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feat(shared,clerk-js,ui): let users with a breached password reverify by resetting it - #10396
When reverification rejects a password as breached (form_password_pwned) or compromised (form_password_compromised), the modal only shows the error. Users whose password is the only way to verify can't make any protected change in UserProfile, or anywhere else that uses useReverification, including the Clerk Dashboard. That includes changing the breached password.
Fix
The reverification modal now offers the same way out sign-in does:
A Password compromised screen with Reset your password, followed by the user's other methods.
A new password, then a code sent to the user's email or phone.
The new password replaces the breached one when the reverification completes. If the reverification also requires a second factor, that comes first.
The rest of the behavior:
Change password in UserProfile: the modal reuses the password the user already typed in the form, so they only enter the code. The copy says "save your new password" instead of "reset", useReverification still retries the change after the modal closes; the backend treats a retry with the password it just set as a no-op, so the password changes once and one notification is sent. If the modal rejected the form's password and the user picked another one there, the retry sends that one.
Rejected new password (weak, breached, or same as current): the user goes back to the new-password step with the error, and the code stays usable.
No reset factor offered (the user has no email or phone, or the instance disables password reverification): the inline error shows, as before.
The screens reuse sign-in's pieces instead of copies: the Password compromised screen is the reverification AlternativeMethods card in a pwned or passwordCompromised mode, like SignIn's. As in sign-in, it shows the "Having trouble?" footer, and after a rejected password it has no back link to the password field, since re-entering that password can't work. The user can still pick another method or close the modal.
API
SessionVerificationFirstFactor now includes ResetPasswordEmailCodeFactor | ResetPasswordPhoneCodeFactor.
session.prepareFirstFactorVerification() accepts both reset strategies.
session.attemptFirstFactorVerification() accepts SessionVerifyResetPasswordAttempt (code, the new password, optional signOutOfOtherSessions).
The internal modal props gain resetPassword (password, signOutOfOtherSessions, and an optional onPasswordChange called when the user picks a different password in the modal). afterVerification and useReverification are unchanged.
Custom flows can build the same reset with these types.
The matching backend change, which adds the reset strategies to reverification. Ship this only after that's live in production; until then the backend never offers a reset factor, and the modal behaves as today.
Testing
Unit tests cover:
UVFactorOne.test.tsx: breached and compromised screens, the full reset, a rejected new password, a wrong code, the second factor, back navigation, and the change-password shortcut.
PasswordSection.test.tsx: the retry sends the form's password, or the one the modal reported, and a failed retry keeps the form open with the error.
Session.test.ts: request bodies for both reset strategies.
Manually against a local backend using the sandbox with a user whose password was set to a breached one:
adding an email
UserProfile change password
a multi_factor reverification with TOTP, both completed and abandoned before the TOTP step
Part of CORE-3773
Checklist
pnpm test runs as expected (shared, clerk-js, ui)
pnpm build runs as expected
(If applicable) JSDoc comments have been added or updated for any package exports
(If applicable) Documentation has been updated (follow-up: breached-password section in the custom reverification guide)
… by resetting it
When reverification rejected a password as found in a breach or
compromised, the modal only showed the error. Users whose password was
the only way to verify couldn't make any protected change, including
changing that password.
The modal now offers the reset sign-in already has: a "Password
compromised" screen with "Reset your password" and the other methods,
then a new password, then a code sent to the user's email or phone. The
new password replaces the breached one when the reverification
completes, after a second factor if one is required.
From UserProfile's change password form, the modal reuses the password
the user already entered, so they only enter the code, and the form
skips its automatic retry so the password changes once.
session.prepareFirstFactorVerification() and
attemptFirstFactorVerification() accept reset_password_email_code and
reset_password_phone_code, so custom flows can build the same reset.
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Walkthrough
The change adds email- and phone-code password reset to reverification for compromised or breached passwords. It extends session verification types and requests, adds password-reset screens and error handling, and adds reverification localization keys across locale resources. UserProfile now passes a pending password into reverification and uses the verification result to decide whether to reload the user or retry the password update.
clerk/javascript#9344: Adds Ukrainian translations for reverification and password-reset keys that this change adds as undefined placeholders.
Suggested reviewers:alexcarpenter
Merge Risk: Moderate · previous review a95c9
Users may be unable to choose an available email or phone reset method. Offer every available reset factor before merging.
Pre-merge checks: 4
Check name
Status
Explanation
Title check
The title names the main change: users whose password is breached or compromised can reverify by resetting it. It also names the affected packages (shared, clerk-js, ui) using the conventional commit …
Linked Issues check
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Description check
The pull request description directly explains the breached-password reverification feature, reset flow, API changes, localization dependency, testing, and rollout requirements described in the change…
Full details: Title check
Explanation
The title names the main change: users whose password is breached or compromised can reverify by resetting it. It also names the affected packages (shared, clerk-js, ui) using the conventional commit style. The title is specific and the changeset matches it: new reset-password reverification strategies, a reset flow in the UI, and matching types.
Full details: Description check
Explanation
The pull request description directly explains the breached-password reverification feature, reset flow, API changes, localization dependency, testing, and rollout requirements described in the changeset.
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Static analyzer: Breaking change in type alias __internal_LocalizationResource: Type changed: {locale:string;maintenanceMode:import("@clerk/shared").LocalizationValue;roles:{[r:string]:import("@clerk/shared").Loca… → {locale:string;maintenanceMode:import("@clerk/shared").LocalizationValue;roles:{[r:string]:import("@clerk/shared").Loca…
🤖 AI review (reclassified as non-breaking) (72%): __internal_LocalizationResource is used only as the base for LocalizationResource extends DeepPartial<DeepLocalizationWithoutObjects<__internal_LocalizationResource>>, so consumers read/extend the partial version; the change adds ~27 new lines of localization keys to this output/base type, which existing consumers neither pass nor need to implement, making this an additive change.
Static analyzer: Breaking change in type alias __internal_UserVerificationProps: Type changed: import("@clerk/shared").RoutingOptions&{getContainer?:()=>!HTMLElement:interface|null;afterVerification?:()=>void;after… → import("@clerk/shared").RoutingOptions&{getContainer?:()=>!HTMLElement:interface|null;afterVerification?:(result?:impor…
🤖 AI review (reclassified as non-breaking) (80%): afterVerification changed from () => void to (result?: __internal_UserVerificationResult) => void — adding an optional parameter to a callback that consumers supply means existing zero-argument implementations still satisfy the new type (a function accepting no args is assignable to a type expecting an optional arg); the new resetPassword property is also optional, so existing consumers passing this type need no changes.
Static analyzer: Breaking change in type alias SessionVerificationFirstFactor: Type changed: import("@clerk/shared").EmailCodeFactor|import("@clerk/shared").EnterpriseSSOFactor|import("@clerk/shared").PasskeyFact… → import("@clerk/shared").EmailCodeFactor|import("@clerk/shared").EnterpriseSSOFactor|import("@clerk/shared").PasskeyFact…
🤖 AI review (reclassified as non-breaking) (85%): SessionVerificationFirstFactor is used as supportedFirstFactors: SessionVerificationFirstFactor[] | null which is an output/return field; adding new union variants ResetPasswordEmailCodeFactor | ResetPasswordPhoneCodeFactor to an output union is non-breaking since consumers only read values of this type and must already handle unknown variants via discriminated-union narrowing.
Static analyzer: Breaking change in type alias SessionVerifyAttemptFirstFactorParams: Type changed: import("@clerk/shared").EmailCodeAttempt|import("@clerk/shared").PasskeyAttempt /** * @experimental */|import("@clerk/s… → import("@clerk/shared").EmailCodeAttempt|import("@clerk/shared").PasskeyAttempt|import("@clerk/shared").PasswordAttempt…
🤖 AI review (reclassified as non-breaking) (85%): SessionVerifyAttemptFirstFactorParams is used as the parameter type of attemptFirstFactorVerification, which consumers pass values into (input position); adding SessionVerifyResetPasswordAttempt to the union widens the accepted input set, which is non-breaking for existing callers who already pass one of the prior variants.
Static analyzer: Breaking change in type alias SessionVerifyPrepareFirstFactorParams: Type changed: import("@clerk/shared").EmailCodeConfig|import("@clerk/shared").PhoneCodeConfig|import("@clerk/shared").PassKeyConfig /… → import("@clerk/shared").EmailCodeConfig|import("@clerk/shared").PhoneCodeConfig|import("@clerk/shared").PassKeyConfig|i…
🤖 AI review (reclassified as non-breaking) (85%): SessionVerifyPrepareFirstFactorParams is used as the parameter type of prepareFirstFactorVerification (input position); adding ResetPasswordEmailCodeFactorConfig | ResetPasswordPhoneCodeFactorConfig widens the set of accepted values, which is non-breaking for existing callers.
🟢 Additions (2)
Added: __internal_UserVerificationResult
+ type __internal_UserVerificationResult = {+ passwordReset?: boolean;+ };
Added type alias __internal_UserVerificationResult
The reset-password reverification screens add about 0.15KB gzip to the
largest ui-common chunk (mostly localization strings), which pushes it
past the 139KB limit main was already sitting at.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
…rification screens
Drop the copied UVPasswordPwnedMethods card. AlternativeMethods now takes a
mode prop ('default' | 'pwned' | 'passwordCompromised'), as in SignIn, and the
shared reset-password strings move to userVerification.resetPasswordAlternativeMethods.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at
@packages/ui/src/components/UserVerification/UserVerificationFactorOne.tsx:
- Line 69: Update the reset-factor selection logic in UserVerificationFactorOne
so it retains every available reset-code strategy instead of using find to keep
only the first. Present both factors as selectable options, and prepare a code
only after the user chooses a factor.
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When I was exploring implementing this for the Mosaic reverification I realized this part is very hard/impossible to get right for custom flows that implement edit password themselves. I don't think this is something users should need to worry about when implementing custom flows, it should be an internal implementation detail.
… set
When a user with a breached password changes it from UserProfile and resets
it in the reverification modal, useReverification then retries the original
change-password request. Developers building the same flow with
useReverification had no way to stop that retry from changing the password
a second time (a second notification, ended sessions, rotated cookie), and
Clerk's form hid it with its own skip. The backend now treats a retry with
the password it just set as a no-op, so the skip is removed.
Without the skip, one case broke: when the modal rejected the form's
password and the user picked another one there, the retry sent the rejected
password and the form showed an error for a change that had succeeded.
resetPassword now takes an optional onPasswordChange callback, and the
form's retry sends the password the modal last used.
Part of CORE-3773
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The reset password code is part of the ongoing reverification, not an
additional reset. The code screen said "Reset password"; it now uses the
same title and subtitle as the plain email and phone code screens. The new
password is still applied when the verification completes.
The change-password form keeps its "Check your email" and "save your new
password" copy, since there the password change is the action.
Part of CORE-3773
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
After the breached password is rejected, the modal shows Password compromised led by Reset your password; a new password then the emailed code (titled Verification required) completes it and the add-email action resumes. Before, only the inline error showed.
Change password: code only, retry sends it Rejected new password returns to form No reset factor: inline error as before Second factor follows reset code Custom flow gets passwordReset result Older clerk-js: error shown, not stuck
Proof on 9cbd6501 (from 567f017d) · mocked: Clerk Frontend API (The backend change that adds reset strategies to reverification is not live, and...) · Did Proof get it right? Yes · No
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Not related to this line, just putting comment here so we can thread the discussion.
I think there's an edge case with versioning that can happen if someone has pinned clerk-js, but let ui float freely.
clerk-js already passes through the compromised/breached errors
A new ui version would render the actual ui to handle that
The code screen calls session.prepareFirstFactorVerification({ strategy: 'reset_password_email_code', … }). Old clerk-js versions lacks that case, so it reaches clerkInvalidStrategy, which throws a plain Error.
UVFactorOneCodeForm catches it with handleError, but that rethrows anything that isn't a Clerk error, so the rejection goes unhandled.
No code is sent and no error is shown and the user waits for an email that never arrives. "Resend" does the same thing.
The users affected are already in a dead end they can't get out of, the only difference is that before they'd get a clear error what was wrong, now they would be stuck in an infinite pending state with no idea what is wrong.
One way to handle it would be to release the clerk-js and shared changes first, then release the ui changes as a follow up and gate the new behavior on the clerk-js version released in phase 1 and otherwise fall back to showing the plain error like before.
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To be clear, I'm not sure if this is blocking or not as I'm not sure how common it is, probably not very but I do think there's some places in the docs still where we detail pinning clerk-js but don't mention ui. It's a judgement call I'll let you make, I wont block it if you wanna merge as is since it's still a big improvement for the vast majority. 😄
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I made a change to show the non Clerk error to the user. With a pinned older clerk-js, the user sees "Strategy "reset_password_email_code" is not a valid strategy…". I think its an incremental improvement from the infinite pending state.
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The fact that we need to do this here indicates to me that we still haven't quite figured out the edit password story for custom flows, so I dug in and found a few issues:
The backend no-op you added never runs if the C1 passes currentPassword to user.updatePassword. That's the old password, which no longer matches after the reset, so the retry fails even though the password was changed. Our custom flow docs do this today.
There's another issue too:
The user types a new password A
Reverification triggers, the password is breached/compromised
The user types another new password B in the modal (with the default modal this always happens, since it doesn't know about A)
The reset sets B, then the retry sets A, which would be confusing since B is the last one they typed. signOutOfOtherSessions has the same problem in a different form: if it's checked in the form but unchecked in the modal, the retry still signs out other sessions I think.
I know we handle this in our own UI, but I don't think custom flows can.
This is pretty annoying to deal with, but what I've come up with is an opt-in to useReverification that passes the reverification result to the wrapped function:
// This could contain more information later, like whether this is the retry runningtypeReverificationResult={passwordReset?: {newPassword: string;signOutOfOtherSessions: boolean;};};constupdatePassword=useReverification(// Skips the BE call after a reset, but still always returns the user(reverification,params)=>reverification?.passwordReset ? user.reload().catch(()=>user) : user.updatePassword(params),// This option changes the wrapped fn signature to take `reverification` as the first param{passReverificationResult: true},);
That fixes all three cases. We could also use it in PasswordForm instead of the ref here, and I think we would need to use signOutOfOtherSessions from the result when available so the final confirmation text matches (whether or not we signed out other sessions).
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To be clear, I do think this one is blocking for three reasons:
I worry we won't think custom flows are important enough that we'll prioritize coming back to fix this later
While we could technically work around this in the Mosaic version, we'd have to take on a bunch of extra complexity there if we don't fix it here at the core
It would also clean up the somewhat smelly ref implementation here in the ui package
These together makes it worth fixing now to me, but feel free to push back of course!
This would prefill those fields on the reverification dialog. If signOutOfOtherSessions is true, we could hide that checkbox, otherwise we could show it since users might want to change their decision after they know their password is compromised (perhaps we should even default it to true regardless of that they previously selected)?
The reason for the callback form is to avoid stale values from state. Since the hook is called in render, the states might have changed until the submit/wrapped function call happens, this form entirely avoids that so there's no footgun for users.
A password change retried after reverification failed or overwrote the
password the user had just reset: custom flows send the old
`currentPassword`, and the modal could save a different password than
the form's.
`useReverification()` takes a `passReverificationResult` option. With
it, the wrapped function receives the reverification result as its
first argument (`undefined` on the first call). After a reset by code,
`passwordReset` holds the new password and the sign out choice, so the
retry can skip `updatePassword()`. UserProfile's PasswordForm uses it
in place of `resetPassword.onPasswordChange`, which is removed.
The modal records the reset attempt at the UserVerification routes
level, so the result is still available when verification completes
on the second factor.
If an older clerk-js rejects the reset password code strategy, the code
screen now shows the error instead of waiting for a code that was never
sent.
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Description
Problem
When reverification rejects a password as breached (
form_password_pwned) or compromised (form_password_compromised), the modal only shows the error. Users whose password is the only way to verify can't make any protected change in UserProfile, or anywhere else that usesuseReverification, including the Clerk Dashboard. That includes changing the breached password.Fix
The reverification modal now offers the same way out sign-in does:
The rest of the behavior:
useReverificationstill retries the change after the modal closes; the backend treats a retry with the password it just set as a no-op, so the password changes once and one notification is sent. If the modal rejected the form's password and the user picked another one there, the retry sends that one.The screens reuse sign-in's pieces instead of copies: the Password compromised screen is the reverification
AlternativeMethodscard in apwnedorpasswordCompromisedmode, like SignIn's. As in sign-in, it shows the "Having trouble?" footer, and after a rejected password it has no back link to the password field, since re-entering that password can't work. The user can still pick another method or close the modal.API
SessionVerificationFirstFactornow includesResetPasswordEmailCodeFactor | ResetPasswordPhoneCodeFactor.session.prepareFirstFactorVerification()accepts both reset strategies.session.attemptFirstFactorVerification()acceptsSessionVerifyResetPasswordAttempt(code, the newpassword, optionalsignOutOfOtherSessions).resetPassword(password,signOutOfOtherSessions, and an optionalonPasswordChangecalled when the user picks a different password in the modal).afterVerificationanduseReverificationare unchanged.Custom flows can build the same reset with these types.
Localization and appearance
resetPasswordscreen name, and the new-password screen has none, matching sign-in, so the two can be styled separately.Depends on
Testing
UVFactorOne.test.tsx: breached and compromised screens, the full reset, a rejected new password, a wrong code, the second factor, back navigation, and the change-password shortcut.PasswordSection.test.tsx: the retry sends the form's password, or the one the modal reported, and a failed retry keeps the form open with the error.Session.test.ts: request bodies for both reset strategies.multi_factorreverification with TOTP, both completed and abandoned before the TOTP stepPart of CORE-3773
Checklist
pnpm testruns as expected (shared,clerk-js,ui)pnpm buildruns as expectedType of change
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