cap-mode skips the guard), bypass exclusivity (non-cap runs still enforce the guard with exactly 2 references to `prevCount × 0.8` — one in condition, one in error msg). 90/90 pass (was 87).
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P1 addressed in `ab9dc5c38`. Critical catch — the temp gate lowering was structurally insufficient because the 80% degradation guard would still fire and block seed-meta refresh. Math at the incident state (confirms the bug)
So even after the coverage gate change (gate=25, 54 ≥ 25 passes), the very next line — `if (countryData.size < prevCount * 0.8)` — would still trip, extendTtl, return, and seed-meta would never advance. WARNING would persist exactly as before. Your reading of the code is correct. Fix shape`fetchAll()` now returns four new fields: ```js `main()` reads them and wraps the degradation guard in a cap-mode bypass: ```js Why the bypass is scoped, not blanketThe 80% guard exists to catch silent data loss — an ArcGIS regression that drops 100 → 50 countries with no signal. That scenario still produces `capTriggered = false` because `needsFetch.length ≤ MAX_COLD_FETCH_PER_RUN` (in a regression, most countries' `asof` matches → cache hit → not added to needsFetch). So non-cap runs still go through the guard, silent-loss protection preserved. Cap-mode is the LOUD, INTENTIONAL, ROTATIONAL path — partial coverage is by design per #3676's rotation contract (refresh 30/run, full coverage in ~6 runs). Tests (3 new)
90/90 tests pass (was 87). |
…+P2 round 3) P1 — Proxy-confirmed Invalid Params never reached the degradation threshold. Pre-fix the proxy-confirmed short-circuit (`/via proxy after/i` → throw) ran BEFORE the threshold check. So during the actual incident — where nearly every error arrives via the proxy fallback path — every error threw the per-country proxy message and the clean `ArcGIS degraded — N 'Invalid query parameters' errors` message was unreachable. Fix: reorder so threshold check fires first, then proxy short-circuit. Counter still increments for proxy-confirmed errors (they contribute to the threshold), and once the threshold is exceeded the degraded message surfaces regardless of whether the error came from direct or proxy. P2 — 20s capture budget didn't realistically catch 30-56s responses. The 3-attempts-× 20s fix was bounded but each attempt was a FRESH request starting from t=0 (the original 45s direct fetch was already aborted). For the observed degraded response class (30-56s server-side from request start), each 20s capture aborts before the body lands. Fix: bump ERROR_BODY_CAPTURE_EXTRA_MS 20s → 40s. Math under PER_COUNTRY_TIMEOUT_MS=90s: direct (45s timeout) + capture (40s budget) = 85s, leaving 5s before the per-country wrap fires. Proxy retry effectively dies for timing-out countries in this mode — accepted tradeoff because the proxy is itself degraded (Decodo throttled per #3694 history), so it wasn't helping anyway. Attempt cap stays at 3 (across the run, not per country) so the diagnostic value is captured by 3rd timing-out country; subsequent countries go straight to proxy. Tests: 1 new ordering test using src.search() index comparison to assert threshold-throw-before-proxy-short-circuit; 2 existing tests updated for the bumped constant and the longer span between increment and short-circuit. 97/97 portwatch tests pass; 8806/8807 npm run test:data (1 flake = pre-existing _bundle-fixture-* race between bundle-runner and news-classify-cache-prefix-audit).
…e retries (#3701) * fix(seed-portwatch): surface degraded ArcGIS 400 body + cap degenerate retries ArcGIS Daily_Ports_Data, during degradation episodes, returns HTTP 200 with a 400 error body (`Cannot perform query. Invalid query parameters.`) after 30-56s of server processing. Our 45s FETCH_TIMEOUT fires before the body lands, callers see AbortError, the existing circuit-breaker that pattern-matches the error message never fires, and the seeder treats every degraded country as a generic timeout (then a doomed proxy retry, then another doomed first-direct-retry from the one-shot fetchWithRetryOnInvalidParams). Two surgical fixes: 1. **Diagnostic body-capture on timeout.** When the direct fetch hits its FETCH_TIMEOUT (not a caller-signal abort), make ONE extra fetch with +20s budget purely to read the response body. If it contains `body.error`, throw with the real ArcGIS message so the upstream circuit-breaker can act on the upstream-degradation signal. Gated to fire once per process — the proxy budget Greptile P2'd on PR #3681 stays intact for subsequent timeouts. 2. **Bail-don't-retry threshold on Invalid-query-parameters.** Preserve the legit one-shot retry for transient single-call flakes (2026-04-20 BRA/IDN/NGA pattern), but cap total retries-on-this-error per process at 5. Beyond that, throw a clear `ArcGIS degraded — N errors` message so the operator sees the regression class instead of N identical retries × 45s burning the 540s container budget. Investigation that drove this: direct curl probes against services9.arcgis.com revealed (a) HTTP 200 with a 400 error body, (b) non-deterministic results across attempts within minutes (same query, ERR → OK → ERR → 504), (c) WHERE-clause reshaping helps unevenly but never reliably. The right frame is "upstream is degraded, surface it and protect the container budget" not "we're being rate-limited." The existing cap-mode + stale-serve + temp-gate-25 logic (PRs #3676/#3681/#3694) already rides through partial coverage — these changes just make sure we don't waste the container budget while ArcGIS recovers, and that the next diagnostic round has the real error message instead of generic AbortError. Tests: - 3 new structural pattern-match tests covering ERROR_BODY_CAPTURE_EXTRA_MS, _captureErrorBodyAfterTimeout helper, once-per-run gating, INVALID_PARAMS_RETRY_THRESHOLD, counter increment + threshold check, reset helpers. - 96/96 tests pass (was 93 before). * review: gate cap-mode bypass on fresh upstream contact + abort-aware backoff sleep (P1+P2) P1 — Cap-mode bypass could publish a stale-only canonical list as healthy. Pre-fix the capTriggered bypass of the 80% degradation guard was unconditional. With the lowered MIN_VALID_COUNTRIES=25 + cap-mode + servedStale entries seeding countryData, a run with all-stale entries (freshFetched=0, cacheHits=0, servedStale=27, dropped=147) could: - Pass validateFn (countryData.size >= 25 — all from stale-cache) - Bypass the 80% guard (capTriggered=true) - Shrink the canonical list from ~174 → 27 stale-only entries - Advance seed-meta, clearing the operator-facing WARNING Fix: gate the bypass on freshFetchedCount + cacheHitCount ≥ MIN_FRESH_FETCH_FOR_CAP_BYPASS (5). Below that floor, cap-mode is NOT rotational steady-state — it's an ArcGIS-completely-down scenario, and the run falls through to the 80% guard (which extendExistingTtl-only, preserves canonical list, keeps WARNING visible). New log line "CAP-MODE BYPASS REFUSED: only N fresh upstream contacts" makes the refusal observable to operators. This composes with the INVALID_PARAMS_RETRY_THRESHOLD=5 fix earlier in this PR — that change increases the rate at which cold fetches return errors during upstream degradation, making the stale-only scenario this P1 guards against MORE likely, not less. P2 — Inter-batch backoff sleep is now abort-aware. The 5s BATCH_BACKOFF_MS wait used a plain setTimeout that ignored the caller signal mid-sleep, so a SIGTERM during the wait still forced the full 5s before observing the abort. Now races the setTimeout against signal's abort event so the loop exits immediately on a real cancellation (the signal?.aborted check at the top of the next iteration then `break`s the loop). Cosmetic change but matches the PR-body intent that the loop is SIGTERM-responsive. Tests: - 2 new structural pattern-match tests covering MIN_FRESH_FETCH_FOR_CAP_BYPASS, freshFetchedCount counter, upstream-contact gate, CAP-MODE BYPASS REFUSED branch, and the abort-aware sleep shape. - 4 existing tests updated to match the new destructure shape + new prevCount × 0.8 reference count (now 4: 2 conditions + 2 Math.ceil sites, one set per guard branch). - 95/95 portwatch tests pass; 8804/8805 npm run test:data (1 flake is the pre-existing scripts/_bundle-fixture-env-*.mjs race between bundle-runner.test.mjs and news-classify-cache-prefix-audit.test.mjs, unrelated to this change). * review: gate body-capture on success not attempt + short-circuit proxy-confirmed errors (P2×2) Two Greptile P2 comments on PR #3701 review round 2. P2 #1 — Body-capture gate fired on first ATTEMPT, not first SUCCESS. During consistent degradation, the 20s ERROR_BODY_CAPTURE_EXTRA_MS window isn't long enough — ArcGIS needs 30-56s of server processing per query from connection start. A failed first capture (capture also timing out) flipped the once-per-run flag, locking out every subsequent timing-out country from ever capturing the body. The diagnostic value could be lost for an entire run, defeating the whole point of the capture path. Fix: track SUCCESS count (cap at 1 — we only need the body shape once) AND ATTEMPT count (cap at 3 to bound total cost). Null captures consume an attempt but not a success, so subsequent timing-out countries keep trying. Worst-case cost: 3 × 20s wall-clock per run, still within PER_COUNTRY_TIMEOUT_MS=90s caps. P2 #2 — Proxy-confirmed "Invalid query parameters" still triggered retry. When arcgisProxyRetry returns an error body, the thrown message has the `(via proxy after ${reason})` prefix and still matches `/Invalid query parameters/i`. fetchWithRetryOnInvalidParams counted it, then retried via fetchWithTimeout — which would timeout → proxy → hit the same authoritative error, burning a full direct+proxy cycle for nothing. The proxy response IS the definitive upstream signal; retrying is meaningless. Fix: counter still increments (proxy-confirmed errors are valid degradation signals for the threshold), but short-circuit the retry with `if (/via proxy after/i.test(msg)) throw err`. Tests: 2 new structural pattern-match tests + 1 existing test relaxed to accept the new `if (captured?.error) { successCount++; throw ... }` shape. 96/96 portwatch tests pass; 8806/8806 npm run test:data (unrelated bundle-fixture race cleared this run). * review: threshold-before-short-circuit + realistic capture budget (P1+P2 round 3) P1 — Proxy-confirmed Invalid Params never reached the degradation threshold. Pre-fix the proxy-confirmed short-circuit (`/via proxy after/i` → throw) ran BEFORE the threshold check. So during the actual incident — where nearly every error arrives via the proxy fallback path — every error threw the per-country proxy message and the clean `ArcGIS degraded — N 'Invalid query parameters' errors` message was unreachable. Fix: reorder so threshold check fires first, then proxy short-circuit. Counter still increments for proxy-confirmed errors (they contribute to the threshold), and once the threshold is exceeded the degraded message surfaces regardless of whether the error came from direct or proxy. P2 — 20s capture budget didn't realistically catch 30-56s responses. The 3-attempts-× 20s fix was bounded but each attempt was a FRESH request starting from t=0 (the original 45s direct fetch was already aborted). For the observed degraded response class (30-56s server-side from request start), each 20s capture aborts before the body lands. Fix: bump ERROR_BODY_CAPTURE_EXTRA_MS 20s → 40s. Math under PER_COUNTRY_TIMEOUT_MS=90s: direct (45s timeout) + capture (40s budget) = 85s, leaving 5s before the per-country wrap fires. Proxy retry effectively dies for timing-out countries in this mode — accepted tradeoff because the proxy is itself degraded (Decodo throttled per #3694 history), so it wasn't helping anyway. Attempt cap stays at 3 (across the run, not per country) so the diagnostic value is captured by 3rd timing-out country; subsequent countries go straight to proxy. Tests: 1 new ordering test using src.search() index comparison to assert threshold-throw-before-proxy-short-circuit; 2 existing tests updated for the bumped constant and the longer span between increment and short-circuit. 97/97 portwatch tests pass; 8806/8807 npm run test:data (1 flake = pre-existing _bundle-fixture-* race between bundle-runner and news-classify-cache-prefix-audit).
Summary
Option E from the 2026-05-14 incident triage: combined response to the ongoing ArcGIS degradation where both direct AND Decodo-proxy paths are now throttled. Three small, coordinated changes in one file.
Why all three together
Post-#3676 (cold-fetch cap) + post-#3681 (proxy fallback on timeout), the proxy retry IS firing but Decodo itself is now rate-limited by our usage:
Run-over-run degradation (24 → 5) means we're depleting Decodo's bucket faster than it refills. Three orthogonal mitigations needed:
Math fits the budget
With CONCURRENCY=6 and cold-fetch cap 30:
Why the temporary gate is OK
Pre-fix the seed-meta was frozen at 2026-05-12 00:03 UTC for 60+ hours, even though SOME successful fetches were landing each run. The gate-of-50 was sized for "normal ArcGIS"; with ArcGIS in this degraded state, no run can clear 50.
Lowering to 25 means a 5-success run STILL FAILS (correctly flags a real outage), but a 25+ partial-success run advances meta and clears the operator-facing WARNING. The remaining countries serve from cache (≤7d old per
MAX_CACHE_AGE_MS).I marked the change
TEMPORARILY lowered from 50 → 25 … Revert to 50 once successive runs reliably exceed 50 again (target: 2026-05-20 review). Test asserts the comment shape so a future reviewer can't silently normalise 25 as the new permanent floor.SIGTERM responsiveness preserved
The 5s backoff is gated on
!signal?.aborted— if SIGTERM fires during a backoff sleep, the loop exits immediately without paying the full 5s.Test plan
node --test tests/portwatch-port-activity-seed.test.mjs— 87/87 pass (was 85, +2 for new invariants, 1 modified for CONCURRENCY)batchIdx < batches && !signal?.abortednode --check scripts/seed-portwatch-port-activity.mjs— syntax OK/api/healthflips HEALTHY (or stays WARNING only if <25 succeed → real outage signal)This week's portwatch series — three layers of resilience
If after this PR + 1-2 runs the seeder reliably hits 25+ successes, we ride out the ArcGIS degradation gracefully. If it still can't hit 25, that's an even deeper upstream problem and we'd need to investigate ArcGIS-side directly (different access pattern, different proxy region, support ticket to IMF).
Followups (not in this PR)