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gregkh
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Jul 25, 2020
commit 311eab8 upstream. devm_gpiod_get_index() doesn't return NULL but -ENOENT when the requested GPIO doesn't exist, leading to the following messages: [ 2.742468] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.748147] can't set direction for gpio #2: -2 [ 2.753081] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.758724] can't set direction for gpio #3: -2 [ 2.763666] gpiod_direction_output: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.769394] can't set direction for gpio #4: -2 [ 2.774341] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.779981] can't set direction for gpio #5: -2 [ 2.784545] ff000a20.serial: ttyCPM1 at MMIO 0xfff00a20 (irq = 39, base_baud = 8250000) is a CPM UART Use devm_gpiod_get_index_optional() instead. At the same time, handle the error case and properly exit with an error. Fixes: 97cbaf2 ("tty: serial: cpm_uart: Convert to use GPIO descriptors") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/694a25fdce548c5ee8b060ef6a4b02746b8f25c0.1591986307.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
gregkh
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Jul 25, 2020
devm_gpiod_get_index() doesn't return NULL but -ENOENT when the requested GPIO doesn't exist, leading to the following messages: [ 2.742468] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.748147] can't set direction for gpio #2: -2 [ 2.753081] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.758724] can't set direction for gpio #3: -2 [ 2.763666] gpiod_direction_output: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.769394] can't set direction for gpio #4: -2 [ 2.774341] gpiod_direction_input: invalid GPIO (errorpointer) [ 2.779981] can't set direction for gpio #5: -2 [ 2.784545] ff000a20.serial: ttyCPM1 at MMIO 0xfff00a20 (irq = 39, base_baud = 8250000) is a CPM UART Use devm_gpiod_get_index_optional() instead. At the same time, handle the error case and properly exit with an error. Fixes: 97cbaf2 ("tty: serial: cpm_uart: Convert to use GPIO descriptors") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/694a25fdce548c5ee8b060ef6a4b02746b8f25c0.1591986307.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
gregkh
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Jul 25, 2020
In pci_disable_sriov(), i.e.,
# echo 0 > /sys/class/net/enp11s0f1np1/device/sriov_numvfs
iommu_release_device
iommu_group_remove_device
arm_smmu_domain_free
kfree(smmu_domain)
Later,
iommu_release_device
arm_smmu_release_device
arm_smmu_detach_dev
spin_lock_irqsave(&smmu_domain->devices_lock,
would trigger an use-after-free. Fixed it by call
arm_smmu_release_device() first before iommu_group_remove_device().
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3458/0x4440
__lock_acquire at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4250
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0089df1a6f68 by task bash/3356
CPU: 5 PID: 3356 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3-next-20200630 #2
Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70 /C01_APACHE_MB , BIOS L50_5.13_1.11 06/18/2019
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x398
show_stack+0x14/0x20
dump_stack+0x140/0x1b8
print_address_description.isra.12+0x54/0x4a8
kasan_report+0x134/0x1b8
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x2c/0x50
__lock_acquire+0x3458/0x4440
lock_acquire+0x204/0xf10
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xf8/0x180
arm_smmu_detach_dev+0xd8/0x4a0
arm_smmu_detach_dev at drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c:2776
arm_smmu_release_device+0xb4/0x1c8
arm_smmu_disable_pasid at drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c:2754
(inlined by) arm_smmu_release_device at drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c:3000
iommu_release_device+0xc0/0x178
iommu_release_device at drivers/iommu/iommu.c:302
iommu_bus_notifier+0x118/0x160
notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x128
__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa8
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x20
device_del+0x618/0xa00
pci_remove_bus_device+0x108/0x2d8
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x1c/0x28
pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x228/0x368
sriov_disable+0x8c/0x348
pci_disable_sriov+0x5c/0x70
mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0xd8/0x260 [mlx5_core]
sriov_numvfs_store+0x240/0x318
dev_attr_store+0x38/0x68
sysfs_kf_write+0xdc/0x128
kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x448
__vfs_write+0x54/0xe8
vfs_write+0x124/0x3f0
ksys_write+0xe8/0x1b8
__arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98
do_el0_svc+0x124/0x220
el0_sync_handler+0x260/0x408
el0_sync+0x140/0x180
Allocated by task 3356:
save_stack+0x24/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc.isra.13+0xc4/0xe0
kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1ec/0x318
arm_smmu_domain_alloc+0x54/0x148
iommu_group_alloc_default_domain+0xc0/0x440
iommu_probe_device+0x1c0/0x308
iort_iommu_configure+0x434/0x518
acpi_dma_configure+0xf0/0x128
pci_dma_configure+0x114/0x160
really_probe+0x124/0x6d8
driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x180
__device_attach_driver+0x184/0x1e8
bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x1a0
__device_attach+0x19c/0x2a8
device_attach+0x10/0x18
pci_bus_add_device+0x70/0xf8
pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x7b4/0xb40
sriov_enable+0x5c8/0xc30
pci_enable_sriov+0x64/0x80
mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0x58/0x260 [mlx5_core]
sriov_numvfs_store+0x1c0/0x318
dev_attr_store+0x38/0x68
sysfs_kf_write+0xdc/0x128
kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x448
__vfs_write+0x54/0xe8
vfs_write+0x124/0x3f0
ksys_write+0xe8/0x1b8
__arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98
do_el0_svc+0x124/0x220
el0_sync_handler+0x260/0x408
el0_sync+0x140/0x180
Freed by task 3356:
save_stack+0x24/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x198
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x110/0x298
kfree+0x128/0x668
arm_smmu_domain_free+0xf4/0x1a0
iommu_group_release+0xec/0x160
kobject_put+0xf4/0x238
kobject_del+0x110/0x190
kobject_put+0x1e4/0x238
iommu_group_remove_device+0x394/0x938
iommu_release_device+0x9c/0x178
iommu_release_device at drivers/iommu/iommu.c:300
iommu_bus_notifier+0x118/0x160
notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x128
__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa8
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x20
device_del+0x618/0xa00
pci_remove_bus_device+0x108/0x2d8
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x1c/0x28
pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0x228/0x368
sriov_disable+0x8c/0x348
pci_disable_sriov+0x5c/0x70
mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0xd8/0x260 [mlx5_core]
sriov_numvfs_store+0x240/0x318
dev_attr_store+0x38/0x68
sysfs_kf_write+0xdc/0x128
kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x448
__vfs_write+0x54/0xe8
vfs_write+0x124/0x3f0
ksys_write+0xe8/0x1b8
__arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98
do_el0_svc+0x124/0x220
el0_sync_handler+0x260/0x408
el0_sync+0x140/0x180
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0089df1a6e00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 360 bytes inside of
512-byte region [ffff0089df1a6e00, ffff0089df1a7000)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffffe02257c680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff0089df1a1400
flags: 0x7ffff800000200(slab)
raw: 007ffff800000200 ffffffe02246b8c8 ffffffe02257ff88 ffff000000320680
raw: ffff0089df1a1400 00000000002a000e 00000001ffffffff ffff0089df1a5001
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page->mem_cgroup:ffff0089df1a5001
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff0089df1a6e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff0089df1a6e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff0089df1a6f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff0089df1a6f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff0089df1a7000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: a6a4c7e ("iommu: Add probe_device() and release_device() call-backs")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
baruchsiach
referenced
this pull request
in siklu/linux
Jul 26, 2020
Jakub Sitnicki says: ==================== This patch set prepares ground for link-based multi-prog attachment for future netns attach types, with BPF_SK_LOOKUP attach type in mind [0]. Two changes are needed in order to attach and run a series of BPF programs: 1) an bpf_prog_array of programs to run (patch #2), and 2) a list of attached links to keep track of attachments (patch #3). Nothing changes for BPF flow_dissector. Just as before only one program can be attached to netns. In v3 I've simplified patch #2 that introduces bpf_prog_array to take advantage of the fact that it will hold at most one program for now. In particular, I'm no longer using bpf_prog_array_copy. It turned out to be less suitable for link operations than I thought as it fails to append the same BPF program. bpf_prog_array_replace_item is also gone, because we know we always want to replace the first element in prog_array. Naturally the code that handles bpf_prog_array will need change once more when there is a program type that allows multi-prog attachment. But I feel it will be better to do it gradually and present it together with tests that actually exercise multi-prog code paths. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ v2 -> v3: - Don't check if run_array is null in link update callback. (Martin) - Allow updating the link with the same BPF program. (Andrii) - Add patch #4 with a test for the above case. - Kill bpf_prog_array_replace_item. Access the run_array directly. - Switch from bpf_prog_array_copy() to bpf_prog_array_alloc(1, ...). - Replace rcu_deref_protected & RCU_INIT_POINTER with rcu_replace_pointer. - Drop Andrii's Ack from patch #2. Code changed. v1 -> v2: - Show with a (void) cast that bpf_prog_array_replace_item() return value is ignored on purpose. (Andrii) - Explain why bpf-cgroup cannot replace programs in bpf_prog_array based on bpf_prog pointer comparison in patch #2 description. (Andrii) ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
baruchsiach
referenced
this pull request
in siklu/linux
Jul 26, 2020
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm fixes for 5.8, take #2 - Make sure a vcpu becoming non-resident doesn't race against the doorbell delivery - Only advertise pvtime if accounting is enabled - Return the correct error code if reset fails with SVE - Make sure that pseudo-NMI functions are annotated as __always_inline
baruchsiach
referenced
this pull request
in siklu/linux
Jul 26, 2020
In BRM_status_show(), if the condition "!ioc->is_warpdrive" tested on entry
to the function is true, a "goto out" is called. This results in unlocking
ioc->pci_access_mutex without this mutex lock being taken. This generates
the following splat:
[ 1148.539883] mpt3sas_cm2: BRM_status_show: BRM attribute is only for warpdrive
[ 1148.547184]
[ 1148.548708] =====================================
[ 1148.553501] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
[ 1148.558277] 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 Not tainted
[ 1148.562183] -------------------------------------
[ 1148.566959] cat/5008 is trying to release lock (&ioc->pci_access_mutex) at:
[ 1148.574035] [<ffffffffc070b7a3>] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas]
[ 1148.580574] but there are no more locks to release!
[ 1148.585524]
[ 1148.585524] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1148.599624] 3 locks held by cat/5008:
[ 1148.607085] #0: ffff92aea3e392c0 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x34/0x480
[ 1148.618509] #1: ffff922ef14c4888 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x2a/0xb0
[ 1148.630729] #2: ffff92aedb5d7310 (kn->active#224){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x32/0xb0
[ 1148.643347]
[ 1148.643347] stack backtrace:
[ 1148.655259] CPU: 73 PID: 5008 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3+ #827
[ 1148.665309] Hardware name: HGST H4060-S/S2600STB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[ 1148.678394] Call Trace:
[ 1148.684750] dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
[ 1148.691802] lock_release.cold+0x45/0x4a
[ 1148.699451] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x270
[ 1148.707675] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas]
[ 1148.716092] dev_attr_show+0x19/0x40
[ 1148.723664] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x87/0x100
[ 1148.731193] seq_read+0xbc/0x480
[ 1148.737882] vfs_read+0xa0/0x160
[ 1148.744514] ksys_read+0x58/0xd0
[ 1148.751129] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0
[ 1148.757941] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1148.766240] RIP: 0033:0x7f1230566542
[ 1148.772957] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 1148.779206] RSP: 002b:00007ffeac1bcac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.790063] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f1230566542
[ 1148.800284] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f1223460000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 1148.810474] RBP: 00007f1223460000 R08: 00007f122345f010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.820641] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.830728] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000
Fix this by returning immediately instead of jumping to the out label.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sreekanth Reddy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
baruchsiach
referenced
this pull request
in siklu/linux
Jul 26, 2020
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes Fix two issues found by syzkaller. Patch #1 removes inappropriate usage of WARN_ON() following memory allocation failure. Constantly triggered when syzkaller injects faults. Patch #2 fixes a use-after-free that can be triggered by 'devlink dev info' following a failed devlink reload. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
imaami
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to imaami/linux
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit ab8b65b ] It is unsafe to traverse kvm->arch.spapr_tce_tables and stt->iommu_tables without the RCU read lock held. Also, add cond_resched_rcu() in places with the RCU read lock held that could take a while to finish. arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:76 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by qemu-kvm/4265. stack backtrace: CPU: 96 PID: 4265 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-next-20200508+ gregkh#2 Call Trace: [c000201a8690f720] [c000000000715948] dump_stack+0xfc/0x174 (unreliable) [c000201a8690f770] [c0000000001d9470] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x164 [c000201a8690f7f0] [c008000010b9fb48] kvm_spapr_tce_release_iommu_group+0x1f0/0x220 [kvm] [c000201a8690f870] [c008000010b8462c] kvm_spapr_tce_release_vfio_group+0x54/0xb0 [kvm] [c000201a8690f8a0] [c008000010b84710] kvm_vfio_destroy+0x88/0x140 [kvm] [c000201a8690f8f0] [c008000010b7d488] kvm_put_kvm+0x370/0x600 [kvm] [c000201a8690f990] [c008000010b7e3c0] kvm_vm_release+0x38/0x60 [kvm] [c000201a8690f9c0] [c0000000005223f4] __fput+0x124/0x330 [c000201a8690fa20] [c000000000151cd8] task_work_run+0xb8/0x130 [c000201a8690fa70] [c0000000001197e8] do_exit+0x4e8/0xfa0 [c000201a8690fb70] [c00000000011a374] do_group_exit+0x64/0xd0 [c000201a8690fbb0] [c000000000132c90] get_signal+0x1f0/0x1200 [c000201a8690fcc0] [c000000000020690] do_notify_resume+0x130/0x3c0 [c000201a8690fda0] [c000000000038d64] syscall_exit_prepare+0x1a4/0x280 [c000201a8690fe20] [c00000000000c8f8] system_call_common+0xf8/0x278 ==== arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:368 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by qemu-kvm/4264: #0: c000201ae2d000d8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xdc/0x950 [kvm] gregkh#1: c000200c9ed0c468 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvmppc_h_put_tce+0x88/0x340 [kvm] ==== arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:108 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by qemu-kvm/4257: #0: c000200b1b363a40 (&kv->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x598/0x6c0 [kvm] ==== arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:146 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by qemu-kvm/4257: #0: c000200b1b363a40 (&kv->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x598/0x6c0 [kvm] Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
imaami
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to imaami/linux
that referenced
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Jul 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit 027690c ] I made every global per-network-namespace instead. But perhaps doing that to this slab was a step too far. The kmem_cache_create call in our net init method also seems to be responsible for this lockdep warning: [ 45.163710] Unable to find swap-space signature [ 45.375718] trinity-c1 (855): attempted to duplicate a private mapping with mremap. This is not supported. [ 46.055744] futex_wake_op: trinity-c1 tries to shift op by -209; fix this program [ 51.011723] [ 51.013378] ====================================================== [ 51.013875] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 51.014378] 5.2.0-rc2 gregkh#1 Not tainted [ 51.014672] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 51.015182] trinity-c2/886 is trying to acquire lock: [ 51.015593] 000000005405f099 (slab_mutex){+.+.}, at: slab_attr_store+0xa2/0x130 [ 51.016190] [ 51.016190] but task is already holding lock: [ 51.016652] 00000000ac662005 (kn->count#43){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x286/0x500 [ 51.017266] [ 51.017266] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 51.017266] [ 51.017909] [ 51.017909] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 51.018497] [ 51.018497] -> gregkh#1 (kn->count#43){++++}: [ 51.018956] __lock_acquire+0x7cf/0x1a20 [ 51.019317] lock_acquire+0x17d/0x390 [ 51.019658] __kernfs_remove+0x892/0xae0 [ 51.020020] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x78/0x110 [ 51.020435] sysfs_remove_link+0x55/0xb0 [ 51.020832] sysfs_slab_add+0xc1/0x3e0 [ 51.021332] __kmem_cache_create+0x155/0x200 [ 51.021720] create_cache+0xf5/0x320 [ 51.022054] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x179/0x320 [ 51.022486] kmem_cache_create+0x1a/0x30 [ 51.022867] nfsd_reply_cache_init+0x278/0x560 [ 51.023266] nfsd_init_net+0x20f/0x5e0 [ 51.023623] ops_init+0xcb/0x4b0 [ 51.023928] setup_net+0x2fe/0x670 [ 51.024315] copy_net_ns+0x30a/0x3f0 [ 51.024653] create_new_namespaces+0x3c5/0x820 [ 51.025257] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xd1/0x240 [ 51.025881] ksys_unshare+0x506/0x9c0 [ 51.026381] __x64_sys_unshare+0x3a/0x50 [ 51.026937] do_syscall_64+0x110/0x10b0 [ 51.027509] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 51.028175] [ 51.028175] -> #0 (slab_mutex){+.+.}: [ 51.028817] validate_chain+0x1c51/0x2cc0 [ 51.029422] __lock_acquire+0x7cf/0x1a20 [ 51.029947] lock_acquire+0x17d/0x390 [ 51.030438] __mutex_lock+0x100/0xfa0 [ 51.030995] mutex_lock_nested+0x27/0x30 [ 51.031516] slab_attr_store+0xa2/0x130 [ 51.032020] sysfs_kf_write+0x11d/0x180 [ 51.032529] kernfs_fop_write+0x32a/0x500 [ 51.033056] do_loop_readv_writev+0x21d/0x310 [ 51.033627] do_iter_write+0x2e5/0x380 [ 51.034148] vfs_writev+0x170/0x310 [ 51.034616] do_pwritev+0x13e/0x160 [ 51.035100] __x64_sys_pwritev+0xa3/0x110 [ 51.035633] do_syscall_64+0x110/0x10b0 [ 51.036200] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 51.036924] [ 51.036924] other info that might help us debug this: [ 51.036924] [ 51.037876] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 51.037876] [ 51.038556] CPU0 CPU1 [ 51.039130] ---- ---- [ 51.039676] lock(kn->count#43); [ 51.040084] lock(slab_mutex); [ 51.040597] lock(kn->count#43); [ 51.041062] lock(slab_mutex); [ 51.041320] [ 51.041320] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 51.041320] [ 51.041793] 3 locks held by trinity-c2/886: [ 51.042128] #0: 000000001f55e152 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}, at: vfs_writev+0x2b9/0x310 [ 51.042739] gregkh#1: 00000000c7d6c034 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x25b/0x500 [ 51.043400] gregkh#2: 00000000ac662005 (kn->count#43){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x286/0x500 Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Fixes: 3ba7583 "drc containerization" Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 2d3a8e2 ] In blkdev_get() we call __blkdev_get() to do some internal jobs and if there is some errors in __blkdev_get(), the bdput() is called which means we have released the refcount of the bdev (actually the refcount of the bdev inode). This means we cannot access bdev after that point. But acctually bdev is still accessed in blkdev_get() after calling __blkdev_get(). This results in use-after-free if the refcount is the last one we released in __blkdev_get(). Let's take a look at the following scenerio: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 blkdev_open blkdev_open Remove disk bd_acquire blkdev_get __blkdev_get del_gendisk bdev_unhash_inode bd_acquire bdev_get_gendisk bd_forget failed because of unhashed bdput bdput (the last one) bdev_evict_inode access bdev => use after free [ 459.350216] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.351190] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806c815a80 by task syz-executor.0/20132 [ 459.352347] [ 459.352594] CPU: 0 PID: 20132 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90 gregkh#2 [ 459.353628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 459.354947] Call Trace: [ 459.355337] dump_stack+0x111/0x19e [ 459.355879] ? __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.356523] print_address_description+0x60/0x223 [ 459.357248] ? __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.357887] kasan_report.cold+0xae/0x2d8 [ 459.358503] __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.359120] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [ 459.359784] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x37b/0x580 [ 459.360465] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [ 459.361123] ? finish_task_switch+0x125/0x600 [ 459.361812] ? finish_task_switch+0xee/0x600 [ 459.362471] ? mark_held_locks+0xf0/0xf0 [ 459.363108] ? __schedule+0x96f/0x21d0 [ 459.363716] lock_acquire+0x111/0x320 [ 459.364285] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.364846] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.365390] __mutex_lock+0xf9/0x12a0 [ 459.365948] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.366493] ? bdev_evict_inode+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 459.367130] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.367678] ? destroy_inode+0xbc/0x110 [ 459.368261] ? mutex_trylock+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 459.368867] ? __blkdev_get+0x3e6/0x1280 [ 459.369463] ? bdev_disk_changed+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 459.370114] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.370656] blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.371178] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [ 459.371774] ? __blkdev_get+0x1280/0x1280 [ 459.372383] ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 [ 459.373002] ? lock_acquire+0x111/0x320 [ 459.373587] ? bd_acquire+0x21/0x2c0 [ 459.374134] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4f/0x250 [ 459.374780] blkdev_open+0x202/0x290 [ 459.375325] do_dentry_open+0x49e/0x1050 [ 459.375924] ? blkdev_get_by_dev+0x70/0x70 [ 459.376543] ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 459.377192] ? inode_permission+0xbe/0x3a0 [ 459.377818] path_openat+0x148c/0x3f50 [ 459.378392] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd5/0x280 [ 459.379016] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 459.379802] ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x900/0x900 [ 459.380489] ? __lock_is_held+0xad/0x140 [ 459.381093] do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280 [ 459.381654] ? may_open_dev+0xf0/0xf0 [ 459.382214] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [ 459.382816] ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 [ 459.383425] ? __lock_is_held+0xad/0x140 [ 459.384024] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4f/0x250 [ 459.384668] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ 459.385280] ? __alloc_fd+0x448/0x560 [ 459.385841] do_sys_open+0x3c3/0x500 [ 459.386386] ? filp_open+0x70/0x70 [ 459.386911] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 459.387610] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x55/0x1c0 [ 459.388342] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a/0x520 [ 459.388930] do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x520 [ 459.389490] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 459.390248] RIP: 0033:0x416211 [ 459.390720] Code: 75 14 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 04 19 00 00 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 0a fa ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 53 fa ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01 [ 459.393483] RSP: 002b:00007fe45dfe9a60 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 [ 459.394610] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe45dfea6d4 RCX: 0000000000416211 [ 459.395678] RDX: 00007fe45dfe9b0a RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007fe45dfe9b00 [ 459.396758] RBP: 000000000076bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000a [ 459.397930] R10: 0000000000000075 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000ffffffff [ 459.399022] R13: 0000000000000bd9 R14: 00000000004cdb80 R15: 000000000076bf2c [ 459.400168] [ 459.400430] Allocated by task 20132: [ 459.401038] kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0 [ 459.401652] kmem_cache_alloc+0xd5/0x280 [ 459.402330] bdev_alloc_inode+0x18/0x40 [ 459.402970] alloc_inode+0x5f/0x180 [ 459.403510] iget5_locked+0x57/0xd0 [ 459.404095] bdget+0x94/0x4e0 [ 459.404607] bd_acquire+0xfa/0x2c0 [ 459.405113] blkdev_open+0x110/0x290 [ 459.405702] do_dentry_open+0x49e/0x1050 [ 459.406340] path_openat+0x148c/0x3f50 [ 459.406926] do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280 [ 459.407471] do_sys_open+0x3c3/0x500 [ 459.408010] do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x520 [ 459.408572] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 459.409415] [ 459.409679] Freed by task 1262: [ 459.410212] __kasan_slab_free+0x129/0x170 [ 459.410919] kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x2a0 [ 459.411564] rcu_process_callbacks+0xbb2/0x2320 [ 459.412318] __do_softirq+0x225/0x8ac Fix this by delaying bdput() to the end of blkdev_get() which means we have finished accessing bdev. Fixes: 77ea887 ("implement in-kernel gendisk events handling") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Cc: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit e5a15e1 upstream. The following kernel panic was captured when running nfs server over ocfs2, at that time ocfs2_test_inode_bit() was checking whether one inode locating at "blkno" 5 was valid, that is ocfs2 root inode, its "suballoc_slot" was OCFS2_INVALID_SLOT(65535) and it was allocted from //global_inode_alloc, but here it wrongly assumed that it was got from per slot inode alloctor which would cause array overflow and trigger kernel panic. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001088 IP: [<ffffffff816f6898>] _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0 PGD 1e06ba067 PUD 1e9e7d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [gregkh#1] SMP CPU: 6 PID: 24873 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.1.12-124.36.1.el6uek.x86_64 gregkh#2 Hardware name: Huawei CH121 V3/IT11SGCA1, BIOS 3.87 02/02/2018 RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0 RSP: e02b:ffff88005ae97908 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff88005ae98000 RBX: 0000000000001088 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: 0000000000001088 RBP: ffff88005ae97928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880212878e00 R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001088 R13: ffff8800063c0aa8 R14: ffff8800650c27d0 R15: 000000000000ffff FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880218180000(0000) knlGS:ffff880218180000 CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000001088 CR3: 00000002033d0000 CR4: 0000000000042660 Call Trace: igrab+0x1e/0x60 ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x63/0x3a0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_test_inode_bit+0x328/0xa00 [ocfs2] ocfs2_get_parent+0xba/0x3e0 [ocfs2] reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300 exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0 fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd] nfsd4_putfh+0x4d/0x60 [nfsd] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x3d3/0x6f0 [nfsd] nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd] svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc] svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc] nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd] kthread+0xcb/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90 Code: 83 c2 02 0f b7 f2 e8 18 dc 91 ff 66 90 eb bf 0f 1f 40 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 fb ba 00 00 02 00 <f0> 0f c1 17 89 d0 45 31 e4 45 31 ed c1 e8 10 66 39 d0 41 89 c6 RIP _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0 CR2: 0000000000001088 ---[ end trace 7264463cd1aac8f9 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 440ab9e ] At times when I'm using kgdb I see a splat on my console about suspicious RCU usage. I managed to come up with a case that could reproduce this that looked like this: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.7.0-rc4+ #609 Not tainted ----------------------------- kernel/pid.c:395 find_task_by_pid_ns() needs rcu_read_lock() protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: ffffff81b6b8e988 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach+0x40/0x13c gregkh#1: ffffffd01109e9e8 (dbg_master_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x20c/0x7ac gregkh#2: ffffffd01109ea90 (dbg_slave_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x3ec/0x7ac stack backtrace: CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4+ #609 Hardware name: Google Cheza (rev3+) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b8 show_stack+0x1c/0x24 dump_stack+0xd4/0x134 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xf0/0x100 find_task_by_pid_ns+0x5c/0x80 getthread+0x8c/0xb0 gdb_serial_stub+0x9d4/0xd04 kgdb_cpu_enter+0x284/0x7ac kgdb_handle_exception+0x174/0x20c kgdb_brk_fn+0x24/0x30 call_break_hook+0x6c/0x7c brk_handler+0x20/0x5c do_debug_exception+0x1c8/0x22c el1_sync_handler+0x3c/0xe4 el1_sync+0x7c/0x100 rpmh_rsc_probe+0x38/0x420 platform_drv_probe+0x94/0xb4 really_probe+0x134/0x300 driver_probe_device+0x68/0x100 __device_attach_driver+0x90/0xa8 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xcc __device_attach+0xb4/0x13c device_initial_probe+0x18/0x20 bus_probe_device+0x38/0x98 device_add+0x38c/0x420 If I understand properly we should just be able to blanket kgdb under one big RCU read lock and the problem should go away. We'll add it to the beast-of-a-function known as kgdb_cpu_enter(). With this I no longer get any splats and things seem to work fine. Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200602154729.v2.1.I70e0d4fd46d5ed2aaf0c98a355e8e1b7a5bb7e4e@changeid Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 54505a1 upstream. The commits cd0e00c and 92d7223 broke boot on the Alpha Avanti platform. The patches move memory barriers after a write before the write. The result is that if there's iowrite followed by ioread, there is no barrier between them. The Alpha architecture allows reordering of the accesses to the I/O space, and the missing barrier between write and read causes hang with serial port and real time clock. This patch makes barriers confiorm to the specification. 1. We add mb() before readX_relaxed and writeX_relaxed - memory-barriers.txt claims that these functions must be ordered w.r.t. each other. Alpha doesn't order them, so we need an explicit barrier. 2. We add mb() before reads from the I/O space - so that if there's a write followed by a read, there should be a barrier between them. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Fixes: cd0e00c ("alpha: io: reorder barriers to guarantee writeX() and iowriteX() ordering") Fixes: 92d7223 ("alpha: io: reorder barriers to guarantee writeX() and iowriteX() ordering gregkh#2") Cc: [email protected] # v4.17+ Acked-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matt Turner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ab8b65b ] It is unsafe to traverse kvm->arch.spapr_tce_tables and stt->iommu_tables without the RCU read lock held. Also, add cond_resched_rcu() in places with the RCU read lock held that could take a while to finish. arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:76 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by qemu-kvm/4265. stack backtrace: CPU: 96 PID: 4265 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-next-20200508+ gregkh#2 Call Trace: [c000201a8690f720] [c000000000715948] dump_stack+0xfc/0x174 (unreliable) [c000201a8690f770] [c0000000001d9470] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x164 [c000201a8690f7f0] [c008000010b9fb48] kvm_spapr_tce_release_iommu_group+0x1f0/0x220 [kvm] [c000201a8690f870] [c008000010b8462c] kvm_spapr_tce_release_vfio_group+0x54/0xb0 [kvm] [c000201a8690f8a0] [c008000010b84710] kvm_vfio_destroy+0x88/0x140 [kvm] [c000201a8690f8f0] [c008000010b7d488] kvm_put_kvm+0x370/0x600 [kvm] [c000201a8690f990] [c008000010b7e3c0] kvm_vm_release+0x38/0x60 [kvm] [c000201a8690f9c0] [c0000000005223f4] __fput+0x124/0x330 [c000201a8690fa20] [c000000000151cd8] task_work_run+0xb8/0x130 [c000201a8690fa70] [c0000000001197e8] do_exit+0x4e8/0xfa0 [c000201a8690fb70] [c00000000011a374] do_group_exit+0x64/0xd0 [c000201a8690fbb0] [c000000000132c90] get_signal+0x1f0/0x1200 [c000201a8690fcc0] [c000000000020690] do_notify_resume+0x130/0x3c0 [c000201a8690fda0] [c000000000038d64] syscall_exit_prepare+0x1a4/0x280 [c000201a8690fe20] [c00000000000c8f8] system_call_common+0xf8/0x278 ==== arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:368 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by qemu-kvm/4264: #0: c000201ae2d000d8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xdc/0x950 [kvm] gregkh#1: c000200c9ed0c468 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvmppc_h_put_tce+0x88/0x340 [kvm] ==== arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:108 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by qemu-kvm/4257: #0: c000200b1b363a40 (&kv->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x598/0x6c0 [kvm] ==== arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:146 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by qemu-kvm/4257: #0: c000200b1b363a40 (&kv->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x598/0x6c0 [kvm] Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Jul 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit 027690c ] I made every global per-network-namespace instead. But perhaps doing that to this slab was a step too far. The kmem_cache_create call in our net init method also seems to be responsible for this lockdep warning: [ 45.163710] Unable to find swap-space signature [ 45.375718] trinity-c1 (855): attempted to duplicate a private mapping with mremap. This is not supported. [ 46.055744] futex_wake_op: trinity-c1 tries to shift op by -209; fix this program [ 51.011723] [ 51.013378] ====================================================== [ 51.013875] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 51.014378] 5.2.0-rc2 gregkh#1 Not tainted [ 51.014672] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 51.015182] trinity-c2/886 is trying to acquire lock: [ 51.015593] 000000005405f099 (slab_mutex){+.+.}, at: slab_attr_store+0xa2/0x130 [ 51.016190] [ 51.016190] but task is already holding lock: [ 51.016652] 00000000ac662005 (kn->count#43){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x286/0x500 [ 51.017266] [ 51.017266] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 51.017266] [ 51.017909] [ 51.017909] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 51.018497] [ 51.018497] -> gregkh#1 (kn->count#43){++++}: [ 51.018956] __lock_acquire+0x7cf/0x1a20 [ 51.019317] lock_acquire+0x17d/0x390 [ 51.019658] __kernfs_remove+0x892/0xae0 [ 51.020020] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x78/0x110 [ 51.020435] sysfs_remove_link+0x55/0xb0 [ 51.020832] sysfs_slab_add+0xc1/0x3e0 [ 51.021332] __kmem_cache_create+0x155/0x200 [ 51.021720] create_cache+0xf5/0x320 [ 51.022054] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x179/0x320 [ 51.022486] kmem_cache_create+0x1a/0x30 [ 51.022867] nfsd_reply_cache_init+0x278/0x560 [ 51.023266] nfsd_init_net+0x20f/0x5e0 [ 51.023623] ops_init+0xcb/0x4b0 [ 51.023928] setup_net+0x2fe/0x670 [ 51.024315] copy_net_ns+0x30a/0x3f0 [ 51.024653] create_new_namespaces+0x3c5/0x820 [ 51.025257] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xd1/0x240 [ 51.025881] ksys_unshare+0x506/0x9c0 [ 51.026381] __x64_sys_unshare+0x3a/0x50 [ 51.026937] do_syscall_64+0x110/0x10b0 [ 51.027509] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 51.028175] [ 51.028175] -> #0 (slab_mutex){+.+.}: [ 51.028817] validate_chain+0x1c51/0x2cc0 [ 51.029422] __lock_acquire+0x7cf/0x1a20 [ 51.029947] lock_acquire+0x17d/0x390 [ 51.030438] __mutex_lock+0x100/0xfa0 [ 51.030995] mutex_lock_nested+0x27/0x30 [ 51.031516] slab_attr_store+0xa2/0x130 [ 51.032020] sysfs_kf_write+0x11d/0x180 [ 51.032529] kernfs_fop_write+0x32a/0x500 [ 51.033056] do_loop_readv_writev+0x21d/0x310 [ 51.033627] do_iter_write+0x2e5/0x380 [ 51.034148] vfs_writev+0x170/0x310 [ 51.034616] do_pwritev+0x13e/0x160 [ 51.035100] __x64_sys_pwritev+0xa3/0x110 [ 51.035633] do_syscall_64+0x110/0x10b0 [ 51.036200] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 51.036924] [ 51.036924] other info that might help us debug this: [ 51.036924] [ 51.037876] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 51.037876] [ 51.038556] CPU0 CPU1 [ 51.039130] ---- ---- [ 51.039676] lock(kn->count#43); [ 51.040084] lock(slab_mutex); [ 51.040597] lock(kn->count#43); [ 51.041062] lock(slab_mutex); [ 51.041320] [ 51.041320] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 51.041320] [ 51.041793] 3 locks held by trinity-c2/886: [ 51.042128] #0: 000000001f55e152 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}, at: vfs_writev+0x2b9/0x310 [ 51.042739] gregkh#1: 00000000c7d6c034 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x25b/0x500 [ 51.043400] gregkh#2: 00000000ac662005 (kn->count#43){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x286/0x500 Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Fixes: 3ba7583 "drc containerization" Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
imaami
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Jul 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit 2d3a8e2 ] In blkdev_get() we call __blkdev_get() to do some internal jobs and if there is some errors in __blkdev_get(), the bdput() is called which means we have released the refcount of the bdev (actually the refcount of the bdev inode). This means we cannot access bdev after that point. But acctually bdev is still accessed in blkdev_get() after calling __blkdev_get(). This results in use-after-free if the refcount is the last one we released in __blkdev_get(). Let's take a look at the following scenerio: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 blkdev_open blkdev_open Remove disk bd_acquire blkdev_get __blkdev_get del_gendisk bdev_unhash_inode bd_acquire bdev_get_gendisk bd_forget failed because of unhashed bdput bdput (the last one) bdev_evict_inode access bdev => use after free [ 459.350216] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.351190] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806c815a80 by task syz-executor.0/20132 [ 459.352347] [ 459.352594] CPU: 0 PID: 20132 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90 gregkh#2 [ 459.353628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 459.354947] Call Trace: [ 459.355337] dump_stack+0x111/0x19e [ 459.355879] ? __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.356523] print_address_description+0x60/0x223 [ 459.357248] ? __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.357887] kasan_report.cold+0xae/0x2d8 [ 459.358503] __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0 [ 459.359120] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [ 459.359784] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x37b/0x580 [ 459.360465] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [ 459.361123] ? finish_task_switch+0x125/0x600 [ 459.361812] ? finish_task_switch+0xee/0x600 [ 459.362471] ? mark_held_locks+0xf0/0xf0 [ 459.363108] ? __schedule+0x96f/0x21d0 [ 459.363716] lock_acquire+0x111/0x320 [ 459.364285] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.364846] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.365390] __mutex_lock+0xf9/0x12a0 [ 459.365948] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.366493] ? bdev_evict_inode+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 459.367130] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.367678] ? destroy_inode+0xbc/0x110 [ 459.368261] ? mutex_trylock+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 459.368867] ? __blkdev_get+0x3e6/0x1280 [ 459.369463] ? bdev_disk_changed+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 459.370114] ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.370656] blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0 [ 459.371178] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [ 459.371774] ? __blkdev_get+0x1280/0x1280 [ 459.372383] ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 [ 459.373002] ? lock_acquire+0x111/0x320 [ 459.373587] ? bd_acquire+0x21/0x2c0 [ 459.374134] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4f/0x250 [ 459.374780] blkdev_open+0x202/0x290 [ 459.375325] do_dentry_open+0x49e/0x1050 [ 459.375924] ? blkdev_get_by_dev+0x70/0x70 [ 459.376543] ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 459.377192] ? inode_permission+0xbe/0x3a0 [ 459.377818] path_openat+0x148c/0x3f50 [ 459.378392] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd5/0x280 [ 459.379016] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 459.379802] ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x900/0x900 [ 459.380489] ? __lock_is_held+0xad/0x140 [ 459.381093] do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280 [ 459.381654] ? may_open_dev+0xf0/0xf0 [ 459.382214] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [ 459.382816] ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 [ 459.383425] ? __lock_is_held+0xad/0x140 [ 459.384024] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4f/0x250 [ 459.384668] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ 459.385280] ? __alloc_fd+0x448/0x560 [ 459.385841] do_sys_open+0x3c3/0x500 [ 459.386386] ? filp_open+0x70/0x70 [ 459.386911] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 459.387610] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x55/0x1c0 [ 459.388342] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a/0x520 [ 459.388930] do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x520 [ 459.389490] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 459.390248] RIP: 0033:0x416211 [ 459.390720] Code: 75 14 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 04 19 00 00 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 0a fa ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 53 fa ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01 [ 459.393483] RSP: 002b:00007fe45dfe9a60 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 [ 459.394610] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe45dfea6d4 RCX: 0000000000416211 [ 459.395678] RDX: 00007fe45dfe9b0a RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007fe45dfe9b00 [ 459.396758] RBP: 000000000076bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000a [ 459.397930] R10: 0000000000000075 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000ffffffff [ 459.399022] R13: 0000000000000bd9 R14: 00000000004cdb80 R15: 000000000076bf2c [ 459.400168] [ 459.400430] Allocated by task 20132: [ 459.401038] kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0 [ 459.401652] kmem_cache_alloc+0xd5/0x280 [ 459.402330] bdev_alloc_inode+0x18/0x40 [ 459.402970] alloc_inode+0x5f/0x180 [ 459.403510] iget5_locked+0x57/0xd0 [ 459.404095] bdget+0x94/0x4e0 [ 459.404607] bd_acquire+0xfa/0x2c0 [ 459.405113] blkdev_open+0x110/0x290 [ 459.405702] do_dentry_open+0x49e/0x1050 [ 459.406340] path_openat+0x148c/0x3f50 [ 459.406926] do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280 [ 459.407471] do_sys_open+0x3c3/0x500 [ 459.408010] do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x520 [ 459.408572] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 459.409415] [ 459.409679] Freed by task 1262: [ 459.410212] __kasan_slab_free+0x129/0x170 [ 459.410919] kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x2a0 [ 459.411564] rcu_process_callbacks+0xbb2/0x2320 [ 459.412318] __do_softirq+0x225/0x8ac Fix this by delaying bdput() to the end of blkdev_get() which means we have finished accessing bdev. Fixes: 77ea887 ("implement in-kernel gendisk events handling") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Cc: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
imaami
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Jul 26, 2020
commit e5a15e1 upstream. The following kernel panic was captured when running nfs server over ocfs2, at that time ocfs2_test_inode_bit() was checking whether one inode locating at "blkno" 5 was valid, that is ocfs2 root inode, its "suballoc_slot" was OCFS2_INVALID_SLOT(65535) and it was allocted from //global_inode_alloc, but here it wrongly assumed that it was got from per slot inode alloctor which would cause array overflow and trigger kernel panic. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001088 IP: [<ffffffff816f6898>] _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0 PGD 1e06ba067 PUD 1e9e7d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [gregkh#1] SMP CPU: 6 PID: 24873 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.1.12-124.36.1.el6uek.x86_64 gregkh#2 Hardware name: Huawei CH121 V3/IT11SGCA1, BIOS 3.87 02/02/2018 RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0 RSP: e02b:ffff88005ae97908 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff88005ae98000 RBX: 0000000000001088 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: 0000000000001088 RBP: ffff88005ae97928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880212878e00 R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001088 R13: ffff8800063c0aa8 R14: ffff8800650c27d0 R15: 000000000000ffff FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880218180000(0000) knlGS:ffff880218180000 CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000001088 CR3: 00000002033d0000 CR4: 0000000000042660 Call Trace: igrab+0x1e/0x60 ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x63/0x3a0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_test_inode_bit+0x328/0xa00 [ocfs2] ocfs2_get_parent+0xba/0x3e0 [ocfs2] reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300 exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0 fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd] nfsd4_putfh+0x4d/0x60 [nfsd] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x3d3/0x6f0 [nfsd] nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd] svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc] svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc] nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd] kthread+0xcb/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90 Code: 83 c2 02 0f b7 f2 e8 18 dc 91 ff 66 90 eb bf 0f 1f 40 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 fb ba 00 00 02 00 <f0> 0f c1 17 89 d0 45 31 e4 45 31 ed c1 e8 10 66 39 d0 41 89 c6 RIP _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0 CR2: 0000000000001088 ---[ end trace 7264463cd1aac8f9 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
imaami
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Jul 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit 440ab9e ] At times when I'm using kgdb I see a splat on my console about suspicious RCU usage. I managed to come up with a case that could reproduce this that looked like this: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.7.0-rc4+ #609 Not tainted ----------------------------- kernel/pid.c:395 find_task_by_pid_ns() needs rcu_read_lock() protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: ffffff81b6b8e988 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach+0x40/0x13c gregkh#1: ffffffd01109e9e8 (dbg_master_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x20c/0x7ac gregkh#2: ffffffd01109ea90 (dbg_slave_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x3ec/0x7ac stack backtrace: CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4+ #609 Hardware name: Google Cheza (rev3+) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b8 show_stack+0x1c/0x24 dump_stack+0xd4/0x134 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xf0/0x100 find_task_by_pid_ns+0x5c/0x80 getthread+0x8c/0xb0 gdb_serial_stub+0x9d4/0xd04 kgdb_cpu_enter+0x284/0x7ac kgdb_handle_exception+0x174/0x20c kgdb_brk_fn+0x24/0x30 call_break_hook+0x6c/0x7c brk_handler+0x20/0x5c do_debug_exception+0x1c8/0x22c el1_sync_handler+0x3c/0xe4 el1_sync+0x7c/0x100 rpmh_rsc_probe+0x38/0x420 platform_drv_probe+0x94/0xb4 really_probe+0x134/0x300 driver_probe_device+0x68/0x100 __device_attach_driver+0x90/0xa8 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xcc __device_attach+0xb4/0x13c device_initial_probe+0x18/0x20 bus_probe_device+0x38/0x98 device_add+0x38c/0x420 If I understand properly we should just be able to blanket kgdb under one big RCU read lock and the problem should go away. We'll add it to the beast-of-a-function known as kgdb_cpu_enter(). With this I no longer get any splats and things seem to work fine. Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200602154729.v2.1.I70e0d4fd46d5ed2aaf0c98a355e8e1b7a5bb7e4e@changeid Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
imaami
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Jul 29, 2020
[ Upstream commit cb551b8 ] In BRM_status_show(), if the condition "!ioc->is_warpdrive" tested on entry to the function is true, a "goto out" is called. This results in unlocking ioc->pci_access_mutex without this mutex lock being taken. This generates the following splat: [ 1148.539883] mpt3sas_cm2: BRM_status_show: BRM attribute is only for warpdrive [ 1148.547184] [ 1148.548708] ===================================== [ 1148.553501] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! [ 1148.558277] 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 Not tainted [ 1148.562183] ------------------------------------- [ 1148.566959] cat/5008 is trying to release lock (&ioc->pci_access_mutex) at: [ 1148.574035] [<ffffffffc070b7a3>] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas] [ 1148.580574] but there are no more locks to release! [ 1148.585524] [ 1148.585524] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1148.599624] 3 locks held by cat/5008: [ 1148.607085] #0: ffff92aea3e392c0 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x34/0x480 [ 1148.618509] gregkh#1: ffff922ef14c4888 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x2a/0xb0 [ 1148.630729] gregkh#2: ffff92aedb5d7310 (kn->active#224){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x32/0xb0 [ 1148.643347] [ 1148.643347] stack backtrace: [ 1148.655259] CPU: 73 PID: 5008 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 [ 1148.665309] Hardware name: HGST H4060-S/S2600STB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 1148.678394] Call Trace: [ 1148.684750] dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 [ 1148.691802] lock_release.cold+0x45/0x4a [ 1148.699451] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x270 [ 1148.707675] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas] [ 1148.716092] dev_attr_show+0x19/0x40 [ 1148.723664] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x87/0x100 [ 1148.731193] seq_read+0xbc/0x480 [ 1148.737882] vfs_read+0xa0/0x160 [ 1148.744514] ksys_read+0x58/0xd0 [ 1148.751129] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 [ 1148.757941] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1148.766240] RIP: 0033:0x7f1230566542 [ 1148.772957] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 1148.779206] RSP: 002b:00007ffeac1bcac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.790063] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f1230566542 [ 1148.800284] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f1223460000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1148.810474] RBP: 00007f1223460000 R08: 00007f122345f010 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.820641] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.830728] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Fix this by returning immediately instead of jumping to the out label. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sreekanth Reddy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
gregkh
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Jul 31, 2020
[ Upstream commit cb551b8 ] In BRM_status_show(), if the condition "!ioc->is_warpdrive" tested on entry to the function is true, a "goto out" is called. This results in unlocking ioc->pci_access_mutex without this mutex lock being taken. This generates the following splat: [ 1148.539883] mpt3sas_cm2: BRM_status_show: BRM attribute is only for warpdrive [ 1148.547184] [ 1148.548708] ===================================== [ 1148.553501] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! [ 1148.558277] 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 Not tainted [ 1148.562183] ------------------------------------- [ 1148.566959] cat/5008 is trying to release lock (&ioc->pci_access_mutex) at: [ 1148.574035] [<ffffffffc070b7a3>] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas] [ 1148.580574] but there are no more locks to release! [ 1148.585524] [ 1148.585524] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1148.599624] 3 locks held by cat/5008: [ 1148.607085] #0: ffff92aea3e392c0 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x34/0x480 [ 1148.618509] #1: ffff922ef14c4888 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x2a/0xb0 [ 1148.630729] #2: ffff92aedb5d7310 (kn->active#224){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x32/0xb0 [ 1148.643347] [ 1148.643347] stack backtrace: [ 1148.655259] CPU: 73 PID: 5008 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 [ 1148.665309] Hardware name: HGST H4060-S/S2600STB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 1148.678394] Call Trace: [ 1148.684750] dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 [ 1148.691802] lock_release.cold+0x45/0x4a [ 1148.699451] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x270 [ 1148.707675] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas] [ 1148.716092] dev_attr_show+0x19/0x40 [ 1148.723664] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x87/0x100 [ 1148.731193] seq_read+0xbc/0x480 [ 1148.737882] vfs_read+0xa0/0x160 [ 1148.744514] ksys_read+0x58/0xd0 [ 1148.751129] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 [ 1148.757941] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1148.766240] RIP: 0033:0x7f1230566542 [ 1148.772957] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 1148.779206] RSP: 002b:00007ffeac1bcac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.790063] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f1230566542 [ 1148.800284] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f1223460000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1148.810474] RBP: 00007f1223460000 R08: 00007f122345f010 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.820641] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1148.830728] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Fix this by returning immediately instead of jumping to the out label. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sreekanth Reddy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
imaami
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Aug 2, 2020
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw fixes This patch set contains various fixes for mlxsw. Patches gregkh#1-gregkh#2 fix two trap related issues introduced in previous cycle. Patches gregkh#3-gregkh#5 fix rare use-after-frees discovered by syzkaller. After over a week of fuzzing with the fixes, the bugs did not reproduce. Patch gregkh#6 from Amit fixes an issue in the ethtool selftest that was recently discovered after running the test on a new platform that supports only 1Gbps and 10Gbps speeds. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
imaami
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Aug 2, 2020
This patch fixes a race condition that causes a use-after-free during amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail. This can occur when 2 non-blocking commits are requested and the second one finishes before the first. Essentially, this bug occurs when the following sequence of events happens: 1. Non-blocking commit gregkh#1 is requested w/ a new dm_state gregkh#1 and is deferred to the workqueue. 2. Non-blocking commit gregkh#2 is requested w/ a new dm_state gregkh#2 and is deferred to the workqueue. 3. Commit gregkh#2 starts before commit gregkh#1, dm_state gregkh#1 is used in the commit_tail and commit gregkh#2 completes, freeing dm_state gregkh#1. 4. Commit gregkh#1 starts after commit gregkh#2 completes, uses the freed dm_state 1 and dereferences a freelist pointer while setting the context. Since this bug has only been spotted with fast commits, this patch fixes the bug by clearing the dm_state instead of using the old dc_state for fast updates. In addition, since dm_state is only used for its dc_state and amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail will retain the dc_state if none is found, removing the dm_state should not have any consequences in fast updates. This use-after-free bug has existed for a while now, but only caused a noticeable issue starting from 5.7-rc1 due to 3202fa6 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object") moving the freelist pointer from dm_state->base (which was unused) to dm_state->context (which is dereferenced). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207383 Fixes: bd200d1 ("drm/amd/display: Don't replace the dc_state for fast updates") Reported-by: Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mazin Rezk <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]
imaami
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Aug 2, 2020
I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I
was using the tep_parse_format function:
Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe)
gregkh#1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985
gregkh#2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140
gregkh#3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206
gregkh#4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291
gregkh#5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299
gregkh#6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849
gregkh#7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161
gregkh#8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207
gregkh#9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786
gregkh#10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285
gregkh#11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369
gregkh#12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335
gregkh#13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389
gregkh#14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431
gregkh#15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251
gregkh#16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284
gregkh#17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593
gregkh#18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727
gregkh#19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048
gregkh#20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127
gregkh#21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152
gregkh#22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252
#23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347
#24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461
#25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673
#26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is
allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before
calling the read_token function.
Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the
leak.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
steev
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to steev/linux-1
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Aug 4, 2020
GFP_KERNEL flag specifies a normal kernel allocation in which executing
in process context without any locks and can sleep.
mmio_diff takes sometime to finish all the diff compare and it has
locks, continue using GFP_KERNEL will output below trace if LOCKDEP
enabled.
Use GFP_ATOMIC instead.
V2: Rebase.
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
5.7.0-rc2 #400 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
is trying to acquire:
ffffffffb47bea20 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x0/0x30
and this task is already holding:
ffff88845b85cc90 (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xcf/0x2e0
which would create a new lock dependency:
(&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2} -> (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}
but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
(&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}
... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x40
shadow_context_status_change+0xfe/0x2f0
notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0xa0
__atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xf0
execlists_schedule_out+0x42a/0x820
process_csb+0xe7/0x3e0
execlists_submission_tasklet+0x5c/0x1d0
tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xeb/0x260
__do_softirq+0x11d/0x56f
irq_exit+0xf6/0x100
do_IRQ+0x7f/0x160
ret_from_intr+0x0/0x2a
cpuidle_enter_state+0xcd/0x5b0
cpuidle_enter+0x37/0x60
do_idle+0x337/0x3f0
cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
start_kernel+0x58b/0x5c5
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
(fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}
... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
...
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290
alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0
init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0
workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb
kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325
kernel_init+0x8/0x116
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(fs_reclaim);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock);
lock(fs_reclaim);
<Interrupt>
lock(&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by cat/1439:
#0: ffff888444a23698 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x49/0x680
gregkh#1: ffff88845b858068 (&gvt->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xc7/0x2e0
gregkh#2: ffff88845b85cc90 (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xcf/0x2e0
the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock:
-> (&gvt->scheduler.mmio_context_lock){+.-.}-{2:2} ops: 31 {
HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x2f/0x40
vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0xcf/0x2e0
seq_read+0x242/0x680
full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0
ksys_read+0xc4/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x40
shadow_context_status_change+0xfe/0x2f0
notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0xa0
__atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xf0
execlists_schedule_out+0x42a/0x820
process_csb+0xe7/0x3e0
execlists_submission_tasklet+0x5c/0x1d0
tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xeb/0x260
__do_softirq+0x11d/0x56f
irq_exit+0xf6/0x100
do_IRQ+0x7f/0x160
ret_from_intr+0x0/0x2a
cpuidle_enter_state+0xcd/0x5b0
cpuidle_enter+0x37/0x60
do_idle+0x337/0x3f0
cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
start_kernel+0x58b/0x5c5
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
INITIAL USE at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x40
shadow_context_status_change+0xfe/0x2f0
notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0xa0
__atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xf0
execlists_schedule_in+0x2c8/0x690
__execlists_submission_tasklet+0x1303/0x1930
execlists_submit_request+0x1e7/0x230
submit_notify+0x105/0x2a4
__i915_sw_fence_complete+0xaa/0x380
__engine_park+0x313/0x5a0
____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x3e/0x90
intel_gt_resume+0x41e/0x440
intel_gt_init+0x283/0xbc0
i915_gem_init+0x197/0x240
i915_driver_probe+0xc2d/0x12e0
i915_pci_probe+0xa2/0x1e0
local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0
pci_device_probe+0x171/0x230
really_probe+0x17a/0x380
driver_probe_device+0x70/0xf0
device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90
__driver_attach+0x60/0x100
bus_for_each_dev+0xe4/0x140
bus_add_driver+0x257/0x2a0
driver_register+0xd3/0x150
i915_init+0x6d/0x80
do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x3a0
kernel_init_freeable+0x2b4/0x325
kernel_init+0x8/0x116
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
}
__key.77812+0x0/0x40
... acquired at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e/0x260
mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150
intel_gvt_for_each_tracked_mmio+0x7b/0x140
vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0x111/0x2e0
seq_read+0x242/0x680
full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0
ksys_read+0xc4/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
the dependencies between the lock to be acquired
and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
-> (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0} ops: 1999031 {
HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290
alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0
init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0
workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb
kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325
kernel_init+0x8/0x116
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290
alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0
init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0
workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb
kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325
kernel_init+0x8/0x116
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
INITIAL USE at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x2e/0x290
alloc_worker+0x2b/0xb0
init_rescuer.part.0+0x17/0xe0
workqueue_init+0x293/0x3bb
kernel_init_freeable+0x149/0x325
kernel_init+0x8/0x116
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
}
__fs_reclaim_map+0x0/0x60
... acquired at:
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e/0x260
mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150
intel_gvt_for_each_tracked_mmio+0x7b/0x140
vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0x111/0x2e0
seq_read+0x242/0x680
full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0
ksys_read+0xc4/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
stack backtrace:
CPU: 5 PID: 1439 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.7.0-rc2 #400
Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0056.2018.1128.1717 11/28/2018
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x97/0xe0
check_irq_usage.cold+0x428/0x434
? check_usage_forwards+0x2c0/0x2c0
? class_equal+0x11/0x20
? __bfs+0xd2/0x2d0
? in_any_class_list+0xa0/0xa0
? check_path+0x22/0x40
? check_noncircular+0x150/0x2b0
? print_circular_bug.isra.0+0x1b0/0x1b0
? mark_lock+0x13d/0xc50
? __lock_acquire+0x1e32/0x39b0
__lock_acquire+0x1e32/0x39b0
? timerqueue_add+0xc1/0x130
? register_lock_class+0xa60/0xa60
? mark_lock+0x13d/0xc50
lock_acquire+0x175/0x4e0
? __zone_pcp_update+0x80/0x80
? check_flags.part.0+0x210/0x210
? mark_held_locks+0x65/0x90
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x40
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x190/0x290
? fwtable_read32+0x163/0x480
? mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150
fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x20/0x30
? __zone_pcp_update+0x80/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2e/0x260
mmio_diff_handler+0xc0/0x150
? vgpu_mmio_diff_open+0x30/0x30
intel_gvt_for_each_tracked_mmio+0x7b/0x140
vgpu_mmio_diff_show+0x111/0x2e0
? mmio_diff_handler+0x150/0x150
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa0/0xb0
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xc0/0xc0
? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x33/0x40
? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
seq_read+0x242/0x680
? debugfs_locked_down.isra.0+0x70/0x70
full_proxy_read+0x95/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc2/0x1b0
ksys_read+0xc4/0x160
? kernel_write+0xb0/0xb0
? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x7ffbe3e6efb2
Code: c0 e9 c2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d ca cb 0a 00 e8 f5 19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffd021c08a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007ffbe3e6efb2
RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007ffbe34cd000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffbe34cd000 R08: 00007ffbe34cc010 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000562b6f0a11f0
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000
------------[ cut here ]------------
Acked-by: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
imaami
pushed a commit
to imaami/linux
that referenced
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Aug 5, 2020
commit fde9f39 upstream. This patch fixes a race condition that causes a use-after-free during amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail. This can occur when 2 non-blocking commits are requested and the second one finishes before the first. Essentially, this bug occurs when the following sequence of events happens: 1. Non-blocking commit gregkh#1 is requested w/ a new dm_state gregkh#1 and is deferred to the workqueue. 2. Non-blocking commit gregkh#2 is requested w/ a new dm_state gregkh#2 and is deferred to the workqueue. 3. Commit gregkh#2 starts before commit gregkh#1, dm_state gregkh#1 is used in the commit_tail and commit gregkh#2 completes, freeing dm_state gregkh#1. 4. Commit gregkh#1 starts after commit gregkh#2 completes, uses the freed dm_state 1 and dereferences a freelist pointer while setting the context. Since this bug has only been spotted with fast commits, this patch fixes the bug by clearing the dm_state instead of using the old dc_state for fast updates. In addition, since dm_state is only used for its dc_state and amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail will retain the dc_state if none is found, removing the dm_state should not have any consequences in fast updates. This use-after-free bug has existed for a while now, but only caused a noticeable issue starting from 5.7-rc1 due to 3202fa6 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object") moving the freelist pointer from dm_state->base (which was unused) to dm_state->context (which is dereferenced). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207383 Fixes: bd200d1 ("drm/amd/display: Don't replace the dc_state for fast updates") Reported-by: Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mazin Rezk <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
gregkh
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Aug 7, 2020
commit fde9f39 upstream. This patch fixes a race condition that causes a use-after-free during amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail. This can occur when 2 non-blocking commits are requested and the second one finishes before the first. Essentially, this bug occurs when the following sequence of events happens: 1. Non-blocking commit #1 is requested w/ a new dm_state #1 and is deferred to the workqueue. 2. Non-blocking commit #2 is requested w/ a new dm_state #2 and is deferred to the workqueue. 3. Commit #2 starts before commit #1, dm_state #1 is used in the commit_tail and commit #2 completes, freeing dm_state #1. 4. Commit #1 starts after commit #2 completes, uses the freed dm_state 1 and dereferences a freelist pointer while setting the context. Since this bug has only been spotted with fast commits, this patch fixes the bug by clearing the dm_state instead of using the old dc_state for fast updates. In addition, since dm_state is only used for its dc_state and amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail will retain the dc_state if none is found, removing the dm_state should not have any consequences in fast updates. This use-after-free bug has existed for a while now, but only caused a noticeable issue starting from 5.7-rc1 due to 3202fa6 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object") moving the freelist pointer from dm_state->base (which was unused) to dm_state->context (which is dereferenced). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207383 Fixes: bd200d1 ("drm/amd/display: Don't replace the dc_state for fast updates") Reported-by: Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mazin Rezk <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Aug 11, 2020
[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
gregkh
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Aug 11, 2020
[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Ido Schimmel says:
====================
icmp: Add RFC 5837 support
tl;dr
=====
This patchset extends certain ICMP error messages (e.g., "Time
Exceeded") with incoming interface information in accordance with RFC
5837 [1]. This is required for more meaningful traceroute results in
unnumbered networks. Like other ICMP settings, the feature is controlled
via a per-{netns, address family} sysctl. The interface and the
implementation are designed to support more ICMP extensions.
Motivation
==========
Over the years, the kernel was extended with the ability to derive the
source IP of ICMP error messages from the interface that received the
datagram which elicited the ICMP error [2][3][4]. This is especially
important for "Time Exceeded" messages as it allows traceroute users to
trace the actual packet path along the network.
The above scheme does not work in unnumbered networks. In these
networks, only the loopback / VRF interface is assigned a global IP
address while router interfaces are assigned IPv6 link-local addresses.
As such, ICMP error messages are generated with a source IP derived from
the loopback / VRF interface, making it impossible to trace the actual
packet path when parallel links exist between routers.
The problem can be solved by implementing the solution proposed by RFC
4884 [5] and RFC 5837. The former defines an ICMP extension structure
that can be appended to selected ICMP messages and carry extension
objects. The latter defines an extension object called the "Interface
Information Object" (IIO) that can carry interface information (e.g.,
name, index, MTU) about interfaces with certain roles such as the
interface that received the datagram which elicited the ICMP error.
The payload of the datagram that elicited the error (potentially padded
/ trimmed) along with the ICMP extension structure will be queued to the
error queue of the originating socket, thereby allowing traceroute
applications to parse and display the information encoded in the ICMP
extension structure. Example:
# traceroute6 -e 2001:db8:1::3
traceroute to 2001:db8:1::3 (2001:db8:1::3), 30 hops max, 80 byte packets
1 2001:db8:1::2 (2001:db8:1::2) <INC:11,"eth1",mtu=1500> 0.214 ms 0.171 ms 0.162 ms
2 2001:db8:1::3 (2001:db8:1::3) <INC:12,"eth2",mtu=1500> 0.154 ms 0.135 ms 0.127 ms
# traceroute -e 192.0.2.3
traceroute to 192.0.2.3 (192.0.2.3), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
1 192.0.2.2 (192.0.2.2) <INC:11,"eth1",mtu=1500> 0.191 ms 0.148 ms 0.144 ms
2 192.0.2.3 (192.0.2.3) <INC:12,"eth2",mtu=1500> 0.137 ms 0.122 ms 0.114 ms
Implementation
==============
As previously stated, the feature is controlled via a per-{netns,
address} sysctl. Specifically, a bit mask where each bit controls the
addition of a different ICMP extension to ICMP error messages.
Currently, only a single value is supported, to append the incoming
interface information.
Key points:
1. Global knob vs finer control. I am not aware of users who require
finer control, but it is possible that some users will want to avoid
appending ICMP extensions when the packet is sent out of a specific
interface (e.g., the management interface) or to a specific subnet. This
can be accomplished via a tc-bpf program that trims the ICMP extension
structure. An example program can be found here [6].
2. Split implementation between IPv4 / IPv6. While the implementation is
currently similar, there are some differences between both address
families. In addition, some extensions (e.g., RFC 8883 [7]) are
IPv6-specific. Given the above and given that the implementation is not
very complex, it makes sense to keep both implementations separate.
3. Compatibility with legacy applications. RFC 4884 from 2007 extended
certain ICMP messages with a length field that encodes the length of the
"original datagram" field, so that applications will be able to tell
where the "original datagram" ends and where the ICMP extension
structure starts.
Before the introduction of the IP{,6}_RECVERR_RFC4884 socket options
[8][9] in 2020 it was impossible for applications to know where the ICMP
extension structure starts and to this day some applications assume that
it starts at offset 128, which is the minimum length of the "original
datagram" field as specified by RFC 4884.
Therefore, in order to be compatible with both legacy and modern
applications, the datagram that elicited the ICMP error is trimmed /
padded to 128 bytes before appending the ICMP extension structure.
This behavior is specifically called out by RFC 4884: "Those wishing to
be backward compatible with non-compliant TRACEROUTE implementations
will include exactly 128 octets" [10].
Note that in 128 bytes we should be able to include enough headers for
the originating node to match the ICMP error message with the relevant
socket. For example, the following headers will be present in the
"original datagram" field when a VXLAN encapsulated IPv6 packet elicits
an ICMP error in an IPv6 underlay: IPv6 (40) | UDP (8) | VXLAN (8) | Eth
(14) | IPv6 (40) | UDP (8). Overall, 118 bytes.
If the 128 bytes limit proves to be insufficient for some use case, we
can consider dedicating a new bit in the previously mentioned sysctl to
allow for more bytes to be included in the "original datagram" field.
4. Extensibility. This patchset adds partial support for a single ICMP
extension. However, the interface and the implementation should be able
to support more extensions, if needed. Examples:
* More interface information objects as part of RFC 5837. We should be
able to derive the outgoing interface information and nexthop IP from
the dst entry attached to the packet that elicited the error.
* Node identification object (e.g., hostname / loopback IP) [11].
* Extended Information object which encodes aggregate header limits as
part of RFC 8883.
A previous proposal from Ishaan Gandhi and Ron Bonica is available here
[12].
Testing
=======
The existing traceroute selftest is extended to test that ICMP
extensions are reported correctly when enabled. Both address families
are tested and with different packet sizes in order to make sure that
trimming / padding works correctly. Tested that packets are parsed
correctly by the IP{,6}_RECVERR_RFC4884 socket options using Willem's
selftest [13].
Changelog
=========
Changes since v1 [14]:
* Patches gregkh#1-gregkh#2: Added a comment about field ordering and review tags.
* Patch gregkh#3: Converted "sysctl" to "echo" when testing the return value.
Added a check to skip the test if traceroute version is older
than 2.1.5.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5837
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=1c2fb7f93cb20621772bf304f3dba0849942e5db
[3] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=fac6fce9bdb59837bb89930c3a92f5e0d1482f0b
[4] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4a8c416602d97a4e2073ed563d4d4c7627de19cf
[5] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4884
[6] https://gist.github.com/idosch/5013448cdb5e9e060e6bfdc8b433577c
[7] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8883
[8] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=eba75c587e811d3249c8bd50d22bb2266ccd3c0f
[9] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=01370434df85eb76ecb1527a4466013c4aca2436
[10] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4884#section-5.3
[11] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-intarea-extended-icmp-nodeid-04
[12] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
[13] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/aPpMItF35gwpgzZx@shredder/
[14] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…ernel/git/ath/ath Jeff Johnson says: ================== ath.git patches for v6.19 (gregkh#2) Just one 2-patch series for this PR. Once pulled into wireless-next, ath-next will fast-forward, and that will provide the baseline for merging ath12k-ng into ath-next. ================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
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Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> says: Similarly to how CAN FD reuses the bittiming logic of Classical CAN, CAN XL also reuses the entirety of CAN FD features, and, on top of that, adds new features which are specific to CAN XL. A so-called 'mixed-mode' is intended to have (XL-tolerant) CAN FD nodes and CAN XL nodes on one CAN segment, where the FD-controllers can talk CC/FD and the XL-controllers can talk CC/FD/XL. This mixed-mode utilizes the known error-signalling (ES) for sending CC/FD/XL frames. For CAN FD and CAN XL the tranceiver delay compensation (TDC) is supported to use common CAN and CAN-SIG transceivers. The CANXL-only mode disables the error-signalling in the CAN XL controller. This mode does not allow CC/FD frames to be sent but additionally offers a CAN XL transceiver mode switching (TMS) to send CAN XL frames with up to 20Mbit/s data rate. The TMS utilizes a PWM configuration which is added to the netlink interface. Configured with CAN_CTRLMODE_FD and CAN_CTRLMODE_XL this leads to: FD=0 XL=0 CC-only mode (ES=1) FD=1 XL=0 FD/CC mixed-mode (ES=1) FD=1 XL=1 XL/FD/CC mixed-mode (ES=1) FD=0 XL=1 XL-only mode (ES=0, TMS optional) Patch gregkh#1 print defined ctrlmode strings capitalized to increase the readability and to be in line with the 'ip' tool (iproute2). Patch gregkh#2 is a small clean-up which makes can_calc_bittiming() use NL_SET_ERR_MSG() instead of netdev_err(). Patch gregkh#3 adds a check in can_dev_dropped_skb() to drop CAN FD frames when CAN FD is turned off. Patch gregkh#4 adds CAN_CTRLMODE_RESTRICTED. Note that contrary to the other CAN_CTRL_MODE_XL_* that are introduced in the later patches, this control mode is not specific to CAN XL. The nuance is that because this restricted mode was only added in ISO 11898-1:2024, it is made mandatory for CAN XL devices but optional for other protocols. This is why this patch is added as a preparation before introducing the core CAN XL logic. Patch gregkh#5 adds all the CAN XL features which are inherited from CAN FD: the nominal bittiming, the data bittiming and the TDC. Patch gregkh#6 add a new CAN_CTRLMODE_XL_TMS control mode which is specific to CAN XL to enable the transceiver mode switching (TMS) in XL-only mode. Patch gregkh#7 adds a check in can_dev_dropped_skb() to drop CAN CC/FD frames when the CAN XL controller is in CAN XL-only mode. The introduced can_dev_in_xl_only_mode() function also determines the error-signalling configuration for the CAN XL controllers. Patch gregkh#8 to gregkh#11 add the PWM logic for the CAN XL TMS mode. Patch gregkh#12 to gregkh#14 add different default sample-points for standard CAN and CAN SIG transceivers (with TDC) and CAN XL transceivers using PWM in the CAN XL TMS mode. Patch gregkh#15 add a dummy_can driver for netlink testing and debugging. Patch gregkh#16 check CAN frame type (CC/FD/XL) when writing those frames to the CAN_RAW socket and reject them if it's not supported by the CAN interface. Patch gregkh#17 increase the resolution when printing the bitrate error and round-up the value to 0.01% in the case the resolution would still provide values which would lead to 0.00%. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
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Dec 4, 2025
Testing in two circumstances: 1. back to back optical SFP+ connection between two LS1028A-QDS ports with the SCH-26908 riser card 2. T1042 with on-board AQR115 PHY using "OCSGMII", as per https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aIuEvaSCIQdJWcZx@FUE-ALEWI-WINX/ strongly suggests that enabling in-band auto-negotiation is actually possible when the lane baud rate is 3.125 Gbps. It was previously thought that this would not be the case, because it was only tested on 2500base-x links with on-board Aquantia PHYs, where it was noticed that MII_LPA is always reported as zero, and it was thought that this is because of the PCS. Test case gregkh#1 above shows it is not, and the configured MII_ADVERTISE on system A ends up in the MII_LPA on system B, when in 2500base-x mode (IF_MODE=0). Test case gregkh#2, which uses "SGMII" auto-negotiation (IF_MODE=3) for the 3.125 Gbps lane, is actually a misconfiguration, but it is what led to the discovery. There is actually an old bug in the Lynx PCS driver - it expects all register values to contain their default out-of-reset values, as if the PCS were initialized by the Reset Configuration Word (RCW) settings. There are 2 cases in which this is problematic: - if the bootloader (or previous kexec-enabled Linux) wrote a different IF_MODE value - if dynamically changing the SerDes protocol from 1000base-x to 2500base-x, e.g. by replacing the optical SFP module. Specifically in test case gregkh#2, an accidental alignment between the bootloader configuring the PCS to expect SGMII in-band code words, and the AQR115 PHY actually transmitting SGMII in-band code words when operating in the "OCSGMII" system interface protocol, led to the PCS transmitting replicated symbols at 3.125 Gbps baud rate. This could only have happened if the PCS saw and reacted to the SGMII code words in the first place. Since test gregkh#2 is invalid from a protocol perspective (there seems to be no standard way of negotiating the data rate of 2500 Mbps with SGMII, and the lower data rates should remain 10/100/1000), in-band auto-negotiation for 2500base-x effectively means Clause 37 (i.e. IF_MODE=0). Make 2500base-x be treated like 1000base-x in this regard, by removing all prior limitations and calling lynx_pcs_config_giga(). This adds a new feature: LINK_INBAND_ENABLE and at the same time fixes the Lynx PCS's long standing problem that the registers (specifically IF_MODE, but others could be misconfigured as well) are not written by the driver to the known valid values for 2500base-x. Co-developed-by: Alexander Wilhelm <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexander Wilhelm <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Dec 4, 2025
It's possible that the auxiliary proxy device we add when setting up the
GPIO controller exposing shared pins, will get matched and probed
immediately. The gpio-proxy-driver will then retrieve the shared
descriptor structure. That will cause a recursive mutex locking and
a deadlock because we're already holding the gpio_shared_lock in
gpio_device_setup_shared() and try to take it again in
devm_gpiod_shared_get() like this:
[ 4.298346] gpiolib_shared: GPIO 130 owned by f100000.pinctrl is shared by multiple consumers
[ 4.307157] gpiolib_shared: Setting up a shared GPIO entry for speaker@0,3
[ 4.314604]
[ 4.316146] ============================================
[ 4.321600] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 4.327054] 6.18.0-rc7-next-20251125-g3f300d0674f6-dirty #3887 Not tainted
[ 4.334115] --------------------------------------------
[ 4.339566] kworker/u32:3/71 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 4.344931] ffffda019ba71850 (gpio_shared_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: devm_gpiod_shared_get+0x34/0x2e0
[ 4.354057]
[ 4.354057] but task is already holding lock:
[ 4.360041] ffffda019ba71850 (gpio_shared_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gpio_device_setup_shared+0x30/0x268
[ 4.369421]
[ 4.369421] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 4.376126] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 4.376126]
[ 4.382198] CPU0
[ 4.384711] ----
[ 4.387223] lock(gpio_shared_lock);
[ 4.390992] lock(gpio_shared_lock);
[ 4.394761]
[ 4.394761] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 4.394761]
[ 4.400832] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 4.400832]
[ 4.407802] 5 locks held by kworker/u32:3/71:
[ 4.412279] #0: ffff000080020948 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x194/0x64c
[ 4.422650] gregkh#1: ffff800080963d60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x64c
[ 4.432117] gregkh#2: ffff00008165c8f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x3c/0x198
[ 4.440700] gregkh#3: ffffda019ba71850 (gpio_shared_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gpio_device_setup_shared+0x30/0x268
[ 4.450523] gregkh#4: ffff0000810fe918 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x3c/0x198
[ 4.459103]
[ 4.459103] stack backtrace:
[ 4.463581] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/u32:3 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-next-20251125-g3f300d0674f6-dirty #3887 PREEMPT
[ 4.463589] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
[ 4.463593] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 4.463602] Call trace:
[ 4.463604] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
[ 4.463617] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98
[ 4.463627] dump_stack+0x18/0x24
[ 4.463636] print_deadlock_bug+0x224/0x238
[ 4.463643] __lock_acquire+0xe4c/0x15f0
[ 4.463648] lock_acquire+0x1cc/0x344
[ 4.463653] __mutex_lock+0xb8/0x840
[ 4.463661] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
[ 4.463667] devm_gpiod_shared_get+0x34/0x2e0
[ 4.463674] gpio_shared_proxy_probe+0x18/0x138
[ 4.463682] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x40/0x78
[ 4.463688] really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0
[ 4.463694] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120
[ 4.463701] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160
[ 4.463708] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x140
[ 4.463716] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[ 4.463723] __device_attach+0xa0/0x198
[ 4.463729] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 4.463737] bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc0
[ 4.463743] device_add+0x578/0x76c
[ 4.463747] __auxiliary_device_add+0x40/0xac
[ 4.463752] gpio_device_setup_shared+0x1f8/0x268
[ 4.463758] gpiochip_add_data_with_key+0xdac/0x10ac
[ 4.463763] devm_gpiochip_add_data_with_key+0x30/0x80
[ 4.463768] msm_pinctrl_probe+0x4b0/0x5e0
[ 4.463779] sm8250_pinctrl_probe+0x18/0x40
[ 4.463784] platform_probe+0x5c/0xa4
[ 4.463793] really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0
[ 4.463800] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120
[ 4.463807] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160
[ 4.463814] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x140
[ 4.463821] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[ 4.463827] __device_attach+0xa0/0x198
[ 4.463834] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 4.463841] bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc0
[ 4.463847] deferred_probe_work_func+0x90/0xcc
[ 4.463854] process_one_work+0x214/0x64c
[ 4.463860] worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360
[ 4.463866] kthread+0x14c/0x220
[ 4.463871] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 77.265041] random: crng init done
Fortunately, at the time of creating of the auxiliary device, we already
know the correct entry so let's store it as the device's platform data.
We don't need to hold gpio_shared_lock in devm_gpiod_shared_get() as
we're not removing the entry or traversing the list anymore but we still
need to protect it from concurrent modification of its fields so add a
more fine-grained mutex.
Fixes: a060b8c ("gpiolib: implement low-level, shared GPIO support")
Reported-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/fimuvblfy2cmn7o4wzcxjzrux5mwhvlvyxfsgeqs6ore2xg75i@ax46d3sfmdux/
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
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Dec 5, 2025
…ockdep While developing IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT support for the code under fs/smb/common/smbdirect [1], I noticed false positives like this: [T79] ====================================================== [T79] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [T79] 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ gregkh#1 Tainted: G OE [T79] ------------------------------------------------------ [T79] kworker/2:0/79 is trying to acquire lock: [T79] ffff88801f968278 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] but task is already holding lock: [T79] ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] which lock already depends on the new lock. [T79] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [T79] -> gregkh#1 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}: [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] __mutex_lock+0x1af/0x1c10 [T79] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [T79] cma_get_port+0xba/0x7d0 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm] [T79] cma_bind_addr+0x107/0x320 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_resolve_addr+0xa3/0x830 [rdma_cm] [T79] destroy_lease_table+0x12b/0x420 [ksmbd] [T79] ksmbd_NTtimeToUnix+0x3e/0x80 [ksmbd] [T79] ndr_encode_posix_acl+0x6e9/0xab0 [ksmbd] [T79] ndr_encode_v4_ntacl+0x53/0x870 [ksmbd] [T79] __sys_connect_file+0x131/0x1c0 [T79] __sys_connect+0x111/0x140 [T79] __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xc0 [T79] x64_sys_call+0xe7d/0x26a0 [T79] do_syscall_64+0x93/0xff0 [T79] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [T79] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}: [T79] check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0 [T79] validate_chain+0x466/0x590 [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [T79] sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw] [T79] iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm] [T79] cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd] [T79] ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930 [T79] worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0 [T79] kthread+0x3ec/0x8b0 [T79] ret_from_fork+0x314/0x400 [T79] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [T79] other info that might help us debug this: [T79] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [T79] CPU0 CPU1 [T79] ---- ---- [T79] lock(lock#9); [T79] lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); [T79] lock(lock#9); [T79] lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); [T79] *** DEADLOCK *** [T79] 5 locks held by kworker/2:0/79: [T79] #0: ffff88800120b158 ((wq_completion)events_long){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xfca/0x1930 [T79] gregkh#1: ffffc9000474fd00 ((work_completion)(&ctrl->ctrl_work)) {+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x804/0x1930 [T79] gregkh#2: ffffffffc11307d0 (ctrl_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: server_ctrl_handle_work+0x21/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] gregkh#3: ffffffffc11347b0 (init_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x18/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] gregkh#4: ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] stack backtrace: [T79] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 79 Comm: kworker/2:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ gregkh#1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [T79] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [T79] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [T79] Workqueue: events_long server_ctrl_handle_work [ksmbd] ... [T79] print_circular_bug+0xfd/0x130 [T79] check_noncircular+0x150/0x170 [T79] check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0 [T79] validate_chain+0x466/0x590 [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? apparmor_socket_post_create+0x180/0x700 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0 [T79] ? __pfx_siw_create_listen+0x10/0x10 [siw] [T79] ? trace_preempt_on+0x4c/0x130 [T79] ? __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x90 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? preempt_count_sub+0x52/0x80 [T79] iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm] [T79] cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x60 [T79] ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? rdma_restrack_add+0x12c/0x630 [ib_core] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? cma_get_port+0x30d/0x7d0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd] [T79] ? __pfx_ksmbd_rdma_init+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? register_netdevice_notifier+0x1dc/0x240 [T79] ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930 [T79] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? assign_work+0x16f/0x280 [T79] worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0 I was not able to reproduce this as I was testing with various runs switching siw and rxe as well as IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT sockets, while the above stack used siw with the non IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT patches [1]. Even if this patch doesn't solve the above I think it's a good idea to reclassify the sockets used by siw, I also send patches for rxe to reclassify, as well as my IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT socket patches [1] will do it, this should minimize potential false positives. [1] https://git.samba.org/?p=metze/linux/wip.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/master-ipproto-smbdirect Cc: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Acked-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
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Dec 5, 2025
…ockdep While developing IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT support for the code under fs/smb/common/smbdirect [1], I noticed false positives like this: [+0,003927] ============================================ [+0,000532] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [+0,000611] 6.18.0-rc5-metze-kasan-lockdep.02+ gregkh#1 Tainted: G OE [+0,000835] -------------------------------------------- [+0,000729] ksmbd:r5445/3609 is trying to acquire lock: [+0,000709] ffff88800b9570f8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000831] but task is already holding lock: [+0,000684] ffff88800654af78 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: smbdirect_sk_close+0x122/0x790 [smbdirect] [+0,000928] other info that might help us debug this: [+0,005552] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [+0,000723] CPU0 [+0,000359] ---- [+0,000377] lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); [+0,000478] lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); [+0,000498] *** DEADLOCK *** [+0,001012] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [+0,000831] 3 locks held by ksmbd:r5445/3609: [+0,000484] #0: ffff88800654af78 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: smbdirect_sk_close+0x122/0x790 [smbdirect] [+0,001000] gregkh#1: ffff888020a40458 (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_lock_handler+0x17/0x30 [rdma_cm] [+0,000982] gregkh#2: ffff888020a40350 (&id_priv->qp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_destroy_qp+0x5d/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [+0,000934] stack backtrace: [+0,000589] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3609 Comm: ksmbd:r5445 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.18.0-rc5-metze-kasan-lockdep.02+ gregkh#1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [+0,000023] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [+0,000004] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 ... [+0,000010] print_deadlock_bug+0x245/0x330 [+0,000014] validate_chain+0x32a/0x590 [+0,000012] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [+0,000013] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [+0,000017] ? inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000013] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000007] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [+0,000012] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [+0,000006] ? inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000028] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [+0,000009] ? inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000008] inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000010] kernel_sock_shutdown+0x5b/0x90 [+0,000011] rxe_qp_do_cleanup+0x4ef/0x810 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000043] ? __pfx_rxe_qp_do_cleanup+0x10/0x10 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000030] execute_in_process_context+0x2b/0x170 [+0,000013] rxe_qp_cleanup+0x1c/0x30 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000021] __rxe_cleanup+0x1cf/0x2e0 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000036] ? __pfx___rxe_cleanup+0x10/0x10 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000020] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000006] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [+0,000012] rxe_destroy_qp+0xe1/0x230 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000035] ib_destroy_qp_user+0x217/0x450 [ib_core] [+0,000074] rdma_destroy_qp+0x83/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [+0,000034] smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp+0x98/0x2e0 [smbdirect] [+0,000017] ? __pfx_smb_direct_logging_needed+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [+0,000044] smbdirect_connection_destroy+0x698/0xed0 [smbdirect] [+0,000023] ? __pfx_smbdirect_connection_destroy+0x10/0x10 [smbdirect] [+0,000033] ? __pfx_smb_direct_logging_needed+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [+0,000031] smbdirect_connection_destroy_sync+0x42b/0x9f0 [smbdirect] [+0,000029] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [+0,000012] ? __pfx_smbdirect_connection_destroy_sync+0x10/0x10 [smbdirect] [+0,000019] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000007] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x64/0x70 [+0,000029] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000010] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000006] ? __smbdirect_connection_schedule_disconnect+0x339/0x4b0 [+0,000021] smbdirect_sk_destroy+0xb0/0x680 [smbdirect] [+0,000024] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000006] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x64/0x70 [+0,000006] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000005] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xba/0x150 [+0,000011] sk_common_release+0x66/0x340 [+0,000010] smbdirect_sk_close+0x12a/0x790 [smbdirect] [+0,000023] ? ip_mc_drop_socket+0x1e/0x240 [+0,000013] inet_release+0x10a/0x240 [+0,000011] smbdirect_sock_release+0x502/0xe80 [smbdirect] [+0,000015] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000024] sock_release+0x91/0x1c0 [+0,000010] smb_direct_free_transport+0x31/0x50 [ksmbd] [+0,000025] ksmbd_conn_free+0x1d0/0x240 [ksmbd] [+0,000040] smb_direct_disconnect+0xb2/0x120 [ksmbd] [+0,000023] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000018] ksmbd_conn_handler_loop+0x94e/0xf10 [ksmbd] ... I'll also add reclassify to the smbdirect socket code [1], but I think it's better to have it in both direction (below and above the RDMA layer). [1] https://git.samba.org/?p=metze/linux/wip.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/master-ipproto-smbdirect Cc: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
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Rework the handling of the MMIO Stale Data mitigation to clear CPU buffers immediately prior to VM-Enter, i.e. in the same location that KVM emits a VERW for unconditional (at runtime) clearing. Co-locating the code and using a single ALTERNATIVES_2 makes it more obvious how VMX mitigates the various vulnerabilities. Deliberately order the alternatives as: 0. Do nothing 1. Clear if vCPU can access MMIO 2. Clear always since the last alternative wins in ALTERNATIVES_2(), i.e. so that KVM will honor the strictest mitigation (always clear CPU buffers) if multiple mitigations are selected. E.g. even if the kernel chooses to mitigate MMIO Stale Data via X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM_MMIO, another mitigation may enable X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and that other thing needs to win. Note, decoupling the MMIO mitigation from the L1TF mitigation also fixes a mostly-benign flaw where KVM wouldn't do any clearing/flushing if the L1TF mitigation is configured to conditionally flush the L1D, and the MMIO mitigation but not any other "clear CPU buffers" mitigation is enabled. For that specific scenario, KVM would skip clearing CPU buffers for the MMIO mitigation even though the kernel requested a clear on every VM-Enter. Note gregkh#2, the flaw goes back to the introduction of the MDS mitigation. The MDS mitigation was inadvertently fixed by commit 43fb862 ("KVM/VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation"), but previous kernels that flush CPU buffers in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit() are affected (though it's unlikely the flaw is meaningfully exploitable even older kernels). Fixes: 650b68a ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active") Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
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According to the APM Volume gregkh#2, Section 15.17, Table 15-10 (24593—Rev. 3.42—March 2024), When "GIF==0", an "Debug exception or trap, due to breakpoint register match" should be "Ignored and discarded". KVM lacks any handling of this. Even when vGIF is enabled and vGIF==0, the CPU does not ignore #DBs and relies on the VMM to do so. Handling this is possible, but the complexity is unjustified given the rarity of using HW breakpoints when GIF==0 (e.g. near VMRUN). KVM would need to intercept the #DB, temporarily disable the breakpoint, singe-step over the instruction (probably reusing NMI singe-stepping), and re-enable the breakpoint. Instead, document this as an erratum. Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
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Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> says: Hi Martin, This patch series includes two bug fixes for this development cycle and six small patches that are intended for the next merge window. If applying the first two patches only during the current development cycle would be inconvenient, postponing all patches until the next merge window is fine with me. Please consider including these patches in the upstream kernel. Thanks, Bart. [mkp: Applied patches gregkh#1 and gregkh#2 to 6.18/scsi-fixes] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a91c809 ] The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ gregkh#1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> gregkh#2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> gregkh#1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 gregkh#1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 gregkh#2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 gregkh#3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 gregkh#4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ gregkh#1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> [ replaced disable_delayed_work_sync() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ gregkh#1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> gregkh#5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> gregkh#4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> gregkh#3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> gregkh#2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> gregkh#1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] gregkh#1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] gregkh#2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ gregkh#1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 9d274c1 upstream. We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [gregkh#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 gregkh#6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) gregkh#1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) gregkh#2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) gregkh#3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) gregkh#4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) gregkh#5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) gregkh#6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) gregkh#7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) gregkh#8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) gregkh#9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) gregkh#10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) gregkh#11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) gregkh#12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) gregkh#13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) gregkh#14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) gregkh#15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) gregkh#16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: [email protected] # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 5944ce0 ] commit 3fcbf1c ("arch_topology: Fix cache attributes detection in the CPU hotplug path") adds a call to detect_cache_attributes() to populate the cacheinfo before updating the siblings mask. detect_cache_attributes() allocates memory and can take the PPTT mutex (on ACPI platforms). On PREEMPT_RT kernels, on secondary CPUs, this triggers a: 'BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context' [1] as the code is executed with preemption and interrupts disabled. The primary CPU was previously storing the cache information using the now removed (struct cpu_topology).llc_id: commit 5b8dc78 ("arch_topology: Drop LLC identifier stash from the CPU topology") allocate_cache_info() tries to build the cacheinfo from the primary CPU prior secondary CPUs boot, if the DT/ACPI description contains cache information. If allocate_cache_info() fails, then fallback to the current state for the cacheinfo allocation. [1] will be triggered in such case. When unplugging a CPU, the cacheinfo memory cannot be freed. If it was, then the memory would be allocated early by the re-plugged CPU and would trigger [1]. Note that populate_cache_leaves() might be called multiple times due to populate_leaves being moved up. This is required since detect_cache_attributes() might be called with per_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu) being allocated but not populated. [1]: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/111 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1 | 3 locks held by swapper/111/0: | #0: (&pcp->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: get_page_from_freelist+0x218/0x12c8 | gregkh#1: (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rt_spin_trylock+0x48/0xf0 | gregkh#2: (&zone->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0x64/0xa80 | irq event stamp: 0 | hardirqs last enabled at (0): 0x0 | hardirqs last disabled at (0): copy_process+0x5dc/0x1ab8 | softirqs last enabled at (0): copy_process+0x5dc/0x1ab8 | softirqs last disabled at (0): 0x0 | Preemption disabled at: | migrate_enable+0x30/0x130 | CPU: 111 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/111 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc4-rt6-[...] | Call trace: | __kmalloc+0xbc/0x1e8 | detect_cache_attributes+0x2d4/0x5f0 | update_siblings_masks+0x30/0x368 | store_cpu_topology+0x78/0xb8 | secondary_start_kernel+0xd0/0x198 | __secondary_switched+0xb0/0xb4 Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wen Yang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ gregkh#1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> gregkh#5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> gregkh#4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> gregkh#3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> gregkh#2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> gregkh#1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] gregkh#1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] gregkh#2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ gregkh#1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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… 'T'
When perf report with annotation for a symbol, press 's' and 'T', then exit
the annotate browser. Once annotate the same symbol, the annotate browser
will crash.
The browser.arch was required to be correctly updated when data type
feature was enabled by 'T'. Usually it was initialized by symbol__annotate2
function. If a symbol has already been correctly annotated at the first
time, it should not call the symbol__annotate2 function again, thus the
browser.arch will not get initialized. Then at the second time to show the
annotate browser, the data type needs to be displayed but the browser.arch
is empty.
Stack trace as below:
Perf: Segmentation fault
-------- backtrace --------
#0 0x55d365 in ui__signal_backtrace setup.c:0
gregkh#1 0x7f5ff1a3e930 in __restore_rt libc.so.6[3e930]
gregkh#2 0x570f08 in arch__is perf[570f08]
gregkh#3 0x562186 in annotate_get_insn_location perf[562186]
gregkh#4 0x562626 in __hist_entry__get_data_type annotate.c:0
gregkh#5 0x56476d in annotation_line__write perf[56476d]
gregkh#6 0x54e2db in annotate_browser__write annotate.c:0
gregkh#7 0x54d061 in ui_browser__list_head_refresh perf[54d061]
gregkh#8 0x54dc9e in annotate_browser__refresh annotate.c:0
gregkh#9 0x54c03d in __ui_browser__refresh browser.c:0
gregkh#10 0x54ccf8 in ui_browser__run perf[54ccf8]
gregkh#11 0x54eb92 in __hist_entry__tui_annotate perf[54eb92]
gregkh#12 0x552293 in do_annotate hists.c:0
gregkh#13 0x55941c in evsel__hists_browse hists.c:0
gregkh#14 0x55b00f in evlist__tui_browse_hists perf[55b00f]
gregkh#15 0x42ff02 in cmd_report perf[42ff02]
gregkh#16 0x494008 in run_builtin perf.c:0
gregkh#17 0x494305 in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
gregkh#18 0x410547 in main perf[410547]
gregkh#19 0x7f5ff1a295d0 in __libc_start_call_main libc.so.6[295d0]
gregkh#20 0x7f5ff1a29680 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc.so.6[29680]
gregkh#21 0x410b75 in _start perf[410b75]
Fixes: 1d4374a ("perf annotate: Add 'T' hot key to toggle data type display")
Reviewed-by: James Clark <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tianyou Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault
occurs if an event fails to open. For example:
perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite
Error:
cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat'
perf: Segmentation fault
#0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366
gregkh#1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378
gregkh#2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722
gregkh#3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090]
gregkh#4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862
gregkh#5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943
gregkh#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075
gregkh#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888
gregkh#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374
gregkh#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349
gregkh#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
gregkh#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448
gregkh#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555
gregkh#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72]
gregkh#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0
The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample
events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when
evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist
is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls
record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL
evlist pointer and causes a segfault.
To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so
it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist
is properly initialized.
Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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When interrupting perf stat in repeat mode with a signal the signal is passed to the child process but the repeat doesn't terminate: ``` $ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1 Control descriptor is not initialized [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#1 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#2 ... ] ^Csleep: Interrupt [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#3 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#4 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#5 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#6 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#7 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#8 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#9 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#10 ... ] Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs): 0.9500 +- 0.0512 seconds time elapsed ( +- 5.39% ) 0.01user 0.02system 0:09.53elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 18940maxresident)k 29944inputs+0outputs (0major+2629minor)pagefaults 0swaps ``` Terminate the repeated run and give a reasonable exit value: ``` $ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1 Control descriptor is not initialized [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#1 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#2 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run gregkh#3 ... ] ^Csleep: Interrupt Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs): 0.680 +- 0.321 seconds time elapsed ( +- 47.16% ) Command exited with non-zero status 130 0.00user 0.01system 0:02.05elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 70688maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+5002minor)pagefaults 0swaps ``` Note, this also changes the exit value for non-repeat runs when interrupted by a signal. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Commit 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*()") dropped the configuration of ISEL from struct irq_chip::{irq_enable, irq_disable} APIs and moved it to struct gpio_chip::irq::{child_to_parent_hwirq, child_irq_domain_ops::free} APIs to fix spurious IRQs. After commit 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*()"), ISEL was no longer configured properly on resume. This is because the pinctrl resume code used struct irq_chip::irq_enable (called from rzg2l_gpio_irq_restore()) to reconfigure the wakeup interrupts. Some drivers (e.g. Ethernet) may also reconfigure non-wakeup interrupts on resume through their own code, eventually calling struct irq_chip::irq_enable. Fix this by adding ISEL configuration back into the struct irq_chip::irq_enable API and on resume path for wakeup interrupts. As struct irq_chip::irq_enable needs now to lock to update the ISEL, convert the struct rzg2l_pinctrl::lock to a raw spinlock and replace the locking API calls with the raw variants. Otherwise the lockdep reports invalid wait context when probing the adv7511 module on RZ/G2L: [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc5-next-20250911-00001-gfcfac22533c9 gregkh#18 Not tainted ----------------------------- (udev-worker)/165 is trying to lock: ffff00000e3664a8 (&pctrl->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0x38/0x78 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by (udev-worker)/165: #0: ffff00000e890108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0x90/0x1ac gregkh#1: ffff000011c07240 (request_class){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xb4/0x6dc gregkh#2: ffff000011c070c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xdc/0x6dc stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-next-20250911-00001-gfcfac22533c9 gregkh#18 PREEMPT Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g044l2 (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __lock_acquire+0xa14/0x20b4 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x354 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x88 rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0x38/0x78 irq_enable+0x40/0x8c __irq_startup+0x78/0xa4 irq_startup+0x108/0x16c __setup_irq+0x3c0/0x6dc request_threaded_irq+0xec/0x1ac devm_request_threaded_irq+0x80/0x134 adv7511_probe+0x928/0x9a4 [adv7511] i2c_device_probe+0x22c/0x3dc really_probe+0xbc/0x2a0 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x40/0x164 __driver_attach+0x9c/0x1ac bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xd0 driver_attach+0x24/0x30 bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 driver_register+0x60/0x128 i2c_register_driver+0x48/0xd0 adv7511_init+0x5c/0x1000 [adv7511] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x30c do_init_module+0x58/0x23c load_module+0x1bcc/0x1d40 init_module_from_file+0x88/0xc4 idempotent_init_module+0x188/0x27c __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xac invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x4c/0x160 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Having ISEL configuration back into the struct irq_chip::irq_enable API should be safe with respect to spurious IRQs, as in the probe case IRQs are enabled anyway in struct gpio_chip::irq::child_to_parent_hwirq. No spurious IRQs were detected on suspend/resume, boot, ethernet link insert/remove tests (executed on RZ/G3S). Boot, ethernet link insert/remove tests were also executed successfully on RZ/G2L. Fixes: 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*(") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
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The pic64gx has a second pinmux "downstream" of the iomux0 pinmux. The documentation for the SoC provides no name for this device, but it is used to swap pins between either GPIO controller gregkh#2 or select other functions, hence the "gpio2" name. Currently there is no documentation about what each bit actually does that is publicly available, nor (I believe) what pins are affected. That info is as follows: pin role (1/0) --- ---------- E14 MAC_0_MDC/GPIO_2_0 E15 MAC_0_MDIO/GPIO_2_1 F16 MAC_1_MDC/GPIO_2_2 F17 MAC_1_MDIO/GPIO_2_3 D19 SPI_0_CLK/GPIO_2_4 B18 SPI_0_SS0/GPIO_2_5 B10 CAN_0_RXBUS/GPIO_2_6 C14 PCIE_PERST_2#/GPIO_2_7 E18 PCIE_WAKE#/GPIO_2_8 D18 PCIE_PERST_1#/GPIO_2_9 E19 SPI_0_DO/GPIO_2_10 C7 SPI_0_DI/GPIO_2_11 D6 QSPI_SS0/GPIO_2_12 D7 QSPI_CLK (B)/GPIO_2_13 C9 QSPI_DATA0/GPIO_2_14 C10 QSPI_DATA1/GPIO_2_15 A5 QSPI_DATA2/GPIO_2_16 A6 QSPI_DATA3/GPIO_2_17 D8 MMUART_3_RXD/GPIO_2_18 D9 MMUART_3_TXD/GPIO_2_19 B8 MMUART_4_RXD/GPIO_2_20 A8 MMUART_4_TXD/GPIO_2_21 C12 CAN_1_TXBUS/GPIO_2_22 B12 CAN_1_RXBUS/GPIO_2_23 A11 CAN_0_TX_EBL_N/GPIO_2_24 A10 CAN_1_TX_EBL_N/GPIO_2_25 D11 MMUART_2_RXD/GPIO_2_26 C11 MMUART_2_TXD/GPIO_2_27 B9 CAN_0_TXBUS/GPIO_2_28 Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
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The pic64gx has a second pinmux "downstream" of the iomux0 pinmux. The documentation for the SoC provides no name for this device, but it is used to swap pins between either GPIO controller gregkh#2 or select other functions, hence the "gpio2" name. Add a driver for it. Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
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As Jiaming Zhang and syzbot reported, there is potential deadlock in
f2fs as below:
Chain exists of:
&sbi->cp_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> sb_internal#2
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(sb_internal#2);
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(sb_internal#2);
rlock(&sbi->cp_rwsem);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by kswapd0/73:
#0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7015 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0x951/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389
gregkh#1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_trylock_shared fs/super.c:562 [inline]
gregkh#1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_cache_scan+0x91/0x4b0 fs/super.c:197
gregkh#2: ffff888011840610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: f2fs_evict_inode+0x8d9/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:890
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2ee/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x134/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain+0xb9b/0x2140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908
__lock_acquire+0xab9/0xd20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x120/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
down_read+0x46/0x2e0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1537
f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2278 [inline]
f2fs_lock_op fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2357 [inline]
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x21c/0x10c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:791
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:867
f2fs_truncate+0x489/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:925
f2fs_evict_inode+0x9f2/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:897
evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810
f2fs_evict_inode+0x1dc/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:853
evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810
dispose_list fs/inode.c:852 [inline]
prune_icache_sb+0x21b/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1000
super_cache_scan+0x39b/0x4b0 fs/super.c:224
do_shrink_slab+0x6ef/0x1110 mm/shrinker.c:437
shrink_slab_memcg mm/shrinker.c:550 [inline]
shrink_slab+0x7ef/0x10d0 mm/shrinker.c:628
shrink_one+0x28a/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4955
shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:5016 [inline]
lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5094 [inline]
shrink_node+0x315d/0x3780 mm/vmscan.c:6081
kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6941 [inline]
balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7124 [inline]
kswapd+0x147c/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389
kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
The root cause is deadlock among four locks as below:
kswapd
- fs_reclaim --- Lock A
- shrink_one
- evict
- f2fs_evict_inode
- sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B
- iput
- evict
- f2fs_evict_inode
- sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B
- f2fs_truncate
- f2fs_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_do_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C
ioctl
- f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write
- f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C
- __f2fs_commit_atomic_write
- __replace_atomic_write_block
- f2fs_get_dnode_of_data
- __get_node_folio
- f2fs_check_nid_range
- f2fs_handle_error
- f2fs_record_errors
- f2fs_down_write --- Lock D
open
- do_open
- do_truncate
- security_inode_need_killpriv
- f2fs_getxattr
- lookup_all_xattrs
- f2fs_handle_error
- f2fs_record_errors
- f2fs_down_write --- Lock D
- f2fs_commit_super
- read_mapping_folio
- filemap_alloc_folio_noprof
- prepare_alloc_pages
- fs_reclaim_acquire --- Lock A
In order to avoid such deadlock, we need to avoid grabbing sb_lock in
f2fs_handle_error(), so, let's use asynchronous method instead:
- remove f2fs_handle_error() implementation
- rename f2fs_handle_error_async() to f2fs_handle_error()
- spread f2fs_handle_error()
Fixes: 95fa90c ("f2fs: support recording errors into superblock")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected]
Reported-by: Jiaming Zhang <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANypQFa-Gy9sD-N35o3PC+FystOWkNuN8pv6S75HLT0ga-Tzgw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 gregkh#1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 gregkh#2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 gregkh#3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] gregkh#4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 gregkh#5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 gregkh#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 gregkh#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 gregkh#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 gregkh#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 gregkh#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 gregkh#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 gregkh#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 gregkh#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] gregkh#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a907f3a ] 1. fadvise(fd1, POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE, {0,3}); 2. fadvise(fd2, POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE, {1,2}); 3. fadvise(fd3, POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE, {3,1}); 4. echo 1024 > /sys/fs/f2fs/tuning/reclaim_caches_kb This gives a way to reclaim file-backed pages by iterating all f2fs mounts until reclaiming 1MB page cache ranges, registered by gregkh#1, gregkh#2, and gregkh#3. 5. cat /sys/fs/f2fs/tuning/reclaim_caches_kb -> gives total number of registered file ranges. Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: e462fc4 ("f2fs: maintain one time GC mode is enabled during whole zoned GC cycle") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 #6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 #7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 #8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 #9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 #10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 #12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 #13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] #14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 #6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 #7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 #8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 #9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 #10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 #12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 #13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] #14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Jakub reported an MPTCP deadlock at fallback time: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.18.0-rc7-virtme gregkh#1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mptcp_connect/20858 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280 but task is already holding lock: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&msk->fallback_lock); lock(&msk->fallback_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by mptcp_connect/20858: #0: ff1100001da18290 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x114/0x1bc0 gregkh#1: ff1100001db40fd0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x2cb/0xaa0 gregkh#2: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20858 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-virtme gregkh#1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xcd validate_chain+0x2ff/0x5f0 __lock_acquire+0x34c/0x740 lock_acquire.part.0+0xbc/0x260 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50 __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280 mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x16c2/0x3050 __mptcp_retrans+0x421/0xaa0 mptcp_release_cb+0x5aa/0xa70 release_sock+0xab/0x1d0 mptcp_sendmsg+0xd5b/0x1bc0 sock_write_iter+0x281/0x4d0 new_sync_write+0x3c5/0x6f0 vfs_write+0x65e/0xbb0 ksys_write+0x17e/0x200 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fa5627cbc5e Code: 4d 89 d8 e8 14 bd 00 00 4c 8b 5d f8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 11 c9 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <c9> c3 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 e7 e8 13 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa RSP: 002b:00007fff1fe14700 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fa5627cbc5e RDX: 0000000000001f9c RSI: 00007fff1fe16984 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007fff1fe14710 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff1fe16920 R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000001f9c R15: 0000000000001f9c The packet scheduler could attempt a reinjection after receiving an MP_FAIL and before the infinite map has been transmitted, causing a deadlock since MPTCP needs to do the reinjection atomically from WRT fallback. Address the issue explicitly avoiding the reinjection in the critical scenario. Note that this is the only fallback critical section that could potentially send packets and hit the double-lock. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Closes: https://netdev-ctrl.bots.linux.dev/logs/vmksft/mptcp-dbg/results/412720/1-mptcp-join-sh/stderr Fixes: f8a1d9b ("mptcp: make fallback action and fallback decision atomic") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-4-9e4781a6c1b8@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Dec 18, 2025
The IPv4 code path in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls dst_link_failure() without ensuring skb->dev is set, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in fib_compute_spec_dst() when ipv4_link_failure() attempts to send ICMP destination unreachable messages. The issue emerged after commit ed0de45 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") started calling __ip_options_compile() from ipv4_link_failure(). This code path eventually calls fib_compute_spec_dst() which dereferences skb->dev. An attempt was made to fix the NULL skb->dev dereference in commit 0113d9c ("ipv4: fix null-deref in ipv4_link_failure"), but it only addressed the immediate dev_net(skb->dev) dereference by using a fallback device. The fix was incomplete because fib_compute_spec_dst() later in the call chain still accesses skb->dev directly, which remains NULL when IPVS calls dst_link_failure(). The crash occurs when: 1. IPVS processes a packet in NAT mode with a misconfigured destination 2. Route lookup fails in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() before establishing a route 3. The error path calls dst_link_failure(skb) with skb->dev == NULL 4. ipv4_link_failure() → ipv4_send_dest_unreach() → __ip_options_compile() → fib_compute_spec_dst() 5. fib_compute_spec_dst() dereferences NULL skb->dev Apply the same fix used for IPv6 in commit 326bf17 ("ipvs: fix ipv6 route unreach panic"): set skb->dev from skb_dst(skb)->dev before calling dst_link_failure(). KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000328-0x000000000000032f] CPU: 1 PID: 12732 Comm: syz.1.3469 Not tainted 6.6.114 gregkh#2 RIP: 0010:__in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:233 RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0x17a/0x9f0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285 Call Trace: <TASK> spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:232 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:229 __ip_options_compile+0x13a1/0x17d0 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:330 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1252 ipv4_link_failure+0x702/0xb80 net/ipv4/route.c:1265 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:437 __ip_vs_get_out_rt+0x15fd/0x19e0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:412 ip_vs_nat_xmit+0x1d8/0xc80 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:764 Fixes: ed0de45 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Slavin Liu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== selftests: forwarding: vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul: Fix flakiness The net/forwarding/vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul selftest runs an overlay traffic, forwarded over a multicast-routed VXLAN underlay. In order to determine whether packets reach their intended destination, it uses a TC match. For convenience, it uses a flower match, which however does not allow matching on the encapsulated packet. So various service traffic ends up being indistinguishable from the test packets, and ends up confusing the test. To alleviate the problem, the test uses sleep to allow the necessary service traffic to run and clear the channel, before running the test traffic. This worked for a while, but lately we have nevertheless seen flakiness of the test in the CI. In this patchset, first generalize tc_rule_stats_get() to support u32 in patch gregkh#1, then in patch gregkh#2 convert the test to use u32 to allow parsing deeper into the packet, and in gregkh#3 drop the now-unnecessary sleep. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Fix a loop scenario of ethx:egress->ethx:egress
Example setup to reproduce:
tc qdisc add dev ethx root handle 1: drr
tc filter add dev ethx parent 1: protocol ip prio 1 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev ethx
Now ping out of ethx and you get a deadlock:
[ 116.892898][ T307] ============================================
[ 116.893182][ T307] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 116.893418][ T307] 6.18.0-rc6-01205-ge05021a829b8-dirty #204 Not tainted
[ 116.893682][ T307] --------------------------------------------
[ 116.893926][ T307] ping/307 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 116.894133][ T307] ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[ 116.894517][ T307]
[ 116.894517][ T307] but task is already holding lock:
[ 116.894836][ T307] ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[ 116.895252][ T307]
[ 116.895252][ T307] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 116.895608][ T307] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 116.895608][ T307]
[ 116.895901][ T307] CPU0
[ 116.896057][ T307] ----
[ 116.896200][ T307] lock(&sch->root_lock_key);
[ 116.896392][ T307] lock(&sch->root_lock_key);
[ 116.896605][ T307]
[ 116.896605][ T307] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 116.896605][ T307]
[ 116.896864][ T307] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 116.896864][ T307]
[ 116.897123][ T307] 6 locks held by ping/307:
[ 116.897302][ T307] #0: ffff88800b4b0250 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0xb20/0x2cf0
[ 116.897808][ T307] gregkh#1: ffffffff88c839c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_output+0xa9/0x600
[ 116.898138][ T307] gregkh#2: ffffffff88c839c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x2c6/0x1ee0
[ 116.898459][ T307] gregkh#3: ffffffff88c83960 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x200/0x3b50
[ 116.898782][ T307] gregkh#4: ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[ 116.899132][ T307] gregkh#5: ffffffff88c83960 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x200/0x3b50
[ 116.899442][ T307]
[ 116.899442][ T307] stack backtrace:
[ 116.899667][ T307] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-01205-ge05021a829b8-dirty #204 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 116.899672][ T307] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 116.899675][ T307] Call Trace:
[ 116.899678][ T307] <TASK>
[ 116.899680][ T307] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
[ 116.899688][ T307] print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xdc
[ 116.899695][ T307] __lock_acquire+0x11f7/0x1be0
[ 116.899704][ T307] lock_acquire+0x162/0x300
[ 116.899707][ T307] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[ 116.899713][ T307] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 116.899717][ T307] ? stack_trace_save+0x93/0xd0
[ 116.899723][ T307] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x40
[ 116.899728][ T307] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
[ 116.899731][ T307] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50
Fixes: 178ca30 ("Revert "net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion"")
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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