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docs: enhance build.yml with security comments for token usage
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‎.github/workflows/build.yml‎

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@@ -114,7 +114,29 @@ jobs:
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CHISEL_VERSION: ${{ steps.build.outputs.CHISEL_VERSION }}
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ARCHIVE_FILE: ${{ steps.archive.outputs.ARCHIVE_FILE }}
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ARCHIVE_FILE_SHA384: ${{ steps.archive.outputs.ARCHIVE_FILE_SHA384 }}
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# The following token needs "contents: write" permission to upload assets to release
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# If triggered by a "release" event, this additional and final step
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# of the job will upload the Chisel binaries (and checksums) to the corresponding
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# GitHub release. This operation NEEDS "contents: write" permissions.
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# Security concerns:
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# - Why a custom token instead of GITHUB_TOKEN?
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# - The GITHUB_TOKEN only has "readonly" permissions by default.
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# - Why not add "permissions: {contents:write}" to this workflow [1]?
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# - While this would elevate the GITHUB_TOKEN permissions to what we require, it
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# would do it for the entire job (ALL steps), which increases the attack surface unnecessarily.
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# - Why is it safer to use the ROCKSBOT_CHISEL_CONTENTS token?
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# 1. it is limited to this step of the workflow (unlike GITHUB_TOKEN, which is always available)
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# 2. this particular step only runs when the "event == release"
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# 3. the step's script doesn't rely on 3rd party actions
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# 4. the current workflow triggers are all maintainer-driven, except for "pull_request",
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# but the latter is designed not to use any secrets during execution from fork-based PRs
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# - NOTE: in fact, custom secrets are never passed to fork-based PR workflows, unlike GITHUB_TOKEN
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# which is available with "readonly" permissions [2]
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# - How could this token be compromised?
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# - By unintentionally merging a change that allows this step to run unvetted scripts
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# (either via a "pull_request_target", use of an insecure 3rd party action, or malicious changes to the
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# current script)
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# [1] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/workflow-syntax#permissions
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# [2] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/events-that-trigger-workflows#workflows-in-forked-repositories
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GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ROCKSBOT_CHISEL_CONTENTS }}
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if: ${{ github.event_name == 'release' }}
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run: |

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