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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: EIPS/eip-1108.md
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@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Fast elliptic curve cryptography is a keystone of a growing number of protocols
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}
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```
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These are all technologies that have been, or are in the process of being, deployed to main-net. There protocols would all benefit from reducing the gas cost of the precompiles.
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These are all technologies that have been, or are in the process of being, deployed to main-net. These protocols would all benefit from reducing the gas cost of the precompiles.
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To give a concrete example, it currently costs `820,000` gas to validate the cryptography in a typical AZTEC confidential transaction. If the gas schedule for the precompiles correctly reflected their load on the Ethereum network, this cost would be `197,000` gas. This significantly increases the potential use cases for private assets on Ethereum. AZTEC is planning to deploy several cryptographic protocols Ethereum, but these are at the limits of what is practical given the current precompile costs:
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Alternatively, account versioning can also be done through:
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***[26-VER](https://specs.corepaper.org/26-ver/)** and
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**[40-UNUSED](https://specs.corepaper.org/40-unused/)**: This makes an
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***[26-VER](https://corepaper.org/ethereum/compatibility/versioning/#prefix-based-account-versioning)** and
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**[40-UNUSED](https://corepaper.org/ethereum/compatibility/forward/)**: This makes an
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account's versioning solely dependent on its code header prefix. If
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with only 26-VER, it is not possible to certify any code is valid,
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because current VM allows treating code as data. This can be fixed
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`Development Loan: 0.005` over 3.1 Million blocks = 15500 ETH
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**Funding Working Groups on 1.X**
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* Funding Contractors, Coordinators, and project managers
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* Working Groups defined with clear mandates
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- Funding Contractors, Coordinators, and project managers
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- Working Groups defined with clear mandates
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Budget
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Working groups
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- State rent (750k)
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- Better sync (360k)
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- finality gadget (360k)
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*[FAQ - How will the funding of the devs be organized?](#how-will-funding-the-devs-be-organized)
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-[FAQ - How will the funding of the devs be organized?](#how-will-funding-the-devs-be-organized)
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## Accountability
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- Community
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## Personal Notes and Disclosure
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I want to address any concerns about conflicts of interests directly. My participation with Eth1.X currently has been as a volunteer. I am in talks about a possible funded role helping with testing and coordination. If my work for with Eth1.x is funded, I will accept no additional funding collected by the mechanism proposed in this EIP.
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Eth1.X is the now of Ethereum and I would like to see it succeed. This is the intent of my proposal.
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### Why Hardcoded Values?
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Why not us a smart contract with some governance mechanism to allow changing the distribution of funds? Wouldn’t that be more flexible and effective?
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Why not use a smart contract with some governance mechanism to allow changing the distribution of funds? Wouldn’t that be more flexible and effective?
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*TLDR: This EIP is not about governance reform*
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First, the payment of the loan will be hardcoded. Once agreed, the terms must be kept to give the lenders confidence in the repayment of the loan. As long as blocks are created the debt will be paid back. This is the essence of a trustless smart contract.
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After the loan, there is the option to allow the amounts (limited to less than .05ETH), and the locations (orgs that receive ecosystem funding) to be changed throughout the emission schedule. It is pretty easy to imagine a smart contract or DAO fulfilling this role. However, there are three classes of options available today we can consider when governing changes.
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***Give the Keys to the Hands of the Few (Oligarchy)**
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-**Give the Keys to the Hands of the Few (Oligarchy)**
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Create a multisig that allows a group of individuals to update the smart contract. The most likely candidates for this are the Core Devs themselves, but it could also be a trusted few from the community/stakeholders. No matter how you slice it, there is a fundamental issue in deciding who gets to decide. There currently is not a trusted/adopted governance mechanism to make these decisions within the Ethereum ecosytem. Also, preventing changing the contract in self interest is difficult without a well-engineered governance system of checks and balances. This EIP does not claim nor aim to solve these issues.
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Create a multisig that allows a group of individuals to update the smart contract. The most likely candidates for this are the Core Devs themselves, but it could also be a trusted few from the community/stakeholders. No matter how you slice it, there is a fundamental issue in deciding who gets to decide. There currently is not a trusted/adopted governance mechanism to make these decisions within the Ethereum ecosystem. Also, preventing changing the contract in self interest is difficult without a well-engineered governance system of checks and balances. This EIP does not claim nor aim to solve these issues.
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***Give the Keys to the Hands of the Many (Plutarchy)**
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-**Give the Keys to the Hands of the Many (Plutarchy)**
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Allow ethereum holders with coin votes to update the smart contract. Using holographic consensus could overcome the issue of voter turnout as it scales as participation scales, even to the size of the whole network. This has some benefits as the entire network can participate. However, the problem is that some individuals in the network are over represented -- the wealthy. Without a solution to identity that has been agreed to and implemented by the entire Ethereum Network, there is no way around giving more power in votes to the rich. This EIP does not claim, nor aim to solve these issues.
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***Use Ethereum Governance as it is Today**
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-**Use Ethereum Governance as it is Today**
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Criticisms or support aside, there is a system that governs Ethereum today. It is a mix of rough consensus among core devs, miners running nodes, clients implementing changes, and stakeholders adopting those changes. It includes yelling or not yelling on twitter and reddit. It is complicated and I don’t claim to understand it. Even without a clear view of how it works, there is evidence of its existence. This evidence is there are changes that have allowed to be implemented, and changes that have not allowed to be implemented in Ethereum.
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### Why not allow current client implementors fund this work? (EF, Consensys, Parity, etc...)
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Historically there has been a precedent that the Ethereum Foundation is solely responsible for funding the development of Ethereum. This process has evolved as the development has become more distributed. Aya Miyaguchi observed in a recent [Coindesk article](https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-foundation-director-sets-new-vision-for-blockchain-non-profit), “it really is not only Ethereum Foundation people who are building [Ethereum]”. Yes, we could rely on the Ethereum Foundation to fund Eth1.X. But, why should we? This is a call for the network to come together and fund its own development. Ethereum _the network_ is not owned by any one organization or group of people. We are lucky to have the EF and I consider this EIP in support of their coordination efforts.
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Historically there has been a precedent that the Ethereum Foundation is solely responsible for funding the development of Ethereum. This process has evolved as the development has become more distributed. Aya Miyaguchi observed in a recent [Coindesk article](https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-foundation-director-sets-new-vision-for-blockchain-non-profit), “it really is not only Ethereum Foundation people who are building [Ethereum]”. Yes, we could rely on the Ethereum Foundation to fund Eth1.X. But, why should we? This is a call for the network to come together and fund its own development. Ethereum *the network* is not owned by any one organization or group of people. We are lucky to have the EF and I consider this EIP in support of their coordination efforts.
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### How Will Funding the Devs be Organized
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@@ -196,14 +199,14 @@ I am not a lawyer and will seek further guidance from lawyers in the field on th
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As the result of [REVES ET AL. v . ERNST YOUNG 1990](https://casetext.com/case/reves-v-ernst-young), the court stated that a home loan, consumer financing, a loan secured by a lien on a small business or some assets of a small business, short term notes, or notes that formalize a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business are not securities. If the note resembles the items listed above (home loans, etc.) then the note will not be deemed a security. The Supreme Court provided four factors to determine if a note sufficiently resembles the types of notes that are not classified as securities. ([source](https://www.invigorlaw.com/loan-subject-securities-regulations/))
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**Family Resemblance Test**
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1) The intentions of the company and the individual—if the company raised money for general use in a business enterprise, then the note is more likely to be a security; if the individual agreed to the loan primarily for the profit the note was expected to generate, the note is more likely to be a security.
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2) The plan of distribution—the more widely the note is offered, the more likely it is to be found a security.
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3) The expectations of the investing public—if the investors thought they were investing in a business to make a profit on their investment, the note is more likely to be found a security.
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4) Other risk-reducing factor—if the note is collateralized or otherwise less risky than common notes, the note is less likely to be found to be a security.
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The loan is for the specific use of supporting Eth1.X research and development. The distribution will not be widely offered and the note will be collateralized by the network itself, provided in ETH and repaid in ETH. In coordinating the collection of these funds recognise I may be legally liable for some of this work and I will do all of the due dilegence I can, seek legal counsel, and accept any legal repercussions resulting from this work.
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####
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The loan is for the specific use of supporting Eth1.X research and development. The distribution will not be widely offered and the note will be collateralized by the network itself, provided in ETH and repaid in ETH. In coordinating the collection of these funds recognise I may be legally liable for some of this work and I will do all of the due dilegence I can, seek legal counsel, and accept any legal repercussions resulting from this work.
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## Copyright
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Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md).
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