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Add Engine v19.03.11 release notes#10940

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usha-mandya merged 2 commits into
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usha-mandya:engine-190311-relnotes
Jun 2, 2020
Merged

Add Engine v19.03.11 release notes#10940
usha-mandya merged 2 commits into
docker:masterfrom
usha-mandya:engine-190311-relnotes

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Release notes for Docker Engine version 19.03.11

@usha-mandya
usha-mandya requested a review from justincormack June 1, 2020 19:39
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netlify Bot commented Jun 1, 2020

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thaJeztah
thaJeztah previously approved these changes Jun 2, 2020

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LGTM

@justincormack if we have more information to add here or link to, could you please provide that?

/cc @tiborvass

justincormack
justincormack previously approved these changes Jun 2, 2020
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You can link to kubernetes/kubernetes#91507

Also can use this text

In the Docker default configuration the container network interface is a virtual ethernet link going to the host (veth interface).
In this configuration, an attacker able to run a process as root in a container can send and receive arbitrary packets to the host using the CAP_NET_RAW capability (present in the default configuration).

If IPv6 is not totally disabled on the host (via ipv6.disable=1 on the kernel cmdline), it will be either unconfigured or configured on some interfaces, but it’s pretty likely that ipv6 forwarding is disabled, ie /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf//forwarding == 0.
Also by default, /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/
/accept_ra == 1. The combination of these 2 sysctls means that the host accepts router advertisements and configures the IPv6 stack using them.

By sending “rogue” router advertisements from a container, an attacker can reconfigure the host to redirect part or all of the IPv6 traffic of the host to the attacker controlled container.
Even if there was no IPv6 traffic before, if the DNS returns A (IPv4) and AAAA (IPv6) records, many HTTP libraries will try to connect via IPv6 first then fallback to IPv4, giving an opportunity to the attacker to respond.
If by chance the host has a vulnerability like last year’s RCE in apt (CVE-2019-3462), the attacker can now escalate to the host.

As CAP_NET_ADMIN is not present by default for Docker containers, the attacker can’t configure the IPs they want to MitM, they can’t use iptables to NAT or REDIRECT the traffic, and they can’t use IP_TRANSPARENT.
The attacker can however still use CAP_NET_RAW and implement a tcp/ip stack in user space.

@usha-mandya
usha-mandya force-pushed the engine-190311-relnotes branch from 018045a to e1b51ed Compare June 2, 2020 10:57
@usha-mandya
usha-mandya merged commit 18f02be into docker:master Jun 2, 2020
@champtar

champtar commented Jun 2, 2020

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@justincormack hope I haven't made any spelling errors :P

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4 participants