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docs(unified-tls-pki): make the canonical name collision-free by construction
The trust anchor was named <release>-tenant-ca on the grounds that no
operator the platform ships claims it. That is false. It collides across
releases: for an application foo the projection is postgres-foo-tenant-ca,
and for a sibling application foo-tenant CloudNativePG's own CA secret is
postgres-foo-tenant plus -ca, which is the same string. Both names are
legal and several Postgres instances in one namespace is ordinary.
The collision has a direction no guard can refuse. When the projection is
written first, CloudNativePG rejects the key-free secret with 'missing
ca.key secret data' and the sibling's PKI never completes, so that
application never starts, blaming a secret its owner never created. The
controller that wrote first was within its rights, so there is nothing to
refuse; and before this contract existed both applications worked.
The name is now <release>.tenant-ca, which is disjoint by character class
rather than by survey: application names are DNS-1035 labels and cannot
contain a dot, release prefixes are dot-free, and secret names are
DNS-1123 subdomains where a dot is legal. No prefix, application name and
operator suffix can therefore produce a dotted name, for any operator,
now or later.
This is the second time the survey argument failed — the previous name was
rejected because Percona claims it. Recording the reasoning so the third
name is not chosen the same way.
Assisted-By: Claude <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <[email protected]>
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: design-proposals/external-database-exposure/README.md
+3-3Lines changed: 3 additions & 3 deletions
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ This is the design-proposal artifact required by `cozystack/cozystack#2816`, and
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## Scope and related proposals
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-**Depends on:**`design-proposals/unified-tls-pki` — provides the `<release>-tenant-ca` key-free trust anchor that external clients use to verify the endpoint. This proposal does not re-specify it. It is a companion submission under the same epic, on its own branch; the path resolves once both proposals merge. The dependency is **per-engine, not blanket**: an engine is exposable here only once its `ca.crt` is actually delivered under that contract, and the path differs by engine — redis self-publishes a key-free `<release>-ca-cert` through its forked operator, while postgres and mongodb obtain theirs through the extraction controller in `unified-tls-pki`. So SNI exposure for a given engine is gated on that engine's `unified-tls-pki` convergence, not merely on the contract existing.
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-**Depends on:**`design-proposals/unified-tls-pki` — provides the `<release>.tenant-ca` key-free trust anchor that external clients use to verify the endpoint. This proposal does not re-specify it. It is a companion submission under the same epic, on its own branch; the path resolves once both proposals merge. The dependency is **per-engine, not blanket**: an engine is exposable here only once its `ca.crt` is actually delivered under that contract. The engines reach that point by two paths, but the tenant-facing object is the same for both: redis self-publishes a key-free `<release>-ca-cert` through its forked operator, which the controller copies verbatim into `<release>.tenant-ca`; postgres and mongodb hold their `ca.crt` inside a key-bearing Secret, from which the controller extracts it. Either way the external client verifies against the one canonical `<release>.tenant-ca`. So SNI exposure for a given engine is gated on that engine's `unified-tls-pki` convergence, not merely on the contract existing.
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-**Related:**`design-proposals/structured-external-exposure` (community pull request #29) — replaces the chart-level `external` boolean with a structured, additive `expose` list riding `ExposureClass` / `ServiceExposure` (`cozystack/cozystack#3081`), and lists Gateway/SNI consolidation as the forward-compatible future path. The two proposals meet at the trigger surface: once `expose` lands, "expose this database via SNI-passthrough" is naturally one `expose` entry (an exposure class or scope backed by the tenant Gateway) rather than a new chart toggle, and the per-release route rendering naturally belongs to that orchestration layer. This proposal defines the Gateway-side mechanics either trigger drives; it does not depend on `expose` landing first.
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-**Umbrella:**`cozystack/cozystack#2811`. This proposal covers WS4 (`cozystack/cozystack#2815`, SNI exposure) and WS5 (`cozystack/cozystack#2816`, end-to-end TLS).
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-**Referenced, not designed here:** WS6 east-west / in-cluster CNI encryption (`cozystack/cozystack#2977`, PR `cozystack/cozystack#2984`). It is complementary defense-in-depth for pod-to-pod traffic and is explicitly out of scope (see Non-goals).
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ flowchart TB
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P2["postgres db2<br/>presents CNPG server cert"]
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P3["redis cache<br/>presents operator server cert"]
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end
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CA["<release>-ca-cert (ca.crt only)<br/>projected via tenantsecrets"]
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CA["<release>.tenant-ca (ca.crt only)<br/>projected via tenantsecrets"]
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C1 -->|"raw TLS, SNI"| L1
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C2 -->|"raw TLS, SNI"| L1
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C3 -->|"raw TLS, SNI"| L2
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ One subtlety the "single certificate" framing hides: an external client doing `s
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WS5 adds nothing beyond two hooks that already exist:
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1.**Trust-anchor delivery** — the `<release>-tenant-ca``ca.crt`-only object from `unified-tls-pki`, projected to the tenant. The external client verifies against that `ca.crt`.
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1.**Trust-anchor delivery** — the `<release>.tenant-ca``ca.crt`-only object from `unified-tls-pki`, projected to the tenant. The external client verifies against that `ca.crt`.
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2.**SAN coverage** — the chart already injects the external hostname into the operator-issued certificate (postgres `serverAltDNSNames` in `db.yaml`, gated on TLS and external). Under this proposal the hook injects **both** name shapes — `<release>.<engine>.<apex>` and `<release>.<apex>` — so the certificate is valid for the subdomain scheme shipping now and the flat scheme arriving with Cilium 1.20 (§6).
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