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docs(readme): align apply-safety-gates bullets with #189/#190/#192 changes
Branch-review surfaced documentation drift in README.md bullet
list (lines 175-181) describing the apply-safety gates. The PR
introduced three operator-visible behavior changes that the
existing bullets did not reflect:
- Bullet #1 (Phase 1, declared-resource existence): the new
syntactic net-addr walker now covers StaticHostConfig.address,
NetworkRuleConfig.matchSourceAddress[], and
WireguardConfig.peers[].endpoint. Operators reading the README
today would still think a typoed Wireguard endpoint is silent
until apply-time.
- Bullet #2 (Phase 2A, pre-apply drift preview): the gate now
redacts secret-bearing field values by default
(cluster.token, cluster.{ca,...}.key, machine.token / machine.ca.key,
cluster.acceptedCAs / machine.acceptedCAs slices,
WireguardConfig.privateKey, peers slice with presharedKeys).
The per-node prefix on the maintenance-connection warning
(multi-node insecure apply) is also noted.
- Bullet #4 (Phase 2C, post-upgrade version verify): 'waits 90s'
is now 'waits the configured reconcile window (default 90s;
tune via --post-upgrade-reconcile-window for slow hardware /
large image pulls)'. The 'slow boot exceeding the 90s
reconcile window' tail is similarly retuned.
Add TestReadmePostUpgradeVerify_NoHardcoded90s as a contract pin
against future drift — same shape as the in-code
TestPostUpgradeVersionMismatchHint_NoHardcoded90s pin, applied to
the README. Reading the file via os.ReadFile (../../README.md
from the test cwd); skip cleanly if absent (vendored source
release scenario).
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <[email protected]>
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: README.md
+3-3Lines changed: 3 additions & 3 deletions
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@@ -172,13 +172,13 @@ cluster:
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> **Apply-time safety gates.** `talm apply` and `talm upgrade` run additional gates around each operation:
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> 1. **Declared-resource existence** (`--skip-resource-validation` opt-out, default on). Before sending the config to the node, the gate walks the rendered MachineConfig, extracts every reference to a host-side resource (network links from v1.12 multi-doc — `LinkConfig.name`, `BondConfig.links[]`, `VLANConfig.parent`, `BridgeConfig.links[]`, `Layer2VIPConfig.link`, `HCloudVIPConfig.link`, `DHCPv4Config.name` / `DHCPv6Config.name` / `EthernetConfig.name`; v1.11 legacy `machine.network.interfaces[].interface`; install disk via `machine.install.disk` literal or `machine.install.diskSelector`; `UserVolumeConfig.provisioning.diskSelector`), and verifies each against the node's COSI `LinkStatus`/`Disk` snapshots. A reference that doesn't resolve fails the apply with a `[blocker]` line listing the available names so the typo or migration miss is fixable from the values without re-running discovery. Disk selectors must match at least one (non-readonly, non-CDROM, non-virtual) disk — zero matches block, multiple matches warn (install picks the first). Virtual-link-creator documents (`BondConfig.name`, `VLANConfig.name`, `BridgeConfig.name`, `WireguardConfig.name`, `DummyLinkConfig.name`, `LinkAliasConfig.name`) are intentionally NOT validated against existing links — those `.name` fields describe new virtual links the apply is creating, not references to pre-existing host resources. Out of scope today: `machine.disks[].device` (extra-disk partitioning); track in a follow-up if you need it. Pass `--skip-resource-validation` for recovery into a maintenance image with mismatched hardware or pre-staging values for hardware that isn't installed yet.
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> 1. **Declared-resource existence** (`--skip-resource-validation` opt-out, default on). Before sending the config to the node, the gate walks the rendered MachineConfig, extracts every reference to a host-side resource (network links from v1.12 multi-doc — `LinkConfig.name`, `BondConfig.links[]`, `VLANConfig.parent`, `BridgeConfig.links[]`, `Layer2VIPConfig.link`, `HCloudVIPConfig.link`, `DHCPv4Config.name` / `DHCPv6Config.name` / `EthernetConfig.name`; v1.11 legacy `machine.network.interfaces[].interface`; install disk via `machine.install.disk` literal or `machine.install.diskSelector`; `UserVolumeConfig.provisioning.diskSelector`), and verifies each against the node's COSI `LinkStatus`/`Disk` snapshots. A reference that doesn't resolve fails the apply with a `[blocker]` line listing the available names so the typo or migration miss is fixable from the values without re-running discovery. Disk selectors must match at least one (non-readonly, non-CDROM, non-virtual) disk — zero matches block, multiple matches warn (install picks the first). Virtual-link-creator documents (`BondConfig.name`, `VLANConfig.name`, `BridgeConfig.name`, `WireguardConfig.name`, `DummyLinkConfig.name`, `LinkAliasConfig.name`) are intentionally NOT validated against existing links — those `.name` fields describe new virtual links the apply is creating, not references to pre-existing host resources. The gate also runs a syntactic net-addr walker against `StaticHostConfig.address` (must parse as an IP literal), `NetworkRuleConfig.matchSourceAddress[]` (per-entry CIDR), and `WireguardConfig.peers[].endpoint` (host:port; empty / absent endpoint is a listener-only peer, NOT a finding). Out of scope today: `machine.disks[].device` (extra-disk partitioning); track in a follow-up if you need it. Pass `--skip-resource-validation` for recovery into a maintenance image with mismatched hardware or pre-staging values for hardware that isn't installed yet.
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> 2. **Pre-apply drift preview** (`--skip-drift-preview` opt-out, default on). Reads the node's current MachineConfig via COSI and prints a `+`/`-`/`~`/`=` diff of what's about to change, keyed by `(kind, name)`. Informational only — never blocks. The `-` lines are the most useful: they surface stale documents from a previous apply that the new render no longer emits (e.g. an `eth1` LinkConfig lingering after a migration to `eth0`). Reading the current config requires the auth path — `MachineConfig` is a Sensitive COSI resource and is unreachable on the `--insecure` maintenance connection; the gate prints `drift verification unavailable on maintenance connection` and proceeds in that case. **`--dry-run` runs this gate** — the diff is read-only and "show me what would change" is exactly the dry-run contract.
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> 2. **Pre-apply drift preview** (`--skip-drift-preview` opt-out, default on). Reads the node's current MachineConfig via COSI and prints a `+`/`-`/`~`/`=` diff of what's about to change, keyed by `(kind, name)`. Informational only — never blocks. The `-` lines are the most useful: they surface stale documents from a previous apply that the new render no longer emits (e.g. an `eth1` LinkConfig lingering after a migration to `eth0`). Reading the current config requires the auth path — `MachineConfig` is a Sensitive COSI resource and is unreachable on the `--insecure` maintenance connection; the gate prints `drift verification unavailable on maintenance connection` (per-node-prefixed on multi-node insecure apply) and proceeds in that case. Secret-bearing field values (`cluster.token`, `cluster.{ca,aggregatorCA,serviceAccount,etcd.ca}.key`, `machine.token` / `machine.ca.key`, the `cluster.acceptedCAs` / `machine.acceptedCAs` slices, `WireguardConfig.privateKey`, the `peers` slice carrying `presharedKey`s) are redacted by default — both sides render as `***redacted (len=N)***` so a rotation surfaces as different-length sentinels without leaking the value. Pass `--show-secrets-in-drift` to see the raw values verbatim (debugging only — disables the redaction for the run). **`--dry-run` runs this gate** — the diff is read-only and "show me what would change" is exactly the dry-run contract.
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>
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> 3. **Post-apply state verification** (`--skip-post-apply-verify` opt-out, **default off** until the Talos-mutated-field allowlist lands — see [#172](https://github.com/cozystack/talm/issues/172)). After `ApplyConfiguration` returns success, re-reads the on-node MachineConfig and structurally compares it against the bytes that were sent. Divergence blocks the apply chain with a per-document diff, primarily catching silent doc drops (Talos parser ignored an unknown field) and controller reverts. Disabled by default because Talos mutates a handful of leaf fields post-apply (cert hashes, timestamps) that would surface as false-positive divergence without an allowlist. The verify runs only on `--mode=no-reboot`. `--mode=staged`, `--mode=try`, `--mode=reboot`, and `--mode=auto` all skip the gate — each for a documented reason: staged stores rather than activates; try auto-rolls back; reboot kills the COSI connection mid-verify; auto is promoted by Talos to REBOOT internally when the change requires it, so the verify would race the reboot. `--dry-run` skips it too.
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> 4. **Post-upgrade version verify** (`--skip-post-upgrade-verify` opt-out, default on — the gate runs). After `talm upgrade` reports success, waits 90sfor the node to finish booting then reads `runtime.Version` COSI and compares the running version's `(Major, Minor)` contract against the contract parsed from the target image tag. Point releases share a minor contract; cross-minor mismatch surfaces as a hint-bearing blocker. Catches the silent A/B rollback case where the upgrade RPC acks success but Talos rolled back to the previous partition (cross-vendor image, missing extensions, failed boot readiness check, slow boot exceeding the reconcile window). Best-effort surrender on digest-pinned images and unparseable tags. See [#175](https://github.com/cozystack/talm/issues/175) for the reproduction.
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> 4. **Post-upgrade version verify** (`--skip-post-upgrade-verify` opt-out, default on — the gate runs). After `talm upgrade` reports success, waits the configured reconcile window (default 90s; tune via `--post-upgrade-reconcile-window` for slow hardware / large image pulls) for the node to finish booting, then reads `runtime.Version` COSI and compares the running version's `(Major, Minor)` contract against the contract parsed from the target image tag. Point releases share a minor contract; cross-minor mismatch surfaces as a hint-bearing blocker. Catches the silent A/B rollback case where the upgrade RPC acks success but Talos rolled back to the previous partition (cross-vendor image, missing extensions, failed boot readiness check, slow boot exceeding the configured window). Best-effort surrender on digest-pinned images and unparseable tags. See [#175](https://github.com/cozystack/talm/issues/175) for the reproduction.
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> The skip flags don't suppress each other — pass them independently. On the `--insecure` (maintenance) path the gates are functionally unreachable for charts that drive discovery via `lookup` — those COSI lookups require an authenticated connection and the render itself errors before any gate runs. Charts that render fully offline (no `lookup` calls) reach the gates on `--insecure` as well, with the Phase 2 hooks degrading gracefully because the `MachineConfig` resource is Sensitive.
t.Skipf("README.md not present at %s (likely a vendored source release without the repo layout): %v", readmePath, err)
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}
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ifstrings.Contains(string(body), "waits 90s") {
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t.Errorf("README.md must not hardcode 'waits 90s' — the post-upgrade reconcile window is operator-tunable via --post-upgrade-reconcile-window; replace with 'the configured reconcile window (default 90s, tune via --post-upgrade-reconcile-window)'")
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