Skip to content

Google API Client Library for Java (google-api-client): bundled trust store trusts compromised eMudhra intermediate CAs

Critical
viacheslav-rostovtsev published GHSA-m4gc-hcgx-wmc7 Oct 30, 2026

Package

maven com.google.api-client:google-api-client (Maven)

Affected versions

>= 1.14.0-beta, < 2.9.2

Patched versions

2.9.2

Description

Summary

google-api-client ships a bundled root certificate store (google.p12) used by GoogleNetHttpTransport.newTrustedTransport() and, before 2.9.0, by GoogleApacheHttpTransport.newTrustedTransport() and GoogleApache5HttpTransport.newTrustedTransport(). In versions before 2.9.2 this store is a 2013 snapshot that trusts Sectigo's AAA Certificate Services, which cross-signed eight eMudhra (emSign) intermediate CAs whose private keys are recoverable from their certificates.

An attacker with one of the recovered keys can issue certificates for any hostname, including *.googleapis.com, and affected clients accept them. An attacker who also has an on-path position can intercept or modify HTTPS traffic, including OAuth 2.0 access tokens.

Version 2.9.2 regenerates the bundled store from https://pki.goog/roots.pem, which does not contain AAA Certificate Services. Upgrade to 2.9.2 or later.

Details

  • Before 2.9.0: the newTrustedTransport() methods above and GoogleUtils.getCertificateTrustStore() configure TLS to trust only the bundled store. JDK and operating-system trust store updates do not reach these clients.
  • 2.9.0 and 2.9.1: getCertificateTrustStore() (PR #2613) loads the JDK cacerts file first and falls back to the bundled store only if that file cannot be opened. In practice this may happen on Android, in GraalVM native images, or when cacerts has a non-default password.
  • The Apache transports stopped using the bundled store in 2.9.0. GoogleApache5HttpTransport ships in the separate artifact com.google.api-client:google-api-client-apache-v5; versions 2.7.0–2.8.1 of that artifact are affected and 2.9.0 or later is not.
  • Generated service libraries (com.google.apis:google-api-services-*): each pins an exact google-api-client version, shown as its version suffix (…-2.0.0 depends on 2.0.0). A build that declares only a service library with a suffix earlier than -2.9.2 resolves an affected google-api-client.

The bundled store never contained the emSign roots; AAA Certificate Services is the only affected root in it. Java does not check certificate revocation by default, so revocation of the intermediates does not mitigate the issue.

Not affected: applications that construct new NetHttpTransport(), new ApacheHttpTransport() or new Apache5HttpTransport() directly — the default in google-auth-library-java and google-cloud-java — and the Apache newTrustedTransport() methods on 2.9.0 or later. These use the JDK trust store, so apply your JDK vendor's security update (and on Windows, the Windows root certificate update).

Patches

  • com.google.api-client:google-api-client / google-api-client-bom 2.9.2 (release, PR #2636).
  • com.google.apis:google-api-services-*: upgrade to a release whose version ends in -2.9.2 or later (for example google-api-services-bigquery:v2-rev20260922-2.9.2), or manage google-api-client at 2.9.2 in <dependencyManagement> / Gradle constraints.
  • com.google.cloud:libraries-bom 26.91.0 or later imports google-api-client-bom 2.9.2.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, stop calling the newTrustedTransport() methods and GoogleUtils.getCertificateTrustStore(); construct the transport directly (new NetHttpTransport() etc.) so TLS uses the JDK trust store, and make sure that store has been updated.

Verification

Check that none of these roots is present in the trust store your application uses (JDK cacerts, OS store, or the bundled store on affected versions):

  • AAA Certificate Services — SHA-256 D7:A7:A0:FB:5D:7E:27:31:D7:71:E9:48:4E:BC:DE:F7:1D:5F:0C:3E:0A:29:48:78:2B:C8:3E:E0:EA:69:9E:F4
  • emSign ECC Root CA - G3 — SHA-256 86:A1:EC:BA:08:9C:4A:8D:3B:BE:27:34:C6:12:BA:34:1D:81:3E:04:3C:F9:E8:A8:62:CD:5C:57:A3:6B:BE:6B
  • emSign Root TLS CA - G3 — SHA-256 7D:D7:8D:5F:4F:13:45:9A:83:DF:F9:AB:BB:A6:2E:DB:AF:6F:2D:10:2B:F2:57:FD:71:2F:4D:9F:27:46:ED:8D

References

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity High
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

Improper Certificate Validation

The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate. Learn more on MITRE.