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feat(sandbox,podman): trust corporate CA for https:// proxies and intercepted TLS
The corporate proxy chaining only accepted plain http:// proxy URLs, so operators whose forward proxy terminates TLS with a private corporate CA had no way to reach it, and TLS-intercepting proxies (mitmproxy, squid ssl-bump) that re-sign tunneled server certificates broke every upstream handshake after CONNECT. The supervisor now accepts https:// proxy URLs: it wraps the connection to the proxy in TLS before the CONNECT handshake, verifying the proxy certificate against the built-in Mozilla roots, the system CA bundle, and an optional operator corporate CA bundle. The upstream dial returns a Plain/Tls stream enum consumed generically by the relay paths. The corporate CA is delivered as a driver-supplied command-line argument (--upstream-proxy-ca-bundle), never an environment variable, matching the hardened proxy-config model where a sandbox image cannot influence the operator's egress boundary. It is folded into the sandbox combined trust bundle (write_ca_files) and the L7 upstream verification store (build_upstream_client_config) at startup, so intercepted upstream handshakes succeed and sandbox workloads trust the re-signed certificates. Configuration is fail-closed: a CA bundle set without a proxy, or an unreadable or certificate-free file, is fatal rather than silently weakening the trust boundary. The shared parse_upstream_proxy_url validator accepts https:// (recording the scheme so the driver and supervisor agree), keeping the explicit-port requirement. The Podman driver gains a proxy_ca_bundle operator setting (TOML, --sandbox-proxy-ca-bundle, OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CA_BUNDLE) that bind-mounts the host PEM read-only into the sandbox (a CA certificate is not secret) and points --upstream-proxy-ca-bundle at it, with a create-time readability check. The standalone dev gateway task passes OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CA_BUNDLE through to the generated podman config, so a local gateway can be pointed at a TLS-intercepting proxy without hand-editing the regenerated TOML. Refs NVIDIA#1792 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <[email protected]>
1 parent 8d67250 commit a13c4dc

13 files changed

Lines changed: 1116 additions & 95 deletions

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‎architecture/sandbox.md‎

Lines changed: 28 additions & 10 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -197,9 +197,12 @@ loopback always dial directly; add driver-injected host aliases (e.g.
197197
proxy cannot reach the container host. `NO_PROXY` matching is port-aware and
198198
resolution-aware: an entry with a `:port` qualifier only bypasses that port,
199199
and IP/CIDR entries also match hostnames through their validated resolved
200-
addresses, with the direct dial limited to the addresses the entry contains. Only `http://` proxy URLs in explicit
201-
`http://host:port` form are supported — the scheme and port are both
202-
required, and a path, query, or fragment is rejected. Local DNS resolution
200+
addresses, with the direct dial limited to the addresses the entry contains. `http://` and `https://` proxy URLs in explicit
201+
`scheme://host:port` form are supported — the scheme and port are both
202+
required, and a path, query, or fragment is rejected. For an `https://` proxy
203+
the supervisor wraps the connection to the proxy in TLS before the CONNECT
204+
handshake, verifying the proxy certificate against the built-in and system
205+
roots plus the optional operator CA bundle (see below). Local DNS resolution
203206
and SSRF validation still run before the proxied dial, and the CONNECT
204207
target sent to the corporate proxy is a validated resolved address, so the
205208
proxy performs no DNS resolution of its own and the tunnel stays bound to
@@ -216,16 +219,31 @@ enhancement and out of scope.) The workload child's proxy variables are
216219
unaffected — they are always rewritten to point at the local policy proxy.
217220

218221
The configuration is fail-closed: a setting that is present but invalid — an
219-
empty value, an unsupported or malformed proxy URL, an unreadable auth file,
220-
a malformed credential, or an auth file or `NO_PROXY` list set while no proxy
221-
URL is configured — is fatal to supervisor startup instead of being treated
222-
as unset, so a misconfiguration can never silently degrade to direct dialing
223-
or unauthenticated proxy access. Only an omitted argument means "no proxy".
224-
The driver validates the same rules at sandbox-create time through
225-
validators shared with the supervisor
222+
empty value, an unsupported or malformed proxy URL, an unreadable auth file or
223+
CA bundle, a malformed credential, or an auth file, `NO_PROXY` list, or CA
224+
bundle set while no proxy URL is configured — is fatal to supervisor startup
225+
instead of being treated as unset, so a misconfiguration can never silently
226+
degrade to direct dialing or unauthenticated proxy access. Only an omitted
227+
argument means "no proxy". The driver validates the same rules at
228+
sandbox-create time through validators shared with the supervisor
226229
(`openshell_core::driver_utils::parse_upstream_proxy_url` and
227230
`parse_upstream_proxy_credential`).
228231

232+
An optional operator CA bundle (`--upstream-proxy-ca-bundle`, a PEM path the
233+
driver bind-mounts read-only into the sandbox) extends the trust boundary for
234+
corporate proxies. A CA certificate is not secret, so unlike the auth file it
235+
travels as a plain read-only bind mount rather than a driver secret. It is
236+
trusted in two places: the TLS handshake with an `https://` proxy, and —
237+
because a TLS-intercepting proxy (mitmproxy, squid `ssl-bump`) re-signs
238+
tunneled server certificates with the same CA — the sandbox combined trust
239+
bundle (`write_ca_files`) and the L7 upstream re-encryption store
240+
(`build_upstream_client_config`). Folding it into both means intercepted
241+
upstream handshakes succeed and sandbox workload processes trust the re-signed
242+
certificates; trusting it only for the proxy-listener handshake would leave
243+
every intercepted upstream connection failing. The bundle is valid with either
244+
an `http://` or `https://` proxy (an intercepting proxy can be reached over
245+
plain HTTP) and is fail-closed: an unreadable or certificate-free file is fatal.
246+
229247
Proxy credentials are never embedded in the URL: an inline `user:pass@` is
230248
rejected because it would be stored in `gateway.toml` and exposed in container
231249
metadata. Operators supply credentials via `proxy_auth_file`; the driver

‎crates/openshell-core/src/driver_utils.rs‎

Lines changed: 107 additions & 26 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
77

88
use crate::proto::compute::v1::{DriverSandbox, GetCapabilitiesResponse};
99

10-
pub use crate::container_paths::{
11-
SANDBOX_TOKEN_MOUNT_PATH, SUPERVISOR_CONTAINER_BINARY, SUPERVISOR_CONTAINER_DIR,
12-
TLS_CA_MOUNT_PATH, TLS_CERT_MOUNT_PATH, TLS_KEY_MOUNT_PATH, UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_MOUNT_PATH,
13-
};
14-
1510
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1611
// Sandbox container/pod label keys (openshell.ai/ namespace)
1712
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -54,6 +49,60 @@ pub fn openshell_sandbox_label_selector() -> String {
5449
/// path used when building the `openshell-sandbox` image layer.
5550
pub const SUPERVISOR_IMAGE_BINARY_PATH: &str = "/openshell-sandbox";
5651

52+
/// Directory inside sandbox containers where the supervisor binary is mounted.
53+
///
54+
/// Compute drivers that side-load the supervisor into a shared volume mount
55+
/// the binary here so the sandbox container can execute it from a fixed path.
56+
pub const SUPERVISOR_CONTAINER_DIR: &str = "/opt/openshell/bin";
57+
58+
/// Full path to the supervisor binary inside sandbox containers.
59+
///
60+
/// Equals `SUPERVISOR_CONTAINER_DIR + "/openshell-sandbox"`. Use this when
61+
/// the full executable path is needed (Docker entrypoint, Podman entrypoint,
62+
/// VM rootfs injection). Use `SUPERVISOR_CONTAINER_DIR` when only the
63+
/// directory mount-point is needed (Kubernetes emptyDir volume mount).
64+
pub const SUPERVISOR_CONTAINER_BINARY: &str = "/opt/openshell/bin/openshell-sandbox";
65+
66+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
67+
// In-container mount paths for guest TLS materials and the sandbox token.
68+
//
69+
// All container-based drivers (Docker, Podman, Kubernetes) mount the gateway's
70+
// mTLS client credentials at these fixed paths inside every sandbox container.
71+
// The supervisor reads these paths on startup to establish its gRPC-over-mTLS
72+
// connection back to the gateway. The paths must remain stable across driver
73+
// versions since the supervisor binary is built and packaged separately.
74+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
75+
76+
/// Container-side mount path for the guest mTLS CA certificate.
77+
pub const TLS_CA_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "/etc/openshell/tls/client/ca.crt";
78+
79+
/// Container-side mount path for the guest mTLS client certificate.
80+
pub const TLS_CERT_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "/etc/openshell/tls/client/tls.crt";
81+
82+
/// Container-side mount path for the guest mTLS client private key.
83+
pub const TLS_KEY_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "/etc/openshell/tls/client/tls.key";
84+
85+
/// Container-side mount path for the per-sandbox JWT token.
86+
pub const SANDBOX_TOKEN_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "/etc/openshell/auth/sandbox.jwt";
87+
88+
/// Container-side mount path for the corporate upstream-proxy credentials.
89+
///
90+
/// The file holds the `user:pass` userinfo used to build the
91+
/// `Proxy-Authorization` header. It is delivered through a root-only secret
92+
/// mount so the credential never appears in container environment/metadata.
93+
pub const UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "/etc/openshell/auth/upstream-proxy";
94+
95+
/// Container-side mount path for the corporate proxy CA bundle.
96+
///
97+
/// Drivers with a `proxy_ca_bundle` operator setting bind-mount the host PEM
98+
/// file here (read-only) and pass the path on the supervisor's argv via
99+
/// `--upstream-proxy-ca-bundle`. The supervisor trusts it for the TLS
100+
/// handshake with an `https://` corporate egress proxy and for server
101+
/// certificates re-signed by a TLS-intercepting proxy. Unlike the proxy
102+
/// credential, a CA certificate is not secret, so a plain read-only bind
103+
/// mount is used rather than a driver secret.
104+
pub const PROXY_CA_MOUNT_PATH: &str = "/etc/openshell/tls/proxy/ca-bundle.pem";
105+
57106
/// A validated corporate upstream-proxy address.
58107
///
59108
/// Produced by [`parse_upstream_proxy_url`], which is the single source of
@@ -68,6 +117,9 @@ pub struct UpstreamProxyAddr {
68117
pub host: String,
69118
/// Proxy TCP port (always explicit in the accepted URL grammar).
70119
pub port: u16,
120+
/// `true` when the proxy URL used the `https://` scheme, so the supervisor
121+
/// wraps the connection to the proxy in TLS before the CONNECT handshake.
122+
pub secure: bool,
71123
}
72124

73125
/// Why an upstream proxy URL was rejected by [`parse_upstream_proxy_url`].
@@ -88,11 +140,11 @@ pub enum UpstreamProxyUrlError {
88140
/// `http://host:port` contract exactly.
89141
#[error("proxy URL must include an explicit scheme, e.g. http://proxy.corp.com:3128")]
90142
MissingScheme,
91-
/// The URL uses a scheme other than `http` (TLS and SOCKS proxies are
143+
/// The URL uses a scheme other than `http` or `https` (SOCKS proxies are
92144
/// not supported by the sandbox supervisor).
93145
#[error(
94-
"unsupported proxy scheme '{0}': only http:// forward proxies are \
95-
supported by the sandbox supervisor"
146+
"unsupported proxy scheme '{0}': only http:// and https:// forward \
147+
proxies are supported by the sandbox supervisor"
96148
)]
97149
UnsupportedScheme(String),
98150
/// The URL has no explicit port. Corporate proxies rarely listen on the
@@ -122,11 +174,13 @@ pub enum UpstreamProxyUrlError {
122174

123175
/// Parse and validate a corporate upstream-proxy URL.
124176
///
125-
/// The accepted grammar is exactly `http://host:port`: the scheme and the
126-
/// port must both be explicit, only `http://` proxies are accepted, and
127-
/// inline userinfo is rejected. The URL must address the proxy only: a path
128-
/// (other than a bare trailing `/`), query, or fragment is rejected rather
129-
/// than silently discarded.
177+
/// The accepted grammar is exactly `http://host:port` or `https://host:port`:
178+
/// the scheme and the port must both be explicit, only `http://` and
179+
/// `https://` proxies are accepted, and inline userinfo is rejected. The URL
180+
/// must address the proxy only: a path (other than a bare trailing `/`),
181+
/// query, or fragment is rejected rather than silently discarded. The
182+
/// returned [`UpstreamProxyAddr::secure`] records whether the `https://`
183+
/// scheme was used so the supervisor knows to TLS-wrap the proxy connection.
130184
///
131185
/// # Errors
132186
///
@@ -142,11 +196,15 @@ pub fn parse_upstream_proxy_url(raw: &str) -> Result<UpstreamProxyAddr, Upstream
142196
}
143197
let parsed = url::Url::parse(trimmed).map_err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::Invalid)?;
144198

145-
if !parsed.scheme().eq_ignore_ascii_case("http") {
199+
let secure = if parsed.scheme().eq_ignore_ascii_case("https") {
200+
true
201+
} else if parsed.scheme().eq_ignore_ascii_case("http") {
202+
false
203+
} else {
146204
return Err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::UnsupportedScheme(
147205
parsed.scheme().to_string(),
148206
));
149-
}
207+
};
150208
if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
151209
return Err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::InlineCredentials);
152210
}
@@ -174,14 +232,14 @@ pub fn parse_upstream_proxy_url(raw: &str) -> Result<UpstreamProxyAddr, Upstream
174232
if !authority_has_explicit_port(trimmed) {
175233
return Err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::MissingPort);
176234
}
177-
// Explicit-port presence was verified above; `port()` is `None` only
178-
// when the URL spells out the scheme default (`:80`), which the url crate
179-
// normalizes away.
180-
let port = parsed.port().unwrap_or(80);
235+
// Explicit-port presence was verified above; `port()` is `None` only when
236+
// the URL spells out the scheme default (`:80` for http, `:443` for
237+
// https), which the url crate normalizes away.
238+
let port = parsed.port().unwrap_or(if secure { 443 } else { 80 });
181239
if port == 0 {
182240
return Err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::ZeroPort);
183241
}
184-
Ok(UpstreamProxyAddr { host, port })
242+
Ok(UpstreamProxyAddr { host, port, secure })
185243
}
186244

187245
/// Return `true` when the raw URL's authority carries an explicit `:port`.
@@ -585,6 +643,20 @@ mod tests {
585643
let addr = parse_upstream_proxy_url("http://proxy.corp.com:8080").unwrap();
586644
assert_eq!(addr.host, "proxy.corp.com");
587645
assert_eq!(addr.port, 8080);
646+
assert!(!addr.secure, "http:// is not TLS-wrapped");
647+
}
648+
649+
#[test]
650+
fn upstream_proxy_url_accepts_https_with_port() {
651+
let addr = parse_upstream_proxy_url("https://proxy.corp.com:3130").unwrap();
652+
assert_eq!(addr.host, "proxy.corp.com");
653+
assert_eq!(addr.port, 3130);
654+
assert!(addr.secure, "https:// is TLS-wrapped");
655+
// An explicit scheme-default port (:443) is accepted even though the
656+
// url crate normalizes it away in the parsed form.
657+
let addr = parse_upstream_proxy_url("https://proxy.corp.com:443").unwrap();
658+
assert_eq!(addr.port, 443);
659+
assert!(addr.secure);
588660
}
589661

590662
#[test]
@@ -644,12 +716,21 @@ mod tests {
644716
}
645717

646718
#[test]
647-
fn upstream_proxy_url_rejects_tls_and_socks_schemes() {
648-
for url in ["https://proxy:443", "socks5://proxy:1080"] {
649-
assert!(matches!(
650-
parse_upstream_proxy_url(url),
651-
Err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::UnsupportedScheme(_))
652-
));
719+
fn upstream_proxy_url_rejects_socks_schemes() {
720+
// http:// and https:// are supported; only other schemes (SOCKS, etc.)
721+
// are rejected.
722+
for url in [
723+
"socks5://proxy:1080",
724+
"socks4://proxy:1080",
725+
"ftp://proxy:21",
726+
] {
727+
assert!(
728+
matches!(
729+
parse_upstream_proxy_url(url),
730+
Err(UpstreamProxyUrlError::UnsupportedScheme(_))
731+
),
732+
"{url}"
733+
);
653734
}
654735
}
655736

‎crates/openshell-driver-podman/README.md‎

Lines changed: 4 additions & 3 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -364,16 +364,17 @@ Podman resources after out-of-band container removal or label drift.
364364
| `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_TLS_CA` | `--podman-tls-ca` | unset | Host path to the CA certificate mounted for sandbox mTLS. |
365365
| `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_TLS_CERT` | `--podman-tls-cert` | unset | Host path to the client certificate mounted for sandbox mTLS. |
366366
| `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_TLS_KEY` | `--podman-tls-key` | unset | Host path to the client private key mounted for sandbox mTLS. |
367-
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_HTTPS_PROXY` | `--sandbox-https-proxy` | unset | Corporate forward proxy URL for the supervisor's upstream TLS dials, chained with HTTP CONNECT. Only credential-free `http://host:port` URLs are supported (scheme and port required). Plain-HTTP requests always dial directly. |
367+
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_HTTPS_PROXY` | `--sandbox-https-proxy` | unset | Corporate forward proxy URL for the supervisor's upstream TLS dials, chained with HTTP CONNECT. Credential-free `http://host:port` and `https://host:port` URLs are supported (scheme and port required). For an `https://` proxy the supervisor TLS-wraps the proxy connection, verifying the proxy certificate against the built-in and system roots plus `--sandbox-proxy-ca-bundle`. Plain-HTTP requests always dial directly. |
368368
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_NO_PROXY` | `--sandbox-no-proxy` | unset | Comma-separated `NO_PROXY` list (hostnames, domain suffixes, IPs, CIDRs, each with an optional `:port` qualifier) dialed directly instead of through the corporate proxy. IP/CIDR entries also match hostnames through their validated DNS resolution. |
369369
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_AUTH_FILE` | `--sandbox-proxy-auth-file` | unset | Path to a file containing the proxy credentials as `user:pass`. Staged as a root-only Podman secret so credentials never appear in config or container metadata. Requires the insecure-auth acknowledgement below. |
370370
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE` | `--sandbox-proxy-auth-allow-insecure` | unset | Explicit acknowledgement (`true`) that the credential is sent as cleartext Basic auth over the plain-TCP connection to the `http://` proxy. Required when the auth file is set; rejected when it is not. |
371371
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME` | `--sandbox-proxy-connect-by-hostname` | unset | Send the destination hostname in CONNECT requests instead of a validated IP. Last resort for proxies whose ACLs filter on hostnames: the proxy then resolves the name itself, so sandbox SSRF/`allowed_ips` validation no longer binds the connection. |
372372
| `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_USERNS` | `--userns` | unset | User namespace mode for sandbox containers (e.g. `auto`). When unset, containers use the default user namespace. |
373+
| `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CA_BUNDLE` | `--sandbox-proxy-ca-bundle` | unset | Path (on the gateway host) to a PEM CA bundle trusted for the corporate proxy. Bind-mounted read-only into the sandbox (a CA certificate is not secret). Trusted for the `https://` proxy TLS handshake and, because TLS-intercepting proxies re-sign tunneled certificates, folded into the sandbox trust bundle and upstream verification. Requires a proxy URL; the file must exist and hold at least one certificate. |
373374

374375
Through the gateway, the same settings are the `https_proxy`, `no_proxy`,
375-
`proxy_auth_file`, `proxy_auth_allow_insecure`, and
376-
`proxy_connect_by_hostname` keys under `[openshell.drivers.podman]`; see
376+
`proxy_auth_file`, `proxy_auth_allow_insecure`, `proxy_connect_by_hostname`,
377+
and `proxy_ca_bundle` keys under `[openshell.drivers.podman]`; see
377378
`docs/reference/gateway-config.mdx`.
378379

379380
This is an operator-owned egress boundary: the driver passes the settings on

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