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gRPC Objective-C (gRPC CocoaPod): bundled CA store trusts compromised eMudhra intermediate CAs
Critical
sergiitk
published
GHSA-mm89-g5jq-mmfqOct 28, 2026
Package
gRPC
(CocoaPods)
Affected versions
>= 1.84.0, < 1.84.1
>= 1.83.0, < 1.83.2
< 1.82.3
Patched versions
1.84.1
1.83.2
1.82.3
Description
Summary
gRPC Objective-C (the gRPC CocoaPod) verifies TLS connections against its bundled root certificate store (roots.pem) by default. In affected versions, this store trusts certificates issued by eight eMudhra intermediate CAs whose private keys are compromised. These intermediates have been revoked, but they still chain to the bundled emSign ECC Root CA - G3 root.
An attacker with one of the compromised keys can issue certificates for any hostname, and gRPC Objective-C accepts them. An attacker who also has an on-path position can intercept or modify gRPC traffic.
Upgrade to the patched version for your release line, or to 1.84.1 or later, and rebuild your app.
Details
Affected: the gRPC CocoaPod, including when it's installed as a dependency of gRPC-ProtoRPC.
Note
Not affected: the gRPC-Core and gRPC-C++ CocoaPods and the grpc-ios Swift Package Manager package. Without the gRPC CocoaPod, gRPC Core and gRPC C++ don't use this store. The gRPC-C++ CocoaPod ships a copy of it (gRPCCertificates-Cpp.bundle/roots.pem) that gRPC never reads.
The bundled store is separate from the operating system's trust store, so updating the OS doesn't affect it. gRPC doesn't check certificate revocation (CRL/OCSP) by default, so revoking the intermediates doesn't mitigate the issue. gRPC also doesn't enforce Certificate Transparency, so it accepts certificates that were never publicly logged.
Sectigo's AAA Certificate Services has also cross-signed the compromised intermediates. Older gRPC CocoaPod releases bundle that root as well, so they're affected even if they predate the emSign root. The patched releases trust neither root.
Workarounds
The GRPC_DEFAULT_SSL_ROOTS_FILE_PATH workaround available for other gRPC languages doesn't apply here.
Summary
gRPC Objective-C (the gRPC CocoaPod) verifies TLS connections against its bundled root certificate store (
roots.pem) by default. In affected versions, this store trusts certificates issued by eight eMudhra intermediate CAs whose private keys are compromised. These intermediates have been revoked, but they still chain to the bundledemSign ECC Root CA - G3root.An attacker with one of the compromised keys can issue certificates for any hostname, and gRPC Objective-C accepts them. An attacker who also has an on-path position can intercept or modify gRPC traffic.
Upgrade to the patched version for your release line, or to 1.84.1 or later, and rebuild your app.
Details
Affected: the gRPC CocoaPod, including when it's installed as a dependency of gRPC-ProtoRPC.
Note
Not affected: the gRPC-Core and gRPC-C++ CocoaPods and the grpc-ios Swift Package Manager package. Without the
gRPCCocoaPod, gRPC Core and gRPC C++ don't use this store. ThegRPC-C++CocoaPod ships a copy of it (gRPCCertificates-Cpp.bundle/roots.pem) that gRPC never reads.The bundled store is separate from the operating system's trust store, so updating the OS doesn't affect it. gRPC doesn't check certificate revocation (CRL/OCSP) by default, so revoking the intermediates doesn't mitigate the issue. gRPC also doesn't enforce Certificate Transparency, so it accepts certificates that were never publicly logged.
Sectigo's
AAA Certificate Serviceshas also cross-signed the compromised intermediates. OldergRPCCocoaPod releases bundle that root as well, so they're affected even if they predate the emSign root. The patched releases trust neither root.Workarounds
The
GRPC_DEFAULT_SSL_ROOTS_FILE_PATHworkaround available for other gRPC languages doesn't apply here.References