Revert "[FIO fromlist] arm64: dts: hi3660: Add dma to uart nodes"#3
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mike-scott merged 1 commit intofoundriesio:tracking-fio-hisi-5.0from May 3, 2019
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This reverts commit 92d82a3. DMA on the HiKey and HiKey 960 has some issues currently. When this is enabled, we see the following messages: Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x1001 tx timeout Reverting for now. Needs investigation. Signed-off-by: Michael Scott <[email protected]>
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…mory [ Upstream commit a6ecfb1 ] When halting a guest, QEMU flushes the virtual ITS caches, which amounts to writing to the various tables that the guest has allocated. When doing this, we fail to take the srcu lock, and the kernel shouts loudly if running a lockdep kernel: [ 69.680416] ============================= [ 69.680819] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 69.681526] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty foundriesio#18 Not tainted [ 69.682096] ----------------------------- [ 69.682501] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 69.683225] [ 69.683225] other info that might help us debug this: [ 69.683225] [ 69.683975] [ 69.683975] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 69.684598] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/4097: [ 69.685059] #0: 0000000034196013 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0 [ 69.686087] foundriesio#1: 00000000f2ed935e (&its->its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0 [ 69.686919] foundriesio#2: 000000005e71ea54 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.687698] foundriesio#3: 00000000c17e548d (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.688475] foundriesio#4: 00000000ba386017 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.689978] foundriesio#5: 00000000c2c3c335 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [ 69.690729] [ 69.690729] stack backtrace: [ 69.691151] CPU: 2 PID: 4097 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty foundriesio#18 [ 69.691984] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019 [ 69.692831] Call trace: [ 69.694072] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110 [ 69.694490] gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190 [ 69.694853] kvm_write_guest+0x50/0xb0 [ 69.695209] vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x248/0x330 [ 69.695639] vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0 [ 69.696024] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8 [ 69.696424] kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8 [ 69.696788] do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960 [ 69.697128] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0 [ 69.697445] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38 [ 69.697817] el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138 [ 69.698173] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [ 69.698528] el0_svc+0x8/0xc The fix is to obviously take the srcu lock, just like we do on the read side of things since bf30824. One wonders why this wasn't fixed at the same time, but hey... Fixes: bf30824 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 7494cec ] Calling kvm_is_visible_gfn() implies that we're parsing the memslots, and doing this without the srcu lock is frown upon: [12704.164532] ============================= [12704.164544] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [12704.164560] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty foundriesio#16 Tainted: G W [12704.164573] ----------------------------- [12704.164589] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [12704.164602] other info that might help us debug this: [12704.164616] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [12704.164631] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/13968: [12704.164644] #0: 000000007ebdae4f (&kvm->lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0 [12704.164691] foundriesio#1: 000000007d751022 (&its->its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0 [12704.164726] foundriesio#2: 00000000219d2706 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164761] foundriesio#3: 00000000a760aecd (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164794] foundriesio#4: 000000000ef8e31d (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164827] foundriesio#5: 000000007a872093 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0 [12704.164861] stack backtrace: [12704.164878] CPU: 2 PID: 13968 Comm: qemu-system-aar Tainted: G W 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty foundriesio#16 [12704.164887] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019 [12704.164896] Call trace: [12704.164910] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x138 [12704.164920] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [12704.164934] dump_stack+0xbc/0x104 [12704.164946] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110 [12704.164958] gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190 [12704.164969] kvm_is_visible_gfn+0x28/0x70 [12704.164980] vgic_its_check_id.isra.0+0xec/0x1e8 [12704.164991] vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x1ac/0x330 [12704.165001] vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0 [12704.165012] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8 [12704.165022] kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8 [12704.165035] do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960 [12704.165045] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0 [12704.165055] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38 [12704.165067] el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138 [12704.165078] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [12704.165089] el0_svc+0x8/0xc Make sure the lock is taken when doing this. Fixes: bf30824 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock") Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 1b8f21b ] In NVMe's error handler, follows the typical steps of tearing down hardware for recovering controller: 1) stop blk_mq hw queues 2) stop the real hw queues 3) cancel in-flight requests via blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter(tags, cancel_request, ...) cancel_request(): mark the request as abort blk_mq_complete_request(req); 4) destroy real hw queues However, there may be race between foundriesio#3 and foundriesio#4, because blk_mq_complete_request() may run q->mq_ops->complete(rq) remotelly and asynchronously, and ->complete(rq) may be run after foundriesio#4. This patch introduces blk_mq_complete_request_sync() for fixing the above race. Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Cc: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Cc: James Smart <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit b9abbdf ] By calling maps__insert() we assume to get 2 references on the map, which we relese within maps__remove call. However if there's already same map name, we currently don't bump the reference and can crash, like: Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff75e60f5 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 foundriesio#1 0x00007ffff75d0895 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6 foundriesio#2 0x00007ffff75d0769 in __assert_fail_base.cold () from /lib64/libc.so.6 foundriesio#3 0x00007ffff75de596 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6 foundriesio#4 0x00000000004fc006 in refcount_sub_and_test (i=1, r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:131 foundriesio#5 refcount_dec_and_test (r=0x1224e88) at tools/include/linux/refcount.h:148 foundriesio#6 map__put (map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:299 foundriesio#7 0x00000000004fdb95 in __maps__remove (map=0x1224df0, maps=0xb17d80) at util/map.c:953 foundriesio#8 maps__remove (maps=0xb17d80, map=0x1224df0) at util/map.c:959 foundriesio#9 0x00000000004f7d8a in map_groups__remove (map=<optimized out>, mg=<optimized out>) at util/map_groups.h:65 foundriesio#10 machine__process_ksymbol_unregister (sample=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, machine=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:728 foundriesio#11 machine__process_ksymbol (machine=<optimized out>, event=0x7ffff7279670, sample=<optimized out>) at util/machine.c:741 foundriesio#12 0x00000000004fffbb in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0xb11390, event=0x7ffff7279670, tool=0x7fffffffc7b0, file_offset=13936) at util/session.c:1362 foundriesio#13 0x00000000005039bb in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0xb17e80) at util/ordered-events.c:243 foundriesio#14 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0xb17e80, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:322 foundriesio#15 0x00000000005005e4 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=session@entry=0xb11390, event=event@entry=0x7ffff72a4af8, ... Add the map to the list and getting the reference event if we find the map with same name. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Saint-Etienne <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]> Fixes: 1e62856 ("perf symbols: Fix slowness due to -ffunction-section") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit dea37a9 upstream. Syzkaller report this: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x5f/0x70 fs/sysfs/file.c:468 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881f59a6b70 by task syz-executor.0/8363 CPU: 0 PID: 8363 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ foundriesio#3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317 sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x5f/0x70 fs/sysfs/file.c:468 sysfs_remove_file include/linux/sysfs.h:519 [inline] driver_remove_file+0x40/0x50 drivers/base/driver.c:122 usb_remove_newid_files drivers/usb/core/driver.c:212 [inline] usb_deregister+0x12a/0x3b0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1005 cpia2_exit+0xa/0x16 [cpia2] __do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline] __se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x3dc/0x5e0 kernel/module.c:961 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x462e99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f86f3754c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000300 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f86f37556bc R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff Allocated by task 8363: set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:495 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline] bus_add_driver+0xc0/0x610 drivers/base/bus.c:651 driver_register+0x1bb/0x3f0 drivers/base/driver.c:170 usb_register_driver+0x267/0x520 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:965 0xffffffffc1b4817c do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 8363: set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:457 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1430 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1457 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3005 [inline] kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3957 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline] kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708 bus_remove_driver+0x10e/0x220 drivers/base/bus.c:732 driver_unregister+0x6c/0xa0 drivers/base/driver.c:197 usb_register_driver+0x341/0x520 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:980 0xffffffffc1b4817c do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881f59a6b40 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff8881f59a6b40, ffff8881f59a6c40) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0007d66980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02e00 index:0x0 flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881f6c02e00 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881f59a6a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8881f59a6a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8881f59a6b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881f59a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881f59a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc cpia2_init does not check return value of cpia2_init, if it failed in usb_register_driver, there is already cleanup using driver_unregister. No need call cpia2_usb_cleanup on module exit. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 56cd26b upstream. Syzkaller report this: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x5f/0x70 fs/sysfs/file.c:468 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881dc7ae030 by task syz-executor.0/6249 CPU: 1 PID: 6249 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ foundriesio#3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317 ? 0xffffffffc1728000 sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x5f/0x70 fs/sysfs/file.c:468 sysfs_remove_file include/linux/sysfs.h:519 [inline] driver_remove_file+0x40/0x50 drivers/base/driver.c:122 remove_bind_files drivers/base/bus.c:585 [inline] bus_remove_driver+0x186/0x220 drivers/base/bus.c:725 driver_unregister+0x6c/0xa0 drivers/base/driver.c:197 serial_ir_init_module+0x169/0x1000 [serial_ir] do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x462e99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f9450132c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f9450132c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f94501336bc R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004 Allocated by task 6249: set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:495 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline] bus_add_driver+0xc0/0x610 drivers/base/bus.c:651 driver_register+0x1bb/0x3f0 drivers/base/driver.c:170 serial_ir_init_module+0xe8/0x1000 [serial_ir] do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 6249: set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:457 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1430 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1457 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3005 [inline] kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3957 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline] kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708 bus_remove_driver+0x10e/0x220 drivers/base/bus.c:732 driver_unregister+0x6c/0xa0 drivers/base/driver.c:197 serial_ir_init_module+0x14c/0x1000 [serial_ir] do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc7ae000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff8881dc7ae000, ffff8881dc7ae100) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea000771eb80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02e00 index:0x0 flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffffea0007d14800 0000000400000002 ffff8881f6c02e00 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881dc7adf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8881dc7adf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8881dc7ae000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881dc7ae080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881dc7ae100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 There are already cleanup handlings in serial_ir_init error path, no need to call serial_ir_exit do it again in serial_ir_init_module, otherwise will trigger a use-after-free issue. Fixes: fa5dc29 ("[media] lirc_serial: move out of staging and rename to serial_ir") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Young <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit f80c5da ] This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers (seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI command to the controller. The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure, where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device found events are sent to userspace. This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp 27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow. Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50 = Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64) 0.352340 = Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22 0.352343 = New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0) [hci0] 0.352344 = Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 [hci0] 0.352345 = Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm) [hci0] 0.352346 @ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0001} 0.352347 @ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0002} 0.352366 @ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0003} 27.302164 @ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 foundriesio#1 [hci0] 27.302496 Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 foundriesio#2 [hci0] 27.419117 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 foundriesio#3 [hci0] 27.419244 Type: Active (0x01) Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012) Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 foundriesio#4 [hci0] 27.420131 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 foundriesio#5 [hci0] 27.420259 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 foundriesio#6 [hci0] 27.420969 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 foundriesio#7 [hci0] 27.421983 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) @ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059 Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1 Status: Success (0x00) Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random @ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random Discovery: Enabled (0x01) @ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random Discovery: Enabled (0x01) @ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067 Address type: 0x06 LE Public LE Random Discovery: Enabled (0x01) Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 41a91c6 ] dwc3_gadget_suspend() is called under dwc->lock spinlock. In such context calling synchronize_irq() is not allowed. Move the problematic call out of the protected block to fix the following kernel BUG during system suspend: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/irq/manage.c:112 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 1601, name: rtcwake 6 locks held by rtcwake/1601: #0: f70ac2a2 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x130/0x16c foundriesio#1: b5fe1270 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xc0/0x1e4 foundriesio#2: 7e597705 (kn->count#60){.+.+}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xc8/0x1e4 foundriesio#3: 8b3527d0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}, at: pm_suspend+0xc4/0xc04 foundriesio#4: fc7f1c42 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __device_suspend+0xd8/0x74c foundriesio#5: 4b36507e (&(&dwc->lock)->rlock){....}, at: dwc3_gadget_suspend+0x24/0x3c irq event stamp: 11252 hardirqs last enabled at (11251): [<c09c54a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x6c/0x74 hardirqs last disabled at (11252): [<c09c4d44>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x5c softirqs last enabled at (9744): [<c0102564>] __do_softirq+0x3a4/0x66c softirqs last disabled at (9737): [<c0128528>] irq_exit+0x140/0x168 Preemption disabled at: [<00000000>] (null) CPU: 7 PID: 1601 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-next-20190122-00039-ga3f4ee4f8a52 #5252 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [<c01110f0>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010d120>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c010d120>] (show_stack) from [<c09a4d04>] (dump_stack+0x90/0xc8) [<c09a4d04>] (dump_stack) from [<c014c700>] (___might_sleep+0x22c/0x2c8) [<c014c700>] (___might_sleep) from [<c0189d68>] (synchronize_irq+0x28/0x84) [<c0189d68>] (synchronize_irq) from [<c05cbbf8>] (dwc3_gadget_suspend+0x34/0x3c) [<c05cbbf8>] (dwc3_gadget_suspend) from [<c05bd020>] (dwc3_suspend_common+0x154/0x410) [<c05bd020>] (dwc3_suspend_common) from [<c05bd34c>] (dwc3_suspend+0x14/0x2c) [<c05bd34c>] (dwc3_suspend) from [<c051c730>] (platform_pm_suspend+0x2c/0x54) [<c051c730>] (platform_pm_suspend) from [<c05285d4>] (dpm_run_callback+0xa4/0x3dc) [<c05285d4>] (dpm_run_callback) from [<c0528a40>] (__device_suspend+0x134/0x74c) [<c0528a40>] (__device_suspend) from [<c052c508>] (dpm_suspend+0x174/0x588) [<c052c508>] (dpm_suspend) from [<c0182134>] (suspend_devices_and_enter+0xc0/0xe74) [<c0182134>] (suspend_devices_and_enter) from [<c0183658>] (pm_suspend+0x770/0xc04) [<c0183658>] (pm_suspend) from [<c0180ddc>] (state_store+0x6c/0xcc) [<c0180ddc>] (state_store) from [<c09a9a70>] (kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x20) [<c09a9a70>] (kobj_attr_store) from [<c02d6800>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x50) [<c02d6800>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c02d594c>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xfc/0x1e4) [<c02d594c>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c02593d8>] (__vfs_write+0x2c/0x160) [<c02593d8>] (__vfs_write) from [<c0259694>] (vfs_write+0xa4/0x16c) [<c0259694>] (vfs_write) from [<c0259870>] (ksys_write+0x40/0x8c) [<c0259870>] (ksys_write) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28) Exception stack(0xed55ffa8 to 0xed55fff0) ... Fixes: 01c1088 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: synchronize_irq dwc irq in suspend") Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…cm_qla2xxx_close_session() [ Upstream commit d4023db ] This patch avoids that lockdep reports the following warning: ===================================================== WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.1.0-rc1-dbg+ foundriesio#11 Tainted: G W ----------------------------------------------------- rmdir/1478 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 00000000e7ac4607 (&(&k->k_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: klist_next+0x43/0x1d0 and this task is already holding: 00000000cf0baf5e (&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock){-...}, at: tcm_qla2xxx_close_session+0x57/0xb0 [tcm_qla2xxx] which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock){-...} -> (&(&k->k_lock)->rlock){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock){-...} ... which became HARDIRQ-irq-safe at: lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 qla2x00_fcport_event_handler+0x1f3d/0x22b0 [qla2xxx] qla2x00_async_login_sp_done+0x1dc/0x1f0 [qla2xxx] qla24xx_process_response_queue+0xa37/0x10e0 [qla2xxx] qla24xx_msix_rsp_q+0x79/0xf0 [qla2xxx] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x79/0x3c0 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0xf0 handle_irq_event+0x5a/0x8b handle_edge_irq+0x12c/0x310 handle_irq+0x192/0x20a do_IRQ+0x73/0x160 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d default_idle+0x23/0x1f0 arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 default_idle_call+0x35/0x40 do_idle+0x2bb/0x2e0 cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x20 start_secondary+0x24d/0x2d0 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 to a HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (&(&k->k_lock)->rlock){+.+.} ... which became HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50 klist_add_tail+0x33/0xb0 device_add+0x7f4/0xb60 device_create_groups_vargs+0x11c/0x150 device_create_with_groups+0x89/0xb0 vtconsole_class_init+0xb2/0x124 do_one_initcall+0xc5/0x3ce kernel_init_freeable+0x295/0x32e kernel_init+0x11/0x11b ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&k->k_lock)->rlock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock); lock(&(&k->k_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by rmdir/1478: #0: 000000002c7f1ba4 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x32/0x70 foundriesio#1: 00000000c85eb147 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]foundriesio#2/1){+.+.}, at: do_rmdir+0x217/0x2d0 foundriesio#2: 000000002b164d6f (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#13){++++}, at: vfs_rmdir+0x7e/0x1d0 foundriesio#3: 00000000cf0baf5e (&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock){-...}, at: tcm_qla2xxx_close_session+0x57/0xb0 [tcm_qla2xxx] the dependencies between HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock: -> (&(&ha->tgt.sess_lock)->rlock){-...} ops: 127 { IN-HARDIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 qla2x00_fcport_event_handler+0x1f3d/0x22b0 [qla2xxx] qla2x00_async_login_sp_done+0x1dc/0x1f0 [qla2xxx] qla24xx_process_response_queue+0xa37/0x10e0 [qla2xxx] qla24xx_msix_rsp_q+0x79/0xf0 [qla2xxx] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x79/0x3c0 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0xf0 handle_irq_event+0x5a/0x8b handle_edge_irq+0x12c/0x310 handle_irq+0x192/0x20a do_IRQ+0x73/0x160 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d default_idle+0x23/0x1f0 arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 default_idle_call+0x35/0x40 do_idle+0x2bb/0x2e0 cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x20 start_secondary+0x24d/0x2d0 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 qla2x00_loop_resync+0xb3d/0x2690 [qla2xxx] qla2x00_do_dpc+0xcee/0xf30 [qla2xxx] kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 } ... key at: [<ffffffffa125f700>] __key.62804+0x0/0xfffffffffff7e900 [qla2xxx] ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x11ed/0x1b60 lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 klist_next+0x43/0x1d0 device_for_each_child+0x96/0x110 scsi_target_block+0x3c/0x40 [scsi_mod] fc_remote_port_delete+0xe7/0x1c0 [scsi_transport_fc] qla2x00_mark_device_lost+0x4d3/0x500 [qla2xxx] qlt_unreg_sess+0x104/0x2c0 [qla2xxx] tcm_qla2xxx_close_session+0xa2/0xb0 [tcm_qla2xxx] target_shutdown_sessions+0x17b/0x190 [target_core_mod] core_tpg_del_initiator_node_acl+0xf3/0x1f0 [target_core_mod] target_fabric_nacl_base_release+0x25/0x30 [target_core_mod] config_item_release+0x9f/0x120 [configfs] config_item_put+0x29/0x2b [configfs] configfs_rmdir+0x3d2/0x520 [configfs] vfs_rmdir+0xb3/0x1d0 do_rmdir+0x25c/0x2d0 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x220 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: -> (&(&k->k_lock)->rlock){+.+.} ops: 14568 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50 klist_add_tail+0x33/0xb0 device_add+0x7f4/0xb60 device_create_groups_vargs+0x11c/0x150 device_create_with_groups+0x89/0xb0 vtconsole_class_init+0xb2/0x124 do_one_initcall+0xc5/0x3ce kernel_init_freeable+0x295/0x32e kernel_init+0x11/0x11b ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50 klist_add_tail+0x33/0xb0 device_add+0x7f4/0xb60 device_create_groups_vargs+0x11c/0x150 device_create_with_groups+0x89/0xb0 vtconsole_class_init+0xb2/0x124 do_one_initcall+0xc5/0x3ce kernel_init_freeable+0x295/0x32e kernel_init+0x11/0x11b ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50 klist_add_tail+0x33/0xb0 device_add+0x7f4/0xb60 device_create_groups_vargs+0x11c/0x150 device_create_with_groups+0x89/0xb0 vtconsole_class_init+0xb2/0x124 do_one_initcall+0xc5/0x3ce kernel_init_freeable+0x295/0x32e kernel_init+0x11/0x11b ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 } ... key at: [<ffffffff83f3d900>] __key.15805+0x0/0x40 ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x11ed/0x1b60 lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 klist_next+0x43/0x1d0 device_for_each_child+0x96/0x110 scsi_target_block+0x3c/0x40 [scsi_mod] fc_remote_port_delete+0xe7/0x1c0 [scsi_transport_fc] qla2x00_mark_device_lost+0x4d3/0x500 [qla2xxx] qlt_unreg_sess+0x104/0x2c0 [qla2xxx] tcm_qla2xxx_close_session+0xa2/0xb0 [tcm_qla2xxx] target_shutdown_sessions+0x17b/0x190 [target_core_mod] core_tpg_del_initiator_node_acl+0xf3/0x1f0 [target_core_mod] target_fabric_nacl_base_release+0x25/0x30 [target_core_mod] config_item_release+0x9f/0x120 [configfs] config_item_put+0x29/0x2b [configfs] configfs_rmdir+0x3d2/0x520 [configfs] vfs_rmdir+0xb3/0x1d0 do_rmdir+0x25c/0x2d0 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x220 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe stack backtrace: CPU: 7 PID: 1478 Comm: rmdir Tainted: G W 5.1.0-rc1-dbg+ foundriesio#11 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xca check_usage.cold.59+0x473/0x563 check_prev_add.constprop.43+0x1f1/0x1170 __lock_acquire+0x11ed/0x1b60 lock_acquire+0xe3/0x200 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x60 klist_next+0x43/0x1d0 device_for_each_child+0x96/0x110 scsi_target_block+0x3c/0x40 [scsi_mod] fc_remote_port_delete+0xe7/0x1c0 [scsi_transport_fc] qla2x00_mark_device_lost+0x4d3/0x500 [qla2xxx] qlt_unreg_sess+0x104/0x2c0 [qla2xxx] tcm_qla2xxx_close_session+0xa2/0xb0 [tcm_qla2xxx] target_shutdown_sessions+0x17b/0x190 [target_core_mod] core_tpg_del_initiator_node_acl+0xf3/0x1f0 [target_core_mod] target_fabric_nacl_base_release+0x25/0x30 [target_core_mod] config_item_release+0x9f/0x120 [configfs] config_item_put+0x29/0x2b [configfs] configfs_rmdir+0x3d2/0x520 [configfs] vfs_rmdir+0xb3/0x1d0 do_rmdir+0x25c/0x2d0 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x220 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Cc: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]> Cc: Giridhar Malavali <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Acked-by: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit ff612ba ] We've been seeing the following sporadically throughout our fleet panic: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4584! netversion: 5.0-0 Backtrace: #0 [ffffc90003adb880] machine_kexec at ffffffff81041da8 foundriesio#1 [ffffc90003adb8c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8110396c foundriesio#2 [ffffc90003adb988] crash_kexec at ffffffff811048ad foundriesio#3 [ffffc90003adb9a0] oops_end at ffffffff8101c19a foundriesio#4 [ffffc90003adb9c0] do_trap at ffffffff81019114 foundriesio#5 [ffffc90003adba00] do_error_trap at ffffffff810195d0 foundriesio#6 [ffffc90003adbab0] invalid_op at ffffffff81a00a9b [exception RIP: btrfs_reloc_cow_block+692] RIP: ffffffff8143b614 RSP: ffffc90003adbb68 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: fffffffffffffff7 RBX: ffff8806b9c32000 RCX: ffff8806aad00690 RDX: ffff880850b295e0 RSI: ffff8806b9c32000 RDI: ffff88084f205bd0 RBP: ffff880849415000 R8: ffffc90003adbbe0 R9: ffff88085ac90000 R10: ffff8805f7369140 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880850b295e0 R13: ffff88084f205bd0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 foundriesio#7 [ffffc90003adbbb0] __btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf1cd foundriesio#8 [ffffc90003adbc28] btrfs_cow_block at ffffffff813bf4b3 foundriesio#9 [ffffc90003adbc78] btrfs_search_slot at ffffffff813c2e6c The way relocation moves data extents is by creating a reloc inode and preallocating extents in this inode and then copying the data into these preallocated extents. Once we've done this for all of our extents, we'll write out these dirty pages, which marks the extent written, and goes into btrfs_reloc_cow_block(). From here we get our current reloc_control, which _should_ match the reloc_control for the current block group we're relocating. However if we get an ENOSPC in this path at some point we'll bail out, never initiating writeback on this inode. Not a huge deal, unless we happen to be doing relocation on a different block group, and this block group is now rc->stage == UPDATE_DATA_PTRS. This trips the BUG_ON() in btrfs_reloc_cow_block(), because we expect to be done modifying the data inode. We are in fact done modifying the metadata for the data inode we're currently using, but not the one from the failed block group, and thus we BUG_ON(). (This happens when writeback finishes for extents from the previous group, when we are at btrfs_finish_ordered_io() which updates the data reloc tree (inode item, drops/adds extent items, etc).) Fix this by writing out the reloc data inode always, and then breaking out of the loop after that point to keep from tripping this BUG_ON() later. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> [ add note from Filipe ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…OL_MF_STRICT were specified When both MPOL_MF_MOVE* and MPOL_MF_STRICT was specified, mbind() should try best to migrate misplaced pages, if some of the pages could not be migrated, then return -EIO. There are three different sub-cases: 1. vma is not migratable 2. vma is migratable, but there are unmovable pages 3. vma is migratable, pages are movable, but migrate_pages() fails If foundriesio#1 happens, kernel would just abort immediately, then return -EIO, after a7f40cf ("mm: mempolicy: make mbind() return -EIO when MPOL_MF_STRICT is specified"). If foundriesio#3 happens, kernel would set policy and migrate pages with best-effort, but won't rollback the migrated pages and reset the policy back. Before that commit, they behaves in the same way. It'd better to keep their behavior consistent. But, rolling back the migrated pages and resetting the policy back sounds not feasible, so just make foundriesio#1 behave as same as foundriesio#3. Userspace will know that not everything was successfully migrated (via -EIO), and can take whatever steps it deems necessary - attempt rollback, determine which exact page(s) are violating the policy, etc. Make queue_pages_range() return 1 to indicate there are unmovable pages or vma is not migratable. The foundriesio#2 is not handled correctly in the current kernel, the following patch will fix it. [[email protected]: fix review comments from Vlastimil] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread"). Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex - i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen afterwards. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 foundriesio#1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 foundriesio#2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec foundriesio#3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 foundriesio#4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f foundriesio#5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 foundriesio#6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 foundriesio#7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] foundriesio#8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce foundriesio#11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 foundriesio#12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f foundriesio#13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 foundriesio#14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device") Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
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reply_cache_stats uses wrong parameter as seq file private structure and thus causes the following kernel crash when users read /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001f9 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [foundriesio#3] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 1502 Comm: cat Tainted: G D 5.3.0-rc3+ foundriesio#1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Broadwell Client platform/Basking Ridge, BIOS BDW-E2R1.86C.0118.R01.1503110618 03/11/2015 RIP: 0010:nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show+0x3b/0x2d0 Code: 41 54 49 89 f4 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b3 10 33 88 53 bb e8 03 00 00 e8 88 82 d1 ff bf 58 89 41 00 e8 eb c5 85 00 48 83 eb 01 75 f0 <41> 8b 94 24 f8 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 be 10 33 88 4c 89 ef bb e8 03 00 RSP: 0018:ffffaa520106fe08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000cfe1a77123 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000291b46 RDX: 000000cf00000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000291b28 RBP: ffffaa520106fe20 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 000000cfe17e55dd R10: ffffa424e47c0000 R11: 000000000000030b R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffa424e5697000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa424e5697000 FS: 00007f805735f580(0000) GS:ffffa424f8f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000001f9 CR3: 00000000655ce005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: seq_read+0x194/0x3e0 __vfs_read+0x1b/0x40 vfs_read+0x95/0x140 ksys_read+0x61/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f805728b861 Code: fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 86 b4 09 00 e8 79 e0 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d 05 d9 19 0d 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 RSP: 002b:00007ffea1ce3c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f805728b861 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f8057183000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8057183000 R08: 00007f8057182010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559a60e8ff10 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000000001f9 ---[ end trace 01613595153f0cba ]--- RIP: 0010:nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show+0x3b/0x2d0 Code: 41 54 49 89 f4 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b3 10 33 88 53 bb e8 03 00 00 e8 88 82 d1 ff bf 58 89 41 00 e8 eb c5 85 00 48 83 eb 01 75 f0 <41> 8b 94 24 f8 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 be 10 33 88 4c 89 ef bb e8 03 00 RSP: 0018:ffffaa52004b3e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000002bab45a7c6 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000291b4c RDX: 0000002b00000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000291b28 RBP: ffffaa52004b3e20 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000002bab1c8c7a R10: ffffa424e5500000 R11: 00000000000002a9 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffa424e4475000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa424e4475000 FS: 00007f805735f580(0000) GS:ffffa424f8f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000001f9 CR3: 00000000655ce005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Killed Fixes: 3ba7583 ("nfsd4: drc containerization") Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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…s_blob()
Calling ceph_buffer_put() in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() may result in
freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can
be fixed by having this function returning the old blob buffer and have
the callers of this function freeing it when the lock is released.
The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/117.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 649, name: fsstress
4 locks held by fsstress/649:
#0: 00000000a7478e7e (&type->s_umount_key#19){++++}, at: iterate_supers+0x77/0xf0
foundriesio#1: 00000000f8de1423 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x7b/0xc60
foundriesio#2: 00000000562f2b27 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3bd/0xc60
foundriesio#3: 00000000f83ce16a (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3ed/0xc60
CPU: 1 PID: 649 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.2.0+ #439
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x67/0x90
___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1
vfree+0x4b/0x60
ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60
__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x12b/0x170
__send_cap+0x302/0x540
? __lock_acquire+0x23c/0x1e40
? __mark_caps_flushing+0x15c/0x280
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30
ceph_check_caps+0x5f0/0xc60
ceph_flush_dirty_caps+0x7c/0x150
? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20
ceph_sync_fs+0x5a/0x130
iterate_supers+0x8f/0xf0
ksys_sync+0x4f/0xb0
__ia32_sys_sync+0xa/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7fc6409ab617
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
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Calling ceph_buffer_put() in fill_inode() may result in freeing the
i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by
postponing the call until later, when the lock is released.
The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/070.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3852, name: kworker/0:4
6 locks held by kworker/0:4/3852:
#0: 000000004270f6bb ((wq_completion)ceph-msgr){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0
foundriesio#1: 00000000eb420803 ((work_completion)(&(&con->work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0
foundriesio#2: 00000000be1c53a4 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x288/0x1476
foundriesio#3: 00000000559cb958 (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476
foundriesio#4: 000000000d5ebbae (&req->r_fill_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x2fc/0x1476
foundriesio#5: 00000000a83d0514 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: fill_inode.isra.0+0xf8/0xf70
CPU: 0 PID: 3852 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #441
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x67/0x90
___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1
vfree+0x4b/0x60
ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60
fill_inode.isra.0+0xa9b/0xf70
ceph_fill_trace+0x13b/0xc70
? dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476
dispatch+0x320/0x1476
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x4d/0x2a0
ceph_con_workfn+0xc97/0x2ec0
? process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0
process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
kthread+0x105/0x140
? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0
? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
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Sep 15, 2019
commit c952b35 upstream. bpf/btf write_* functions need ff->ph->env. With this missing, pipe-mode (perf record -o -) would crash like: Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. This patch assign proper ph value to ff. Committer testing: (gdb) run record -o - Starting program: /root/bin/perf record -o - PERFILE2 <SNIP start of perf.data headers> Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. __do_write_buf (size=4, buf=0x160, ff=0x7fffffff8f80) at util/header.c:126 126 memcpy(ff->buf + ff->offset, buf, size); (gdb) bt #0 __do_write_buf (size=4, buf=0x160, ff=0x7fffffff8f80) at util/header.c:126 foundriesio#1 do_write (ff=ff@entry=0x7fffffff8f80, buf=buf@entry=0x160, size=4) at util/header.c:137 foundriesio#2 0x00000000004eddba in write_bpf_prog_info (ff=0x7fffffff8f80, evlist=<optimized out>) at util/header.c:912 foundriesio#3 0x00000000004f69d7 in perf_event__synthesize_features (tool=tool@entry=0x97cc00 <record>, session=session@entry=0x7fffe9c6d010, evlist=0x7fffe9cae010, process=process@entry=0x4435d0 <process_synthesized_event>) at util/header.c:3695 foundriesio#4 0x0000000000443c79 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=false, rec=0x97cc00 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1214 foundriesio#5 0x0000000000444ec9 in __cmd_record (rec=0x97cc00 <record>, argv=<optimized out>, argc=0) at builtin-record.c:1435 foundriesio#6 cmd_record (argc=0, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-record.c:2450 foundriesio#7 0x00000000004ae3e9 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x98e058 <commands+216>, argc=argc@entry=3, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at perf.c:304 foundriesio#8 0x000000000042eded in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:356 foundriesio#9 run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:400 foundriesio#10 main (argc=3, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:522 (gdb) After the patch the SEGSEGV is gone. Reported-by: David Carrillo Cisneros <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v5.1+ Fixes: 606f972 ("perf bpf: Save bpf_prog_info information as headers to perf.data") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 6c0ed66 ] rtl_usb_probe() must do error handle rtl_deinit_core() only if rtl_init_core() is done, otherwise goto error_out2. | usb 1-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=0, Product=0, SerialNumber=0 | rtl_usb: reg 0xf0, usbctrl_vendorreq TimeOut! status:0xffffffb9 value=0x0 | rtl8192cu: Chip version 0x10 | rtl_usb: reg 0xa, usbctrl_vendorreq TimeOut! status:0xffffffb9 value=0x0 | rtl_usb: Too few input end points found | INFO: trying to register non-static key. | the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. | turning off the locking correctness validator. | CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4-319354-g9a33b36 foundriesio#3 | Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS | Google 01/01/2011 | Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event | Call Trace: | __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] | dump_stack+0xe8/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:113 | assign_lock_key kernel/locking/lockdep.c:786 [inline] | register_lock_class+0x11b8/0x1250 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1095 | __lock_acquire+0xfb/0x37c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3582 | lock_acquire+0x10d/0x2f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211 | __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] | _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:152 | rtl_c2hcmd_launcher+0xd1/0x390 | drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/base.c:2344 | rtl_deinit_core+0x25/0x2d0 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/base.c:574 | rtl_usb_probe.cold+0x861/0xa70 | drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c:1093 | usb_probe_interface+0x31d/0x820 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 | really_probe+0x2da/0xb10 drivers/base/dd.c:509 | driver_probe_device+0x21d/0x350 drivers/base/dd.c:671 | __device_attach_driver+0x1d8/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:778 | bus_for_each_drv+0x163/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 | __device_attach+0x223/0x3a0 drivers/base/dd.c:844 | bus_probe_device+0x1f1/0x2a0 drivers/base/bus.c:514 | device_add+0xad2/0x16e0 drivers/base/core.c:2106 | usb_set_configuration+0xdf7/0x1740 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2021 | generic_probe+0xa2/0xda drivers/usb/core/generic.c:210 | usb_probe_device+0xc0/0x150 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 | really_probe+0x2da/0xb10 drivers/base/dd.c:509 | driver_probe_device+0x21d/0x350 drivers/base/dd.c:671 | __device_attach_driver+0x1d8/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:778 | bus_for_each_drv+0x163/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:454 | __device_attach+0x223/0x3a0 drivers/base/dd.c:844 | bus_probe_device+0x1f1/0x2a0 drivers/base/bus.c:514 | device_add+0xad2/0x16e0 drivers/base/core.c:2106 | usb_new_device.cold+0x537/0xccf drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2534 | hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5089 [inline] | hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5204 [inline] | port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5350 [inline] | hub_event+0x138e/0x3b00 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5432 | process_one_work+0x90f/0x1580 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 | worker_thread+0x9b/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 | kthread+0x313/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:253 | ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit b387e9b ] When system memory is in heavy pressure, bch_gc_thread_start() from run_cache_set() may fail due to out of memory. In such condition, c->gc_thread is assigned to -ENOMEM, not NULL pointer. Then in following failure code path bch_cache_set_error(), when cache_set_flush() gets called, the code piece to stop c->gc_thread is broken, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(c->gc_thread)) kthread_stop(c->gc_thread); And KASAN catches such NULL pointer deference problem, with the warning information: [ 561.207881] ================================================================== [ 561.207900] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in kthread_stop+0x3b/0x440 [ 561.207904] Write of size 4 at addr 000000000000001c by task kworker/15:1/313 [ 561.207913] CPU: 15 PID: 313 Comm: kworker/15:1 Tainted: G W 5.0.0-vanilla+ foundriesio#3 [ 561.207916] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR650 -[7X05CTO1WW]-/-[7X05CTO1WW]-, BIOS -[IVE136T-2.10]- 03/22/2019 [ 561.207935] Workqueue: events cache_set_flush [bcache] [ 561.207940] Call Trace: [ 561.207948] dump_stack+0x9a/0xeb [ 561.207955] ? kthread_stop+0x3b/0x440 [ 561.207960] ? kthread_stop+0x3b/0x440 [ 561.207965] kasan_report+0x176/0x192 [ 561.207973] ? kthread_stop+0x3b/0x440 [ 561.207981] kthread_stop+0x3b/0x440 [ 561.207995] cache_set_flush+0xd4/0x6d0 [bcache] [ 561.208008] process_one_work+0x856/0x1620 [ 561.208015] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1d0 [ 561.208028] ? drain_workqueue+0x380/0x380 [ 561.208048] worker_thread+0x87/0xb80 [ 561.208058] ? __kthread_parkme+0xb6/0x180 [ 561.208067] ? process_one_work+0x1620/0x1620 [ 561.208072] kthread+0x326/0x3e0 [ 561.208079] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0 [ 561.208090] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 561.208110] ================================================================== [ 561.208113] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 561.208115] irq event stamp: 11800231 [ 561.208126] hardirqs last enabled at (11800231): [<ffffffff83008538>] do_syscall_64+0x18/0x410 [ 561.208127] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000001c [ 561.208129] #PF error: [WRITE] [ 561.312253] hardirqs last disabled at (11800230): [<ffffffff830052ff>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 561.312259] softirqs last enabled at (11799832): [<ffffffff850005c7>] __do_softirq+0x5c7/0x8c3 [ 561.405975] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 561.442494] softirqs last disabled at (11799821): [<ffffffff831add2c>] irq_exit+0x1ac/0x1e0 [ 561.791359] Oops: 0002 [foundriesio#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 561.791362] CPU: 15 PID: 313 Comm: kworker/15:1 Tainted: G B W 5.0.0-vanilla+ foundriesio#3 [ 561.791363] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR650 -[7X05CTO1WW]-/-[7X05CTO1WW]-, BIOS -[IVE136T-2.10]- 03/22/2019 [ 561.791371] Workqueue: events cache_set_flush [bcache] [ 561.791374] RIP: 0010:kthread_stop+0x3b/0x440 [ 561.791376] Code: 00 00 65 8b 05 26 d5 e0 7c 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 ec aa df 02 0f 82 dc 02 00 00 4c 8d 63 20 be 04 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 65 c5 53 00 <f0> ff 43 20 48 8d 7b 24 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 [ 561.791377] RSP: 0018:ffff88872fc8fd10 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 561.838895] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 561.838916] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 561.838934] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 561.838948] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 561.838966] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 561.838979] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 561.838996] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 563.067028] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffffffffffffc RCX: ffffffff832dd314 [ 563.067030] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000297 [ 563.067032] RBP: ffff88872fc8fe88 R08: fffffbfff0b8213d R09: fffffbfff0b8213d [ 563.067034] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff0b8213c R12: 000000000000001c [ 563.408618] R13: ffff88dc61cc0f68 R14: ffff888102b94900 R15: ffff88dc61cc0f68 [ 563.408620] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888f7dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 563.408622] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 563.408623] CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 0000000f48a1a004 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [ 563.408625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 563.408627] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 563.904795] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 563.915796] PKRU: 55555554 [ 563.915797] Call Trace: [ 563.915807] cache_set_flush+0xd4/0x6d0 [bcache] [ 563.915812] process_one_work+0x856/0x1620 [ 564.001226] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 564.033563] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1d0 [ 564.033567] ? drain_workqueue+0x380/0x380 [ 564.033574] worker_thread+0x87/0xb80 [ 564.062823] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 564.118042] ? __kthread_parkme+0xb6/0x180 [ 564.118046] ? process_one_work+0x1620/0x1620 [ 564.118048] kthread+0x326/0x3e0 [ 564.118050] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0 [ 564.167066] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 564.252441] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 564.252447] Modules linked in: msr rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_iser ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib i40iw configfs iw_cm ib_cm libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi mlx4_ib ib_uverbs mlx4_en ib_core nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 vfat fat intel_rapl skx_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ses raid0 aesni_intel cdc_ether enclosure usbnet ipmi_ssif joydev aes_x86_64 i40e scsi_transport_sas mii bcache md_mod crypto_simd mei_me ioatdma crc64 ptp cryptd pcspkr i2c_i801 mlx4_core glue_helper pps_core mei lpc_ich dca wmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf nd_pmem dax_pmem nd_btt ipmi_msghandler device_dax pcc_cpufreq button hid_generic usbhid mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect xhci_pci sysimgblt fb_sys_fops xhci_hcd ttm megaraid_sas drm usbcore nfit libnvdimm sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua efivarfs [ 564.299390] bcache: bch_count_io_errors() nvme0n1: IO error on writing btree. [ 564.348360] CR2: 000000000000001c [ 564.348362] ---[ end trace b7f0e5cc7b2103b0 ]--- Therefore, it is not enough to only check whether c->gc_thread is NULL, we should use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() to check both NULL pointer and error value. This patch changes the above buggy code piece in this way, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(c->gc_thread)) kthread_stop(c->gc_thread); Signed-off-by: Coly Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3f167e1 ] ipv4_pdp_add() is called in RCU read-side critical section. So GFP_KERNEL should not be used in the function. This patch make ipv4_pdp_add() to use GFP_ATOMIC instead of GFP_KERNEL. Test commands: gtp-link add gtp1 & gtp-tunnel add gtp1 v1 100 200 1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2 Splat looks like: [ 130.618881] ============================= [ 130.626382] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 130.626994] 5.2.0-rc6+ #50 Not tainted [ 130.627622] ----------------------------- [ 130.628223] ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:266 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 130.629684] [ 130.629684] other info that might help us debug this: [ 130.629684] [ 130.631022] [ 130.631022] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 130.632136] 4 locks held by gtp-tunnel/1025: [ 130.632925] #0: 000000002b93c8b7 (cb_lock){++++}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 130.634159] foundriesio#1: 00000000f17bc999 (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0xfb/0x130 [ 130.635487] foundriesio#2: 00000000c644ed8e (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: gtp_genl_new_pdp+0x18c/0x1150 [gtp] [ 130.636936] foundriesio#3: 0000000007a1cde7 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: gtp_genl_new_pdp+0x187/0x1150 [gtp] [ 130.638348] [ 130.638348] stack backtrace: [ 130.639062] CPU: 1 PID: 1025 Comm: gtp-tunnel Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6+ #50 [ 130.641318] Call Trace: [ 130.641707] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 130.642252] ___might_sleep+0x2c0/0x3b0 [ 130.642862] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1cd/0x2b0 [ 130.643591] gtp_genl_new_pdp+0x6c5/0x1150 [gtp] [ 130.644371] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x63a/0x1030 [ 130.645074] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1090/0x1090 [ 130.645845] ? genl_unregister_family+0x630/0x630 [ 130.646592] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 130.647293] ? check_flags.part.40+0x440/0x440 [ 130.648099] genl_rcv_msg+0xa3/0x130 [ ... ] Fixes: 459aa66 ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a4c0b3d ] INFO: task syz-executor.5:8634 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 5.2.0-rc5+ foundriesio#3 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. syz-executor.5 D25632 8634 8224 0x00004004 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2818 [inline] __schedule+0x658/0x9e0 kernel/sched/core.c:3445 schedule+0x131/0x1d0 kernel/sched/core.c:3509 schedule_timeout+0x9a/0x2b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1783 do_wait_for_common+0x35e/0x5a0 kernel/sched/completion.c:83 __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:104 [inline] wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:115 [inline] wait_for_completion+0x47/0x60 kernel/sched/completion.c:136 kthread_stop+0xb4/0x150 kernel/kthread.c:559 io_sq_thread_stop fs/io_uring.c:2252 [inline] io_finish_async fs/io_uring.c:2259 [inline] io_ring_ctx_free fs/io_uring.c:2770 [inline] io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill+0x268/0x880 fs/io_uring.c:2834 io_uring_release+0x5d/0x70 fs/io_uring.c:2842 __fput+0x2e4/0x740 fs/file_table.c:280 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313 task_work_run+0x17e/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:113 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:185 [inline] exit_to_usermode_loop arch/x86/entry/common.c:168 [inline] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x402/0x4f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:199 syscall_return_slowpath+0x110/0x440 arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 do_syscall_64+0x126/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:304 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x412fb1 Code: 80 3b 7c 0f 84 c7 02 00 00 c7 85 d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 05 cf a6 24 00 49 8b 14 24 41 b9 cb 2a 44 00 48 89 ee 48 89 df <48> 85 c0 4c 0f 45 c8 45 31 c0 31 c9 e8 0e 5b 00 00 85 c0 41 89 c7 RSP: 002b:00007ffe7ee6a180 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000412fb1 RDX: 0000001b2d920000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000f3a3e1f8 R09: 00000000f3a3e1fc R10: 00007ffe7ee6a260 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000075c9a0 R13: 000000000075c9a0 R14: 0000000000024c00 R15: 000000000075bf2c ============================================= There is an wrong logic, when kthread_park running in front of io_sq_thread. CPU#0 CPU#1 io_sq_thread_stop: int kthread(void *_create): kthread_park() __kthread_parkme(self); <<< Wrong kthread_stop() << wait for self->exited << clear_bit KTHREAD_SHOULD_PARK ret = threadfn(data); | |- io_sq_thread |- kthread_should_park() << false |- schedule() <<< nobody wake up stuck CPU#0 stuck CPU#1 So, use a new variable sqo_thread_started to ensure that io_sq_thread run first, then io_sq_thread_stop. Reported-by: [email protected] Suggested-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jackie Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 8c6166c ] Prior to commit d021fab ("rds: rdma: add consumer reject") function "rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn" would always honor a rejected connection attempt by issuing a "rds_conn_drop". The commit mentioned above added a "break", eliminating the "fallthrough" case and made the "rds_conn_drop" rather conditional: Now it only happens if a "consumer defined" reject (i.e. "rdma_reject") carries an integer-value of "1" inside "private_data": if (!conn) break; err = (int *)rdma_consumer_reject_data(cm_id, event, &len); if (!err || (err && ((*err) == RDS_RDMA_REJ_INCOMPAT))) { pr_warn("RDS/RDMA: conn <%pI6c, %pI6c> rejected, dropping connection\n", &conn->c_laddr, &conn->c_faddr); conn->c_proposed_version = RDS_PROTOCOL_COMPAT_VERSION; rds_conn_drop(conn); } rdsdebug("Connection rejected: %s\n", rdma_reject_msg(cm_id, event->status)); break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ A number of issues are worth mentioning here: foundriesio#1) Previous versions of the RDS code simply rejected a connection by calling "rdma_reject(cm_id, NULL, 0);" So the value of the payload in "private_data" will not be "1", but "0". foundriesio#2) Now the code has become dependent on host byte order and sizing. If one peer is big-endian, the other is little-endian, or there's a difference in sizeof(int) (e.g. ILP64 vs LP64), the *err check does not work as intended. foundriesio#3) There is no check for "len" to see if the data behind *err is even valid. Luckily, it appears that the "rdma_reject(cm_id, NULL, 0)" will always carry 148 bytes of zeroized payload. But that should probably not be relied upon here. foundriesio#4) With the added "break;", we might as well drop the misleading "/* FALLTHROUGH */" comment. This commit does _not_ address issue foundriesio#2, as the sender would have to agree on a byte order as well. Here is the sequence of messages in this observed error-scenario: Host-A is pre-QoS changes (excluding the commit mentioned above) Host-B is post-QoS changes (including the commit mentioned above) foundriesio#1 Host-B issues a connection request via function "rds_conn_path_transition" connection state transitions to "RDS_CONN_CONNECTING" foundriesio#2 Host-A rejects the incompatible connection request (from foundriesio#1) It does so by calling "rdma_reject(cm_id, NULL, 0);" foundriesio#3 Host-B receives an "RDMA_CM_EVENT_REJECTED" event (from foundriesio#2) But since the code is changed in the way described above, it won't drop the connection here, simply because "*err == 0". foundriesio#4 Host-A issues a connection request foundriesio#5 Host-B receives an "RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST" event and ends up calling "rds_ib_cm_handle_connect". But since the state is already in "RDS_CONN_CONNECTING" (as of foundriesio#1) it will end up issuing a "rdma_reject" without dropping the connection: if (rds_conn_state(conn) == RDS_CONN_CONNECTING) { /* Wait and see - our connect may still be succeeding */ rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_connect_raced); } goto out; foundriesio#6 Host-A receives an "RDMA_CM_EVENT_REJECTED" event (from foundriesio#5), drops the connection and tries again (goto foundriesio#4) until it gives up. Tested-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gerd Rausch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit e88439d ] [BUG] Lockdep will report the following circular locking dependency: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.2.0-rc2-custom #24 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/8631 is trying to acquire lock: 000000002536438c (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}, at: btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> foundriesio#2 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x475/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_super+0x71/0x80 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x2bd/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110 kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x16/0xa0 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x80 deactivate_super+0x51/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x80 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x94/0xb0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd8/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x210/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> foundriesio#1 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x2da/0x730 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2691/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xa7/0x190 __mutex_lock+0x76/0x940 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x40/0x620 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshot+0x9d7/0xe60 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshots+0x94/0xb0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x415/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x496/0x4e0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xa90/0x2b40 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x6d0 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2 --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &fs_info->tree_log_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); lock(&fs_info->tree_log_mutex); lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by btrfs/8631: #0: 00000000ed8f23f6 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x28/0x60 foundriesio#1: 000000009fb1597a (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10/1){+.+.}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x70/0x4e0 [btrfs] foundriesio#2: 0000000088c5ad88 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_mksubvol+0x128/0x4e0 [btrfs] foundriesio#3: 000000009606fc3e (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x37a/0x520 [btrfs] foundriesio#4: 00000000f82bbdf5 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x40d/0xa00 [btrfs] foundriesio#5: 000000003d52cc23 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}, at: create_pending_snapshot+0x8b6/0xe60 [btrfs] [CAUSE] Due to the delayed subvolume creation, we need to call btrfs_qgroup_inherit() inside commit transaction code, with a lot of other mutex hold. This hell of lock chain can lead to above problem. [FIX] On the other hand, we don't really need to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock if we're in the context of create_pending_snapshot(). As in that context, we're the only one being able to modify qgroup. All other qgroup functions which needs qgroup_ioctl_lock are either holding a transaction handle, or will start a new transaction: Functions will start a new transaction(): * btrfs_quota_enable() * btrfs_quota_disable() Functions hold a transaction handler: * btrfs_add_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_del_qgroup_relation() * btrfs_create_qgroup() * btrfs_remove_qgroup() * btrfs_limit_qgroup() * btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call inside create_subvol() So we have a higher level protection provided by transaction, thus we don't need to always hold qgroup_ioctl_lock in btrfs_qgroup_inherit(). Only the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_subvol() needs to hold qgroup_ioctl_lock, while the btrfs_qgroup_inherit() call in create_pending_snapshot() is already protected by transaction. So the fix is to detect the context by checking trans->transaction->state. If we're at TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING, then we're in commit transaction context and no need to get the mutex. Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 foundriesio#1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 foundriesio#2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec foundriesio#3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 foundriesio#4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f foundriesio#5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 foundriesio#6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 foundriesio#7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] foundriesio#8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce foundriesio#11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 foundriesio#12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f foundriesio#13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 foundriesio#14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 foundriesio#1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 foundriesio#2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e foundriesio#3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 foundriesio#4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 foundriesio#5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd foundriesio#7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 foundriesio#8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 foundriesio#9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 foundriesio#10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 foundriesio#11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 foundriesio#12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 foundriesio#13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 foundriesio#14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b foundriesio#15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 foundriesio#16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 foundriesio#17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] foundriesio#18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 foundriesio#19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] foundriesio#20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…OL_MF_STRICT were specified commit d883544 upstream. When both MPOL_MF_MOVE* and MPOL_MF_STRICT was specified, mbind() should try best to migrate misplaced pages, if some of the pages could not be migrated, then return -EIO. There are three different sub-cases: 1. vma is not migratable 2. vma is migratable, but there are unmovable pages 3. vma is migratable, pages are movable, but migrate_pages() fails If foundriesio#1 happens, kernel would just abort immediately, then return -EIO, after a7f40cf ("mm: mempolicy: make mbind() return -EIO when MPOL_MF_STRICT is specified"). If foundriesio#3 happens, kernel would set policy and migrate pages with best-effort, but won't rollback the migrated pages and reset the policy back. Before that commit, they behaves in the same way. It'd better to keep their behavior consistent. But, rolling back the migrated pages and resetting the policy back sounds not feasible, so just make foundriesio#1 behave as same as foundriesio#3. Userspace will know that not everything was successfully migrated (via -EIO), and can take whatever steps it deems necessary - attempt rollback, determine which exact page(s) are violating the policy, etc. Make queue_pages_range() return 1 to indicate there are unmovable pages or vma is not migratable. The foundriesio#2 is not handled correctly in the current kernel, the following patch will fix it. [[email protected]: fix review comments from Vlastimil] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit cf3591e upstream. Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread"). Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex - i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen afterwards. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 foundriesio#1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 foundriesio#2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec foundriesio#3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 foundriesio#4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f foundriesio#5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 foundriesio#6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 foundriesio#7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] foundriesio#8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] foundriesio#10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce foundriesio#11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 foundriesio#12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f foundriesio#13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 foundriesio#14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device") Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…s_blob() [ Upstream commit 12fe3dd ] Calling ceph_buffer_put() in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() may result in freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by having this function returning the old blob buffer and have the callers of this function freeing it when the lock is released. The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/117. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 649, name: fsstress 4 locks held by fsstress/649: #0: 00000000a7478e7e (&type->s_umount_key#19){++++}, at: iterate_supers+0x77/0xf0 foundriesio#1: 00000000f8de1423 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x7b/0xc60 foundriesio#2: 00000000562f2b27 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3bd/0xc60 foundriesio#3: 00000000f83ce16a (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3ed/0xc60 CPU: 1 PID: 649 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.2.0+ #439 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 ___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1 vfree+0x4b/0x60 ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60 __ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x12b/0x170 __send_cap+0x302/0x540 ? __lock_acquire+0x23c/0x1e40 ? __mark_caps_flushing+0x15c/0x280 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30 ceph_check_caps+0x5f0/0xc60 ceph_flush_dirty_caps+0x7c/0x150 ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 ceph_sync_fs+0x5a/0x130 iterate_supers+0x8f/0xf0 ksys_sync+0x4f/0xb0 __ia32_sys_sync+0xa/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fc6409ab617 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 1b710b1 ] Sergey didn't like the locking order, uart_port->lock -> tty_port->lock uart_write (uart_port->lock) __uart_start pl011_start_tx pl011_tx_chars uart_write_wakeup tty_port_tty_wakeup tty_port_default tty_port_tty_get (tty_port->lock) but those code is so old, and I have no clue how to de-couple it after checking other locks in the splat. There is an onging effort to make all printk() as deferred, so until that happens, workaround it for now as a short-term fix. LTP: starting iogen01 (export LTPROOT; rwtest -N iogen01 -i 120s -s read,write -Da -Dv -n 2 500b:$TMPDIR/doio.f1.$$ 1000b:$TMPDIR/doio.f2.$$) WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ------------------------------------------------------ doio/49441 is trying to acquire lock: ffff008b7cff7290 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: rmqueue+0x138/0x2050 but task is already holding lock: 60ff000822352818 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at: start_flush_work+0xd8/0x3f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}: lock_acquire+0x320/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80 __queue_work+0x4b4/0xa10 queue_work_on+0xac/0x11c tty_schedule_flip+0x84/0xbc tty_flip_buffer_push+0x1c/0x28 pty_write+0x98/0xd0 n_tty_write+0x450/0x60c tty_write+0x338/0x474 __vfs_write+0x88/0x214 vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4 redirected_tty_write+0x90/0xdc do_loop_readv_writev+0x140/0x180 do_iter_write+0xe0/0x10c vfs_writev+0x134/0x1cc do_writev+0xbc/0x130 __arm64_sys_writev+0x58/0x8c el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240 el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250 el0_sync+0x164/0x180 -> #3 (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-.-.}: lock_acquire+0x320/0x360 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0x9c tty_port_tty_get+0x24/0x60 tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c tty_port_tty_wakeup+0x34/0x40 uart_write_wakeup+0x28/0x44 pl011_tx_chars+0x1b8/0x270 pl011_start_tx+0x24/0x70 __uart_start+0x5c/0x68 uart_write+0x164/0x1c8 do_output_char+0x33c/0x348 n_tty_write+0x4bc/0x60c tty_write+0x338/0x474 redirected_tty_write+0xc0/0xdc do_loop_readv_writev+0x140/0x180 do_iter_write+0xe0/0x10c vfs_writev+0x134/0x1cc do_writev+0xbc/0x130 __arm64_sys_writev+0x58/0x8c el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240 el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250 el0_sync+0x164/0x180 -> #2 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}: lock_acquire+0x320/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80 pl011_console_write+0xec/0x2cc console_unlock+0x794/0x96c vprintk_emit+0x260/0x31c vprintk_default+0x54/0x7c vprintk_func+0x218/0x254 printk+0x7c/0xa4 register_console+0x734/0x7b0 uart_add_one_port+0x734/0x834 pl011_register_port+0x6c/0xac sbsa_uart_probe+0x234/0x2ec platform_drv_probe+0xd4/0x124 really_probe+0x250/0x71c driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x200 __device_attach_driver+0xd8/0x188 bus_for_each_drv+0xbc/0x110 __device_attach+0x120/0x220 device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c bus_probe_device+0x54/0x100 device_add+0xae8/0xc2c platform_device_add+0x278/0x3b8 platform_device_register_full+0x238/0x2ac acpi_create_platform_device+0x2dc/0x3a8 acpi_bus_attach+0x390/0x3cc acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc acpi_bus_scan+0x7c/0xb0 acpi_scan_init+0xe4/0x304 acpi_init+0x100/0x114 do_one_initcall+0x348/0x6a0 do_initcall_level+0x190/0x1fc do_basic_setup+0x34/0x4c kernel_init_freeable+0x19c/0x260 kernel_init+0x18/0x338 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #1 (console_owner){-...}: lock_acquire+0x320/0x360 console_lock_spinning_enable+0x6c/0x7c console_unlock+0x4f8/0x96c vprintk_emit+0x260/0x31c vprintk_default+0x54/0x7c vprintk_func+0x218/0x254 printk+0x7c/0xa4 get_random_u64+0x1c4/0x1dc shuffle_pick_tail+0x40/0xac __free_one_page+0x424/0x710 free_one_page+0x70/0x120 __free_pages_ok+0x61c/0xa94 __free_pages_core+0x1bc/0x294 memblock_free_pages+0x38/0x48 __free_pages_memory+0xcc/0xfc __free_memory_core+0x70/0x78 free_low_memory_core_early+0x148/0x18c memblock_free_all+0x18/0x54 mem_init+0xb4/0x17c mm_init+0x14/0x38 start_kernel+0x19c/0x530 -> #0 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){..-.}: validate_chain+0xf6c/0x2e2c __lock_acquire+0x868/0xc2c lock_acquire+0x320/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80 rmqueue+0x138/0x2050 get_page_from_freelist+0x474/0x688 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3b4/0x18dc alloc_pages_current+0xd0/0xe0 alloc_slab_page+0x2b4/0x5e0 new_slab+0xc8/0x6bc ___slab_alloc+0x3b8/0x640 kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b4/0x588 __debug_object_init+0x778/0x8b4 debug_object_init_on_stack+0x40/0x50 start_flush_work+0x16c/0x3f0 __flush_work+0xb8/0x124 flush_work+0x20/0x30 xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x88/0x204 [xfs] xfs_log_force_lsn+0x128/0x1b8 [xfs] xfs_file_fsync+0x3c4/0x488 [xfs] vfs_fsync_range+0xb0/0xd0 generic_write_sync+0x80/0xa0 [xfs] xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x66c/0x6e4 [xfs] xfs_file_write_iter+0x1a0/0x218 [xfs] __vfs_write+0x1cc/0x214 vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4 ksys_write+0xb0/0x120 __arm64_sys_write+0x54/0x88 el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240 el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250 el0_sync+0x164/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &(&zone->lock)->rlock --> &(&port->lock)->rlock --> &pool->lock/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&pool->lock/1); lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock); lock(&pool->lock/1); lock(&(&zone->lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by doio/49441: #0: a0ff00886fc27408 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x118/0x1a4 #1: 8fff00080810dfe0 (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0x2a8/0x300 [xfs] #2: ffff9000129f2390 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #3: 60ff000822352818 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at: start_flush_work+0xd8/0x3f0 stack backtrace: CPU: 48 PID: 49441 Comm: doio Tainted: G W Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70 /C01_APACHE_MB , BIOS L50_5.13_1.11 06/18/2019 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0xe8/0x150 print_circular_bug+0x368/0x380 check_noncircular+0x28c/0x294 validate_chain+0xf6c/0x2e2c __lock_acquire+0x868/0xc2c lock_acquire+0x320/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80 rmqueue+0x138/0x2050 get_page_from_freelist+0x474/0x688 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3b4/0x18dc alloc_pages_current+0xd0/0xe0 alloc_slab_page+0x2b4/0x5e0 new_slab+0xc8/0x6bc ___slab_alloc+0x3b8/0x640 kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b4/0x588 __debug_object_init+0x778/0x8b4 debug_object_init_on_stack+0x40/0x50 start_flush_work+0x16c/0x3f0 __flush_work+0xb8/0x124 flush_work+0x20/0x30 xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x88/0x204 [xfs] xfs_log_force_lsn+0x128/0x1b8 [xfs] xfs_file_fsync+0x3c4/0x488 [xfs] vfs_fsync_range+0xb0/0xd0 generic_write_sync+0x80/0xa0 [xfs] xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x66c/0x6e4 [xfs] xfs_file_write_iter+0x1a0/0x218 [xfs] __vfs_write+0x1cc/0x214 vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4 ksys_write+0xb0/0x120 __arm64_sys_write+0x54/0x88 el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240 el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250 el0_sync+0x164/0x180 Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 576c75e ] With zpci_disable() working, lockdep detected a potential deadlock (lockdep output at the end). The deadlock is between recovering a PCI function via the /sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/recover attribute vs powering it off via /sys/bus/pci/slots/<slot>/power. The fix is analogous to the changes in commit 0ee223b ("scsi: core: Avoid that SCSI device removal through sysfs triggers a deadlock") that fixed a potential deadlock on removing a SCSI device via sysfs. [ 204.830107] ====================================================== [ 204.830109] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 204.830111] 5.5.0-rc2-06072-gbc03ecc9a672 #6 Tainted: G W [ 204.830112] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 204.830113] bash/1034 is trying to acquire lock: [ 204.830115] 0000000192a1a610 (kn->count#200){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5c/0xa8 [ 204.830122] but task is already holding lock: [ 204.830123] 00000000c16134a8 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}, at: pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x26/0x48 [ 204.830128] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 204.830129] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 204.830130] -> #1 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}: [ 204.830134] validate_chain+0x93a/0xd08 [ 204.830136] __lock_acquire+0x4ae/0x9d0 [ 204.830137] lock_acquire+0x114/0x280 [ 204.830140] __mutex_lock+0xa2/0x960 [ 204.830142] mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40 [ 204.830145] recover_store+0x4c/0xa8 [ 204.830147] kernfs_fop_write+0xe6/0x218 [ 204.830151] vfs_write+0xb0/0x1b8 [ 204.830152] ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 [ 204.830154] system_call+0xd8/0x2d8 [ 204.830155] -> #0 (kn->count#200){++++}: [ 204.830187] check_noncircular+0x1e6/0x240 [ 204.830189] check_prev_add+0xfc/0xdb0 [ 204.830190] validate_chain+0x93a/0xd08 [ 204.830192] __lock_acquire+0x4ae/0x9d0 [ 204.830193] lock_acquire+0x114/0x280 [ 204.830194] __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x2e4/0x360 [ 204.830196] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5c/0xa8 [ 204.830198] remove_files.isra.0+0x4c/0x98 [ 204.830199] sysfs_remove_group+0x66/0xc8 [ 204.830201] sysfs_remove_groups+0x46/0x68 [ 204.830204] device_remove_attrs+0x52/0x90 [ 204.830207] device_del+0x182/0x418 [ 204.830208] pci_remove_bus_device+0x8a/0x130 [ 204.830210] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x3a/0x48 [ 204.830212] disable_slot+0x68/0x100 [ 204.830213] power_write_file+0x7c/0x130 [ 204.830215] kernfs_fop_write+0xe6/0x218 [ 204.830217] vfs_write+0xb0/0x1b8 [ 204.830218] ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 [ 204.830220] system_call+0xd8/0x2d8 [ 204.830221] other info that might help us debug this: [ 204.830223] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 204.830224] CPU0 CPU1 [ 204.830225] ---- ---- [ 204.830226] lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock); [ 204.830227] lock(kn->count#200); [ 204.830229] lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock); [ 204.830231] lock(kn->count#200); [ 204.830233] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 204.830234] 4 locks held by bash/1034: [ 204.830235] #0: 00000001b6fbc498 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x158/0x1b8 [ 204.830239] #1: 000000018c9f5090 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xaa/0x218 [ 204.830242] #2: 00000001f7da0810 (kn->count#235){.+.+}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xb6/0x218 [ 204.830245] #3: 00000000c16134a8 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}, at: pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x26/0x48 [ 204.830248] stack backtrace: [ 204.830250] CPU: 2 PID: 1034 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 5.5.0-rc2-06072-gbc03ecc9a672 #6 [ 204.830252] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR) [ 204.830253] Call Trace: [ 204.830257] [<00000000c05e10c0>] show_stack+0x88/0xf0 [ 204.830260] [<00000000c112dca4>] dump_stack+0xa4/0xe0 [ 204.830261] [<00000000c0694c06>] check_noncircular+0x1e6/0x240 [ 204.830263] [<00000000c0695bec>] check_prev_add+0xfc/0xdb0 [ 204.830264] [<00000000c06971da>] validate_chain+0x93a/0xd08 [ 204.830266] [<00000000c06994c6>] __lock_acquire+0x4ae/0x9d0 [ 204.830267] [<00000000c069867c>] lock_acquire+0x114/0x280 [ 204.830269] [<00000000c09ca15c>] __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x2e4/0x360 [ 204.830270] [<00000000c09cb5c4>] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5c/0xa8 [ 204.830272] [<00000000c09cee14>] remove_files.isra.0+0x4c/0x98 [ 204.830274] [<00000000c09cf2ae>] sysfs_remove_group+0x66/0xc8 [ 204.830276] [<00000000c09cf356>] sysfs_remove_groups+0x46/0x68 [ 204.830278] [<00000000c0e3dfe2>] device_remove_attrs+0x52/0x90 [ 204.830280] [<00000000c0e40382>] device_del+0x182/0x418 [ 204.830281] [<00000000c0dcfd7a>] pci_remove_bus_device+0x8a/0x130 [ 204.830283] [<00000000c0dcfe92>] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x3a/0x48 [ 204.830285] [<00000000c0de7190>] disable_slot+0x68/0x100 [ 204.830286] [<00000000c0de6514>] power_write_file+0x7c/0x130 [ 204.830288] [<00000000c09cc846>] kernfs_fop_write+0xe6/0x218 [ 204.830290] [<00000000c08f3480>] vfs_write+0xb0/0x1b8 [ 204.830291] [<00000000c08f378c>] ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 [ 204.830293] [<00000000c1154374>] system_call+0xd8/0x2d8 [ 204.830294] INFO: lockdep is turned off. Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Feb 26, 2020
[ Upstream commit c34f6dc ] I see the following lockdep splat in the qcom pinctrl driver when attempting to suspend the device. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.4.2 #2 Tainted: G S -------------------------------------------- cat/6536 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff814787ccc0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x64/0x94 but task is already holding lock: ffffff81436740c0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x64/0x94 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by cat/6536: #0: ffffff8140e0c420 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0xc8/0x19c #1: ffffff8121eec480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x128/0x1f4 #2: ffffff8147cad668 (kn->count#263){.+.+}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x130/0x1f4 #3: ffffffd011446000 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}, at: pm_suspend+0x108/0x354 #4: ffffff814302b970 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __device_suspend+0x16c/0x420 #5: ffffff81436740c0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x64/0x94 #6: ffffff81479b8c10 (&pctrl->lock){....}, at: msm_gpio_irq_set_wake+0x48/0x7c stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 6536 Comm: cat Tainted: G S 5.4.2 #2 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x174 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0xdc/0x144 __lock_acquire+0x52c/0x2268 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x220 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x64/0x80 __irq_get_desc_lock+0x64/0x94 irq_set_irq_wake+0x40/0x144 msm_gpio_irq_set_wake+0x5c/0x7c set_irq_wake_real+0x40/0x5c irq_set_irq_wake+0x70/0x144 cros_ec_rtc_suspend+0x38/0x4c platform_pm_suspend+0x34/0x60 dpm_run_callback+0x64/0xcc __device_suspend+0x314/0x420 dpm_suspend+0xf8/0x298 dpm_suspend_start+0x84/0xb4 suspend_devices_and_enter+0xbc/0x628 pm_suspend+0x214/0x354 state_store+0xb0/0x108 kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x64 kernfs_fop_write+0x158/0x1f4 __vfs_write+0x54/0x18c vfs_write+0xdc/0x19c ksys_write+0x7c/0xe4 __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x2c el0_svc_common+0xa8/0x160 el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x10 This is because the msm_gpio_irq_set_wake() function calls irq_set_irq_wake() as a backup in case the irq comes in during the path to idle. Given that we're calling irqchip functions from within an irqchip we need to set the lockdep class to be different for this child controller vs. the default one that the parent irqchip gets. This used to be done before this driver was converted to hierarchical irq domains in commit e35a6ae ("pinctrl/msm: Setup GPIO chip in hierarchy") via the gpiochip_irq_map() function. With hierarchical irq domains this function has been replaced by gpiochip_hierarchy_irq_domain_alloc(). Therefore, set the lockdep class like was done previously in the irq domain path so we can avoid this lockdep warning. Fixes: fdd61a0 ("gpio: Add support for hierarchical IRQ domains") Cc: Thierry Reding <[email protected]> Cc: Brian Masney <[email protected]> Cc: Lina Iyer <[email protected]> Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Cc: Maulik Shah <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Feb 28, 2020
commit 52e29e3 upstream. The only time we actually leave the path spinning is if we're truncating a small amount and don't actually free an extent, which is not a common occurrence. We have to set the path blocking in order to add the delayed ref anyway, so the first extent we find we set the path to blocking and stay blocking for the duration of the operation. With the upcoming file extent map stuff there will be another case that we have to have the path blocking, so just swap to blocking always. Note: this patch also fixes a warning after 28553fa ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") got merged that inserts extent locks around truncation so the path must not leave spinning locks after btrfs_search_slot. [70.794783] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:565 [70.794834] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1141, name: rsync [70.794863] 5 locks held by rsync/1141: [70.794876] #0: ffff888417b9c408 (sb_writers#17){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [70.795030] #1: ffff888428de28e8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#13/1){+.+.}, at: lock_rename+0xf1/0x100 [70.795051] #2: ffff888417b9c608 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x394/0x560 [70.795124] #3: ffff888403081768 (btrfs-fs-01){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160 [70.795203] #4: ffff888403086568 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160 [70.795222] CPU: 5 PID: 1141 Comm: rsync Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-backup+ #2 [70.795362] Call Trace: [70.795374] dump_stack+0x71/0xa0 [70.795445] ___might_sleep.part.96.cold.106+0xa6/0xb6 [70.795459] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1d3/0x290 [70.795471] alloc_extent_state+0x22/0x1c0 [70.795544] __clear_extent_bit+0x3ba/0x580 [70.795557] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 [70.795569] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x339/0xe50 [70.795647] btrfs_evict_inode+0x269/0x540 [70.795659] ? dput.part.38+0x29/0x460 [70.795671] evict+0xcd/0x190 [70.795682] __dentry_kill+0xd6/0x180 [70.795754] dput.part.38+0x2ad/0x460 [70.795765] do_renameat2+0x3cb/0x540 [70.795777] __x64_sys_rename+0x1c/0x20 Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]> Fixes: 28553fa ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") CC: [email protected] # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 064ff66 ] After bond_release(), netdev_update_lockdep_key() should be called. But both ioctl path and attribute path don't call netdev_update_lockdep_key(). This patch adds missing netdev_update_lockdep_key(). Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond ip link add bond1 type bond ifenslave bond0 bond1 ifenslave -d bond0 bond1 ifenslave bond1 bond0 Splat looks like: [ 29.501182][ T1046] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 29.501945][ T1039] hardirqs last disabled at (1962): [<ffffffffac6c807f>] handle_mm_fault+0x13f/0x700 [ 29.503442][ T1046] 5.5.0+ #322 Not tainted [ 29.503447][ T1046] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 29.504277][ T1039] softirqs last enabled at (1180): [<ffffffffade00678>] __do_softirq+0x678/0x981 [ 29.505443][ T1046] ifenslave/1046 is trying to acquire lock: [ 29.505886][ T1039] softirqs last disabled at (1169): [<ffffffffac19c18a>] irq_exit+0x17a/0x1a0 [ 29.509997][ T1046] ffff88805d5da280 (&dev->addr_list_lock_key#3){+...}, at: dev_mc_sync_multiple+0x95/0x120 [ 29.511243][ T1046] [ 29.511243][ T1046] but task is already holding lock: [ 29.512192][ T1046] ffff8880460f2280 (&dev->addr_list_lock_key#4){+...}, at: bond_enslave+0x4482/0x47b0 [bonding] [ 29.514124][ T1046] [ 29.514124][ T1046] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 29.514124][ T1046] [ 29.517297][ T1046] [ 29.517297][ T1046] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 29.518231][ T1046] [ 29.518231][ T1046] -> #1 (&dev->addr_list_lock_key#4){+...}: [ 29.519076][ T1046] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 29.519588][ T1046] dev_mc_sync_multiple+0x95/0x120 [ 29.520208][ T1046] bond_enslave+0x448d/0x47b0 [bonding] [ 29.520862][ T1046] bond_option_slaves_set+0x1a3/0x370 [bonding] [ 29.521640][ T1046] __bond_opt_set+0x1ff/0xbb0 [bonding] [ 29.522438][ T1046] __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2b/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.523251][ T1046] bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x92/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.524082][ T1046] bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x8a/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.524959][ T1046] kernfs_fop_write+0x276/0x410 [ 29.525620][ T1046] vfs_write+0x197/0x4a0 [ 29.526218][ T1046] ksys_write+0x141/0x1d0 [ 29.526818][ T1046] do_syscall_64+0x99/0x4f0 [ 29.527430][ T1046] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 29.528265][ T1046] [ 29.528265][ T1046] -> #0 (&dev->addr_list_lock_key#3){+...}: [ 29.529272][ T1046] __lock_acquire+0x2d8d/0x3de0 [ 29.529935][ T1046] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 29.530638][ T1046] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 29.531187][ T1046] dev_mc_sync_multiple+0x95/0x120 [ 29.531790][ T1046] bond_enslave+0x448d/0x47b0 [bonding] [ 29.532451][ T1046] bond_option_slaves_set+0x1a3/0x370 [bonding] [ 29.533163][ T1046] __bond_opt_set+0x1ff/0xbb0 [bonding] [ 29.533789][ T1046] __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2b/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.534595][ T1046] bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x92/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.535500][ T1046] bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x8a/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.536379][ T1046] kernfs_fop_write+0x276/0x410 [ 29.537057][ T1046] vfs_write+0x197/0x4a0 [ 29.537640][ T1046] ksys_write+0x141/0x1d0 [ 29.538251][ T1046] do_syscall_64+0x99/0x4f0 [ 29.538870][ T1046] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 29.539659][ T1046] [ 29.539659][ T1046] other info that might help us debug this: [ 29.539659][ T1046] [ 29.540953][ T1046] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 29.540953][ T1046] [ 29.541883][ T1046] CPU0 CPU1 [ 29.542540][ T1046] ---- ---- [ 29.543209][ T1046] lock(&dev->addr_list_lock_key#4); [ 29.543880][ T1046] lock(&dev->addr_list_lock_key#3); [ 29.544873][ T1046] lock(&dev->addr_list_lock_key#4); [ 29.545863][ T1046] lock(&dev->addr_list_lock_key#3); [ 29.546525][ T1046] [ 29.546525][ T1046] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 29.546525][ T1046] [ 29.547542][ T1046] 5 locks held by ifenslave/1046: [ 29.548196][ T1046] #0: ffff88806044c478 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x3bb/0x4a0 [ 29.549248][ T1046] #1: ffff88805af00890 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x1cf/0x410 [ 29.550343][ T1046] #2: ffff88805b8b54b0 (kn->count#157){.+.+}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x1f2/0x410 [ 29.551575][ T1046] #3: ffffffffaecf4cf0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x5f/0xf0 [bonding] [ 29.552819][ T1046] #4: ffff8880460f2280 (&dev->addr_list_lock_key#4){+...}, at: bond_enslave+0x4482/0x47b0 [bonding] [ 29.554175][ T1046] [ 29.554175][ T1046] stack backtrace: [ 29.554907][ T1046] CPU: 0 PID: 1046 Comm: ifenslave Not tainted 5.5.0+ #322 [ 29.555854][ T1046] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 29.557064][ T1046] Call Trace: [ 29.557504][ T1046] dump_stack+0x96/0xdb [ 29.558054][ T1046] check_noncircular+0x371/0x450 [ 29.558723][ T1046] ? print_circular_bug.isra.35+0x310/0x310 [ 29.559486][ T1046] ? hlock_class+0x130/0x130 [ 29.560100][ T1046] ? __lock_acquire+0x2d8d/0x3de0 [ 29.560761][ T1046] __lock_acquire+0x2d8d/0x3de0 [ 29.561366][ T1046] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 29.562045][ T1046] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1d0 [ 29.562641][ T1046] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 29.563199][ T1046] ? dev_mc_sync_multiple+0x95/0x120 [ 29.563872][ T1046] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 29.564464][ T1046] ? dev_mc_sync_multiple+0x95/0x120 [ 29.565146][ T1046] dev_mc_sync_multiple+0x95/0x120 [ 29.565793][ T1046] bond_enslave+0x448d/0x47b0 [bonding] [ 29.566487][ T1046] ? bond_update_slave_arr+0x940/0x940 [bonding] [ 29.567279][ T1046] ? bstr_printf+0xc20/0xc20 [ 29.567857][ T1046] ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160 [ 29.568614][ T1046] ? deactivate_slab.isra.77+0x2c5/0x800 [ 29.569320][ T1046] ? check_chain_key+0x236/0x5d0 [ 29.569939][ T1046] ? sscanf+0x93/0xc0 [ 29.570442][ T1046] ? vsscanf+0x1e20/0x1e20 [ 29.571003][ T1046] bond_option_slaves_set+0x1a3/0x370 [bonding] [ ... ] Fixes: ab92d68 ("net: core: add generic lockdep keys") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Mar 24, 2020
[ Upstream commit 102210f ] rmnet_get_port() internally calls rcu_dereference_rtnl(), which checks RTNL. But rmnet_get_port() could be called by packet path. The packet path is not protected by RTNL. So, the suspicious RCU usage problem occurs. Test commands: modprobe rmnet ip netns add nst ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip link add rmnet0 link veth0 type rmnet mux_id 1 ip netns exec nst ip link add rmnet1 link veth1 type rmnet mux_id 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set rmnet1 up ip netns exec nst ip a a 192.168.100.2/24 dev rmnet1 ip link set veth0 up ip link set rmnet0 up ip a a 192.168.100.1/24 dev rmnet0 ping 192.168.100.2 Splat looks like: [ 146.630958][ T1174] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 146.631735][ T1174] 5.6.0-rc1+ #447 Not tainted [ 146.632387][ T1174] ----------------------------- [ 146.633151][ T1174] drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c:386 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() ! [ 146.634742][ T1174] [ 146.634742][ T1174] other info that might help us debug this: [ 146.634742][ T1174] [ 146.645992][ T1174] [ 146.645992][ T1174] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 146.646937][ T1174] 5 locks held by ping/1174: [ 146.647609][ T1174] #0: ffff8880c31dea70 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}, at: raw_sendmsg+0xab8/0x2980 [ 146.662463][ T1174] #1: ffffffff93925660 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x243/0x2150 [ 146.671696][ T1174] #2: ffffffff93925660 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x213/0x2940 [ 146.673064][ T1174] #3: ffff8880c19ecd58 (&dev->qdisc_running_key#7){+...}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x714/0x2150 [ 146.690358][ T1174] #4: ffff8880c5796898 (&dev->qdisc_xmit_lock_key#3){+.-.}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x1e2/0x1020 [ 146.699875][ T1174] [ 146.699875][ T1174] stack backtrace: [ 146.701091][ T1174] CPU: 0 PID: 1174 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1+ #447 [ 146.705215][ T1174] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 146.706565][ T1174] Call Trace: [ 146.707102][ T1174] dump_stack+0x96/0xdb [ 146.708007][ T1174] rmnet_get_port.part.9+0x76/0x80 [rmnet] [ 146.709233][ T1174] rmnet_egress_handler+0x107/0x420 [rmnet] [ 146.710492][ T1174] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x1e2/0x1020 [ 146.716193][ T1174] rmnet_vnd_start_xmit+0x3d/0xa0 [rmnet] [ 146.717012][ T1174] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x740 [ 146.717854][ T1174] sch_direct_xmit+0x265/0x1020 [ 146.718577][ T1174] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 146.719429][ T1174] ? dev_watchdog+0xac0/0xac0 [ 146.723738][ T1174] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x15fd/0x2940 [ 146.724469][ T1174] ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 146.725172][ T1174] __dev_queue_xmit+0x20c7/0x2940 [ ... ] Fixes: ceed73a ("drivers: net: ethernet: qualcomm: rmnet: Initial implementation") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 6c5d911 ] journal_head::b_transaction and journal_head::b_next_transaction could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, LTP: starting fsync04 /dev/zero: Can't open blockdev EXT4-fs (loop0): mounting ext3 file system using the ext4 subsystem EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null) ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer [jbd2] / jbd2_write_access_granted [jbd2] write to 0xffff99f9b1bd0e30 of 8 bytes by task 25721 on cpu 70: __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer+0xdd/0x210 [jbd2] __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:2569 jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x2d15/0x3f20 [jbd2] (inlined by) jbd2_journal_commit_transaction at fs/jbd2/commit.c:1034 kjournald2+0x13b/0x450 [jbd2] kthread+0x1cd/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 read to 0xffff99f9b1bd0e30 of 8 bytes by task 25724 on cpu 68: jbd2_write_access_granted+0x1b2/0x250 [jbd2] jbd2_write_access_granted at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1155 jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x60 [jbd2] __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x50/0x90 [ext4] ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used+0x158/0x620 [ext4] ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x54f/0xca0 [ext4] ext4_ind_map_blocks+0xc79/0x1b40 [ext4] ext4_map_blocks+0x3b4/0x950 [ext4] _ext4_get_block+0xfc/0x270 [ext4] ext4_get_block+0x3b/0x50 [ext4] __block_write_begin_int+0x22e/0xae0 __block_write_begin+0x39/0x50 ext4_write_begin+0x388/0xb50 [ext4] generic_perform_write+0x15d/0x290 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4] ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4] new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0 vfs_write+0x103/0x260 ksys_write+0x9d/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe 5 locks held by fsync04/25724: #0: ffff99f9911093f8 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x21c/0x260 #1: ffff99f9db4c0348 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}, at: ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x65/0x210 [ext4] #2: ffff99f5e7dfcf58 (jbd2_handle){++++}, at: start_this_handle+0x1c1/0x9d0 [jbd2] #3: ffff99f9db4c0168 (&ei->i_data_sem){++++}, at: ext4_map_blocks+0x176/0x950 [ext4] #4: ffffffff99086b40 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: jbd2_write_access_granted+0x4e/0x250 [jbd2] irq event stamp: 1407125 hardirqs last enabled at (1407125): [<ffffffff980da9b7>] __find_get_block+0x107/0x790 hardirqs last disabled at (1407124): [<ffffffff980da8f9>] __find_get_block+0x49/0x790 softirqs last enabled at (1405528): [<ffffffff98a0034c>] __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c softirqs last disabled at (1405521): [<ffffffff97cc67a2>] irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 68 PID: 25724 Comm: fsync04 Tainted: G L 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200221+ #7 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019 The plain reads are outside of jh->b_state_lock critical section which result in data races. Fix them by adding pairs of READ|WRITE_ONCE(). Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…event commit 7d36665 upstream. An eventfd monitors multiple memory thresholds of the cgroup, closes them, the kernel deletes all events related to this eventfd. Before all events are deleted, another eventfd monitors the memory threshold of this cgroup, leading to a crash: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 800000033058e067 P4D 800000033058e067 PUD 3355ce067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 14012 Comm: kworker/2:6 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4 #3 Hardware name: LENOVO 20AWS01K00/20AWS01K00, BIOS GLET70WW (2.24 ) 05/21/2014 Workqueue: events memcg_event_remove RIP: 0010:__mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0xb3/0x190 RSP: 0018:ffffb47e01c4fe18 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8bb223a8a000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8bb22fb83540 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffffb47e01c4fe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 000000000000000c R11: 071c71c71c71c71c R12: ffff8bb226aba880 R13: ffff8bb223a8a480 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8bb242680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 000000032c29c003 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: memcg_event_remove+0x32/0x90 process_one_work+0x172/0x380 worker_thread+0x49/0x3f0 kthread+0xf8/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 CR2: 0000000000000004 We can reproduce this problem in the following ways: 1. We create a new cgroup subdirectory and a new eventfd, and then we monitor multiple memory thresholds of the cgroup through this eventfd. 2. closing this eventfd, and __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event () will be called multiple times to delete all events related to this eventfd. The first time __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() is called, the kernel will clear all items related to this eventfd in thresholds-> primary. Since there is currently only one eventfd, thresholds-> primary becomes empty, so the kernel will set thresholds-> primary and hresholds-> spare to NULL. If at this time, the user creates a new eventfd and monitor the memory threshold of this cgroup, kernel will re-initialize thresholds-> primary. Then when __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event () is called for the second time, because thresholds-> primary is not empty, the system will access thresholds-> spare, but thresholds-> spare is NULL, which will trigger a crash. In general, the longer it takes to delete all events related to this eventfd, the easier it is to trigger this problem. The solution is to check whether the thresholds associated with the eventfd has been cleared when deleting the event. If so, we do nothing. [[email protected]: fix comment, per Kirill] Fixes: 907860e ("cgroups: make cftype.unregister_event() void-returning") Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 28936b6 upstream. inode->i_blocks could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_do_update_inode [ext4] / inode_add_bytes write to 0xffff9a00d4b982d0 of 8 bytes by task 22100 on cpu 118: inode_add_bytes+0x65/0xf0 __inode_add_bytes at fs/stat.c:689 (inlined by) inode_add_bytes at fs/stat.c:702 ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x418/0xca0 [ext4] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1a6b/0x27b0 [ext4] ext4_map_blocks+0x1a9/0x950 [ext4] _ext4_get_block+0xfc/0x270 [ext4] ext4_get_block_unwritten+0x33/0x50 [ext4] __block_write_begin_int+0x22e/0xae0 __block_write_begin+0x39/0x50 ext4_write_begin+0x388/0xb50 [ext4] ext4_da_write_begin+0x35f/0x8f0 [ext4] generic_perform_write+0x15d/0x290 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4] ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4] new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0 vfs_write+0x103/0x260 ksys_write+0x9d/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe read to 0xffff9a00d4b982d0 of 8 bytes by task 8 on cpu 65: ext4_do_update_inode+0x4a0/0xf60 [ext4] ext4_inode_blocks_set at fs/ext4/inode.c:4815 ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0xaf/0x160 [ext4] ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x129/0x3e0 [ext4] ext4_convert_unwritten_extents+0x253/0x2d0 [ext4] ext4_convert_unwritten_io_end_vec+0xc5/0x150 [ext4] ext4_end_io_rsv_work+0x22c/0x350 [ext4] process_one_work+0x54f/0xb90 worker_thread+0x80/0x5f0 kthread+0x1cd/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 4 locks held by kworker/u256:0/8: #0: ffff9a025abc4328 ((wq_completion)ext4-rsv-conversion){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0xb90 #1: ffffab5a862dbe20 ((work_completion)(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0xb90 #2: ffff9a025a9d0f58 (jbd2_handle){++++}, at: start_this_handle+0x1c1/0x9d0 [jbd2] #3: ffff9a00d4b985d8 (&(&ei->i_raw_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: ext4_do_update_inode+0xaa/0xf60 [ext4] irq event stamp: 3009267 hardirqs last enabled at (3009267): [<ffffffff980da9b7>] __find_get_block+0x107/0x790 hardirqs last disabled at (3009266): [<ffffffff980da8f9>] __find_get_block+0x49/0x790 softirqs last enabled at (3009230): [<ffffffff98a0034c>] __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c softirqs last disabled at (3009223): [<ffffffff97cc67a2>] irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 65 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u256:0 Tainted: G L 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200221+ #7 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019 Workqueue: ext4-rsv-conversion ext4_end_io_rsv_work [ext4] The plain read is outside of inode->i_lock critical section which results in a data race. Fix it by adding READ_ONCE() there. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a866759 ] This reverts commit 64e62bd. This commit ends up causing some lockdep splats due to trying to grab the payload lock while holding the mgr's lock: [ 54.010099] [ 54.011765] ====================================================== [ 54.018670] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 54.025577] 5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47 Not tainted [ 54.031610] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 54.038516] kworker/1:6/1040 is trying to acquire lock: [ 54.044354] ffff888272af3228 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}, at: drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.054957] [ 54.054957] but task is already holding lock: [ 54.061473] ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4 [ 54.071193] [ 54.071193] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 54.071193] [ 54.080334] [ 54.080334] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 54.088697] [ 54.088697] -> #1 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}: [ 54.094440] __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498 [ 54.099015] drm_dp_mst_topology_get_port_validated+0x25/0x80 [ 54.106018] drm_dp_update_payload_part1+0xa2/0x2e2 [ 54.112051] intel_mst_pre_enable_dp+0x144/0x18f [ 54.117791] intel_encoders_pre_enable+0x63/0x70 [ 54.123532] hsw_crtc_enable+0xa1/0x722 [ 54.128396] intel_update_crtc+0x50/0x194 [ 54.133455] skl_commit_modeset_enables+0x40c/0x540 [ 54.139485] intel_atomic_commit_tail+0x5f7/0x130d [ 54.145418] intel_atomic_commit+0x2c8/0x2d8 [ 54.150770] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x5a/0x70 [ 54.156801] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x2ab/0x833 [ 54.161862] drm_ioctl+0x2e5/0x424 [ 54.166242] vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x2f [ 54.170426] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5fb/0x61e [ 54.175096] ksys_ioctl+0x55/0x75 [ 54.179377] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x1e [ 54.184146] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x6d [ 54.188721] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 54.194946] [ 54.194946] -> #0 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}: [ 54.201463] [ 54.201463] other info that might help us debug this: [ 54.201463] [ 54.210410] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 54.210410] [ 54.217025] CPU0 CPU1 [ 54.222082] ---- ---- [ 54.227138] lock(&mgr->lock); [ 54.230643] lock(&mgr->payload_lock); [ 54.237742] lock(&mgr->lock); [ 54.244062] lock(&mgr->payload_lock); [ 54.248346] [ 54.248346] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 54.248346] [ 54.254959] 7 locks held by kworker/1:6/1040: [ 54.259822] #0: ffff888275c4f528 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2 [ 54.269451] #1: ffffc9000119beb0 ((work_completion)(&(&dev_priv->hotplug.hotplug_work)->work)){+.+.}, at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2 [ 54.282768] #2: ffff888272a403f0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x4b/0x2be [ 54.293368] #3: ffffffff824fc6c0 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x17e/0x2be [ 54.304061] #4: ffffc9000119bc58 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x40/0xfd [ 54.314855] #5: ffff888272a40470 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock+0x74/0xe2 [ 54.324385] #6: ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4 [ 54.334597] [ 54.334597] stack backtrace: [ 54.339464] CPU: 1 PID: 1040 Comm: kworker/1:6 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47 [ 54.348893] Hardware name: Google Fizz/Fizz, BIOS Google_Fizz.10139.39.0 01/04/2018 [ 54.357451] Workqueue: events i915_hotplug_work_func [ 54.362995] Call Trace: [ 54.365724] dump_stack+0x71/0x9c [ 54.369427] check_noncircular+0x91/0xbc [ 54.373809] ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66 [ 54.378286] ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66 [ 54.382763] ? lock_acquire+0x175/0x1ac [ 54.387048] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.393177] ? __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498 [ 54.397362] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.403492] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.409620] ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0x101 [ 54.414390] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.420517] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.426645] ? intel_digital_port_connected+0x34d/0x35c [ 54.432482] ? intel_dp_detect+0x227/0x44e [ 54.437056] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x49/0x9a [ 54.441242] ? drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x75/0xfd [ 54.446789] ? intel_encoder_hotplug+0x4b/0x97 [ 54.451752] ? intel_ddi_hotplug+0x61/0x2e0 [ 54.456423] ? mark_held_locks+0x53/0x68 [ 54.460803] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3a/0x51 [ 54.466347] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x187/0x1a4 [ 54.471310] ? drm_connector_list_iter_next+0x89/0x9a [ 54.476953] ? i915_hotplug_work_func+0x206/0x2be [ 54.482208] ? worker_thread+0x4d5/0x6e2 [ 54.486587] ? worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2 [ 54.490966] ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64 [ 54.495151] ? kthread+0x1e9/0x1f1 [ 54.498946] ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64 [ 54.503130] ? kthread_unpark+0x5e/0x5e [ 54.507413] ? ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 The proper fix for this is probably cleanup the VCPI allocations when we're enabling the topology, or on the first payload allocation. For now though, let's just revert. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]> Fixes: 64e62bd ("drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr") Cc: Sean Paul <[email protected]> Cc: Wayne Lin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit d3ec10a upstream. A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test: [12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock. That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is, 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed. Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit d3296fb ] We hit following warning when running tests on kernel compiled with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y: WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 4472 at mm/gup.c:2381 __get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200 CPU: 19 PID: 4472 Comm: dummy Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #3 RIP: 0010:__get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200 ... Call Trace: perf_prepare_sample+0xff1/0x1d90 perf_event_output_forward+0xe8/0x210 __perf_event_overflow+0x11a/0x310 __intel_pmu_pebs_event+0x657/0x850 intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm+0x7de/0x11d0 handle_pmi_common+0x1b2/0x650 intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x17b/0x370 perf_event_nmi_handler+0x40/0x60 nmi_handle+0x192/0x590 default_do_nmi+0x6d/0x150 do_nmi+0x2f9/0x3c0 nmi+0x8e/0xd7 While __get_user_pages_fast() is IRQ-safe, it calls access_ok(), which warns on: WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task() && !pagefault_disabled()) Peter suggested disabling page faults around __get_user_pages_fast(), which gets rid of the warning in access_ok() call. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 10a98cb upstream. Leaving PF_MEMALLOC set when exiting a kthread causes it to remain set during do_exit(). That can confuse things. In particular, if BSD process accounting is enabled, then do_exit() writes data to an accounting file. If that file has FS_SYNC_FL set, then this write occurs synchronously and can misbehave if PF_MEMALLOC is set. For example, if the accounting file is located on an XFS filesystem, then a WARN_ON_ONCE() in iomap_do_writepage() is triggered and the data doesn't get written when it should. Or if the accounting file is located on an ext4 filesystem without a journal, then a WARN_ON_ONCE() in ext4_write_inode() is triggered and the inode doesn't get written. Fix this in xfsaild() by using the helper functions to save and restore PF_MEMALLOC. This can be reproduced as follows in the kvm-xfstests test appliance modified to add the 'acct' Debian package, and with kvm-xfstests's recommended kconfig modified to add CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y: mkfs.xfs -f /dev/vdb mount /vdb touch /vdb/file chattr +S /vdb/file accton /vdb/file mkfs.xfs -f /dev/vdc mount /vdc umount /vdc It causes: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 336 at fs/iomap/buffered-io.c:1534 CPU: 1 PID: 336 Comm: xfsaild/vdc Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20191223_100556-anatol 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:iomap_do_writepage+0x16b/0x1f0 fs/iomap/buffered-io.c:1534 [...] Call Trace: write_cache_pages+0x189/0x4d0 mm/page-writeback.c:2238 iomap_writepages+0x1c/0x33 fs/iomap/buffered-io.c:1642 xfs_vm_writepages+0x65/0x90 fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c:578 do_writepages+0x41/0xe0 mm/page-writeback.c:2344 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xd2/0x120 mm/filemap.c:421 file_write_and_wait_range+0x71/0xc0 mm/filemap.c:760 xfs_file_fsync+0x7a/0x2b0 fs/xfs/xfs_file.c:114 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2867 [inline] xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x379/0x3b0 fs/xfs/xfs_file.c:691 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1901 [inline] new_sync_write+0x130/0x1d0 fs/read_write.c:483 __kernel_write+0x54/0xe0 fs/read_write.c:515 do_acct_process+0x122/0x170 kernel/acct.c:522 slow_acct_process kernel/acct.c:581 [inline] acct_process+0x1d4/0x27c kernel/acct.c:607 do_exit+0x83d/0xbc0 kernel/exit.c:791 kthread+0xf1/0x140 kernel/kthread.c:257 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 This bug was originally reported by syzbot at https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…f fs_info::journal_info commit fcc9973 upstream. [BUG] One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(sb_internal#2); lock(sb_internal#2); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7: #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80 #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80 #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] Call Trace: dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214 lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210 __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290 start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs] btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs] create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs] btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs] record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs] btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs] finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x632/0xb80 worker_thread+0x80/0x690 kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far. [CAUSE] This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using the current running one: btrfs_finish_ordered_io() |- btrfs_join_transaction() <<< Call #1 |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans() |- btrfs_reserve_extent() |- btrfs_join_transaction() <<< Call #2 Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing one, without trying to re-start a transaction. But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info. And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock. [FIX] Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized current::journal_info. CC: [email protected] # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 5cbf326 upstream. Use follow_pfn() to get the PFN of a PFNMAP VMA instead of assuming that vma->vm_pgoff holds the base PFN of the VMA. This fixes a bug where attempting to do VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA on an arbitrary PFNMAP'd region of memory calculates garbage for the PFN. Hilariously, this only got detected because the first "PFN" calculated by vaddr_get_pfn() is PFN 0 (vma->vm_pgoff==0), and iommu_iova_to_phys() uses PA==0 as an error, which triggers a WARN in vfio_unmap_unpin() because the translation "failed". PFN 0 is now unconditionally reserved on x86 in order to mitigate L1TF, which causes is_invalid_reserved_pfn() to return true and in turns results in vaddr_get_pfn() returning success for PFN 0. Eventually the bogus calculation runs into PFNs that aren't reserved and leads to failure in vfio_pin_map_dma(). The subsequent call to vfio_remove_dma() attempts to unmap PFN 0 and WARNs. WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 5130 at drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c:750 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x2e1/0x310 [vfio_iommu_type1] Modules linked in: vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio ... CPU: 8 PID: 5130 Comm: sgx Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc5-705d787c7fee-vfio+ #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Mehlow UP Server Platform/Moss Beach Server, BIOS CNLSE2R1.D00.X119.B49.1803010910 03/01/2018 RIP: 0010:vfio_unmap_unpin+0x2e1/0x310 [vfio_iommu_type1] Code: <0f> 0b 49 81 c5 00 10 00 00 e9 c5 fe ff ff bb 00 10 00 00 e9 3d fe RSP: 0018:ffffbeb5039ebda8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a55cbf8d480 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9a52b771c200 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00000000fffffff2 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9a51fa896000 R12: 0000000184010000 R13: 0000000184000000 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: ffff9a55cb66ea08 FS: 00007f15d3830b40(0000) GS:ffff9a55d5600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561cf39429e0 CR3: 000000084f75f005 CR4: 00000000003626e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: vfio_remove_dma+0x17/0x70 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0x9e3/0xa7b [vfio_iommu_type1] ksys_ioctl+0x92/0xb0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15d04c75d7 Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Fixes: 73fa0d1 ("vfio: Type1 IOMMU implementation") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 20a785a ] This BUG halt was reported a while back, but the patch somehow got missed: PID: 2879 TASK: c16adaa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "sctpn" #0 [f418dd28] crash_kexec at c04a7d8c #1 [f418dd7c] oops_end at c0863e02 #2 [f418dd90] do_invalid_op at c040aaca #3 [f418de28] error_code (via invalid_op) at c08631a5 EAX: f34baac0 EBX: 00000090 ECX: f418deb0 EDX: f5542950 EBP: 00000000 DS: 007b ESI: f34ba800 ES: 007b EDI: f418dea0 GS: 00e0 CS: 0060 EIP: c046fa5e ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010286 #4 [f418de5c] add_timer at c046fa5e #5 [f418de68] sctp_do_sm at f8db8c77 [sctp] #6 [f418df30] sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN at f8dcc1b5 [sctp] #7 [f418df48] inet_shutdown at c080baf9 #8 [f418df5c] sys_shutdown at c079eedf #9 [f418df70] sys_socketcall at c079fe88 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 0000000d ECX: bfceea90 EDX: 0937af98 DS: 007b ESI: 0000000c ES: 007b EDI: b7150ae4 SS: 007b ESP: bfceea7c EBP: bfceeaa8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: b775c424 ERR: 00000066 EFLAGS: 00000282 It appears that the side effect that starts the shutdown timer was processed multiple times, which can happen as multiple paths can trigger it. This of course leads to the BUG halt in add_timer getting called. Fix seems pretty straightforward, just check before the timer is added if its already been started. If it has mod the timer instead to min(current expiration, new expiration) Its been tested but not confirmed to fix the problem, as the issue has only occured in production environments where test kernels are enjoined from being installed. It appears to be a sane fix to me though. Also, recentely, Jere found a reproducer posted on list to confirm that this resolves the issues Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> CC: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]> CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 2b86cb8 upstream. Be there a platform with the following layout: Regular NIC | +----> DSA master for switch port | +----> DSA master for another switch port After changing DSA back to static lockdep class keys in commit 1a33e10 ("net: partially revert dynamic lockdep key changes"), this kernel splat can be seen: [ 13.361198] ============================================ [ 13.366524] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 13.371851] 5.7.0-rc4-02121-gc32a05ecd7af-dirty #988 Not tainted [ 13.377874] -------------------------------------------- [ 13.383201] swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 13.388004] ffff0000668ff298 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0 [ 13.397879] [ 13.397879] but task is already holding lock: [ 13.403727] ffff0000661a1698 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0 [ 13.413593] [ 13.413593] other info that might help us debug this: [ 13.420140] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 13.420140] [ 13.426075] CPU0 [ 13.428523] ---- [ 13.430969] lock(&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key); [ 13.435946] lock(&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key); [ 13.440924] [ 13.440924] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 13.440924] [ 13.446860] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 13.446860] [ 13.453668] 6 locks held by swapper/0/0: [ 13.457598] #0: ffff800010003de0 ((&idev->mc_ifc_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x400 [ 13.466593] #1: ffffd4d3fb478700 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: mld_sendpack+0x0/0x560 [ 13.474803] #2: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x64/0xb10 [ 13.483886] #3: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x6c/0xbe0 [ 13.492793] #4: ffff0000661a1698 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0 [ 13.503094] #5: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x6c/0xbe0 [ 13.512000] [ 13.512000] stack backtrace: [ 13.516369] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-02121-gc32a05ecd7af-dirty #988 [ 13.530421] Call trace: [ 13.532871] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d8 [ 13.536539] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 13.539862] dump_stack+0xe8/0x150 [ 13.543271] __lock_acquire+0x1030/0x1678 [ 13.547290] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x458 [ 13.550873] _raw_spin_lock+0x44/0x58 [ 13.554543] __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0 [ 13.558562] dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30 [ 13.562232] dsa_slave_xmit+0xe0/0x128 [ 13.565988] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x448 [ 13.570182] __dev_queue_xmit+0x808/0xbe0 [ 13.574200] dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30 [ 13.577869] neigh_resolve_output+0x15c/0x220 [ 13.582237] ip6_finish_output2+0x244/0xb10 [ 13.586430] __ip6_finish_output+0x1dc/0x298 [ 13.590709] ip6_output+0x84/0x358 [ 13.594116] mld_sendpack+0x2bc/0x560 [ 13.597786] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x210/0x390 [ 13.602153] call_timer_fn+0xcc/0x400 [ 13.605822] run_timer_softirq+0x588/0x6e0 [ 13.609927] __do_softirq+0x118/0x590 [ 13.613597] irq_exit+0x13c/0x148 [ 13.616918] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0 [ 13.621023] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x160 [ 13.624779] el1_irq+0xbc/0x180 [ 13.627927] cpuidle_enter_state+0xb4/0x4d0 [ 13.632120] cpuidle_enter+0x3c/0x50 [ 13.635703] call_cpuidle+0x44/0x78 [ 13.639199] do_idle+0x228/0x2c8 [ 13.642433] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x48 [ 13.646363] rest_init+0x1ac/0x280 [ 13.649773] arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c [ 13.653878] start_kernel+0x490/0x4bc Lockdep keys themselves were added in commit ab92d68 ("net: core: add generic lockdep keys"), and it's very likely that this splat existed since then, but I have no real way to check, since this stacked platform wasn't supported by mainline back then. >From Taehee's own words: This patch was considered that all stackable devices have LLTX flag. But the dsa doesn't have LLTX, so this splat happened. After this patch, dsa shares the same lockdep class key. On the nested dsa interface architecture, which you illustrated, the same lockdep class key will be used in __dev_queue_xmit() because dsa doesn't have LLTX. So that lockdep detects deadlock because the same lockdep class key is used recursively although actually the different locks are used. There are some ways to fix this problem. 1. using NETIF_F_LLTX flag. If possible, using the LLTX flag is a very clear way for it. But I'm so sorry I don't know whether the dsa could have LLTX or not. 2. using dynamic lockdep again. It means that each interface uses a separate lockdep class key. So, lockdep will not detect recursive locking. But this way has a problem that it could consume lockdep class key too many. Currently, lockdep can have 8192 lockdep class keys. - you can see this number with the following command. cat /proc/lockdep_stats lock-classes: 1251 [max: 8192] ... The [max: 8192] means that the maximum number of lockdep class keys. If too many lockdep class keys are registered, lockdep stops to work. So, using a dynamic(separated) lockdep class key should be considered carefully. In addition, updating lockdep class key routine might have to be existing. (lockdep_register_key(), lockdep_set_class(), lockdep_unregister_key()) 3. Using lockdep subclass. A lockdep class key could have 8 subclasses. The different subclass is considered different locks by lockdep infrastructure. But "lock-classes" is not counted by subclasses. So, it could avoid stopping lockdep infrastructure by an overflow of lockdep class keys. This approach should also have an updating lockdep class key routine. (lockdep_set_subclass()) 4. Using nonvalidate lockdep class key. The lockdep infrastructure supports nonvalidate lockdep class key type. It means this lockdep is not validated by lockdep infrastructure. So, the splat will not happen but lockdep couldn't detect real deadlock case because lockdep really doesn't validate it. I think this should be used for really special cases. (lockdep_set_novalidate_class()) Further discussion here: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/[email protected]/ There appears to be no negative side-effect to declaring lockless TX for the DSA virtual interfaces, which means they handle their own locking. So that's what we do to make the splat go away. Patch tested in a wide variety of cases: unicast, multicast, PTP, etc. Fixes: ab92d68 ("net: core: add generic lockdep keys") Suggested-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit aa880ad ] When we increase hardware queue count, blk_mq_update_queue_map will reset the mapping between cpu and hardware queue base on the hardware queue count(set->nr_hw_queues). The mapping cannot be reset if it encounters error in blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs, but the fallback flow will continue using it, then blk_mq_map_swqueue will touch a invalid memory, because the mapping points to a wrong hctx. blktest block/030: null_blk: module loaded Increasing nr_hw_queues to 8 fails, fallback to 1 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in blk_mq_map_swqueue+0x2f2/0x830 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000128 by task nproc/8541 CPU: 5 PID: 8541 Comm: nproc Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-dbg+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6 __kasan_report.cold+0x65/0xbb kasan_report+0x45/0x60 check_memory_region+0x15e/0x1c0 __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 blk_mq_map_swqueue+0x2f2/0x830 __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x3df/0x690 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x32/0x50 nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0xde/0x160 [null_blk] configfs_write_file+0x1c4/0x250 [configfs] __vfs_write+0x4c/0x90 vfs_write+0x14b/0x2d0 ksys_write+0xdd/0x180 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x310 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 Signed-off-by: Weiping Zhang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Bart van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Jul 10, 2020
[ Upstream commit f6766ff ] We need to check mddev->del_work before flush workqueu since the purpose of flush is to ensure the previous md is disappeared. Otherwise the similar deadlock appeared if LOCKDEP is enabled, it is due to md_open holds the bdev->bd_mutex before flush workqueue. kernel: [ 154.522645] ====================================================== kernel: [ 154.522647] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected kernel: [ 154.522650] 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 Tainted: G O kernel: [ 154.522651] ------------------------------------------------------ kernel: [ 154.522653] mdadm/2482 is trying to acquire lock: kernel: [ 154.522655] ffff888078529128 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522673] kernel: [ 154.522673] but task is already holding lock: kernel: [ 154.522675] ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522691] kernel: [ 154.522691] which lock already depends on the new lock. kernel: [ 154.522691] kernel: [ 154.522694] kernel: [ 154.522694] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: kernel: [ 154.522696] kernel: [ 154.522696] -> #4 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522704] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950 kernel: [ 154.522706] __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522708] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522709] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x2f/0x40 kernel: [ 154.522716] lock_rdev+0x3d/0x90 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522719] md_import_device+0xd6/0x1b0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522723] new_dev_store+0x15e/0x210 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522728] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522732] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522735] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522737] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0 kernel: [ 154.522745] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522749] kernel: [ 154.522749] -> #3 (&mddev->reconfig_mutex){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522752] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950 kernel: [ 154.522756] new_dev_store+0xc9/0x210 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522759] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522761] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522763] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522765] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0 kernel: [ 154.522767] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522769] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522770] kernel: [ 154.522770] -> #2 (kn->count#253){++++}: kernel: [ 154.522775] __kernfs_remove+0x253/0x2c0 kernel: [ 154.522778] kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30 kernel: [ 154.522780] kobject_del+0x28/0x60 kernel: [ 154.522783] mddev_delayed_delete+0x24/0x30 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522786] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5f0 kernel: [ 154.522788] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kernel: [ 154.522793] kthread+0x117/0x130 kernel: [ 154.522795] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 kernel: [ 154.522796] kernel: [ 154.522796] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&mddev->del_work)){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522800] process_one_work+0x27e/0x5f0 kernel: [ 154.522802] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kernel: [ 154.522804] kthread+0x117/0x130 kernel: [ 154.522806] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 kernel: [ 154.522807] kernel: [ 154.522807] -> #0 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522813] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522816] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522818] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522821] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522823] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522825] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522828] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380 kernel: [ 154.522831] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0 kernel: [ 154.522834] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 kernel: [ 154.522836] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522838] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80 kernel: [ 154.522840] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522842] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522844] kernel: [ 154.522844] other info that might help us debug this: kernel: [ 154.522844] kernel: [ 154.522846] Chain exists of: kernel: [ 154.522846] (wq_completion)md_misc --> &mddev->reconfig_mutex --> &bdev->bd_mutex kernel: [ 154.522846] kernel: [ 154.522850] Possible unsafe locking scenario: kernel: [ 154.522850] kernel: [ 154.522852] CPU0 CPU1 kernel: [ 154.522853] ---- ---- kernel: [ 154.522854] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522856] lock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522858] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522860] lock((wq_completion)md_misc); kernel: [ 154.522861] kernel: [ 154.522861] *** DEADLOCK *** kernel: [ 154.522861] kernel: [ 154.522864] 1 lock held by mdadm/2482: kernel: [ 154.522865] #0: ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522868] kernel: [ 154.522868] stack backtrace: kernel: [ 154.522873] CPU: 1 PID: 2482 Comm: mdadm Tainted: G O 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 kernel: [ 154.522875] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 kernel: [ 154.522878] Call Trace: kernel: [ 154.522881] dump_stack+0x8f/0xcb kernel: [ 154.522884] check_noncircular+0x194/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522888] ? __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522890] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522893] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522895] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522898] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522900] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522905] ? md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522908] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522910] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522912] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0 kernel: [ 154.522914] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522916] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0 kernel: [ 154.522918] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380 kernel: [ 154.522921] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0 kernel: [ 154.522923] ? __lock_acquire+0x380/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522926] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 kernel: [ 154.522929] ? __alloc_fd+0xe5/0x1f0 kernel: [ 154.522935] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x28c/0x630 kernel: [ 154.522939] ? do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522941] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522944] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80 kernel: [ 154.522946] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522948] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522951] RIP: 0033:0x7f98d279d9ae And md_alloc also flushed the same workqueue, but the thing is different here. Because all the paths call md_alloc don't hold bdev->bd_mutex, and the flush is necessary to avoid race condition, so leave it as it is. Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Jul 10, 2020
[ Upstream commit c312446 ] The mpath disk node takes a reference on the request mpath request queue when adding live path to the mpath gendisk. However if we connected to an inaccessible path device_add_disk is not called, so if we disconnect and remove the mpath gendisk we endup putting an reference on the request queue that was never taken [1]. Fix that to check if we ever added a live path (using NVME_NS_HEAD_HAS_DISK flag) and if not, clear the disk->queue reference. [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1372 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa6/0xf0 CPU: 1 PID: 1372 Comm: nvme Tainted: G O 5.7.0-rc2+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa6/0xf0 RSP: 0018:ffffb29e8053bdc0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b7a2f4fc060 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8b7a3ec99980 RBP: ffff8b7a2f4fc000 R08: 00000000000002e1 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: fffffffffffffff2 R14: ffffb29e8053bf08 R15: ffff8b7a320e2da0 FS: 00007f135d4ca800(0000) GS:ffff8b7a3ec80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005651178c0c30 CR3: 000000003b650005 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: disk_release+0xa2/0xc0 device_release+0x28/0x80 kobject_put+0xa5/0x1b0 nvme_put_ns_head+0x26/0x70 [nvme_core] nvme_put_ns+0x30/0x60 [nvme_core] nvme_remove_namespaces+0x9b/0xe0 [nvme_core] nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x43/0x5c [nvme_core] nvme_sysfs_delete.cold+0x8/0xd [nvme_core] kernfs_fop_write+0xc1/0x1a0 vfs_write+0xb6/0x1a0 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Reported-by: Anton Eidelman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Anton Eidelman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Jul 30, 2020
commit 0bd0db4 upstream. The `INSN_CONFIG` comedi instruction with sub-instruction code `INSN_CONFIG_DIGITAL_TRIG` includes a base channel in `data[3]`. This is used as a right shift amount for other bitmask values without being checked. Shift amounts greater than or equal to 32 will result in undefined behavior. Add code to deal with this. Fixes: 33cdce6 ("staging: comedi: addi_apci_1032: conform to new INSN_CONFIG_DIGITAL_TRIG") Cc: <[email protected]> #3.8+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Jul 30, 2020
commit 926234f upstream. The `INSN_CONFIG` comedi instruction with sub-instruction code `INSN_CONFIG_DIGITAL_TRIG` includes a base channel in `data[3]`. This is used as a right shift amount for other bitmask values without being checked. Shift amounts greater than or equal to 32 will result in undefined behavior. Add code to deal with this. Fixes: 1e15687 ("staging: comedi: addi_apci_1564: add Change-of-State interrupt subdevice and required functions") Cc: <[email protected]> #3.17+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Jul 30, 2020
commit be6577a upstream. Stalls are quite frequent with recent kernels. I enabled CONFIG_SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR and I caught the following stall: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [cc1:22803] CPU: 0 PID: 22803 Comm: cc1 Not tainted 5.6.17+ #3 Hardware name: 9000/800/rp3440 IAOQ[0]: d_alloc_parallel+0x384/0x688 IAOQ[1]: d_alloc_parallel+0x388/0x688 RP(r2): d_alloc_parallel+0x134/0x688 Backtrace: [<000000004036974c>] __lookup_slow+0xa4/0x200 [<0000000040369fc8>] walk_component+0x288/0x458 [<000000004036a9a0>] path_lookupat+0x88/0x198 [<000000004036e748>] filename_lookup+0xa0/0x168 [<000000004036e95c>] user_path_at_empty+0x64/0x80 [<000000004035d93c>] vfs_statx+0x104/0x158 [<000000004035dfcc>] __do_sys_lstat64+0x44/0x80 [<000000004035e5a0>] sys_lstat64+0x20/0x38 [<0000000040180054>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x14 The code was stuck in this loop in d_alloc_parallel: 4037d414: 0e 00 10 dc ldd 0(r16),ret0 4037d418: c7 fc 5f ed bb,< ret0,1f,4037d414 <d_alloc_parallel+0x384> 4037d41c: 08 00 02 40 nop This is the inner loop of bit_spin_lock which is called by hlist_bl_unlock in d_alloc_parallel: static inline void bit_spin_lock(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) { /* * Assuming the lock is uncontended, this never enters * the body of the outer loop. If it is contended, then * within the inner loop a non-atomic test is used to * busywait with less bus contention for a good time to * attempt to acquire the lock bit. */ preempt_disable(); #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) while (unlikely(test_and_set_bit_lock(bitnum, addr))) { preempt_enable(); do { cpu_relax(); } while (test_bit(bitnum, addr)); preempt_disable(); } #endif __acquire(bitlock); } After consideration, I realized that we must be losing bit unlocks. Then, I noticed that we missed defining atomic64_set_release(). Adding this define fixes the stalls in bit operations. Signed-off-by: Dave Anglin <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Aug 11, 2020
[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Aug 25, 2020
[ Upstream commit ab0db04 ] When running with -o enospc_debug you can get the following splat if one of the dump_space_info's trip ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G OE ------------------------------------------------------ dd/563090 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9e7dbf4f1e18 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3c/0x3c0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x7ef/0x13b0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x340 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x122/0x530 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x106/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x55/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&space_info->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_block_rsv_release+0x1a6/0x3f0 [btrfs] btrfs_inode_rsv_release+0x4f/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent+0x155/0x480 [btrfs] clear_state_bit+0x81/0x1a0 [btrfs] __clear_extent_bit+0x25c/0x5d0 [btrfs] clear_extent_bit+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x2b7/0x3c0 [btrfs] truncate_cleanup_page+0x47/0xe0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x238/0x840 truncate_pagecache+0x44/0x60 btrfs_setattr+0x202/0x5e0 [btrfs] notify_change+0x33b/0x490 do_truncate+0x76/0xd0 path_openat+0x687/0xa10 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x215/0x2d0 do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&tree->lock#2){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 find_first_extent_bit+0x32/0x150 [btrfs] write_pinned_extent_entries.isra.0+0xc5/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x172/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7a/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x286/0x3b0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x245/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0xf9/0x2f5 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctl->tree_lock --> &space_info->lock --> &cache->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cache->lock); lock(&space_info->lock); lock(&cache->lock); lock(&ctl->tree_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by dd/563090: #0: ffff9e7e21d18448 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x195/0x200 #1: ffff9e7dd0410ed8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#19){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_file_write_iter+0x86/0x610 [btrfs] #2: ffff9e7e21d18638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5b0 [btrfs] #3: ffff9e7e1f05d688 (&cur_trans->cache_write_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x158/0x4f0 [btrfs] #4: ffff9e7e2284ddb8 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0x69/0x120 [btrfs] #5: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 563090 Comm: dd Tainted: G OE 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x30/0x40 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] ? btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x1d/0x60 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xa8/0xd0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because we're holding the block_group->lock while trying to dump the free space cache. However we don't need this lock, we just need it to read the values for the printk, so move the free space cache dumping outside of the block group lock. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…onfig [ Upstream commit 8a473c3 ] When the cml_rt1011_rt5682_dailink[].codecs pointer is overridden by a quirk with a devm allocated structure and the probe is deferred, in the next probe we will see an use-after-free condition (verified with KASAN). This can be avoided by using statically allocated configurations - which simplifies the code quite a bit as well. KASAN issue fixed. [ 23.301373] cml_rt1011_rt5682 cml_rt1011_rt5682: sof_rt1011_quirk = f [ 23.301875] ================================================================== [ 23.302018] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_cml_rt1011_probe+0x23a/0x3d0 [snd_soc_cml_rt1011_rt5682] [ 23.302178] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881ec6acae0 by task kworker/0:2/105 [ 23.302320] CPU: 0 PID: 105 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc7-test+ #3 [ 23.302322] Hardware name: Google Helios/Helios, BIOS 01/21/2020 [ 23.302329] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func [ 23.302331] Call Trace: [ 23.302339] dump_stack+0x76/0xa0 [ 23.302345] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x43e [ 23.302351] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0 [ 23.302355] ? _raw_spin_trylock_bh+0xf0/0xf0 [ 23.302362] ? snd_cml_rt1011_probe+0x23a/0x3d0 [snd_soc_cml_rt1011_rt5682] [ 23.302365] __kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x86 [ 23.302371] ? snd_cml_rt1011_probe+0x23a/0x3d0 [snd_soc_cml_rt1011_rt5682] [ 23.302375] kasan_report+0x38/0x50 [ 23.302382] snd_cml_rt1011_probe+0x23a/0x3d0 [snd_soc_cml_rt1011_rt5682] [ 23.302389] platform_drv_probe+0x66/0xc0 Fixes: 629ba12 ("ASoC: Intel: boards: split woofer and tweeter support") Suggested-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fred Oh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 18c850f upstream. There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex. Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies, which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock: ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}: __sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x60/0x80 _copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0 get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4 sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180 __blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550 blkdev_get+0x38/0x150 do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0 path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00 do_filp_open+0x75/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 __blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550 blkdev_get+0x85/0x150 blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70 btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-journal/509: #0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0 #1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] #2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc8 check_noncircular+0x134/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe Code: Bad RIP value. Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list while the file system is running. However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the ->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the ->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change the devices at this point. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [ add some comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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… set [ Upstream commit 1101c87 ] We received an error report that perf-record caused 'Segmentation fault' on a newly system (e.g. on the new installed ubuntu). (gdb) backtrace #0 __read_once_size (size=4, res=<synthetic pointer>, p=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/linux/compiler.h:139 #1 atomic_read (v=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/asm/../../arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28 #2 refcount_read (r=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/linux/refcount.h:65 #3 perf_mmap__read_init (map=map@entry=0x0) at mmap.c:177 #4 0x0000561ce5c0de39 in perf_evlist__poll_thread (arg=0x561ce68584d0) at util/sideband_evlist.c:62 #5 0x00007fad78491609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #6 0x00007fad7823c103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 The root cause is, evlist__add_bpf_sb_event() just returns 0 if HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT is not defined (inline function path). So it will not create a valid evsel for side-band event. But perf-record still creates BPF side band thread to process the side-band event, then the error happpens. We can reproduce this issue by removing the libelf-dev. e.g. 1. apt-get remove libelf-dev 2. perf record -a -- sleep 1 root@test:~# ./perf record -a -- sleep 1 perf: Segmentation fault Obtained 6 stack frames. ./perf(+0x28eee8) [0x5562d6ef6ee8] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x46210) [0x7fbfdc65f210] ./perf(+0x342e74) [0x5562d6faae74] ./perf(+0x257e39) [0x5562d6ebfe39] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(+0x9609) [0x7fbfdc990609] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(clone+0x43) [0x7fbfdc73b103] Segmentation fault (core dumped) To fix this issue, 1. We either install the missing libraries to let HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT be defined. e.g. apt-get install libelf-dev and install other related libraries. 2. Use this patch to skip the side-band event setup if HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT is not set. Committer notes: The side band thread is not used just with BPF, it is also used with --switch-output-event, so narrow the ifdef to the BPF specific part. Fixes: 23cbb41 ("perf record: Move side band evlist setup to separate routine") Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Jin Yao <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Aug 25, 2020
[ Upstream commit ab0db04 ] When running with -o enospc_debug you can get the following splat if one of the dump_space_info's trip ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G OE ------------------------------------------------------ dd/563090 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9e7dbf4f1e18 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3c/0x3c0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x7ef/0x13b0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x340 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x122/0x530 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x106/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x55/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&space_info->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_block_rsv_release+0x1a6/0x3f0 [btrfs] btrfs_inode_rsv_release+0x4f/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent+0x155/0x480 [btrfs] clear_state_bit+0x81/0x1a0 [btrfs] __clear_extent_bit+0x25c/0x5d0 [btrfs] clear_extent_bit+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x2b7/0x3c0 [btrfs] truncate_cleanup_page+0x47/0xe0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x238/0x840 truncate_pagecache+0x44/0x60 btrfs_setattr+0x202/0x5e0 [btrfs] notify_change+0x33b/0x490 do_truncate+0x76/0xd0 path_openat+0x687/0xa10 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x215/0x2d0 do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&tree->lock#2){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 find_first_extent_bit+0x32/0x150 [btrfs] write_pinned_extent_entries.isra.0+0xc5/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x172/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7a/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x286/0x3b0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x245/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0xf9/0x2f5 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctl->tree_lock --> &space_info->lock --> &cache->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cache->lock); lock(&space_info->lock); lock(&cache->lock); lock(&ctl->tree_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by dd/563090: #0: ffff9e7e21d18448 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x195/0x200 #1: ffff9e7dd0410ed8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#19){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_file_write_iter+0x86/0x610 [btrfs] #2: ffff9e7e21d18638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5b0 [btrfs] #3: ffff9e7e1f05d688 (&cur_trans->cache_write_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x158/0x4f0 [btrfs] #4: ffff9e7e2284ddb8 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0x69/0x120 [btrfs] #5: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 563090 Comm: dd Tainted: G OE 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x30/0x40 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] ? btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x1d/0x60 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xa8/0xd0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because we're holding the block_group->lock while trying to dump the free space cache. However we don't need this lock, we just need it to read the values for the printk, so move the free space cache dumping outside of the block group lock. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 18c850f upstream. There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex. Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies, which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock: ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}: __sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x60/0x80 _copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0 get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4 sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180 __blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550 blkdev_get+0x38/0x150 do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0 path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00 do_filp_open+0x75/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 __blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550 blkdev_get+0x85/0x150 blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70 btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-journal/509: #0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0 #1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] #2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc8 check_noncircular+0x134/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe Code: Bad RIP value. Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list while the file system is running. However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the ->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the ->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change the devices at this point. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [ add some comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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This reverts commit 92d82a3.
DMA on the HiKey and HiKey 960 has some issues currently. When this is
enabled, we see the following messages:
Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x1001 tx timeout
Reverting for now. Needs investigation.
Signed-off-by: Michael Scott [email protected]