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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: website/docs/docs/remote-proxy.md
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@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ the device-host VM must use the daemon's loopback port and local daemon token.
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Remote clients read `/health` before issuing commands and compare the daemon RPC protocol version. Keep the client and proxy versions reasonably close; patch-level differences should normally work, but incompatible RPC protocol versions fail before commands run.
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`/health` also reports `hostArch`, the CPU architecture of the proxy host and, under `upstream`, of the daemon host (`arm64` or `x86_64`). Simulators on that host run this architecture unless their runtime uses Rosetta, so a client that builds simulator apps for a remote host can compile only that slice. Older daemons omit the field.
Run `agent-device disconnect` when the remote session is done. Stop the tunnel and the `agent-device proxy` process only when the host should stop accepting remote clients. Restarting the proxy generates a fresh token unless you supplied `--daemon-auth-token` explicitly.
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: website/docs/docs/security-trust.md
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ description: Security and trust guidance for agent-device local app automation,
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CLI commands run through a per-user background daemon:
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- The daemon binds to `127.0.0.1` only, on ephemeral ports, for both its socket and HTTP transports. It is never reachable from the network unless you deliberately front it with your own proxy.
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- Command (RPC), upload, artifact-download, and `/admin/human-control/*` requests must present a token generated fresh on each daemon boot (24 random bytes). The only unauthenticated endpoint is `GET /health`, which intentionally returns a bare liveness response and nothing else; like the rest of the server it is reachable only via loopback. The token is stored in `daemon.json` inside the daemon state directory (`~/.agent-device` for packaged installs; source checkouts use a worktree-scoped directory under `~/.agent-device/dev/`) with `0600` permissions; whoever can read that file already has your user account.
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- Command (RPC), upload, artifact-download, and `/admin/human-control/*` requests must present a token generated fresh on each daemon boot (24 random bytes). The only unauthenticated endpoint is `GET /health`, which intentionally returns only liveness, package and protocol version, instance ID, and host CPU architecture; like the rest of the server it is reachable only via loopback. The token is stored in `daemon.json` inside the daemon state directory (`~/.agent-device` for packaged installs; source checkouts use a worktree-scoped directory under `~/.agent-device/dev/`) with `0600` permissions; whoever can read that file already has your user account.
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- A client reuses a running daemon only when the version matches its own and both sides can vouch for the same code, which the daemon records in `daemon.json` as its code origin. Two installs of one published version are the same artifact, so they have nothing further to compare and share one daemon; demanding a fingerprint between them made the second install replace a daemon already running its code and drop the live session on it (#2458). Every other pair is judged by the daemon's code fingerprint: a checkout compares its own, and a pair whose trees cannot match at all — a checkout against an install, or an install against a daemon too old to report an origin — restarts the daemon rather than run code it cannot identify. The fingerprint compares file sizes and timestamps, never contents, so an install whose files were hand-replaced under its own version is still not detected.
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- Artifact uploads are size-capped, filenames are sanitized, and archive extraction rejects path-traversal entries. Artifact downloads resolve through server-side IDs, never client-supplied paths.
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