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Fills both `pending_lane` stubs in `mod api_tokens_nip98_replay`:
# `token_minted_in_a_does_not_authorize_in_b` — doc-only
The api_token mint surface does not exist on the wire in `buzz-relay`: no
`/tokens` route in `router.rs:52-79` (verified by hand on PR head), no
`tokens` module in `crates/buzz-relay/src/api/`. The 792-line self-service
minting endpoint that existed pre-rewrite (sprout-relay PR block#37, commit
`f84da74d3`) was deliberately not ported. Api_tokens are *consumed* (not
minted) by the Blossom upload path at `media.rs:638`.
This means "mint in A, present to B" has no wire precondition — a
wire-driven row would test a contract with no entry point. The honest
shape is doc-only, mirroring `audit_log`: where audit proves the
*output* surface does not exist on the wire, api_tokens proves the
*input* surface does not. Both are strictly stronger isolation claims
than a wire-denied assertion.
The `(community_id, token_hash)` fence itself is directly proven at the
storage layer (where direct Postgres access is in-convention):
* `crates/buzz-db/src/api_token.rs:425
lookup_by_hash_is_scoped_to_community` — same hash in A and B,
A-scoped lookup returns A only.
* `crates/buzz-db/src/api_token.rs:488
active_lookup_by_hash_is_scoped_to_community` — mirror for the
revoked-filter variant.
Plus the consumer fence: `media.rs:638` calls the scoped DB lookup with
`tenant.community()` derived from request host *before* token
resolution (`media.rs:97` comment names the row-44 fence explicitly).
# `nip98_replay_seenset_is_shared_and_community_scoped` — wire-driven
Load-bearing wire claim: within-community replay rejection. Sign a
NIP-98 event E for A's `u=`, POST to A → 200. POST again → 401 with a
body that names replay detection. The proof that the shared
(cross-pod) seen-set is in the request path at all — without it, any
pod would re-honor a spent NIP-98 event.
Mutate-bite: `check_nip98_replay → noop` in `bridge.rs:79` (return
`Ok(())` without consulting the guard). Under mutation, second POST
goes 200 instead of 401. Test asserts the failure with named
assertion message pointing at the mutate-bite handle, so a future
reader sees what would have been caught.
Cross-community independence is a *tripwire*, not a bite: sign an
independent NIP-98 event E' for B's `u=` (different event_id by
u-tag canonicalization divergence), POST to B → 200 even though E
was spent in A. Catches future namespace-globalization regressions
(key truncation, u-normalization collapse) that would break the
spend-spread, on top of the unit-layer proof at
`crates/buzz-auth/src/nip98_replay.rs:163
key_isolates_communities_for_same_event_id` (which the substrate's
own doc-comment names as "belt-and-suspenders").
The prefix-drop mutation considered earlier turned out to be vacuous
against natural wire traffic: u-tag divergence across communities
makes event_ids already community-distinct, so dropping the
community prefix from `nip98_replay_key` does not collapse natural
traffic into a shared slot. A same-event_id-different-community
wire collision can't be constructed because u-host
(`verify_bridge_auth`) rejects with 401 before the replay check
runs. That artificial property is proven at the unit layer; the
wire layer asserts the load-bearing per-call replay rejection.
# Bar
* `cargo check -p buzz-test-client --tests`: clean.
* `cargo clippy -p buzz-test-client --tests -- -D warnings`: clean.
* `cargo fmt -p buzz-test-client -- --check`: clean.
* Default test run (no `--ignored`): 1 passed (doc-only `#[test]`),
16 ignored (live rows).
* `--ignored api_tokens` against fresh `:3300` harness
(`BUZZ_GIT_CONFORMANCE_PROBE=false`): GREEN.
* Mutate-bite `check_nip98_replay → noop` on `bridge.rs:79`,
rebuild, restart: RED on the within-A second-POST assertion
("second POST to A with the same NIP-98 event MUST be rejected
as replay (got 200 OK)"), `left: 200, right: 401`. Restored
byte-identical, GREEN again.
Base: PR block#1321 head `ae703c5c8`. Test-only diff: zero lines in
`buzz-db`, `buzz-relay`, or `buzz-auth` production code. Matrix
8/14.
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <[email protected]>
let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::TextNote, content)
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.sign_with_keys(keys)
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.expect("sign kind:1");
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nostr::JsonUtil::as_json(&event)
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}
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/// Convert any base form to `http(s)://` for REST.
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fnto_http(base:&str) -> String{
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if base.starts_with("http://") || base.starts_with("https://"){
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