fix(codeql): go/path-injection in pkg/server/session_manager.go:542#3758
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User-supplied WorkingDir (POST /api/sessions body) was passed through filepath.Abs and then directly to os.Stat without any containment check, allowing an authenticated caller to probe or operate on arbitrary filesystem locations (go/path-injection, CodeQL alert #57). Add resolveWithinRoot which canonicalises the requested path via filepath.EvalSymlinks (on both the candidate and the allowed root) and then rejects any path whose filepath.Rel result escapes the root with a ".." prefix. The allowed root defaults to the server's configured WorkingDir (runConfig.WorkingDir), falling back to the process working directory when none is configured. Symlink escapes (a link inside root pointing outside), dot-dot traversal, and sibling-directory attacks are all covered by the new test suite.
aheritier
added
area/api
forbidigo rule disallows context.Background() in tests.
ronan-thibaut-glitch
marked this pull request as ready for review
July 20, 2026 16:03
Sayt-0
approved these changes
Jul 20, 2026
This was referenced Jul 21, 2026
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The
WorkingDirfield supplied in the POST /api/sessions request body was resolved withfilepath.Absand passed directly toos.Statwithout checking whether it lies within any permitted scope. An authenticated caller could setWorkingDirto/etc,/root, or any other directory and cause the AI agent to operate on arbitrary filesystem locations — a horizontal privilege escalation risk in multi-user deployments (CodeQL rulego/path-injection, alert #57, line 542).The fix adds two helpers to
SessionManager:workingDirRoot(returns the server's configuredWorkingDirfromrunConfig, falling back to the process working directory) andresolveWithinRoot(callsfilepath.EvalSymlinkson both the candidate path and the root to defeat symlink escapes, then usesfilepath.Relto verify the result does not escape the root via../components or an absolute path on a different drive). The taintedabsWdnow passes throughresolveWithinRootbefore reachingos.Stat, breaking the alerted data flow. Symlink-escape, sibling-directory, and dot-dot traversal attacks are each covered by the newpkg/server/session_workingdir_test.gotest file.