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…(GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) remember resolved its domain from caller-supplied directory or domain and never compared it with the session's project, so a caller steered by untrusted content could place text in another local project's domain, which that project's query_methodology then served as hot memory. A write may now target no domain, a shared domain that names no known repository, or the session's own project (CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, else the working directory). Another project's domain is refused with a ValidationError naming CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES, the local variable that may reopen it (a domain list or *); no tool argument can. The rule is one helper (handlers/_write_scope.py), applied to every writer that takes a caller domain: remember (and codebase_analyze through it), seed_project, ingest_prd, ingest_document. The reported PoC is reproduced on the real handlers and store: two git repositories under an isolated dev root, a session in beta, a directory inside alpha or an unregistered directory plus domain=alpha. On the unfixed handler both writes succeed (2 tests fail); with the fix they are refused, the session's own project and shared domains stay writable, and the variable reopens alpha.
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Claude finished @cdeust's task in 5m 24s —— View job Review 1 of 3: PR #940. Verdict: block
The domain guard itself is sound, but the attack still works without naming a domain. That is one Blocker:
The full review also has 3 notes, which need no action before merge. I could not run |
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| root = Path(directory).expanduser().resolve() | ||
| # source: ADR-0445 | ||
| domain = args.get("domain", "") or root.name | ||
| require_writable_domain(domain, "seed_project") # GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w |
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Validate the resolved seed target before deleting memories
When a session in beta calls seed_project with directory pointing to known repository alpha and domain="beta", this check permits the request, and the handler then deletes all existing beta memories tagged seeded. However, _store_discoveries passes both arguments to remember, whose _resolve_domain prioritizes the directory and resolves the target to alpha; the newly added guard there raises ValidationError. The rejected request therefore leaves the session's existing seed memories deleted. Validate the effective domain using the same resolution as remember before performing the purge, while retaining authorization for the purge domain itself.
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Review 1 of 3: PR #940 (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w)I ran five reviews (security, code quality, tests, docs, performance) and checked the main finding against the code myself. One Blocker. The domain guard itself is sound:
The Blocker is that the same attack still works without naming a domain. Blocker: a write can still reach another project's
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Mutation gate on #940: 33 survivors. The tests checked neither the exact message and details, the trimming and case of the domain and of CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES, the working-directory fallback of the session, nor that seed_project, ingest_prd and ingest_document refuse under their own name (ingest_prd and ingest_document before any write).
…-domain # Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md
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Claude finished @cdeust's task in 2m 51s —— View job Review 2 of 3: PR #940. Verdict: block
Review 1's Blocker is still open. The two commits since then (
The new tests have no Blockers. I traced them against the code and they should pass in CI. The full review has 3 notes, which need no action before merge. I didn't run |
Review 2 of 3: PR #940 (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w)The last review covered Blocker (from review 1, still open): global scope bypasses the guardNo commit since
Scenario: a session in
The new tests have no Blockers. I traced their expected strings, the Notes, no action before merge
I didn't run Verdict: block |
…-domain # Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md
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Claude finished @cdeust's task in 1m 5s —— View job Review 3 of 3: PR #940 (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w)
Review 2 covered Blocker (from reviews 1 and 2, still open): global scope bypasses the guard
So a session in
Accepted vs open
Notes, no action before merge
I couldn't run Verdict: block |
…or an existing row (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Reviews 1-3 of #940, blocker: hot memories are 'domain = ? OR is_global', so remember(is_global=true) or anchor(is_global=true) still put text into every project's query_methodology context, and anchor rewrote any memory_id. Also swept, per the review: curation merges, supersedes_id targets and the memory-replica vpath refresh changed rows of any domain; seed_project checked the raw domain while remember resolves the directory first, so a refused run had already purged the seeded rows. - An explicit is_global=true needs CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES=*; a global scope the detector infers without it is kept local and reported. - anchor and supersedes_id refuse a memory of another project, or a global one without '*'; curation and the replica refresh skip such rows and create a new one instead. - seed_project checks the domain remember will write under. - The domain is compared by its canonical name (resolve_explicit_domain). New tests drive every path on the real handlers and store from a session in beta: 10 of 11 fail on the previous code. Tests that write a global memory on purpose now declare the allowance; the replica fake store matches the query that now also reads domain and is_global. 623 handler tests pass.
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| domain = args.get("domain", "") or root.name | ||
| # GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w: check the domain remember will write each file under | ||
| # (the directory wins over the argument) before anything is purged. | ||
| require_writable_domain(_remember_domain(str(root), domain), "seed_project") |
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Authorize the purge domain independently of the write domain
When a session in beta calls seed_project with directory pointing to beta and domain="alpha", _remember_domain resolves to beta, so this check passes without any cross-project allowance. However, handler still passes the original domain to delete_memories_by_tag("seeded", domain=domain), deleting alpha's seeded memories before storing the discoveries in beta. The effective-domain check fixes the previously reported rejected-write scenario, but the unchanged purge argument provides a separate cross-project deletion path. Validate the purge domain as well as the resolved write domain before allowing either mutation.
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| if not memory_writable( | ||
| {"domain": rows[0].get("domain"), "is_global": rows[0].get("is_global")} | ||
| ): | ||
| return False, None |
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Search for a writable replica before falling back to insertion
When the same vpath: is replicated from two projects, the unscoped LIMIT 1 query can keep returning the first project's now-unwritable row, even after the fallback has created a writable replica in the current project. Every subsequent refresh that selects that row returns here instead of updating the current project's replica. With forced writes, this creates another row on every sync, retaining stale snapshots and growing the store; exact-replay deduplication does not prevent this because memory_exact_sql.bypass explicitly excludes memory-replica writes. Search for an eligible existing replica rather than abandoning the upsert after checking only one arbitrary match.
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…hor writer line moved Check `unit` (run 42373733761, job 128407016638) failed on 4 tests. The PR makes an explicit is_global=true write require CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES=*, and two tests still wrote a global memory without it (test_global_memory_visible_across_domains, test_explicit_global_hooks_cross_projects). The anchor UPDATE moved from anchor.py:145 to :154, so the I2 writer allowlist pointed at a stale line. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsijeugoBcVdpBJric
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Diagnostic du check Commit poussé : 10b5afb (les tests posent l'autorisation via Vérifié en local : les 4 tests passent ; Non vérifié : la CI de 10b5afb (en cours). La branche a aussi 1 commit de retard sur Generated by Claude Code |
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Claude finished @cdeust's task in 3m 19s —— View job Review 4 of 3: PR #940 (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w)
Earlier Blocker: fixed
Blocker:
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| target = resolve_explicit_domain(domain or "") | ||
| if not target or target not in project_domains(): | ||
| return |
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Security: Reject writes to unregistered repository domains
When the victim repository is outside CORTEX_DEV_ROOT or the four hard-coded roots/depths, a lower-privileged local MCP session can pass its domain and content to remember. project_domains() omits that real repository, so this early return treats its domain as shared and skips the session-domain check; the row is inserted under the victim domain and mandatory query_methodology later returns it as hot memory. A targeted probe reproduced beta → unregistered-victim as ALLOWED. Distinguish intentionally shared domains from unresolved project domains, or deny unresolved explicit targets.
SECURITY.md reference: SECURITY.md:L15-L16
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…eft open Check `unit`, run 42377328684 (job 128417628663): the tests passed, then the mutation gate found 52 genuine survivors in _write_scope, anchor, remember and remember_helpers. Root causes: - The details of the global refusals, and the environment each check reads, were never asserted. - memory_writable called require_writable_memory with a tool name it then discarded, and anchor passed a reason string global_scope threw away: both only produced equivalent mutants. The refusal is now decided by a predicate (_refused_domain), and require_global_allowed raises the global refusal, called by global_scope and directly by anchor. - remember computes the scope twice (exact-duplicate record, then the write), so each refusal masked the other. The tests now drive the paths where only one decides: an explicit global replay of a local note, a detected or explicit global replay, and a superseding global write. - The curation loop's skip of an unwritable candidate was not distinguished from stopping the loop. tests_py/invariants/test_I2_canonical_writer.py: the anchor writer moved to line 157 (the import grew by three lines). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYqpV8QEumVvQXENjQN
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CI autopilot : diagnostic du check Les 12328 tests passent. C'est le gate de mutation qui échoue : La cause racine tient en trois points :
Commit poussé : a0cd381
Vérifié localement :
Non vérifié :
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… argument (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w)
The guard checked the domain remember writes under (the directory wins over the
argument) while the purge ran on the raw domain argument. A session in beta
calling seed_project({'domain': 'alpha'}) from its own directory passed the
check and deleted alpha's seeded memories. The purge now targets the checked
domain; a regression test fails without the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF
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Blocage du review 4 corrigé dans a653394 : la purge de 🤖 Generated with Claude Code Generated by Claude Code |
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| source=str(path), version=content_version(raw), source_kind=kind | ||
| ) | ||
| domain = (str(args.get("domain") or "").strip()) or "documents" | ||
| require_writable_domain(domain, "ingest_document") # GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w |
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Security: Scope document receipt reconciliation to the authorized domain
Requires a beta MCP session that can name and read a file previously ingested into alpha. This guard authorizes only domain="beta", but _retire_obsolete looks up receipts by source/version and writer without domain and stales unmatched rows. Reingesting the same file from beta with a different title therefore marks alpha’s protected summary stale; a targeted repro changed alpha row 1 from is_stale=false to true while the call passed this guard. Scope receipt lookup, reuse, and retirement to the authorized domain, or authorize each existing row before mutation.
SECURITY.md reference: SECURITY.md:L15-L16
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…(GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) The checked domain is resolved in _parse_args and is the one the handler purges, writes and reports, as review 4 asked. The handler body goes back to what main has, so the mutation gate no longer takes its mutants as changed by this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF
…ved domain (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Check `unit` (run 42742461370, job 129596153622) failed on three genuine mutation survivors: - remember._exact_record mutmut_14/15 drop the content or the tags from the global-scope detection of the pre-encode duplicate lookup. The locked insert repeats the lookup with the real scope, so a handler-level replay still reported exact_duplicate: the test now asserts that prepare_write itself returns the duplicate. - seed_project._parse_args mutmut_26 passes no domain to remember's resolver. Outside a known repository the explicit domain is then kept raw: the new test asserts it is stripped and lowercased as remember resolves it. Each mutant was applied by hand and fails the updated tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYqhUSqsRzpLYKtCFFQ
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CI autopilot : diagnostic du check Les tests passent ; c'est le gate de mutation qui échoue (
Commit poussé : 3b7f417 (tests seulement)
Vérifié localement :
Non vérifié :
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| def _prepare_request(args: dict, store: MemoryStore, write_class: str) -> GateRequest: | ||
| domain = _resolve_domain(args.get("directory", ""), args.get("domain", "")) | ||
| require_writable_domain(domain, "remember") # GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w |
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Security: Authorize directory context before storing memories
Requires a local beta MCP session and a victim project beneath a known ancestor. This is distinct from the unresolved-domain issue: both repositories can be registered and the checked domain is beta. The new guard accepts remember({domain: "beta", directory: "/home/alice"}), but the raw directory is stored as directory_context; alpha's session-start and auto-recall paths treat any ancestor of alpha as in scope, so the attacker's hot text is injected into alpha. Bind or canonicalize directory_context to the authorized session project, including in direct ingesters. Cortex's user-level filesystem/store access is documented here.
SECURITY.md reference: SECURITY.md:L15-L16
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Continued in #969 on a new branch, same commits (head 3b7f417). This PR used its review budget and its head was never reviewed: the last verdict (block, 2026-11-07) is on an earlier head. A new branch gives the current head its review (ADR-1119). Generated by Claude Code |
…(GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) (#981) * fix(security): a memory write cannot target another project's domain (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) remember resolved its domain from caller-supplied directory or domain and never compared it with the session's project, so a caller steered by untrusted content could place text in another local project's domain, which that project's query_methodology then served as hot memory. A write may now target no domain, a shared domain that names no known repository, or the session's own project (CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, else the working directory). Another project's domain is refused with a ValidationError naming CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES, the local variable that may reopen it (a domain list or *); no tool argument can. The rule is one helper (handlers/_write_scope.py), applied to every writer that takes a caller domain: remember (and codebase_analyze through it), seed_project, ingest_prd, ingest_document. The reported PoC is reproduced on the real handlers and store: two git repositories under an isolated dev root, a session in beta, a directory inside alpha or an unregistered directory plus domain=alpha. On the unfixed handler both writes succeed (2 tests fail); with the fix they are refused, the session's own project and shared domains stay writable, and the variable reopens alpha. * test: pin the GHSA-7848 refusal, its allowance and every writer's call Mutation gate on #940: 33 survivors. The tests checked neither the exact message and details, the trimming and case of the domain and of CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES, the working-directory fallback of the session, nor that seed_project, ingest_prd and ingest_document refuse under their own name (ingest_prd and ingest_document before any write). * test: a None domain next to a placeholder-named project, the exact no-project refusal * fix(security): no write reaches another project through global scope or an existing row (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Reviews 1-3 of #940, blocker: hot memories are 'domain = ? OR is_global', so remember(is_global=true) or anchor(is_global=true) still put text into every project's query_methodology context, and anchor rewrote any memory_id. Also swept, per the review: curation merges, supersedes_id targets and the memory-replica vpath refresh changed rows of any domain; seed_project checked the raw domain while remember resolves the directory first, so a refused run had already purged the seeded rows. - An explicit is_global=true needs CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES=*; a global scope the detector infers without it is kept local and reported. - anchor and supersedes_id refuse a memory of another project, or a global one without '*'; curation and the replica refresh skip such rows and create a new one instead. - seed_project checks the domain remember will write under. - The domain is compared by its canonical name (resolve_explicit_domain). New tests drive every path on the real handlers and store from a session in beta: 10 of 11 fail on the previous code. Tests that write a global memory on purpose now declare the allowance; the replica fake store matches the query that now also reads domain and is_global. 623 handler tests pass. * fix(tests): global writes in tests carry the GHSA-7848 allowance; anchor writer line moved Check `unit` (run 42373733761, job 128407016638) failed on 4 tests. The PR makes an explicit is_global=true write require CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES=*, and two tests still wrote a global memory without it (test_global_memory_visible_across_domains, test_explicit_global_hooks_cross_projects). The anchor UPDATE moved from anchor.py:145 to :154, so the I2 writer allowlist pointed at a stale line. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsijeugoBcVdpBJric * fix(security): pin every GHSA-7848 scope decision the mutation gate left open Check `unit`, run 42377328684 (job 128417628663): the tests passed, then the mutation gate found 52 genuine survivors in _write_scope, anchor, remember and remember_helpers. Root causes: - The details of the global refusals, and the environment each check reads, were never asserted. - memory_writable called require_writable_memory with a tool name it then discarded, and anchor passed a reason string global_scope threw away: both only produced equivalent mutants. The refusal is now decided by a predicate (_refused_domain), and require_global_allowed raises the global refusal, called by global_scope and directly by anchor. - remember computes the scope twice (exact-duplicate record, then the write), so each refusal masked the other. The tests now drive the paths where only one decides: an explicit global replay of a local note, a detected or explicit global replay, and a superseding global write. - The curation loop's skip of an unwritable candidate was not distinguished from stopping the loop. tests_py/invariants/test_I2_canonical_writer.py: the anchor writer moved to line 157 (the import grew by three lines). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYqpV8QEumVvQXENjQN * fix(security): seed_project purges the domain it checked, not the raw argument (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) The guard checked the domain remember writes under (the directory wins over the argument) while the purge ran on the raw domain argument. A session in beta calling seed_project({'domain': 'alpha'}) from its own directory passed the check and deleted alpha's seeded memories. The purge now targets the checked domain; a regression test fails without the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF * fix(security): seed_project resolves its domain once, in _parse_args (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) The checked domain is resolved in _parse_args and is the one the handler purges, writes and reports, as review 4 asked. The handler body goes back to what main has, so the mutation gate no longer takes its mutants as changed by this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF * fix(tests): pin the remember preflight scope and seed_project's resolved domain (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Check `unit` (run 42742461370, job 129596153622) failed on three genuine mutation survivors: - remember._exact_record mutmut_14/15 drop the content or the tags from the global-scope detection of the pre-encode duplicate lookup. The locked insert repeats the lookup with the real scope, so a handler-level replay still reported exact_duplicate: the test now asserts that prepare_write itself returns the duplicate. - seed_project._parse_args mutmut_26 passes no domain to remember's resolver. Outside a known repository the explicit domain is then kept raw: the new test asserts it is stripped and lowercased as remember resolves it. Each mutant was applied by hand and fails the updated tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYqhUSqsRzpLYKtCFFQ * fix(security): a write stores the domain its scope check resolved (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Review 1 of #969, B1: ingest_prd and ingest_document checked the resolved domain and stored the raw argument. require_writable_domain now returns the domain to store and both handlers keep it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): a resolved domain is never resolved twice; a replica refresh finds this session's own row (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Codex on #969. Where a directory name is an alias of one project and the canonical domain of another repository family, re-resolving a canonical refused the family its own writes and let the aliased project change the family's rows. The replica lookup read one row (LIMIT 1): another project's replica hid this session's own and each sync inserted one more row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): a name that is itself a project's domain is that domain; the collision is tested on real repositories (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Review 2 of #969, B2. foo-lib-a and foo-lib-b form the family foo-lib while the repository zed lives in a directory named foo-lib, so the registry maps foo-lib to zed. remember(directory=foo-lib-a) from a zed session was checked as zed and stored as foo-lib. The tests build that layout with git repositories and the real registry and fail on 7eb8a39. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): the directory a write stores reaches no other project (GHSA-7848) Review 1 of #970, blockers 1 to 3. The scope check read the domain only, while the SessionStart and auto-recall hooks select by directory_context: a memory is served to a session whose project root is that directory or lies below it. - remember refuses a directory inside another known project or above one, whatever the domain. - ingest_prd given text stores it under the session's project, no longer under the folder above the server's working directory; a file's folder passes the same rule, as does ingest_document's. - anchor, supersedes_id, curation merges and replica refreshes refuse a row whose directory belongs to another project, whatever its domain. CORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES reopens it locally, as for a domain. Tests: test_ghsa_7848_directory_context.py, 9 of which fail without the change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): compare a directory with the roots as written and as resolved; a replica refresh reads the row's directory (GHSA-7848) Codex on #970, two P1. - The discovery keeps the text of a symlinked parent of the projects (~/code -> /mnt/repos) and the hooks compare path text, while the check resolved the directory only: a directory naming the link reached no project. The directory and each root are now compared in both forms, and a directory inside a root is found by path, not only by resolve_cwd, which knows no root behind a symlinked parent. - try_block_replica_upsert selected id, domain and is_global, so a replica with a shared domain and another project's directory was refreshed. The row is read with its directory_context and checked whole. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): ingest_codebase and the session directory pass the directory rule (GHSA-7848) Review 2 of #970, blocker 2 and a note. Blockers 1 and 3 are the two Codex findings fixed in the previous commit. - ingest_codebase stores every row under the resolved project_path with a code:<name> domain, which no domain check reads: the path now passes require_writable_directory before anything is read or written. - ingest_prd checks the session's directory as well as a file's folder: a server started above the projects has no project of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): the directory check is the hooks' own rule, over every root of a repository (GHSA-7848) Codex on #970 at 48c73b9, two P1 and one P2. The check and the hooks were two readings of the same path, and each difference was a way through. - The reach of a directory is now computed with shared.project_scope, the functions the hooks call: a backslash is a separator there, so /repos\\alpha is alpha's directory here too, and / reaches no session. - A repository's roots include those of its linked worktrees: a folder above alpha's worktree is served to a session opened in that worktree. - resolve_cwd finds a repository discovered through a symlinked parent, so a session opened there is its own project again and keeps its writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): the directory checks carry no default a mutant can swap (GHSA-7848) The mutation gate of #970 left twelve mutants alive. Six replaced the empty default of a directory lookup by another value that reaches no project either: the defaults are gone, the checks take the stored value as it is. The others changed the tool name in the refusal or dropped the caller's environment from the row check: the remember refusal is now matched from its first word, and a row is judged in the environment the caller passes, with the process environment refusing it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): seed_project refuses before it purges; the directory rule reads the roots at every check (GHSA-7848) Review 1 of #977, B1: seed_project checked and purged the domain it resolved, then remember resolved that name once more (a family's domain can be another project's alias) and refused after the purge. A domain that does not stay itself is refused before anything is purged, and the directory is checked there too. Codex on #977: the roots of the known repositories were kept from the first check, so a worktree added while the server runs was unknown; they are read at every check. A directory is compared as written, with no character trimmed (a folder name may end with a space). A worktree entry is decoded as an OS path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): the directory read has no default or slice a mutant can swap (GHSA-7848) The mutation gate of #977 left three mutants alive in _reached_projects: an empty default replaced by a text that reaches no project either, a slice one element longer of which only the first is read, and None in place of False for is_global. The directory goes to project_ancestors as given (it accepts None), its first element is read by index, and the is_global value is a named constant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYsWnKSjpX4oNV19PCF Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): the mutation gate of _reached_projects has no survivor left (GHSA-7848) Check `unit` of run 42885571909 (job 130073499102) failed on two GENUINE survivors in `_write_scope._reached_projects`: - mutmut_7 reads `ancestors[1]` for the absolute test. A relative directory of two parts ("src/notes") has one ancestor only, so the mutant raises IndexError where the rule returns no project. No test passed such a path: test_a_relative_directory_or_a_label_reaches_no_session now does. - mutmut_15 passes None instead of `_LOCAL` (False) as is_global. memory_matches_project reads it only as `if is_global:`, so both values take the same branch for every input: equivalent by construction, registered in memory/mutation-equivalents.json with its exact line pair. Local: the six test_ghsa_7848_* files and tests_py/scripts/test_mutation_equivalents* pass (107), the mutant-7 source fails the new assertion with IndexError, and scripts/mutation_check.sh on _reached_projects exits 0. ruff and the craftsmanship gate pass. <!-- ci-autopilot attempt=1 signature=merge,unit:surviving-mutants-_write_scope._reached_projects --> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYqj3CUJAQ7tAriaQHy * fix(security): a prospective trigger fires only in its own project (GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w) Review 1 of #981: remember turns a phrase such as TODO: into a keyword_match trigger, and a trigger fired in every project whose first message or query shared a keyword, so caller text still reached other projects. - core.prospective.trigger_in_scope: a trigger fires only in a session whose project root is its target_directory or lies below it, the hooks' own rule; a trigger without a directory reaches no session. - query_methodology and recall apply it before check_trigger. - create_trigger stores the session's project when no directory is given and passes a given one through require_writable_directory. - ingest_document.py is back at the 300-line cap (305 before). Proof: tests_py/handlers/test_ghsa_7848_triggers.py on two git repositories; the two attack tests fail without the change to the two readers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYrKg46KKYpvLPXcW4M Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> * fix(security): the trigger changes leave no surviving mutant (GHSA-7848) The `unit` check of Pipeline run 42931331400 (job 130231355842) failed in its mutation step: five mutants survived in the functions f14286f changed. - query_methodology._get_fired_triggers mutmut_13 (`continue` -> `break`): no test stored an out-of-scope trigger before an in-scope one. The new test stores an alpha trigger first and still sees beta's fire in beta. - create_trigger.handler mutmut_63/66/67 (the tool name passed to require_writable_directory): the refusal test now pins the `create_trigger:` prefix of the message. - prospective.trigger_in_scope mutmut_9 (`False` -> `None` for is_global): equivalent by construction, registered in memory/mutation-equivalents.json with the same rationale as _write_scope._reached_projects mutmut_15. Local receipt (SQLite backend, MUTMUT_MAX_CHILDREN=1 as in CI): ci_mutation_diff plan/run_job on the three files, all exit 0. ci-autopilot attempt=1 signature=merge,unit|unit: surviving mutants in the changed functions of mcp_server/core/prospective.py Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kyZYucf61S8fDCRuJ7xdj --------- Signed-off-by: Claude <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Fix for GHSA-7848-qh48-mx2w (accepted, CVE requested). The advisory is published with 4.24.0. Developed and verified in the advisory's private fork; it is merged here because a private fork cannot run the required checks.
Rule
A memory write may target:
CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, else the working directory).Another project's domain is refused with a
ValidationErrornamingCORTEX_CROSS_PROJECT_WRITES. That local variable, a domain list or*, can reopen such writes; no tool argument can. Owner decision 2026-11-07.One helper,
mcp_server/handlers/_write_scope.py, applies the rule to:remember, andcodebase_analyzethrough it;seed_project;ingest_prd;ingest_document.Proof
tests_py/handlers/test_ghsa_7848_cross_project_write.pyreproduces the report on the real handlers and store, with two git repositories and a session in one of them:*reopens every project.On the unfixed handler, the two attack tests fail, because the marker reaches the other project's
query_methodologycontext.Local full suite on PostgreSQL: 11,992 passed, 0 failed. The 41 errors were
uv venvpicking an x86_64 Python that this host cannot run.ruff: clean;check_craftsmanship.py: OK.