fix: escape delimiter characters in applyEscape to prevent SQL injection by mohammadmseet-hue · Pull Request #2811 · googleapis/mcp-toolbox

mohammadmseet-hue · 2026-03-23T06:52:39Z

Summary

The applyEscape() function in internal/util/parameters/parameters.go wraps user-supplied template parameter values with delimiter characters (backticks, double quotes, single quotes, or square brackets) but does not escape those same delimiter characters within the value itself. This allows an attacker to break out of the quoted identifier and inject arbitrary SQL.

Security Impact

applyEscape is the documented mitigation for SQL injection in template parameters:

To minimize SQL injection risk when using template parameters, always provide the allowedValues field within the parameter to restrict inputs. Alternatively, for string type parameters, you can use the escape field to add delimiters to the identifier.

However, this mitigation is broken because delimiter characters inside the value are not escaped.

Example (backtick escaping)

Attack input: users` WHERE 1=1 UNION SELECT * FROM credentials--

Before fix (VULNERABLE):

SELECT * FROM `users` WHERE 1=1 UNION SELECT * FROM credentials--` WHERE id = $1

The backtick in the input closes the identifier early, injecting arbitrary SQL.

After fix (SAFE):

SELECT * FROM `users`` WHERE 1=1 UNION SELECT * FROM credentials--` WHERE id = $1

The backtick inside the value is doubled, keeping the identifier intact.

The Fix

Standard SQL identifier escaping — double the delimiter character within the value before wrapping:

Escape Mode	Character	Escaping	Standard
backticks	`	` → ``	MySQL
double_quotes	`"`	`" → ""`	PostgreSQL/ANSI
single_quotes	`'`	`' → ''`	Standard SQL
square_brackets	`]`	`] → ]]`	SQL Server

Affected Code

internal/util/parameters/parameters.go, lines 783-796

…ent SQL injection The applyEscape() function wraps user-supplied template parameter values with delimiter characters (backticks, double quotes, single quotes, or square brackets) but does not escape those same delimiter characters within the value itself. This allows an attacker to break out of the quoted identifier and inject arbitrary SQL. For example, with backtick escaping configured: - Input: `users` OR 1=1--` - Before fix: `users` OR 1=1--`` (delimiter closed early, SQL injected) - After fix: `users`` OR 1=1--``` (backtick inside value is doubled) The fix applies standard SQL identifier escaping by doubling the delimiter character within the value before wrapping: - Backticks: ` → `` - Double quotes: " → "" - Single quotes: ' → '' - Square brackets: ] → ]] This matches the escaping conventions used by MySQL (backticks), PostgreSQL/ANSI SQL (double quotes), SQL Server (square brackets), and standard SQL (single quotes).

google-cla · 2026-03-23T06:52:51Z

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gemini-code-assist · 2026-03-23T06:53:49Z

Summary of Changes

Hello, I'm Gemini Code Assist¹! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!

This pull request addresses a critical SQL injection vulnerability in the applyEscape() function. The function, intended as a mitigation against SQL injection, failed to escape delimiter characters within user-supplied template parameter values, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL. This PR fixes the vulnerability by implementing proper escaping of delimiter characters.

Highlights

SQL Injection Vulnerability: The applyEscape() function was vulnerable to SQL injection because it didn't escape delimiter characters within user-supplied template parameter values.
Broken Mitigation: The applyEscape function is the documented mitigation for SQL injection in template parameters, but it was broken due to the lack of escaping.
The Fix: The fix involves standard SQL identifier escaping by doubling the delimiter character within the value before wrapping.

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Code Review

This pull request correctly addresses a critical SQL injection vulnerability by properly escaping delimiter characters in the applyEscape function. The method used, doubling the delimiter characters, is the standard approach for SQL. However, the changes lack corresponding unit tests to validate the fix for injection scenarios. It is highly recommended to add test cases that cover inputs containing the delimiter characters to prevent regressions and ensure the fix is robust.

Adds 4 test cases that verify delimiter characters within values are properly escaped (doubled) to prevent SQL injection: - Backtick in value: users` OR 1=1-- → `users`` OR 1=1--` - Double quote in value: col" OR 1=1-- → "col"" OR 1=1--" - Single quote in value: val' OR 1=1-- → 'val'' OR 1=1--' - Square bracket in value: col] OR 1=1-- → [col]] OR 1=1--]

averikitsch · 2026-03-23T17:40:43Z

Thank you for the PR. We will review shortly.

…to prevent injection (#3219) ## Summary This PR fixes identifier-injection vulnerabilities in three built-in tools that interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into SQL without sanitisation. --- ### 1. `clickhouse-list-tables` — database identifier injection (original fix) `Tool.Invoke` interpolates the caller-supplied `database` parameter directly into a `SHOW TABLES FROM %s` statement: ```go query := fmt.Sprintf("SHOW TABLES FROM %s", database) ``` The existing comment acknowledges the risk. The fix adds a `validIdentifier` regex (`^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$`) that must match before interpolation. Concrete payloads on a default ClickHouse deployment: | `database` parameter | rendered query | effect | |---|---|---| | `default LIKE '%secret%'` | `SHOW TABLES FROM default LIKE '%secret%'` | filters listing by attacker-chosen pattern | | `system FORMAT JSONEachRow` | `SHOW TABLES FROM system FORMAT JSONEachRow` | enumerates `system.*` (system.users, etc.) | | `default INTO OUTFILE '/tmp/x.tsv'` | `SHOW TABLES FROM default INTO OUTFILE '/tmp/x.tsv'` | writes to disk on ClickHouse host | --- ### 2. `bigquery-forecast` — backtick + column-name injection Two injection classes: **a. Backtick injection in `history_data` (table identifier path)** ```go historyDataSource = fmt.Sprintf("TABLE `%s`", historyData) ``` When `allowed_datasets` is not configured (the default), no validation runs before this line. An attacker-supplied `history_data` containing a backtick closes the opening delimiter and appends arbitrary SQL: ``` history_data = "ds.tbl` UNION ALL SELECT secret FROM private.pii --" → TABLE `ds.tbl` UNION ALL SELECT secret FROM private.pii --` ``` **b. Column-name injection in `data_col`, `timestamp_col`, `id_cols`** ```go sql := fmt.Sprintf(`... data_col => '%s', timestamp_col => '%s' ...`, dataCol, timestampCol, ...) ``` Column names are interpolated as single-quoted strings with no validation. A value containing `'` breaks out of the string literal context. **Fix:** `ValidTableID` (restricts `history_data` to `[a-zA-Z0-9_]+` components with 1–2 dots) applied in the table-ID else-branch; `ValidColumnName` (`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$`) applied to `data_col`, `timestamp_col`, and each element of `id_cols`. --- ### 3. `bigquery-analyze-contribution` — backtick + OPTIONS injection **a. Backtick injection in `input_data` (table identifier path)** ```go inputDataSource = fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM `%s`", inputData) ``` Same root cause as bigquery-forecast: when `allowed_datasets` is absent, no validation before interpolation. **b. Column-name and OPTIONS injection** ```go options = append(options, fmt.Sprintf("IS_TEST_COL = '%s'", paramsMap["is_test_col"])) // and each element of dimension_id_cols: strCols = append(strCols, fmt.Sprintf("'%s'", c)) ``` `is_test_col` and `dimension_id_cols` are column names interpolated into BigQuery ML `OPTIONS()` string literals without validation. `contribution_metric` (e.g. `SUM(col)/COUNT(DISTINCT col2)`) goes into `OPTIONS(CONTRIBUTION_METRIC = '%s')`. A single-quote in this value breaks the OPTIONS string literal. **Fix:** `ValidTableID` for `input_data` in the table-ID else-branch; `ValidColumnName` for `is_test_col` and each `dimension_id_cols` element; single-quote check for `contribution_metric`. --- ## Shared validators in `bigquerycommon` `ValidTableID` and `ValidColumnName` are exported from the `bigquerycommon` package so both tools share the same rules. Tests are in `validators_test.go`. ## Test plan - [x] `go build ./...` clean - [x] `go test ./internal/tools/bigquery/... -v` passes (all existing tests + new `TestValidTableID`, `TestValidColumnName`) - [x] `go test ./internal/tools/clickhouse/clickhouselisttables/... -v` passes ## Not a dupe of #2811 / #779 Those cover the `templateParameter` flow (`internal/util/parameters/parameters.go:applyEscape`). The three tools fixed here use hard-coded `fmt.Sprintf` interpolation in their own `Invoke` methods — none of the templateParameter mitigations apply. --------- Co-authored-by: Yuan Teoh <[email protected]>

averikitsch · 2026-06-05T19:13:52Z

/gcbrun

averikitsch

We may need to make this database specific.

averikitsch · 2026-06-10T00:06:35Z

/gcbrun

## Description Currently, the integration tests on Cloud Build suffer from regex evaluation and maintainability issues within `.ci/integration.cloudbuild.yaml`: 1. Core file and shared utility modifications (such as `internal/util/parameters/parameters.go` in #2811) skip many integration test shards because their `PATTERN` only looked for specific database source paths. 3. Shards like `mysql` and `mssql` used unanchored substring matching (`mysql|`), which accidentally triggered them whenever their Cloud SQL counterparts (`cloudsqlmysql`, `cloudsqlmssql`) were edited, leading to redundant/incorrect test runs. 4. Appending a massive core logic regex to 47 different shards creates a massive maintenance burden and violates DRY. ## Changes - Created a centralized `.ci/core_pattern.txt` file that contains core path regex (covering `internal/server/`, `internal/util/`, `internal/auth/`, etc.). - Every test shard now dynamically reads this via `$$(cat .ci/core_pattern.txt)`, cleaning up the YAML file. - Added Path Boundary Anchors `(^|/)` to all integration-specific regex terms (e.g., `mysql` is now `(^|/)mysql/`). - This eliminates substring leaks while preserving intentional file sharing (such as base `postgres/` changes correctly triggering `alloydb`, `alloydb-pg`, and `cloud-sql-pg` shards). ## Checklist - [ ] Make sure to open an issue as a bug/issue before writing your code! - [x] Ensure the tests and linter pass - [x] Code coverage does not decrease (if any source code was changed) - [x] Appropriate docs were updated (if necessary) - [x] Make sure to add `!` if this involves a breaking change

🤖 I have created a release *beep* *boop* --- ## [1.5.0](v1.4.0...v1.5.0) (2026-06-18) ### Features * **auth/google:** Require audience or clientId for mcpEnabled ([#3450](#3450)) ([59f7b6e](59f7b6e)) * Enable per source level flags for sql commenter ([#3465](#3465)) ([ecce6b7](ecce6b7)) * **mcp:** Add URL parameter binding for HTTP transport ([#3112](#3112)) ([0cc7b37](0cc7b37)) * **scylladb:** Adding support for ScyllaDB source and tool ([#3119](#3119)) ([2dada83](2dada83)) * **server:** Add support for toolset filtering in prebuilt CLI flag ([#3245](#3245)) ([7cc4f65](7cc4f65)) * **skills:** Generate skills offline without live source connections ([#3388](#3388)) ([4c860b6](4c860b6)) * **skills:** Tolerate missing env vars during offline skills-generate ([#3399](#3399)) ([ea5d3e5](ea5d3e5)) * **source/cloud-storage:** Restrict bucket and local path access ([#3454](#3454)) ([2c3ca5d](2c3ca5d)) * **tools/bigquery:** Add per tool query label in BigQuery jobs ([#1975](#1975)) ([3f6a49f](3f6a49f)) * **tools/dataplex:** Add tools to support metadata enrichment workflow ([#3270](#3270)) ([05289aa](05289aa)) * **tools/mysql:** Add show-query-stats and list-all-locks tools for MySQL and Cloud SQL MySQL source ([#2954](#2954)) ([a9693bd](a9693bd)) * **tools:** Decouple tool initialization from sources ([#3355](#3355)) ([32a24e3](32a24e3)) ### Bug Fixes * **auth/dataplex:** Fix failing source with service account credentials ([#3369](#3369)) ([ba4deef](ba4deef)) * **bigquery:** Wire maximumBytesBilled into prebuilt config ([#3385](#3385)) ([4abbf6e](4abbf6e)) * Bound MCP HTTP body size ([#3216](#3216)) ([d4f4342](d4f4342)) * **config:** Add doc/line context to parse errors ([#2957](#2957)) ([4b097da](4b097da)) * Escape delimiter characters in applyEscape to prevent SQL injection ([#2811](#2811)) ([932519a](932519a)) * **npm:** Source binary version from cmd/version.txt ([#3417](#3417)) ([6ffbdec](6ffbdec)) * **prebuilt/alloydb-omni:** Require password env var explicitly ([#3398](#3398)) ([fcbe3e7](fcbe3e7)) * **server:** Fail if MCP auth is enabled together with enable-api ([#3435](#3435)) ([a6ff910](a6ff910)) * **server:** Return errors instead of panicking in InitializeConfigs ([#3397](#3397)) ([f48b01d](f48b01d)) * **source/cloudhealthcare:** Validate pageURL parameter to prevent SSRF ([#3453](#3453)) ([9abf47d](9abf47d)) * **source/dataplex,source/datalineage:** Specify cloud-platform scope for default credentials ([#3376](#3376)) ([13e8c36](13e8c36)) * **source/http:** Implement SSRF guard ([#3448](#3448)) ([24d7d29](24d7d29)) * **tool/bigquery-execute-sql:** Prevent dataset restriction bypass ([#3452](#3452)) ([ca6d5e3](ca6d5e3)) * **tool/mysql-get-query-plan:** Prevent query execution bypass and statement injection ([#3235](#3235)) ([7ed1e7b](7ed1e7b)) * **tool/spanner-sql,tool/spanner-execute-sql:** Use read-only annotations when readOnly is set ([#3338](#3338)) ([8bde0ec](8bde0ec)) --- This PR was generated with [Release Please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please). See [documentation](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please#release-please). --------- Co-authored-by: release-please[bot] <55107282+release-please[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Yuan Teoh <[email protected]>

🤖 I have created a release *beep* *boop* --- ## [1.5.0](v1.4.0...v1.5.0) (2026-06-18) ### Features * **auth/google:** Require audience or clientId for mcpEnabled ([#3450](#3450)) ([59f7b6e](59f7b6e)) * Enable per source level flags for sql commenter ([#3465](#3465)) ([ecce6b7](ecce6b7)) * **mcp:** Add URL parameter binding for HTTP transport ([#3112](#3112)) ([0cc7b37](0cc7b37)) * **scylladb:** Adding support for ScyllaDB source and tool ([#3119](#3119)) ([2dada83](2dada83)) * **server:** Add support for toolset filtering in prebuilt CLI flag ([#3245](#3245)) ([7cc4f65](7cc4f65)) * **skills:** Generate skills offline without live source connections ([#3388](#3388)) ([4c860b6](4c860b6)) * **skills:** Tolerate missing env vars during offline skills-generate ([#3399](#3399)) ([ea5d3e5](ea5d3e5)) * **source/cloud-storage:** Restrict bucket and local path access ([#3454](#3454)) ([2c3ca5d](2c3ca5d)) * **tools/bigquery:** Add per tool query label in BigQuery jobs ([#1975](#1975)) ([3f6a49f](3f6a49f)) * **tools/dataplex:** Add tools to support metadata enrichment workflow ([#3270](#3270)) ([05289aa](05289aa)) * **tools/mysql:** Add show-query-stats and list-all-locks tools for MySQL and Cloud SQL MySQL source ([#2954](#2954)) ([a9693bd](a9693bd)) * **tools:** Decouple tool initialization from sources ([#3355](#3355)) ([32a24e3](32a24e3)) ### Bug Fixes * **auth/dataplex:** Fix failing source with service account credentials ([#3369](#3369)) ([ba4deef](ba4deef)) * **bigquery:** Wire maximumBytesBilled into prebuilt config ([#3385](#3385)) ([4abbf6e](4abbf6e)) * Bound MCP HTTP body size ([#3216](#3216)) ([d4f4342](d4f4342)) * **config:** Add doc/line context to parse errors ([#2957](#2957)) ([4b097da](4b097da)) * Escape delimiter characters in applyEscape to prevent SQL injection ([#2811](#2811)) ([932519a](932519a)) * **npm:** Source binary version from cmd/version.txt ([#3417](#3417)) ([6ffbdec](6ffbdec)) * **prebuilt/alloydb-omni:** Require password env var explicitly ([#3398](#3398)) ([fcbe3e7](fcbe3e7)) * **server:** Fail if MCP auth is enabled together with enable-api ([#3435](#3435)) ([a6ff910](a6ff910)) * **server:** Return errors instead of panicking in InitializeConfigs ([#3397](#3397)) ([f48b01d](f48b01d)) * **source/cloudhealthcare:** Validate pageURL parameter to prevent SSRF ([#3453](#3453)) ([9abf47d](9abf47d)) * **source/dataplex,source/datalineage:** Specify cloud-platform scope for default credentials ([#3376](#3376)) ([13e8c36](13e8c36)) * **source/http:** Implement SSRF guard ([#3448](#3448)) ([24d7d29](24d7d29)) * **tool/bigquery-execute-sql:** Prevent dataset restriction bypass ([#3452](#3452)) ([ca6d5e3](ca6d5e3)) * **tool/mysql-get-query-plan:** Prevent query execution bypass and statement injection ([#3235](#3235)) ([7ed1e7b](7ed1e7b)) * **tool/spanner-sql,tool/spanner-execute-sql:** Use read-only annotations when readOnly is set ([#3338](#3338)) ([8bde0ec](8bde0ec)) --- This PR was generated with [Release Please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please). See [documentation](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please#release-please). --------- Co-authored-by: release-please[bot] <55107282+release-please[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Yuan Teoh <[email protected]> 45c0f86

🤖 I have created a release *beep* *boop* --- ## [1.5.0](googleapis/mcp-toolbox@v1.4.0...v1.5.0) (2026-06-18) ### Features * **auth/google:** Require audience or clientId for mcpEnabled ([googleapis#3450](googleapis#3450)) ([59f7b6e](googleapis@59f7b6e)) * Enable per source level flags for sql commenter ([googleapis#3465](googleapis#3465)) ([ecce6b7](googleapis@ecce6b7)) * **mcp:** Add URL parameter binding for HTTP transport ([googleapis#3112](googleapis#3112)) ([0cc7b37](googleapis@0cc7b37)) * **scylladb:** Adding support for ScyllaDB source and tool ([googleapis#3119](googleapis#3119)) ([2dada83](googleapis@2dada83)) * **server:** Add support for toolset filtering in prebuilt CLI flag ([googleapis#3245](googleapis#3245)) ([7cc4f65](googleapis@7cc4f65)) * **skills:** Generate skills offline without live source connections ([googleapis#3388](googleapis#3388)) ([4c860b6](googleapis@4c860b6)) * **skills:** Tolerate missing env vars during offline skills-generate ([googleapis#3399](googleapis#3399)) ([ea5d3e5](googleapis@ea5d3e5)) * **source/cloud-storage:** Restrict bucket and local path access ([googleapis#3454](googleapis#3454)) ([2c3ca5d](googleapis@2c3ca5d)) * **tools/bigquery:** Add per tool query label in BigQuery jobs ([googleapis#1975](googleapis#1975)) ([3f6a49f](googleapis@3f6a49f)) * **tools/dataplex:** Add tools to support metadata enrichment workflow ([googleapis#3270](googleapis#3270)) ([05289aa](googleapis@05289aa)) * **tools/mysql:** Add show-query-stats and list-all-locks tools for MySQL and Cloud SQL MySQL source ([googleapis#2954](googleapis#2954)) ([a9693bd](googleapis@a9693bd)) * **tools:** Decouple tool initialization from sources ([googleapis#3355](googleapis#3355)) ([32a24e3](googleapis@32a24e3)) ### Bug Fixes * **auth/dataplex:** Fix failing source with service account credentials ([googleapis#3369](googleapis#3369)) ([ba4deef](googleapis@ba4deef)) * **bigquery:** Wire maximumBytesBilled into prebuilt config ([googleapis#3385](googleapis#3385)) ([4abbf6e](googleapis@4abbf6e)) * Bound MCP HTTP body size ([googleapis#3216](googleapis#3216)) ([d4f4342](googleapis@d4f4342)) * **config:** Add doc/line context to parse errors ([googleapis#2957](googleapis#2957)) ([4b097da](googleapis@4b097da)) * Escape delimiter characters in applyEscape to prevent SQL injection ([googleapis#2811](googleapis#2811)) ([932519a](googleapis@932519a)) * **npm:** Source binary version from cmd/version.txt ([googleapis#3417](googleapis#3417)) ([6ffbdec](googleapis@6ffbdec)) * **prebuilt/alloydb-omni:** Require password env var explicitly ([googleapis#3398](googleapis#3398)) ([fcbe3e7](googleapis@fcbe3e7)) * **server:** Fail if MCP auth is enabled together with enable-api ([googleapis#3435](googleapis#3435)) ([a6ff910](googleapis@a6ff910)) * **server:** Return errors instead of panicking in InitializeConfigs ([googleapis#3397](googleapis#3397)) ([f48b01d](googleapis@f48b01d)) * **source/cloudhealthcare:** Validate pageURL parameter to prevent SSRF ([googleapis#3453](googleapis#3453)) ([9abf47d](googleapis@9abf47d)) * **source/dataplex,source/datalineage:** Specify cloud-platform scope for default credentials ([googleapis#3376](googleapis#3376)) ([13e8c36](googleapis@13e8c36)) * **source/http:** Implement SSRF guard ([googleapis#3448](googleapis#3448)) ([24d7d29](googleapis@24d7d29)) * **tool/bigquery-execute-sql:** Prevent dataset restriction bypass ([googleapis#3452](googleapis#3452)) ([ca6d5e3](googleapis@ca6d5e3)) * **tool/mysql-get-query-plan:** Prevent query execution bypass and statement injection ([googleapis#3235](googleapis#3235)) ([7ed1e7b](googleapis@7ed1e7b)) * **tool/spanner-sql,tool/spanner-execute-sql:** Use read-only annotations when readOnly is set ([googleapis#3338](googleapis#3338)) ([8bde0ec](googleapis@8bde0ec)) --- This PR was generated with [Release Please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please). See [documentation](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please#release-please). --------- Co-authored-by: release-please[bot] <55107282+release-please[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Yuan Teoh <[email protected]> 45c0f86

mohammadmseet-hue requested a review from a team as a code owner March 23, 2026 06:52

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mohammadmseet-hue force-pushed the fix/sqli-escape-bypass branch from dd58d8b to 18e01ee Compare March 25, 2026 18:15

evilgensec mentioned this pull request May 12, 2026

fix(tools/clickhouse,tools/bigquery): validate identifier parameters to prevent injection #3219

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averikitsch added the priority: p2 Moderately-important priority. Fix may not be included in next release. label May 27, 2026

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release-please Bot mentioned this pull request Jun 10, 2026

chore(main): release 1.5.0 #3379

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anubhav756 mentioned this pull request Jun 11, 2026

ci: fix integration test skips and centralize core pattern #3401

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mcp-toolbox 1.5.0 Homebrew/homebrew-core#288736

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fix: escape delimiter characters in applyEscape to prevent SQL injection#2811

fix: escape delimiter characters in applyEscape to prevent SQL injection#2811
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mohammadmseet-hue commented Mar 23, 2026

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Example (backtick escaping)

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