forked from systemd/systemd
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
cifuzz: try steps.*.outcome #1
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Closed
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
a9418b9 to
ac09f2c
Compare
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 5, 2020
Having taken a look at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/runs/645252074?check_suite_focus=true where fuzz-journal-remote failed with ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==16==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7f864f98948e bp 0x7ffde5c6b7c0 sp 0x7ffde5c6b560 T0) ==16==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==16==Hint: address points to the zero page. SCARINESS: 10 (null-deref) #0 0x7f864f98948e in output_short /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c #1 0x7f864f984624 in show_journal_entry /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c:1154:15 #2 0x7f864f984b63 in show_journal /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c:1239:21 #3 0x4cabab in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-journal-remote.c:67:21 #4 0x51fd16 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:556:15 #5 0x51c330 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3 #6 0x523700 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:765:7 #7 0x5246cd in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:792:3 #8 0x4de3d1 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:824:6 #9 0x4cfb47 in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10 #10 0x7f864e69782f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #11 0x41f2a8 in _start (out/fuzz-journal-remote+0x41f2a8) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c in output_short ==16==ABORTING MS: 0 ; base unit: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x44,0x3d,0xa,0x5f,0x5f,0x52,0x45,0x41,0x4c,0x54,0x49,0x4d,0x45,0x5f,0x54,0x49,0x4d,0x45,0x53,0x54,0x41,0x4d,0x50,0x3d,0x31,0xa,0xa, D=\x0a__REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=1\x0a\x0a artifact_prefix='./'; Test unit written to ./crash-d635b9dd31cceff3c912fd45e1a58d7e90f0ad73 Base64: RD0KX19SRUFMVElNRV9USU1FU1RBTVA9MQoK ``` I was wondering why it hadn't been caught by the compiler even though clang should have failed to compile it with ``` ../src/shared/logs-show.c:624:25: warning: null passed to a callee that requires a non-null argument [-Wnonnull] print_multiline(f, 4 + fieldlen + 1, 0, OUTPUT_FULL_WIDTH, 0, false, ^ ../src/shared/logs-show.c:161:24: note: callee declares array parameter as static here size_t highlight[static 2]) { ^ ~~~~~~~~~~ ../src/shared/logs-show.c:1239:21: warning: null passed to a callee that requires a non-null argument [-Wnonnull] r = show_journal_entry(f, j, mode, n_columns, flags, NULL, NULL, ellipsized); ^ ~~~~ ../src/shared/logs-show.c:1133:30: note: callee declares array parameter as static here const size_t highlight[static 2], ^ ~~~~~~~~~~ 2 warnings generated. ``` Given that judging by systemd#13039 it doesn't seem to be the first time issues like that have been missed I think it would be better to turn nonnull on and get around false positives on a case-by-case basis with DISABLE_WARNING_NONNULL .. REENABLE_WARNING Reopens systemd#6119
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 6, 2020
Having taken a look at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/runs/645252074?check_suite_focus=true where fuzz-journal-remote failed with ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==16==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7f864f98948e bp 0x7ffde5c6b7c0 sp 0x7ffde5c6b560 T0) ==16==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==16==Hint: address points to the zero page. SCARINESS: 10 (null-deref) #0 0x7f864f98948e in output_short /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c #1 0x7f864f984624 in show_journal_entry /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c:1154:15 #2 0x7f864f984b63 in show_journal /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c:1239:21 #3 0x4cabab in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-journal-remote.c:67:21 #4 0x51fd16 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:556:15 #5 0x51c330 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3 #6 0x523700 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:765:7 #7 0x5246cd in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:792:3 #8 0x4de3d1 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:824:6 #9 0x4cfb47 in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10 #10 0x7f864e69782f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #11 0x41f2a8 in _start (out/fuzz-journal-remote+0x41f2a8) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/logs-show.c in output_short ==16==ABORTING MS: 0 ; base unit: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x44,0x3d,0xa,0x5f,0x5f,0x52,0x45,0x41,0x4c,0x54,0x49,0x4d,0x45,0x5f,0x54,0x49,0x4d,0x45,0x53,0x54,0x41,0x4d,0x50,0x3d,0x31,0xa,0xa, D=\x0a__REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=1\x0a\x0a artifact_prefix='./'; Test unit written to ./crash-d635b9dd31cceff3c912fd45e1a58d7e90f0ad73 Base64: RD0KX19SRUFMVElNRV9USU1FU1RBTVA9MQoK ``` I was wondering why it hadn't been caught by the compiler even though clang should have failed to compile it with ``` ../src/shared/logs-show.c:624:25: warning: null passed to a callee that requires a non-null argument [-Wnonnull] print_multiline(f, 4 + fieldlen + 1, 0, OUTPUT_FULL_WIDTH, 0, false, ^ ../src/shared/logs-show.c:161:24: note: callee declares array parameter as static here size_t highlight[static 2]) { ^ ~~~~~~~~~~ ../src/shared/logs-show.c:1239:21: warning: null passed to a callee that requires a non-null argument [-Wnonnull] r = show_journal_entry(f, j, mode, n_columns, flags, NULL, NULL, ellipsized); ^ ~~~~ ../src/shared/logs-show.c:1133:30: note: callee declares array parameter as static here const size_t highlight[static 2], ^ ~~~~~~~~~~ 2 warnings generated. ``` Given that judging by systemd#13039 it doesn't seem to be the first time issues like that have been missed I think it would be better to turn nonnull on and get around false positives on a case-by-case basis with DISABLE_WARNING_NONNULL .. REENABLE_WARNING Reopens systemd#6119
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 19, 2020
Fixes: oss-fuzz#22208 ``` test/fuzz/fuzz-calendarspec/oss-fuzz-22208... ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:666:48: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 2147000000 + 1000000 cannot be represented in type 'int' #0 0x7f0b9f6cc56a in prepend_component ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:666 #1 0x7f0b9f6cd03a in parse_chain ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:718 #2 0x7f0b9f6cea1c in parse_calendar_time ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:845 #3 0x7f0b9f6d1397 in calendar_spec_from_string ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:1084 #4 0x401570 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/fuzz/fuzz-calendarspec.c:17 #5 0x401ae0 in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:39 #6 0x7f0b9e31b1a2 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x271a2) #7 0x40122d in _start (/home/fsumsal/repos/systemd/build/fuzz-calendarspec+0x40122d) SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:666:48 in ```
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 22, 2020
```
p11-kit-0.23.20-1.fc32.x86_64 pam-1.3.1-26.fc33.x86_64 xz-libs-5.2.5-1.fc33.x86_64 zlib-1.2.11-21.fc32.x86_64
(gdb) bt
lvalue=0x560e10 "SendOption", ltype=2, rvalue=0x560e1b "11:string", data=0x561e20, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/network/networkd-dhcp-common.c:580
table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, section=0x560ef0 "DHCPv4", section_line=14, lvalue=0x560e10 "SendOption", rvalue=0x560e1b "11:string", flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN,
userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:132
lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, section=0x7fffffffc9f8, section_line=0x7fffffffc9a0,
section_ignored=0x7fffffffc99d, l=0x560e10 "SendOption", userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:270
lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:395
lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:452
dropin_dirname=0x7fffffffcbd0 "veth99.network.d", sections=0x4f3a18 "Match", lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>,
flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:511
(gdb) q
A debugging session is active.
Inferior 1 [process 118718] will be killed.
```
```
$ printf '[DHCPv4]\nSendOption=1:uint8' >crash
$ ./out/fuzz-network-parser ./crash
INFO: Seed: 1158717610
INFO: Loaded 2 modules (199728 inline 8-bit counters): 136668 [0x7faf3e91a930, 0x7faf3e93bf0c), 63060 [0xadf190, 0xaee7e4),
INFO: Loaded 2 PC tables (199728 PCs): 136668 [0x7faf3e93bf10,0x7faf3eb51cd0), 63060 [0xaee7e8,0xbe4d28),
./out/fuzz-network-parser: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: ./crash
Assertion 's' failed at src/basic/parse-util.c:458, function int safe_atou8(const char *, uint8_t *)(). Aborting.
==5588== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal
#0 0x51811e in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x51811e)
#1 0x46b921 in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x46b921)
#2 0x44ded6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() (.part.0) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x44ded6)
#3 0x44df9d in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x44df9d)
#4 0x7faf3d6d7b1f (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x14b1f)
#5 0x7faf3d3c2624 in raise (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3c624)
#6 0x7faf3d3ab8d8 in abort (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x258d8)
#7 0x7faf3e12593a in log_assert_failed_realm /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/log.c:819:9
#8 0x7faf3e140ce1 in safe_atou8 /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/parse-util.c:458:9
#9 0x68089c in config_parse_dhcp_send_option /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/network/networkd-dhcp-common.c:517:21
#10 0x7faf3debed4e in next_assignment /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:132:32
#11 0x7faf3deb7783 in parse_line /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:270:16
#12 0x7faf3deb606c in config_parse /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:395:21
#13 0x7faf3deb85ee in config_parse_many_files /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:452:21
#14 0x7faf3deb8c57 in config_parse_many /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:511:16
#15 0x57c2eb in network_load_one /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/network/networkd-network.c:470:13
#16 0x543490 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/network/fuzz-network-parser.c:26:16
#17 0x44e3e8 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x44e3e8)
#18 0x433505 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x433505)
#19 0x43c449 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x43c449)
#20 0x42c4a6 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x42c4a6)
#21 0x7faf3d3ad1a2 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x271a2)
#22 0x42c4fd in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x42c4fd)
NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers.
Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports.
SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal
```
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 24, 2020
…tches
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==12==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x00000000000c (pc 0x7f0a518b3428 bp 0x7fffa463bfd0 sp 0x7fffa463be68 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0x7f0a518b3428 in raise (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x35428)
#1 0x7f0a518b5029 in abort (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x37029)
#2 0x7f0a52ca635a in log_assert_failed_realm /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/log.c:819:9
#3 0x4eea92 in config_parse_wireguard_endpoint /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c:808:9
#4 0x7f0a52b2f74e in next_assignment /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:133:32
#5 0x7f0a52b2954e in parse_line /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:242:16
#6 0x7f0a52b28911 in config_parse /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:377:21
#7 0x7f0a52b29ec6 in config_parse_many_files /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:439:21
#8 0x7f0a52b2a5a6 in config_parse_many /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:507:16
#9 0x4d8d6c in netdev_load_one /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/network/netdev/netdev.c:732:13
#10 0x4d3e2b in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/network/fuzz-netdev-parser.c:23:16
#11 0x6b3266 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:558:15
#12 0x6af860 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3
#13 0x6b6970 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:770:7
#14 0x6b7376 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:799:3
#15 0x67573f in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:846:6
#16 0x667097 in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10
#17 0x7f0a5189e82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
#18 0x4295a8 in _start (out/fuzz-netdev-parser+0x4295a8)
DEDUP_TOKEN: raise--abort--log_assert_failed_realm
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: ABRT (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x35428) in raise
==12==ABORTING
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 24, 2020
We'd try to map a zero-byte buffer from a NULL pointer, which is undefined behaviour.
src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60: runtime error: applying zero offset to null pointer
#0 0x7f6ff064e691 in find_part /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60
#1 0x7f6ff0640788 in message_peek_body /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3283:16
#2 0x7f6ff064e8db in enter_struct_or_dict_entry /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3967:21
#3 0x7f6ff06444ac in bus_message_enter_struct /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4009:13
#4 0x7f6ff0641dde in sd_bus_message_enter_container /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4136:21
#5 0x7f6ff0619874 in sd_bus_message_dump /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-dump.c:178:29
#6 0x4293d9 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-bus-message.c:39:9
#7 0x441986 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:558:15
#8 0x44121e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3
#9 0x443164 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:770:7
#10 0x4434bc in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:799:3
#11 0x42d2bc in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:846:6
#12 0x42978a in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10
#13 0x7f6fef13c82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
#14 0x407808 in _start (out/fuzz-bus-message+0x407808)
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 15, 2021
Coverity says: CID 1446387 (#1 of 1): Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT) 8. negative_shift: In expression 1U << (int)cmd, shifting by a negative amount has undefined behavior. The shift amount, cmd, is -22. I don't think there's any issue, unless we forget to set token->data appropriately. Let's add an assert.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 25, 2021
The current pattern '#' triggers on the openSUSE kernel version that is printed early during boot when no actual prompt is ready > [ 0.000000] Linux version 5.12.10-1-default (geeko@buildhost) (gcc (SUSE Linux) 11.1.1 20210510 [revision 23855a176609fe8dda6abaf2b21846b4517966eb], GNU ld (GNU Binutils; openSUSE Tumbleweed) 2.36.1.20210326-4) #1 SMP Fri Jun 11 05:05:06 UTC 2021 (b92eaf7) Instead wait for pattern that: a) should have fewer false positives, b) still be with working on distro shells: openSUSE (red color) ^[[1m^[[31mimage:~ #^[[m^O arch [root@image ~]# debian root@image:~# ubuntu root@image:~# fedora [root@image ~]#
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 23, 2021
so we can run TEST-46 under sanitizers once again. `systemd-homed` runs fsck on home directories, which reports a memory leak we're not interested in. Let's introduce an LSan suppression file to get around this. Since the patterns in the suppression file are matched using basic substring match[0], they're a bit cumbersome, but should get the work one. [0] https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerLeakSanitizer#suppressions Example leaks (as reported by TEST-46): ``` systemd-homed[1333]: ================================================================= systemd-homed[1333]: ==1333==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks systemd-homed[1333]: Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: systemd-homed[1333]: #0 0x7f0c8facccd1 in calloc (/usr/lib/clang/12.0.1/lib/linux/libclang_rt.asan-x86_64.so+0xf4cd1) systemd-homed[1333]: #1 0x558d9494ff67 (/usr/bin/fsck+0x3f67) systemd-homed[1333]: Direct leak of 6 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: systemd-homed[1333]: #0 0x7f0c8fa906c1 in strdup (/usr/lib/clang/12.0.1/lib/linux/libclang_rt.asan-x86_64.so+0xb86c1) systemd-homed[1333]: #1 0x558d949518fd (/usr/bin/fsck+0x58fd) systemd-homed[1333]: SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 30 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). systemd-homed[1337]: ==1337==WARNING: Symbolizer was blocked from starting itself! systemd-homed[1337]: ================================================================= systemd-homed[1337]: ==1337==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks systemd-homed[1337]: Direct leak of 67584 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: systemd-homed[1337]: #0 0x7f01edb84b19 (/usr/lib/clang/12.0.1/lib/linux/libclang_rt.asan-x86_64.so+0xf4b19) systemd-homed[1337]: #1 0x7f01e8326829 (/usr/bin/../lib/libLLVM-12.so+0xb46829) systemd-homed[1337]: SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 67584 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` With the suppression file: ``` systemd-homed[1339]: ----------------------------------------------------- systemd-homed[1339]: Suppressions used: systemd-homed[1339]: count bytes template systemd-homed[1339]: 2 30 /bin/fsck$ systemd-homed[1339]: ----------------------------------------------------- systemd-homed[1343]: ==1343==WARNING: Symbolizer was blocked from starting itself! systemd-homed[1343]: ----------------------------------------------------- systemd-homed[1343]: Suppressions used: systemd-homed[1343]: count bytes template systemd-homed[1343]: 1 67584 /lib/libLLVM systemd-homed[1343]: ----------------------------------------------------- ```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 29, 2021
ELF descriptors created with elf_memory have to be released with
elf_end
```
==2879==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 264 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x50faa7 in calloc (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-core+0x50faa7)
#1 0x7fead94aef51 in allocate_elf /home/vagrant/oss-fuzz/projects/libbpf/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/./common.h:74:17
#2 0x7fead94acda6 in __libelf_read_mmaped_file /home/vagrant/oss-fuzz/projects/libbpf/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:571:10
#3 0x7fead94cb0f2 in elf_memory /home/vagrant/oss-fuzz/projects/libbpf/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_memory.c:49:10
#4 0x5481f9 in module_callback /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/coredump/stacktrace.c:305:31
#5 0x7fead96ad1ba in dwfl_getmodules /home/vagrant/oss-fuzz/projects/libbpf/libbpf/elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_getmodules.c:86:16
#6 0x547980 in parse_core /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/coredump/stacktrace.c:368:13
#7 0x5472e7 in coredump_parse_core /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/coredump/stacktrace.c:408:13
```
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 8, 2022
It was reported as used by the linker: > [It is] called in the setup of ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 from _dl_sysdep_start. > My local call stack (with LTO): > > #0 init_cpu_features.constprop.0 (/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2) > #1 _dl_sysdep_start (/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2) > #2 _dl_start (/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2) > #3 _start (/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2) > > Looking through the source, I think it's this (links for glibc 2.34): > - First dl_platform_init calls _dl_x86_init_cpu_features, a wrapper for init_cpu_features. > - Then init_cpu_features calls get_cet_status. > - At last, get_cet_status invokes arch_prctl. Fixes systemd#22033.
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 9, 2022
on 32-bit architectures so that it won't get lost.
```
==169373==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf4900780 at pc 0xf75dd9cf bp 0xfff63438 sp 0xfff6342c
READ of size 1 at 0xf4900780 thread T0
#0 0xf75dd9ce in bus_message_parse_fields ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:5272
#1 0xf75b68c3 in bus_message_from_malloc ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:568
#2 0x80497f3 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/fuzz-bus-message.c:30
#3 0x804a0ba in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
#4 0xf6f1f468 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib/libc.so.6+0x25468)
#5 0xf6f1f549 in __libc_start_main_impl (/lib/libc.so.6+0x25549)
#6 0x804928b in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-bus-message+0x804928b)
0xf4900780 is located 0 bytes to the right of 16-byte region [0xf4900770,0xf4900780)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0xf7abb39b in malloc (/lib/libasan.so.6+0xb239b)
#1 0xf744cf1f in memdup ../src/basic/alloc-util.c:16
#2 0x8049723 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/fuzz-bus-message.c:28
#3 0x804a0ba in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
#4 0xf6f1f468 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib/libc.so.6+0x25468)
```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 11, 2022
on 32-bit architectures so that it won't get lost.
```
==169373==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf4900780 at pc 0xf75dd9cf bp 0xfff63438 sp 0xfff6342c
READ of size 1 at 0xf4900780 thread T0
#0 0xf75dd9ce in bus_message_parse_fields ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:5272
#1 0xf75b68c3 in bus_message_from_malloc ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:568
#2 0x80497f3 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/fuzz-bus-message.c:30
#3 0x804a0ba in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
#4 0xf6f1f468 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib/libc.so.6+0x25468)
#5 0xf6f1f549 in __libc_start_main_impl (/lib/libc.so.6+0x25549)
#6 0x804928b in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-bus-message+0x804928b)
0xf4900780 is located 0 bytes to the right of 16-byte region [0xf4900770,0xf4900780)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0xf7abb39b in malloc (/lib/libasan.so.6+0xb239b)
#1 0xf744cf1f in memdup ../src/basic/alloc-util.c:16
#2 0x8049723 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/fuzz-bus-message.c:28
#3 0x804a0ba in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
#4 0xf6f1f468 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib/libc.so.6+0x25468)
```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 20, 2022
by always calling journal_remote_server_destroy, which resets global
variables like journal_remote_server_global. It should prevent crashes like
```
Assertion 'journal_remote_server_global == NULL' failed at src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:312, function int journal_remote_server_init(RemoteServer *, const char *, JournalWriteSplitMode, _Bool, _Bool)(). Aborting.
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==24769==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x0539000060c1 (pc 0x7f23b4d5818b bp 0x7ffcbc4080c0 sp 0x7ffcbc407e70 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0x7f23b4d5818b in raise /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51:1
#1 0x7f23b4d37858 in abort /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/stdlib/abort.c:79:7
#2 0x7f23b5731809 in log_assert_failed systemd/src/basic/log.c:866:9
```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 20, 2022
by always calling journal_remote_server_destroy, which resets global
variables like journal_remote_server_global. It should prevent crashes like
```
Assertion 'journal_remote_server_global == NULL' failed at src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:312, function int journal_remote_server_init(RemoteServer *, const char *, JournalWriteSplitMode, _Bool, _Bool)(). Aborting.
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==24769==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x0539000060c1 (pc 0x7f23b4d5818b bp 0x7ffcbc4080c0 sp 0x7ffcbc407e70 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0x7f23b4d5818b in raise /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51:1
#1 0x7f23b4d37858 in abort /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/stdlib/abort.c:79:7
#2 0x7f23b5731809 in log_assert_failed systemd/src/basic/log.c:866:9
```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 23, 2022
by always calling journal_remote_server_destroy, which resets global
variables like journal_remote_server_global. It should prevent crashes like
```
Assertion 'journal_remote_server_global == NULL' failed at src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:312, function int journal_remote_server_init(RemoteServer *, const char *, JournalWriteSplitMode, _Bool, _Bool)(). Aborting.
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==24769==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x0539000060c1 (pc 0x7f23b4d5818b bp 0x7ffcbc4080c0 sp 0x7ffcbc407e70 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0x7f23b4d5818b in raise /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51:1
#1 0x7f23b4d37858 in abort /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/stdlib/abort.c:79:7
#2 0x7f23b5731809 in log_assert_failed systemd/src/basic/log.c:866:9
```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 29, 2022
Turns out that part of systemd isn't covered by any fuzz targets and
that's not ideal considering that it parses data sent remotely. The
fuzzer triggers an infinite loop in lease_parse_routes as soon as it
starts so it seems to be working :-)
```
INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0xFF, 100).
INFO: Seed: 23620602
INFO: Loaded 2 modules (182073 inline 8-bit counters): 176548 [0x7fdf511fc8d0, 0x7fdf51227a74), 5525 [0x5f6ef0, 0x5f8485),
INFO: Loaded 2 PC tables (182073 PCs): 176548 [0x7fdf51227a78,0x7fdf514d94b8), 5525 [0x5f8488,0x60ddd8),
./build/fuzz-dhcp-client: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: test/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp-client/timeout-ed34161922c7075c4773f2ada3dee8685d220980
ALARM: working on the last Unit for 31 seconds
and the timeout value is 30 (use -timeout=N to change)
==80731== ERROR: libFuzzer: timeout after 31 seconds
#0 0x51b32e in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x51b32e)
#1 0x4689e9 in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x4689e9)
#2 0x44a0f4 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticAlarmCallback() (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a0f4)
#3 0x7fdf4f8b474f (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x4274f)
#4 0x465fee in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x465fee)
#5 0x57eee5 in lease_parse_routes /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:495:23
#6 0x57baf3 in dhcp_lease_parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:701:21
#7 0x572450 in parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:348:33
#8 0x571cea in dhcp_option_parse /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:381:21
#9 0x559a01 in client_handle_offer /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:1543:13
#10 0x5592bd in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-dhcp-client.c:78:9
#11 0x44a379 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a379)
#12 0x42ae1f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x42ae1f)
#13 0x432ade in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x432ade)
#14 0x421f86 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421f86)
#15 0x7fdf4f89f55f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f)
#16 0x7fdf4f89f60b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b)
#17 0x421fd4 in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421fd4)
SUMMARY: libFuzzer: timeout
```
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 29, 2022
=================================================================
==81071==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x51245c in __interceptor_reallocarray (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x51245c)
#1 0x7f01440c67e6 in strv_push /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/strv.c:435:13
#2 0x7f01440ca9e1 in strv_consume /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/strv.c:506:13
#3 0x7f01440ca9e1 in strv_extend /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/strv.c:558:16
#4 0x5806e3 in dhcp_lease_parse_search_domains /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:900:21
#5 0x57c1be in dhcp_lease_parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:727:21
#6 0x572450 in parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:348:33
#7 0x571c6a in dhcp_option_parse /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:376:13
#8 0x559a01 in client_handle_offer /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:1543:13
#9 0x5592bd in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-dhcp-client.c:74:16
#10 0x44a379 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a379)
#11 0x42ae1f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x42ae1f)
#12 0x432ade in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x432ade)
#13 0x421f86 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421f86)
#14 0x7f0142fff55f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f)
evverx
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 30, 2022
==25679==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x511e2f in __interceptor_realloc (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-lease-load+0x511e2f)
#1 0x7f9588047529 in greedy_realloc /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/alloc-util.c:70:13
#2 0x7f958806e3f7 in parse_env_file_internal /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/env-file.c:120:38
#3 0x7f958806f1d5 in parse_env_filev /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/env-file.c:348:13
#4 0x7f958806f1d5 in parse_env_file_sentinel /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/env-file.c:365:13
#5 0x5530ff in dhcp_lease_load /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:1151:13
#6 0x54a2b1 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-lease-load.c:33:16
#7 0x44a099 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-lease-load+0x44a099)
#8 0x44a84b in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MinimizeCrashLoop(std::vector<unsigned char, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<unsigned char> > const&) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-lease-load+0x44a84b)
#9 0x42a1a7 in fuzzer::MinimizeCrashInputInternalStep(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, fuzzer::InputCorpus*) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-lease-load+0x42a1a7)
#10 0x432753 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-lease-load+0x432753)
#11 0x421ca6 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-lease-load+0x421ca6)
#12 0x7f95876bb55f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 64 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
INFO: to ignore leaks on libFuzzer side use -detect_leaks=0.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 21, 2022
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 27, 2023
==8036==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x4a10bc in __interceptor_realloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85:3
#1 0x4deef1 in realloc (/build/fuzz-unit-file+0x4deef1)
#2 0x7ffa35abfe23 in greedy_realloc /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/alloc-util.c:70:13
#3 0x7ffa35aefad2 in parse_env_file_internal /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/env-file.c:127:38
#4 0x7ffa35af08a6 in parse_env_file_fdv /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/env-file.c:374:13
#5 0x7ffa35b6391e in parse_extension_release_atv /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/os-util.c:323:16
#6 0x7ffa35b63c8a in parse_extension_release_sentinel /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/os-util.c:360:13
#7 0x7ffa35a5e3f5 in parse_os_release_specifier /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/specifier.c:292:13
#8 0x7ffa35a5e3f5 in specifier_os_id /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/specifier.c:303:16
#9 0x7ffa35a5c7f5 in specifier_printf /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/specifier.c:70:45
#10 0x7ffa3690b279 in unit_full_printf_full /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/core/unit-printf.c:264:16
#11 0x7ffa367de795 in config_parse_bus_name /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/core/load-fragment.c:2401:13
#12 0x7ffa358fe5ec in next_assignment /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:151:24
#13 0x7ffa358fe5ec in parse_line /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:257:16
#14 0x7ffa358fd653 in config_parse /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/conf-parser.c:400:21
#15 0x4de828 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/core/fuzz-unit-file.c:72:16
#16 0x4df208 in NaloFuzzerTestOneInput (/build/fuzz-unit-file+0x4df208)
#17 0x4fe213 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:611:15
#18 0x4fd9fa in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:514:3
#19 0x4ff0c9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:757:19
#20 0x4ffd95 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::__Fuzzer::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:895:5
#21 0x4ef0ff in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:912:6
#22 0x4ef9c8 in LLVMFuzzerRunDriver /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:925:10
#23 0x4df485 in main (/build/fuzz-unit-file+0x4df485)
#24 0x7ffa35232082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) (BuildId: 1878e6b475720c7c51969e69ab2d276fae6d1dee)
DEDUP_TOKEN: __interceptor_realloc--realloc--greedy_realloc
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 64 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Found by Nallocfuzz.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 27, 2023
Otherwise we might hit an assertion during cleanup if the
following mmap_cache_new() call fails:
Assertion 'p->n_ref > 0' failed at src/journal-remote/journal-remote-write.c:80, function writer_unref(). Aborting.
==2069==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x000000000815 (pc 0x7f39dcd0200b bp 0x7ffe2fe24db0 sp 0x7ffe2fe24b60 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0x7f39dcd0200b in raise (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x4300b) (BuildId: 1878e6b475720c7c51969e69ab2d276fae6d1dee)
#1 0x7f39dcce1858 in abort (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x22858) (BuildId: 1878e6b475720c7c51969e69ab2d276fae6d1dee)
#2 0x7f39dd747e49 in log_assert_failed /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/log.c:940:9
#3 0x4e4431 in writer_unref /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-write.c:80:1
#4 0x4e3fd5 in writer_unrefp /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-write.h:27:1
#5 0x4e3fd5 in writer_new /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-write.c:56:1
#6 0x4e04bc in journal_remote_get_writer /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:125:21
#7 0x4e0e0b in get_source_for_fd /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:181:13
#8 0x4e0e0b in journal_remote_add_source /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c:233:13
#9 0x4df99f in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal-remote/fuzz-journal-remote.c:54:9
#10 0x4e8f48 in NaloFuzzerTestOneInput (/build/fuzz-journal-remote+0x4e8f48)
#11 0x507f53 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:611:15
#12 0x50773a in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:514:3
#13 0x508e09 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:757:19
#14 0x509ad5 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::__Fuzzer::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:895:5
#15 0x4f8e3f in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:912:6
#16 0x4f9708 in LLVMFuzzerRunDriver /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:925:10
#17 0x4e91c5 in main (/build/fuzz-journal-remote+0x4e91c5)
#18 0x7f39dcce3082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) (BuildId: 1878e6b475720c7c51969e69ab2d276fae6d1dee)
#19 0x420bcd in _start (/build/fuzz-journal-remote+0x420bcd)
DEDUP_TOKEN: raise--abort--log_assert_failed
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: ABRT (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x4300b) (BuildId: 1878e6b475720c7c51969e69ab2d276fae6d1dee) in raise
Found by Nallocufzz.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 27, 2023
If we fail any allocation prior adding the lease to the server lease
hashmap.
==2103==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x4a203e in __interceptor_calloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77:3
#1 0x4f6341 in calloc (/build/fuzz-dhcp-server+0x4f6341)
#2 0x4ec818 in add_lease /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-dhcp-server.c:26:9
#3 0x4ec2bf in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-dhcp-server.c:75:9
#4 0x4f68a8 in NaloFuzzerTestOneInput (/build/fuzz-dhcp-server+0x4f68a8)
#5 0x5158b3 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:611:15
#6 0x51509a in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:514:3
#7 0x516769 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:757:19
#8 0x517435 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::__Fuzzer::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:895:5
#9 0x50679f in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:912:6
#10 0x507068 in LLVMFuzzerRunDriver /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:925:10
#11 0x4f6b25 in main (/build/fuzz-dhcp-server+0x4f6b25)
#12 0x7f16084e3082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) (BuildId: 1878e6b475720c7c51969e69ab2d276fae6d1dee)
DEDUP_TOKEN: __interceptor_calloc--calloc--add_lease
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 128 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
Found by Nallocufzz.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2023
==1==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 17 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fc096c7243b in strdup (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x7243b)
#1 0x7fc095db3899 in bus_socket_set_transient_property ../src/core/dbus-socket.c:386
#2 0x7fc095db5140 in bus_socket_set_property ../src/core/dbus-socket.c:460
#3 0x7fc095dd20f1 in bus_unit_set_properties ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:2473
#4 0x7fc095d87d53 in transient_unit_from_message ../src/core/dbus-manager.c:1025
#5 0x7fc095d8872f in method_start_transient_unit ../src/core/dbus-manager.c:1112
#6 0x7fc0944ddf4f in method_callbacks_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:406
#7 0x7fc0944e7854 in object_find_and_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1319
#8 0x7fc0944e8f03 in bus_process_object ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1439
#9 0x7fc09454ad78 in process_message ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3011
#10 0x7fc09454b302 in process_running ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3053
#11 0x7fc09454e158 in bus_process_internal ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3273
#12 0x7fc09454e2f2 in sd_bus_process ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3300
#13 0x7fc094551a59 in io_callback ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3642
#14 0x7fc094727830 in source_dispatch ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4187
#15 0x7fc094731009 in sd_event_dispatch ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4808
#16 0x7fc094732124 in sd_event_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4869
#17 0x7fc095f7af9f in manager_loop ../src/core/manager.c:3242
#18 0x41cc7c in invoke_main_loop ../src/core/main.c:1937
#19 0x4252e0 in main ../src/core/main.c:3072
#20 0x7fc092a4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 17 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2023
On faster machines we might be too fast and kill the fake binary during fork() which then makes kernel report a "wrong" binary in the coredump, e.g.: [ 31.408078] testsuite-74.sh[548]: + /tmp/make-dump /tmp/test-dump SIGTRAP [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + bin=/tmp/test-dump [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + sig=SIGTRAP [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + ulimit -c unlimited [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + pid=561 [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + sleep 1 [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + kill -s SIGTRAP 561 [ 31.409720] testsuite-74.sh[560]: + wait 561 [ 31.491757] systemd[1]: Created slice system-systemd\x2dcoredump.slice. [ 31.524488] systemd[1]: Started [email protected]. [ 31.616372] systemd-coredump[564]: [🡕] Process 561 (make-dump) of user 0 dumped core. Stack trace of thread 561: #0 0x00007ff86bb49af7 _Fork (libc.so.6 + 0xd4af7) #1 0x00007ff86bb4965f __libc_fork (libc.so.6 + 0xd465f) #2 0x000055e88011b0ad make_child (bash + 0x550ad) #3 0x000055e8800fd05f n/a (bash + 0x3705f) #4 0x000055e880100116 execute_command_internal (bash + 0x3a116) #5 0x000055e8801011f2 execute_command_internal (bash + 0x3b1f2) #6 0x000055e8801025b6 execute_command (bash + 0x3c5b6) #7 0x000055e8800f134b reader_loop (bash + 0x2b34b) #8 0x000055e8800e757d main (bash + 0x2157d) #9 0x00007ff86ba98850 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x23850) #10 0x00007ff86ba9890a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6 + 0x2390a) #11 0x000055e8800e83b5 _start (bash + 0x223b5) ELF object binary architecture: AMD x86-64 [ 31.666617] testsuite-74.sh[560]: /tmp/make-dump: line 12: 561 Trace/breakpoint trap (core dumped) "$bin" infinity ... $ coredumpctl list --file system.journal TIME PID UID GID SIG COREFILE EXE SIZE Fri 2023-06-02 10:42:10 CEST 561 0 0 SIGTRAP journal /usr/bin/bash - Fri 2023-06-02 10:42:11 CEST 570 0 0 SIGABRT journal /tmp/test-dump - Fri 2023-06-02 10:42:12 CEST 582 0 0 SIGTRAP missing /tmp/test-dump - Fri 2023-06-02 10:42:13 CEST 593 0 0 SIGABRT missing /tmp/test-dump -
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 13, 2023
When the header= option comes before any other type= defining one, we trip over an assertion: Jun 04 15:45:33 H testsuite-24.sh[752]: + systemctl start [email protected] Jun 04 15:45:33 H systemd[1]: Starting [email protected]... Jun 04 15:45:33 H systemd-cryptsetup[4641]: Assertion 'name' failed at src/basic/strv.c:21, function strv_find(). Aborting. ... Jun 04 15:45:33 H systemd-coredump[4643]: Process 4641 (systemd-cryptse) of user 0 dumped core. ... Stack trace of thread 4641: #0 0x00007ff9256afe5c __pthread_kill_implementation (libc.so.6 + 0x8ce5c) #1 0x00007ff92565fa76 raise (libc.so.6 + 0x3ca76) #2 0x00007ff9256497fc abort (libc.so.6 + 0x267fc) #3 0x00007ff926076047 log_assert_failed (libsystemd-shared-253.so + 0x276047) #4 0x00007ff9260ab317 strv_find (libsystemd-shared-253.so + 0x2ab317) #5 0x0000000000405927 parse_one_option (systemd-cryptsetup + 0x5927) #6 0x0000000000407793 parse_options (systemd-cryptsetup + 0x7793) #7 0x000000000040fa0c run (systemd-cryptsetup + 0xfa0c) #8 0x000000000041137f main (systemd-cryptsetup + 0x1137f) #9 0x00007ff92564a510 __libc_start_call_main (libc.so.6 + 0x27510) #10 0x00007ff92564a5c9 __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (libc.so.6 + 0x275c9) #11 0x0000000000403915 _start (systemd-cryptsetup + 0x3915) ELF object binary architecture: AMD x86-64
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 24, 2023
Provides coverage for systemd#26872. With systemd#26875 reverted: [16444.287652] testsuite-03.sh[71]: + for i in {0..19} [16444.287652] testsuite-03.sh[71]: + systemctl start transaction-cycle0.service [16444.359503] systemd[1]: ================================================================= [16444.360321] systemd[1]: ==1==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6180002e578e at pc 0x7f73b25ec7a6 bp 0x7ffc5531c6f0 sp 0x7ffc5531be68 [16444.360798] systemd[1]: [16444.361044] systemd[1]: READ of size 783 at 0x6180002e578e thread T0 (systemd) [16444.391684] systemd[1]: #0 0x7f73b25ec7a5 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0x557a5) [16444.392167] systemd[1]: #1 0x7f73b260a1d5 in __interceptor_vasprintf (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0x731d5) [16444.392442] systemd[1]: #2 0x7f73afa1d1e1 in log_format_iovec ../src/basic/log.c:996 [16444.392750] systemd[1]: #3 0x7f73afa1e7b6 in log_struct_internal ../src/basic/log.c:1058 [16444.393101] systemd[1]: #4 0x7f73b1979136 in transaction_verify_order_one ../src/core/transaction.c:392 [16444.393540] systemd[1]: #5 0x7f73b197ac82 in transaction_verify_order_one ../src/core/transaction.c:463 [16444.393946] systemd[1]: #6 0x7f73b197ac82 in transaction_verify_order_one ../src/core/transaction.c:463 [16444.394262] systemd[1]: #7 0x7f73b197ac82 in transaction_verify_order_one ../src/core/transaction.c:463 [16444.394532] systemd[1]: #8 0x7f73b197ac82 in transaction_verify_order_one ../src/core/transaction.c:463 [16444.394812] systemd[1]: #9 0x7f73b197ac82 in transaction_verify_order_one ../src/core/transaction.c:463 ...
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 29, 2023
So we're able to detect memory leaks in our NSS modules. An example after introducing a memory leak in nss-myhostname.c: testsuite-71.sh[2881]: ================================================================= testsuite-71.sh[2881]: ==2880==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks testsuite-71.sh[2881]: Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #0 0x7fa28907243b in strdup (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.8.0.0+0x7243b) testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #1 0x7fa286a7bc10 in gethostname_full ../src/basic/hostname-util.c:67 testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #2 0x7fa286a74af9 in gethostname_malloc ../src/basic/hostname-util.h:24 testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #3 0x7fa286a756f4 in _nss_myhostname_gethostbyname4_r ../src/nss-myhostname/nss-myhostname.c:79 testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #4 0x7fa288f17588 in getaddrinfo (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xf4588) testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #5 0x7fa2890a4d93 in __interceptor_getaddrinfo.part.0 (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.8.0.0+0xa4d93) testsuite-71.sh[2881]: #6 0x55a54b2b7159 in ahosts_keys_int.part.0 (/usr/bin/getent.orig+0x4159) testsuite-71.sh[2881]: SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 2 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 1, 2023
Spotted while fuzzing systemd#27890. ================================================================= ==908098==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f4efe6d81f5 in __interceptor_realloc.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xd81f5) (BuildId: dc689b05ca2577037af24700212bb5cce1f91c8a) #1 0x7f4efb8e3ace in greedy_realloc ../src/basic/alloc-util.c:70 #2 0x7f4efb93b713 in extract_first_word ../src/basic/extract-word.c:62 #3 0x7f4efb970d50 in set_put_strsplit ../src/basic/hashmap.c:1902 #4 0x7f4efd76c27e in exec_context_deserialize ../src/core/execute-serialize.c:3341 #5 0x7f4efd778dcb in exec_deserialize ../src/core/execute-serialize.c:4122 #6 0x4032c0 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/core/fuzz-execute-serialize.c:60 #7 0x403c58 in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50 #8 0x7f4efecccb49 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b49) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9) #9 0x7f4efecccc0a in __libc_start_main_alias_2 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27c0a) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9) #10 0x402344 in _start (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-san/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x402344) (BuildId: 195f382cf1e39b9ba48d6dcf5a90f786d72837a8) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 64 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted (core dumped) ==911550==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 17 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4df281 in strdup (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x4df281) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #1 0x7fe4ae2b38fc in _set_put_strndup_full /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/basic/hashmap.c:1868:21 #2 0x7fe4b0bad897 in exec_context_deserialize /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/core/execute-serialize.c:3914:29 #3 0x7fe4b0b80592 in exec_deserialize /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/core/execute-serialize.c:4109:13 #4 0x531d0f in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/core/fuzz-execute-serialize.c:59:16 #5 0x440594 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x440594) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #6 0x43f9b9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x43f9b9) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #7 0x440fd5 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x440fd5) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #8 0x441955 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile>>&) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x441955) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #9 0x42e151 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x42e151) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #10 0x45a916 in main (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x45a916) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) #11 0x7fe4ac449b49 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b49) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9) #12 0x7fe4ac449c0a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27c0a) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9) #13 0x422b74 in _start (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x422b74) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 17 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 24, 2023
Introduced by 41712cd. ================================================================= ==2194==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Indirect leak of 359856 byte(s) in 459 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7ffff7511df4 (/usr/lib64/clang/16/lib/linux/libclang_rt.asan-powerpc64le.so+0x191df4) (BuildId: 47e1dd371a2b8525b6cb737760a4dc535f30ea10) #1 0x7ffff6bb5fb0 in message_from_header /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:372:13 #2 0x7ffff6bb5fb0 in bus_message_from_malloc /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:421:13 #3 0x7ffff6c23f54 in bus_socket_make_message /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c:1222:13 #4 0x7ffff6c22d10 in bus_socket_read_message /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c #5 0x7ffff6c4d414 in bus_read_message /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2082:16 #6 0x7ffff6c4d414 in sd_bus_call /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2480:21 #7 0x7ffff6682904 in bus_service_manager_reload /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c:2823:13 #8 0x1000d570 in daemon_reload /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/sysext/sysext.c:233:16 #9 0x100090f8 in merge /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/sysext/sysext.c:895:21 #10 0x10006ff4 in verb_merge /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/sysext/sysext.c:964:16 #11 0x7ffff69ae894 in dispatch_verb /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/shared/verbs.c:103:24 #12 0x10004570 in sysext_main /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/sysext/sysext.c:1194:16 #13 0x10004570 in run /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/sysext/sysext.c:1214:16 #14 0x10004570 in main /systemd-meson-build/../root/systemd/src/sysext/sysext.c:1217:1 #15 0x7ffff5f5a968 in generic_start_main.isra.0 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2a968) (BuildId: c218e04818632a05c23f6fdcca16f93e95ea7de2) #16 0x7ffff5f5ab00 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2ab00) (BuildId: c218e04818632a05c23f6fdcca16f93e95ea7de2) Indirect leak of 124984 byte(s) in 459 object(s) allocated from: ... #11 0x7ffff5f5a968 in generic_start_main.isra.0 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2a968) (BuildId: c218e04818632a05c23f6fdcca16f93e95ea7de2) #12 0x7ffff5f5ab00 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2ab00) (BuildId: c218e04818632a05c23f6fdcca16f93e95ea7de2) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 493766 byte(s) leaked in 1383 allocation(s).
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 17, 2023
When exiting PID 1 we most likely don't have stdio/stdout open, so the final LSan check would not print any actionable information and would just crash PID 1 leading up to a kernel panic, which is a bit annoying. Let's instead attempt to open /dev/console, and if we succeed redirect LSan's report there. The result is a bit messy, as it's slightly interleaved with the kernel panic, but it's definitely better than not having the stack trace at all: [ OK ] Reached target final.target. [ OK ] Finished systemd-poweroff.service. [ OK ] Reached target poweroff.target. ================================================================= 3 1m 43.251782] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000100 [ 43.252838] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 6.4.12-200.fc38.x86_64 #1 ==[1==ERR O R :4 3Le.a2k53562] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 [ 43.254683] Call Trace: [ 43.254911] <TASK> [ 43.255107] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x60 S[ a 43.n2555i05] panic+t0x192/0x350 izer[ :43.255966 ] do_exit+0x990/0xdb10 etec[ 43.256504] do_group_exit+0x31/0x80 [ 43.256889] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20 [ 43.257288] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 o_user_mod leaks[ 43.257618] ? syscall_exit_t +0x2b/0x40 [ 43.258411] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 1mDirect le[ 43.258755] ak of 21 byte(s)? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [ 43.259446] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 43.259901] RiIP: 0033:0x7f357nb8f3ad4 1 objec[ 43.260354] Ctode: 48 89 (f7 0f 05 c3 sf3 0f 1e fa b8 3b 00 00 00) 0f 05 c3 0f 1f 4 0 00 f3 0f 1e fa 50 58 b8 e7 00 00 00 48 83 ec 08 48 63 ff 0f 051 [ 43.262581] RSP: 002b:00007ffc25872440 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 a RBX: 00007f357be9b218 RCX: 00007f357b8f3ad4m:ffd [ 43.264512] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f357b933b63 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 43.265355] RBP: 00007f357be9b218 R08: efffffffffffffff R09: 00007ffc258721ef [ 43.266191] R10: 000000000000003f R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00000fe6ae9e0000 [ 43.266891] R13: 00007f3574f00000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007 [ 43.267517] </TASK> #0 0x7f357b8814a8 in strdup (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x814a8) (BuildId: e5f0a0d511a659fbc47bf41072869139cb2db47f) #1 0x7f3578d43317 in cg_path_decode_unit ../src/basic/cgroup-util.c:1132 #2 0x7f3578d43936 in cg_path_get_unit ../src/basic/cgroup-util.c:1190 #3 0x7f3578d440f6 in cg_pid_get_unit ../src/basic/cgroup-util.c:1234 #4 0x7f35789263d7 in bus_log_caller ../src/shared/bus-util.c:734 #5 0x7f357a9cf10a in method_reload ../src/core/dbus-manager.c:1621 #6 0x7f3578f77497 in method_callbacks_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:406 #7 0x7f3578f80dd8 in object_find_and_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1319 #8 0x7f3578f82487 in bus_process_object ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1439 #9 0x7f3578fe41f1 in process_message ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3007 #10 0x7f3578fe477b in process_running ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3049 #11 0x7f3578fe75d1 in bus_process_internal ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3269 #12 0x7f3578fe776e in sd_bus_process ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3296 #13 0x7f3578feaedc in io_callback ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3638 #14 0x7f35791c2f68 in source_dispatch ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4187 #15 0x7f35791cc6f9 in sd_event_dispatch ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4808 #16 0x7f35791cd830 in sd_event_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4869 #17 0x7f357abcd572 in manager_loop ../src/core/manager.c:3244 #18 0x41db21 in invoke_main_loop ../src/core/main.c:1960 #19 0x426615 in main ../src/core/main.c:3125 #20 0x7f3577c49b49 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b49) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9) #21 0x7f3577c49c0a in __libc_start_main_alias_2 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27c0a) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9) #22 0x408494 in _start (/usr/lib/systemd/systemd+0x408494) (BuildId: fe61e1b0f00b6a36aa34e707a98c15c52f6b960a) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). [ 43.295912] Kernel Offset: 0x7000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 43.297036] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000100 ]--- Originally noticed in systemd#28579.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 29, 2023
fuzzers randomly fail with the following:
```
==172==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x7f41169cb39b in update_argv /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/argv-util.c:96:13
#1 0x7f41169cb39b in rename_process /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/argv-util.c:210:16
#2 0x7f4116b6824e in safe_fork_full /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/process-util.c:1516:21
#3 0x7f4116bffa36 in safe_fork /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/process-util.h:191:16
#4 0x7f4116bffa36 in parse_timestamp /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/time-util.c:1047:13
#5 0x4a61e6 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-time-util.c:16:16
#6 0x4c4a13 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:611:15
#7 0x4c41fa in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:514:3
#8 0x4c58c9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:757:19
#9 0x4c6595 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::__Fuzzer::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:895:5
#10 0x4b58ff in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:912:6
#11 0x4def52 in main /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
#12 0x7f4115ea3082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) (BuildId: e678fe54a5d2c2092f8e47eb0b33105e380f7340)
#13 0x41f5ad in _start (build-out/fuzz-time-util+0x41f5ad)
DEDUP_TOKEN: update_argv--rename_process--safe_fork_full
Uninitialized value was created by an allocation of 'fv' in the stack frame of function 'have_effective_cap'
#0 0x7f41169d3540 in have_effective_cap /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/capability-util.c:21
```
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 1, 2024
By making assert_return() critical, we observe the following:
---
Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
0x00007f01320b0884 in __pthread_kill_implementation () from /lib64/libc.so.6
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00007f01320b0884 in __pthread_kill_implementation ()
from /lib64/libc.so.6
#1 0x00007f013205fafe in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
#2 0x00007f013204887f in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
#3 0x00007f01338d02d6 in log_assert_failed (
text=0x7f01340009e0 "e->state != SD_EVENT_FINISHED",
file=0x7f0133fff403 "src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c", line=1399,
func=0x7f01340045a0 <__func__.148> "sd_event_add_time")
at ../src/basic/log.c:948
#4 0x00007f01338d0457 in log_assert_failed_return (
text=0x7f01340009e0 "e->state != SD_EVENT_FINISHED",
file=0x7f0133fff403 "src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c", line=1399,
func=0x7f01340045a0 <__func__.148> "sd_event_add_time")
at ../src/basic/log.c:967
#5 0x00007f0133c7ed83 in sd_event_add_time (e=0x617000022280,
ret=0x610000007e98, clock=7, usec=24054941030, accuracy=0,
callback=0x4625b4 <on_announcement_timeout>, userdata=0x610000007e40)
at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:1399
#6 0x00007f0133c7f725 in sd_event_add_time_relative (e=0x617000022280,
ret=0x610000007e98, clock=7, usec=1000000, accuracy=0,
callback=0x4625b4 <on_announcement_timeout>, userdata=0x610000007e40)
at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:1462
#7 0x0000000000464cac in dns_scope_announce (scope=0x610000007e40, goodbye=true) at ../src/resolve/resolved-dns-scope.c:1530
#8 0x0000000000504d08 in link_free (l=0x612000023d40) at ../src/resolve/resolved-link.c:83
#9 0x000000000052dbbd in manager_free (m=0x619000000a80) at ../src/resolve/resolved-manager.c:697
#10 0x0000000000562328 in manager_freep (p=0x7f012f800040) at ../src/resolve/resolved-manager.h:198
#11 0x000000000056315a in run (argc=1, argv=0x7fff22b06468) at ../src/resolve/resolved.c:25
#12 0x0000000000563284 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fff22b06468) at ../src/resolve/resolved.c:99
---
Prompted by systemd#30049 (comment).
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 1, 2024
When assert_return() is critical, the following assertion is triggered on exit: --- #0 0x00007f8b1f6b0884 in __pthread_kill_implementation () from target:/lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007f8b1f65fafe in raise () from target:/lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007f8b1f64887f in abort () from target:/lib64/libc.so.6 #3 0x00007f8b208d02d6 in log_assert_failed (text=0x7f8b210009e0 "e->state != SD_EVENT_FINISHED", file=0x7f8b20fff403 "src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c", line=1252, func=0x7f8b21004400 <__func__.154> "sd_event_add_io") at ../src/basic/log.c:948 #4 0x00007f8b208d0457 in log_assert_failed_return (text=0x7f8b210009e0 "e->state != SD_EVENT_FINISHED", file=0x7f8b20fff403 "src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c", line=1252, func=0x7f8b21004400 <__func__.154> "sd_event_add_io") at ../src/basic/log.c:967 #5 0x00007f8b20c7d102 in sd_event_add_io (e=0x617000000080, ret=0x60c000000a20, fd=11, events=1, callback=0x7dfd85 <ipv4acd_on_packet>, userdata=0x60c000000a00) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:1252 #6 0x00000000007e3934 in sd_ipv4acd_start (acd=0x60c000000a00, reset_conflicts=true) at ../src/libsystemd-network/sd-ipv4acd.c:597 #7 0x00000000007e72b9 in ipv4ll_start_internal (ll=0x6080000006a0, reset_generation=true) at ../src/libsystemd-network/sd-ipv4ll.c:278 #8 0x00000000007e7462 in sd_ipv4ll_start (ll=0x6080000006a0) at ../src/libsystemd-network/sd-ipv4ll.c:298 #9 0x00000000006047a1 in dhcp4_handler (client=0x617000000400, event=0, userdata=0x61a000000680) at ../src/network/networkd-dhcp4.c:1183 #10 0x000000000075b1ed in client_notify (client=0x617000000400, event=0) at ../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:783 #11 0x000000000075bf8d in client_stop (client=0x617000000400, error=0) at ../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:821 #12 0x000000000077710f in sd_dhcp_client_stop (client=0x617000000400) at ../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:2388 #13 0x000000000065cdd1 in link_stop_engines (link=0x61a000000680, may_keep_dhcp=true) at ../src/network/networkd-link.c:336 #14 0x000000000041f214 in manager_free (m=0x618000000080) at ../src/network/networkd-manager.c:613 #15 0x00000000004124e3 in manager_freep (p=0x7f8b1c800040) at ../src/network/networkd-manager.h:128 #16 0x00000000004139f6 in run (argc=1, argv=0x7ffffe4522e8) at ../src/network/networkd.c:24 #17 0x0000000000413b20 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7ffffe4522e8) at ../src/network/networkd.c:119 --- Prompted by systemd#30049 (comment).
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 1, 2024
Avoid passing a NULL message to sd_bus_message_is_signal(), to not trip over an assertion: [ 132.869436] H testsuite-82.sh[614]: + systemctl --no-block --check-inhibitors=yes soft-reboot [ 132.967386] H systemd[1]: Created slice system-systemd\x2dcoredump.slice. [ 133.018292] H systemd[1]: Starting inhibit.service... [ 133.122610] H systemd[1]: Started [email protected]. [ 133.163643] H systemd[1]: Started inhibit.service. [ 133.206836] H testsuite-82.sh[614]: + exec sleep infinity [ 133.236762] H systemd-logind[611]: The system will reboot now! [ 135.891607] H systemd-coredump[667]: [🡕] Process 663 (busctl) of user 0 dumped core. Stack trace of thread 663: #0 0x00007f2ec45e6acf raise (libc.so.6 + 0x4eacf) #1 0x00007f2ec45b9ea5 abort (libc.so.6 + 0x21ea5) #2 0x00007f2ec4b5c9a6 log_assert_failed (libsystemd-shared-255.so + 0x1ff9a6) #3 0x00007f2ec4b5dca5 log_assert_failed_return (libsystemd-shared-255.so + 0x200ca5) #4 0x00007f2ec4bb3df6 sd_bus_message_is_signal (libsystemd-shared-255.so + 0x256df6) #5 0x000000000040e478 monitor (busctl + 0xe478) #6 0x000000000040e82f verb_monitor (busctl + 0xe82f) #7 0x00007f2ec4b202cb dispatch_verb (libsystemd-shared-255.so + 0x1c32cb) #8 0x00000000004074fa busctl_main (busctl + 0x74fa) #9 0x0000000000407525 run (busctl + 0x7525) #10 0x000000000040ff67 main (busctl + 0xff67) #11 0x00007f2ec45d2d85 __libc_start_main (libc.so.6 + 0x3ad85) #12 0x00000000004044be _start (busctl + 0x44be) ELF object binary architecture: AMD x86-64 [ 136.141152] H dbus-daemon[634]: [system] Monitoring connection :1.2 closed. [ 136.152233] H systemd[1]: busctl.service: Main process exited, code=dumped, status=6/ABRT [ 136.153996] H systemd[1]: busctl.service: Failed with result 'core-dump'. The asertion in question: Assertion 'm' failed at src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:1015, function sd_bus_message_is_signal(). Aborting. We can get a NULL message here through sd_bus_process() -> bus_process_internal() -> process_running(), so let's handle this case appropriately.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 1, 2024
Since in that case the event loop is already finished and we'd hit an assertion: [ 1295.993300] testsuite-75.sh[50]: + systemctl stop systemd-resolved.service [ 1296.005152] systemd-resolved[298]: Assertion 'e->state != SD_EVENT_FINISHED' failed at src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:1252, function sd_event_add_io(). Aborting. Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f17d25e2940 (LWP 298)): #0 __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 #1 0x00007f17d16ac8a3 in __pthread_kill_internal (signo=6, threadid=<optimized out>) at pthread_kill.c:78 #2 0x00007f17d165c668 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/raise.c:26 #3 0x00007f17d16444b8 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #4 0x00007f17d2402d2d in log_assert_failed (text=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, line=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>) at ../build/src/basic/log.c:968 #5 0x00007f17d240401c in log_assert_failed_return (text=text@entry=0x7f17d2533f13 "e->state != SD_EVENT_FINISHED", file=file@entry=0x7f17d25195d9 "src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c", line=line@entry=1252, func=func@entry=0x7f17d2567260 <__func__.140> "sd_event_add_io") at ../build/src/basic/log.c:987 #6 0x00007f17d24d011a in sd_event_add_io (e=0x55e5cb497270, ret=0x55e5cb4a5120, fd=fd@entry=26, events=events@entry=1, callback=callback@entry=0x55e5caff5466 <on_io_event>, userdata=0x55e5cb4a5110) at ../build/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:1252 #7 0x000055e5caff571c in manager_add_socket_to_graveyard (m=0x55e5cb43cf00, fd=26) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-socket-graveyard.c:117 #8 0x000055e5cafd4253 in dns_transaction_close_connection (t=t@entry=0x55e5cb57c7d0, use_graveyard=use_graveyard@entry=true) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c:78 #9 0x000055e5cafd8444 in dns_transaction_complete (t=t@entry=0x55e5cb57c7d0, state=state@entry=DNS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c:427 #10 0x000055e5cafc4969 in dns_scope_abort_transactions (s=s@entry=0x55e5cb4b1a70) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-dns-scope.c:91 #11 0x000055e5cafc6aee in dns_scope_free (s=0x55e5cb4b1a70) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-dns-scope.c:106 #12 0x000055e5cafe72d1 in link_free (l=0x55e5cb4a5160) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-link.c:94 #13 0x000055e5cafedefc in manager_free (m=0x55e5cb43cf00) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-manager.c:697 #14 0x000055e5caff99b6 in manager_freep (p=p@entry=0x7ffd71fab8f8) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved-manager.h:198 #15 0x000055e5caff9d66 in run (argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffd71faba78) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved.c:25 #16 0x000055e5caff9fe3 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7ffd71faba78) at ../build/src/resolve/resolved.c:99 Resolves: systemd#30618
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 3, 2024
Since libfuzzer feeds a single fuzzing process with multiple inputs, we
might carry over arg_transport from a previous invocation, tripping over
the assert in acquire_bus():
+----------------------------------------Release Build Stacktrace----------------------------------------+
Assertion 'transport != BUS_TRANSPORT_REMOTE || runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM' failed at src/shared/bus-util.c:284, function bus_connect_transport(). Aborting.
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==2739==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x00000ab3 (pc 0xf7f52509 bp 0xffdf74cc sp 0xffdf74b0 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
#0 0xf7f52509 in linux-gate.so.1
#1 0xf703b415 in raise
#2 0xf70233f6 in abort
#3 0xf772ac0a in log_assert_failed systemd/src/basic/log.c:968:9
#4 0xf77300d5 in log_assert_failed_return systemd/src/basic/log.c:987:17
#5 0xf7432bbf in bus_connect_transport systemd/src/shared/bus-util.c:284:9
#6 0x818cd17 in acquire_bus systemd/src/systemctl/systemctl-util.c:53:29
#7 0x815fd3c in help_boot_loader_entry systemd/src/systemctl/systemctl-logind.c:431:13
#8 0x819ca87 in systemctl_parse_argv systemd/src/systemctl/systemctl.c:863:37
#9 0x8197632 in systemctl_dispatch_parse_argv systemd/src/systemctl/systemctl.c:1137:16
#10 0x813328d in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput systemd/src/systemctl/fuzz-systemctl-parse-argv.c:54:13
#11 0x81bbe7e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned int) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:611:15
#12 0x81bb5b8 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned int, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:514:3
#13 0x81bd42d in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::__Fuzzer::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:826:7
#14 0x81bd62e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::__Fuzzer::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:857:3
#15 0x81ac84c in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned int)) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:912:6
#16 0x81d65c7 in main /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
#17 0xf7024ed4 in __libc_start_main
#18 0x806bdb5 in _start
Resolves: systemd#30802
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 10, 2024
…ck policy So far you had to pick: 1. Use a signed PCR TPM2 policy to lock your disk to (i.e. UKI vendor blesses your setup via signature) or 2. Use a pcrlock policy (i.e. local system blesses your setup via dynamic local policy stored in NV index) It was not possible combine these two, because TPM2 access policies do not allow the combination of PolicyAuthorize (used to implement #1 above) and PolicyAuthorizeNV (used to implement #2) in a single policy, unless one is "further upstream" (and can simply remove the other from the policy freely). This is quite limiting of course, since we actually do want to enforce on each TPM object that both the OS vendor policy and the local policy must be fulfilled, without the chance for the vendor or the local system to disable the other. This patch addresses this: instead of trying to find a way to come up with some adventurous scheme to combine both policy into one TPM2 policy, we simply shard the symmetric LUKS decryption key: one half we protect via the signed PCR policy, and the other we protect via the pcrlock policy. Only if both halves can be acquired the disk can be decrypted. This means: 1. we simply double the unlock key in length in case both policies shall be used. 2. We store two resulting TPM policy hashes in the LUKS token JSON, one for each policy 3. We store two sealed TPM policy key blobs in the LUKS token JSON, for both halves of the LUKS unlock key. This patch keeps the "sharding" logic relatively generic (i.e. the low level logic is actually fine with more than 2 shards), because I figure sooner or later we might have to encode more shards, for example if we add further TPM2-based access policies, for example when combining FIDO2 with TPM2, or implementing TOTP for this.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 2, 2024
…s with an explicit flag Let's mark functions that accept the 'more' flag explicitly for that, and validate for this explicitly. This is preparation for varlink/varlink.github.io#26, if we get that one day. Let's make sure that from day #1 we have this info available even if we don't generate this in the IDL for now. Also enables the two flags for all interfaces we export that use the logic.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 4, 2025
All other usages of sd_varlink_call* do not free the json return parameter, and it is owned by the varlink object instead. Do the same here. TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: ==1074==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x50c00000095a at pc 0x55cf8cd18a0f bp 0x7ffd7b9d4f10 sp 0x7ffd7b9d4f08 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: READ of size 2 at 0x50c00000095a thread T0 ((sd-mkdcreds)) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #0 0x55cf8cd18a0e in sd_json_variant_unref /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:887:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #1 0x55cf8cd4cecb in varlink_clear_current /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:593:22 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #2 0x55cf8cd4975e in varlink_clear /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:614:9 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #3 0x55cf8cd3dc3c in varlink_destroy /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:651:9 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #4 0x55cf8cd3dc3c in sd_varlink_unref /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:657:1 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #5 0x55cf8cb47a82 in sd_varlink_unrefp /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/systemd/sd-varlink.h:279:1 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #6 0x55cf8cb47a82 in ipc_decrypt_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/shared/creds-util.c:1660:1 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #7 0x55cf8caca99a in maybe_decrypt_and_write_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:486:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #8 0x55cf8cac790b in load_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:713:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #9 0x55cf8cac5403 in acquire_credentials /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:819:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #10 0x55cf8cac5403 in setup_credentials_internal /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:1023:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #11 0x55cf8cac42d4 in exec_setup_credentials /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:1168:21 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #12 0x55cf8ca59569 in exec_invoke /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-invoke.c:4866:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #13 0x55cf8ca428d8 in run /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/executor.c:244:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #14 0x55cf8ca428d8 in main /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/executor.c:275:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #15 0x7f64b40110c7 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x40c7) (BuildId: 159846287d47eef88f2a478f59803f6e8fc81d05) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #16 0x7f64b401118a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x418a) (BuildId: 159846287d47eef88f2a478f59803f6e8fc81d05) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #17 0x55cf8ca41cb4 (/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor+0x124cb4) (BuildId: 24f2b1608c3aaee3226cdd14fa2b6e6741156222) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c00000095a is located 26 bytes inside of 120-byte region [0x50c000000940,0x50c0000009b8) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: freed by thread T0 ((sd-mkdcreds)) here: TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #0 0x7f64b48d57ea in free (/usr/lib/clang/19/lib/x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu/libclang_rt.asan.so+0xd57ea) (BuildId: c59bbd28ceb74038a60373d4a8cd4c258bcf0b4e) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #1 0x55cf8cd188ab in sd_json_variant_unref /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:895:25 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #2 0x55cf8cb47a4c in sd_json_variant_unrefp /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/systemd/sd-json.h:98:1 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #3 0x55cf8cb47a4c in ipc_decrypt_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/shared/creds-util.c:1660:1 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #4 0x55cf8caca99a in maybe_decrypt_and_write_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:486:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #5 0x55cf8cac790b in load_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:713:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #6 0x55cf8cac5403 in acquire_credentials /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:819:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #7 0x55cf8cac5403 in setup_credentials_internal /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:1023:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #8 0x55cf8cac42d4 in exec_setup_credentials /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:1168:21 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #9 0x55cf8ca59569 in exec_invoke /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-invoke.c:4866:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #10 0x55cf8ca428d8 in run /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/executor.c:244:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #11 0x55cf8ca428d8 in main /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/executor.c:275:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #12 0x7f64b40110c7 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x40c7) (BuildId: 159846287d47eef88f2a478f59803f6e8fc81d05) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #13 0x7f64b401118a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x418a) (BuildId: 159846287d47eef88f2a478f59803f6e8fc81d05) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #14 0x55cf8ca41cb4 (/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor+0x124cb4) (BuildId: 24f2b1608c3aaee3226cdd14fa2b6e6741156222) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: previously allocated by thread T0 ((sd-mkdcreds)) here: TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #0 0x7f64b48d5a83 in malloc (/usr/lib/clang/19/lib/x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu/libclang_rt.asan.so+0xd5a83) (BuildId: c59bbd28ceb74038a60373d4a8cd4c258bcf0b4e) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #1 0x55cf8cd16bb7 in malloc_multiply /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/basic/alloc-util.h:119:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #2 0x55cf8cd16bb7 in sd_json_variant_new_object /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:737:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #3 0x55cf8cd32e58 in json_parse_internal /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:3161:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #4 0x55cf8cd37326 in sd_json_parse_with_source /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:3408:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #5 0x55cf8cd37326 in sd_json_parse /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:3437:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #6 0x55cf8cd3f753 in varlink_parse_message /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:962:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #7 0x55cf8cd3f753 in sd_varlink_process /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:1466:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #8 0x55cf8cd4c0a9 in sd_varlink_call_full /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:2160:21 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #9 0x55cf8cd4d617 in sd_varlink_callb_ap /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:2237:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #10 0x55cf8cd4da3c in sd_varlink_callb /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:2251:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #11 0x55cf8cb47686 in ipc_decrypt_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/shared/creds-util.c:1623:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #12 0x55cf8caca99a in maybe_decrypt_and_write_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:486:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #13 0x55cf8cac790b in load_credential /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:713:16 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #14 0x55cf8cac5403 in acquire_credentials /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:819:29 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #15 0x55cf8cac5403 in setup_credentials_internal /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:1023:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #16 0x55cf8cac42d4 in exec_setup_credentials /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-credential.c:1168:21 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #17 0x55cf8ca59569 in exec_invoke /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/exec-invoke.c:4866:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #18 0x55cf8ca428d8 in run /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/executor.c:244:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #19 0x55cf8ca428d8 in main /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/core/executor.c:275:13 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #20 0x7f64b40110c7 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x40c7) (BuildId: 159846287d47eef88f2a478f59803f6e8fc81d05) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #21 0x7f64b401118a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x418a) (BuildId: 159846287d47eef88f2a478f59803f6e8fc81d05) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: #22 0x55cf8ca41cb4 (/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor+0x124cb4) (BuildId: 24f2b1608c3aaee3226cdd14fa2b6e6741156222) TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-json/sd-json.c:887:16 in sd_json_variant_unref TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Shadow bytes around the buggy address: TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000780: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000880: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: =>0x50c000000900: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000980: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: 0x50c000000b80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Addressable: 00 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Heap left redzone: fa TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Freed heap region: fd TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Stack left redzone: f1 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Stack mid redzone: f2 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Stack right redzone: f3 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Stack after return: f5 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Stack use after scope: f8 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Global redzone: f9 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Global init order: f6 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Poisoned by user: f7 TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Container overflow: fc TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Array cookie: ac TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Intra object redzone: bb TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: ASan internal: fe TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Left alloca redzone: ca TEST-54-CREDS.sh[1074]: Right alloca redzone: cb Follow-up for 2c3cbc5
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 28, 2025
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 28, 2025
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 28, 2025
This one is between "efi" and "linux": we'll recognize such entries as linux, but we'll just invoke them as EFI binaries. This creates a high-level concept for invoking UKIs via indirection of a bls type #1 entry, for example to permit invocation from a non-standard path or for giving entries a different name. Companion BLS spec PR: uapi-group/specifications#135 (Let's rename LOADER_UNIFIED_LINUX to LOADER_TYPE2_UKI at the same time to reduce confusion what is what)
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 28, 2025
Companion BLS spec PR: uapi-group/specifications#135
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 28, 2025
With this we can now do: systemd-vmspawn -n -i foobar.raw -s io.systemd.boot.entries-extra:particleos-current.conf=$'title ParticleOS Current\nuki-url http://example.com/somedir/uki.efi' Assuming sd-boot is available inside the ESP of foobar.raw a new item will show up in the boot menu that allows booting directly into the specified UKI.
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 10, 2025
…r() and friends
The buffer will be used by a library outside of our code base,
and may not be initialized even on success. Let's initialize
them for safety.
Hopefully fixes the following fuzzer warning:
```
==2039==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x7f9ad8be3ae6 in _nss_files_getsgnam_r (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libnss_files.so.2+0x8ae6) (BuildId: 013bf05b4846ebbdbebdb05585acc9726c2fabce)
#1 0x7f9ad93e5902 in getsgnam_r (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x126902) (BuildId: 0323ab4806bee6f846d9ad4bccfc29afdca49a58)
#2 0x7f9ad9b98153 in nss_sgrp_for_group /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/user-record-nss.c:357:21
#3 0x7f9ad9b98926 in nss_group_record_by_gid /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/user-record-nss.c:431:21
#4 0x7f9ad9bcebd7 in groupdb_by_gid_fallbacks /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/userdb.c:1372:29
Uninitialized value was created by a heap allocation
#0 0x556fd5294302 in malloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/msan/msan_interceptors.cpp:1021:3
#1 0x7f9ad9b9811d in nss_sgrp_for_group /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/user-record-nss.c:353:23
#2 0x7f9ad9b98926 in nss_group_record_by_gid /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/user-record-nss.c:431:21
#3 0x7f9ad9bcebd7 in groupdb_by_gid_fallbacks /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/shared/userdb.c:1372:29
```
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 17, 2025
The following failure should be in libxkbcommon and/or sanitizer.
There is nothing we can do here. Let's skip it.
```
TEST-73-LOCALE.sh[3733]: + assert_rc 0 localectl set-keymap lv
TEST-73-LOCALE.sh[6699]: + set +ex
TEST-73-LOCALE.sh[6700]: Failed to set keymap: Remote peer disconnected
TEST-73-LOCALE.sh[6703]: FAIL: expected: '0' actual: '1'
TEST-73-LOCALE.sh[157]: + rm -f /etc/dbus-1/system.d/systemd-localed-read-only.conf
[FAILED] Failed to start TEST-73-LOCALE.service - TEST-73-LOCALE.
```
```
==3719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fa51f161000 at pc 0x7fa521250be4 bp 0x7ffe49130a80 sp 0x7ffe49130240
READ of size 19126 at 0x7fa51f161000 thread T0
#0 0x7fa521250be3 in strndup (/usr/lib/clang/20/lib/x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu/libclang_rt.asan.so+0x50be3) (BuildId: aa6231e817f72469c44a6c6cee9f0694a87db7fb)
#1 0x7fa51f128325 (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x1c325) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#2 0x7fa51f121952 (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x15952) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#3 0x7fa51f123d3a (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x17d3a) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#4 0x7fa51f117c86 (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0xbc86) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#5 0x7fa51f12548f (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x1948f) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#6 0x7fa51f125c9e (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x19c9e) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#7 0x7fa51f126a59 (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x1aa59) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#8 0x7fa51f12cec6 (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x20ec6) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#9 0x7fa51f12e3c2 (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x223c2) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#10 0x7fa51f12a4e5 in xkb_keymap_new_from_names (/lib64/libxkbcommon.so.0+0x1e4e5) (BuildId: 72e8cb985db37963272d140f7b2aee551c465ff5)
#11 0x5574dd63f864 in verify_xkb_rmlvo /usr/src/debug/systemd/src/locale/xkbcommon-util.c:69:14
(snip)
```
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 17, 2025
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 20, 2025
When check_access() was added, the callback data parameter was changed from a pointer to a double pointer, resulting in a crash when it is accessed when logging an error: #0 __internal_syscall_cancel (a1=a1@entry=0, a2=a2@entry=0, a3=a3@entry=140726176497168, a4=a4@entry=4, a5=a5@entry=0, a6=a6@entry=0, nr=247) at ./nptl/cancellation.c:44 #1 0x00007f5d0ec996ad in __syscall_cancel (a1=a1@entry=0, a2=a2@entry=0, a3=a3@entry=140726176497168, a4=a4@entry=4, a5=a5@entry=0, a6=a6@entry=0, nr=247) at ./nptl/cancellation.c:75 #2 0x00007f5d0ed047ab in __waitid (idtype=idtype@entry=P_ALL, id=id@entry=0, infop=infop@entry=0x7ffd5dc2be10, options=options@entry=4) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/waitid.c:29 #3 0x00007f5d0f044412 in freeze () at ../src/basic/process-util.c:2039 #4 0x00005568f181bc2a in freeze_or_exit_or_reboot () at ../src/core/crash-handler.c:55 #5 0x00005568f181be82 in crash (sig=<optimized out>, siginfo=<optimized out>, context=<optimized out>) at ../src/core/crash-handler.c:184 #6 <signal handler called> #7 __strlen_avx2 () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strlen-avx2.S:76 #8 0x00007f5d0ec6e300 in __printf_buffer (buf=buf@entry=0x7ffd5dc2ca90, format=0x7f5d0f196e60 "%s: Failed to acquire credentials: %m", ap=0x7ffd5dc2d3d0, mode_flags=2) at ./stdio-common/vfprintf-process-arg.c:435 #9 0x00007f5d0ec91daf in __vsnprintf_internal (string=string@entry=0x7ffd5dc2cb70 "", maxlen=maxlen@entry=2048, format=format@entry=0x7f5d0f196e60 "%s: Failed to acquire credentials: %m", args=args@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d3d0, mode_flags=mode_flags@entry=2) at ./libio/vsnprintf.c:96 #10 0x00007f5d0ed27044 in ___vsnprintf_chk (s=s@entry=0x7ffd5dc2cb70 "", maxlen=maxlen@entry=2048, flag=flag@entry=1, slen=slen@entry=2048, format=format@entry=0x7f5d0f196e60 "%s: Failed to acquire credentials: %m", ap=ap@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d3d0) at ./debug/vsnprintf_chk.c:34 #11 0x00007f5d0f02de59 in vsnprintf (__s=0x7ffd5dc2cb70 "", __n=2048, __fmt=0x7f5d0f196e60 "%s: Failed to acquire credentials: %m", __ap=0x7ffd5dc2d3d0) at /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/stdio2.h:100 #12 log_internalv (level=7, error=-9, file=0x7f5d0f196643 "src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c", line=2853, func=0x7f5d0f1d5ca0 <__func__.62> "sd_varlink_get_peer_uid", format=0x7f5d0f196e60 "%s: Failed to acquire credentials: %m", ap=0x7ffd5dc2d3d0) at ../src/basic/log.c:865 #13 0x00007f5d0f02ded5 in log_internalv (level=<optimized out>, error=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, line=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, format=<optimized out>, ap=0x7ffd5dc2d3d0) at ../src/basic/log.c:868 #14 0x00007f5d0f02df67 in log_internal (level=<optimized out>, error=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, line=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, format=<optimized out>) at ../src/basic/log.c:882 #15 0x00007f5d0f10a135 in sd_varlink_get_peer_uid (v=0x7f5d0f5ab110 <__func__.44>, ret=ret@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d4f0) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c:2853 #16 0x00007f5d0f50c29e in audit_callback (auditdata=0x7ffd5dc2d698, cls=<optimized out>, msgbuf=0x55692366e77d "", msgbufsize=995) at ../src/core/selinux-access.c:65 #17 0x00007f5d0f716079 in avc_suppl_audit (ptr=0x7ffd5dc2d698, class=95, buf=<optimized out>, len=<optimized out>) at ./src/avc_internal.h:101 #18 avc_audit (ssid=0x5569237f2890, tsid=0x556922d7f4b0, tclass=<optimized out>, requested=<optimized out>, avd=<optimized out>, result=0, a=0x7ffd5dc2d698) at ./src/avc.c:721 #19 0x00007f5d0f716367 in avc_has_perm (ssid=0x5569237f2890, tsid=0x556922d7f4b0, tclass=tclass@entry=95, requested=4, aeref=aeref@entry=0x0, auditdata=auditdata@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d698) at ./src/avc.c:836 #20 0x00007f5d0f718b0a in selinux_check_access (scon=scon@entry=0x55692384cbc0 "system_u:system_r:policykit_t:s0", tcon=tcon@entry=0x556922c98a20 "system_u:object_r:systemd_networkd_unit_t:s0", class=class@entry=0x7f5d0f580b9e "service", perm=perm@entry=0x7f5d0f580cc0 "status", aux=aux@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d698) at ./src/checkAccess.c:64 #21 0x00007f5d0f50bf7e in check_access (scon=0x55692384cbc0 "system_u:system_r:policykit_t:s0", tcon=0x556922c98a20 "system_u:object_r:systemd_networkd_unit_t:s0", tclass=0x7f5d0f580b9e "service", permission=permission@entry=0x7f5d0f580cc0 "status", audit_info=<optimized out>, audit_info@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d720, error=error@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d880) at ../src/core/selinux-access.c:229 #22 0x00007f5d0f5100a1 in mac_selinux_access_check_bus_internal (message=<optimized out>, unit=<optimized out>, permission=0x7f5d0f580cc0 "status", function=0x7f5d0f5ab110 <__func__.44> "method_get_unit_by_pidfd", error=0x7ffd5dc2d880) at ../src/core/selinux-access.c:329 #23 0x00007f5d0f4a024b in method_get_unit_by_pidfd (message=0x5569236d9010, userdata=<optimized out>, error=0x7ffd5dc2d880) at ../src/core/dbus-manager.c:657 #24 0x00007f5d0f0c9bd0 in method_callbacks_run (bus=0x5569238684e0, m=0x5569236d9010, c=<optimized out>, require_fallback=false, found_object=0x7ffd5dc2d947) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:413 #25 object_find_and_run (bus=bus@entry=0x5569238684e0, m=m@entry=0x5569236d9010, p=<optimized out>, require_fallback=require_fallback@entry=false, found_object=found_object@entry=0x7ffd5dc2d947) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1323 #26 0x00007f5d0f0cafa2 in bus_process_object (bus=0x5569238684e0, m=0x5569236d9010) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1443 #27 0x00007f5d0f0d8c3e in process_message (bus=0x5569238684e0, m=0x5569236d9010) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3006 #28 process_running (bus=0x5569238684e0, ret=0x0) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3048 #29 bus_process_internal (bus=bus@entry=0x5569238684e0, ret=ret@entry=0x0) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3275 #30 0x00007f5d0f0d9099 in sd_bus_process (bus=bus@entry=0x5569238684e0, ret=ret@entry=0x0) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3302 #31 0x00007f5d0f0db3ec in io_callback (s=<optimized out>, fd=<optimized out>, revents=<optimized out>, userdata=0x5569238684e0) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3643 #32 0x00007f5d0f0a53d9 in source_dispatch (s=s@entry=0x5569236dea60) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4163 #33 0x00007f5d0f0a563d in sd_event_dispatch (e=<optimized out>, e@entry=0x5569232f6c00) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4782 #34 0x00007f5d0f0a6d38 in sd_event_run (e=<optimized out>, timeout=18446744073709551615) at ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4843 #35 0x00007f5d0f4f7871 in manager_loop (m=m@entry=0x5569232f8250) at ../src/core/manager.c:3310 #36 0x00005568f181517d in invoke_main_loop (m=0x5569232f8250, saved_rlimit_nofile=0x7ffd5dc2dcb0, saved_rlimit_memlock=0x7ffd5dc2dca0, ret_retval=<synthetic pointer>, ret_fds=0x7ffd5dc2dc78, ret_switch_root_dir=<synthetic pointer>, ret_switch_root_init=<synthetic pointer>, ret_error_message=0x7ffd5dc2dc90) at ../src/core/main.c:2140 #37 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffd5dc2dfe8) at ../src/core/main.c:3351 Follow-up for fe3f2ac
evverx
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 10, 2025
This test occasionally fails due to a race where systemd processes kernel's SIGKILL before the OOM notification, so the test service dies with Result=signal instead of the expected Result=oom-kill: [ 51.008765] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[906]: + systemd-run --wait --unit oom-kill -p OOMPolicy=kill -p Delegate=yes -p DelegateSubgroup=init.scope /tmp/script.sh [ 51.048747] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[907]: Running as unit: oom-kill.service; invocation ID: 456645347d554ea2878463404b181bd8 [ 51.066296] sysrq: Manual OOM execution [ 51.066596] kworker/1:0 invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL), order=-1, oom_score_adj=0 [ 51.066915] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.17.1-arch1-1 #1 PREEMPT(full) d2b229857b2eb4001337041f41d3c4f131433540 [ 51.066919] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014 [ 51.066921] Workqueue: events moom_callback [ 51.066928] Call Trace: [ 51.066931] <TASK> [ 51.066936] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 51.066942] dump_header+0x43/0x1aa <...snip...> [ 51.087814] 47583 pages reserved [ 51.087969] 0 pages cma reserved [ 51.088208] 0 pages hwpoisoned [ 51.088519] Out of memory: Killed process 908 (sleep) total-vm:3264kB, anon-rss:256kB, file-rss:1916kB, shmem-rss:0kB, UID:0 pgtables:44kB oom_score_adj:1000 [ 51.090263] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[907]: Finished with result: signal [ 51.094416] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[907]: Main processes terminated with: code=killed, status=9/KILL [ 51.094898] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[907]: Service runtime: 58ms [ 51.095436] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[907]: CPU time consumed: 22ms [ 51.095854] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[907]: Memory peak: 1.6M (swap: 0B) [ 51.096722] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[912]: ++ systemctl show oom-kill -P Result [ 51.106549] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[879]: + assert_eq signal oom-kill [ 51.107394] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[913]: + set +ex [ 51.108256] TEST-55-OOMD.sh[913]: FAIL: expected: 'oom-kill' actual: 'signal' [FAILED] Failed to start TEST-55-OOMD.service. To mitigate this, let's spawn a child process and move it to the subcgroup to get killed instead of the main process, so systemd has more time to react to the OOM notification and terminate the service with the expected oom-kill result.
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
No description provided.